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The objective of the thesis is to study, through a critical constructivist analysis, the conception and practice 
of security by humanitarian international aid agencies (IAAs), with particular reference to their relation with 
private military and security companies (PMSCs).  
 
The research provides a qualitative analysis of humanitarian security, which is defined as the practice of 
safely accessing vulnerable populations for humanitarian purposes. Its methodology relies on semi-
structured interviews, including in Afghanistan and Haiti; participant observation; and a literature review. 
The thesis‘ critical constructivist approach implies studying the co-constitution of aid organizations‘ identity 
and interests. It argues that IAAs‘ identity and approaches to security are mutually shaped. It does so by 
first highlighting dominant discourses framing aid agencies‘ identity and processes by which particular 
views are reproduced. It then identifies the dominant representations in security management and reveals 
how they relate to IAAs‘ identity.  
 
The thesis defines three ideal–types of IAAs (Deontological, Solidarist and Utilitarian) and of PMSCs 
(Guarding, Unarmed, and Weaponised). This typology allows a dissecting of IAAs‘ different conceptions 
and practices of security, and the conditions under which each type of IAA employs PMSCs. The research 
reveals that an aid agency‘s identity forms the basis of its approach to security. Identity and security, are 
however, not stable but dynamic and in a constant process of interaction with each other. The thesis then 
offers a study of these dynamic processes, with a focus on agents. 
 
The thesis delves into the implications of the research for the concept of security and reveals how 
humanitarian security embodies IAAs‘ distinctive baggage. It suggests that IAAs require a more 
comprehensive understanding of how their identity and practices affect their security. The thesis‘ original 
contribution is two-fold: it represents the first critical constructivist study of humanitarian security practices 
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“In a world in which the total of human knowledge is doubling about every ten years, our security can rest 







It is striking to see the different ways humanitarian aid organizations manage their security. 
When faced with a similar given threat, some aid agencies react by lowering their profile, others by 
contracting a private military and security company, whilst others cease operating in the area deemed 
dangerous. Differences in aid agencies‘ approaches to security are repeatedly noticed from one 
context of operations to another. The reasons for such diversity are not clearly understood. One 
frequently hears aid workers emphasising the disparities between the United Nations agencies and 
non-governmental organizations, or between American and European organizations. Although such 
commonly repeated distinctions may reveal organizational and cultural differences, they are based on 
subjective perceptions rather than evidence-based investigation. Indeed, an assessment of the 
realities of intervention in any country show that such distinctions do not necessarily account for the 
differences in humanitarian organizations‘ security posture.  
The present thesis is an attempt to understand aid agencies‘ approaches to security and to 




The research provides a qualitative analysis of ‗humanitarian security‘, which is defined as the 
practice of safely accessing vulnerable populations for humanitarian purposes. It includes the security 
of humanitarian personnel, the security of aid organizations‘ humanitarian programmes and the 
security of their assets and reputation. 
Defining what exactly is a humanitarian actor or a private military and security company 
involves a normative element. The choice of words is indeed telling: aid agencies are prone to 
differentiate between humanitarian aid (which is said to be based on the needs or the rights of the 
identified vulnerable populations) and assistance (which may be simply defined as helping others – be 
it for the ‗giver‘s‘ political, economic, military or other interests).2 For the purposes of this thesis, the 
                                               
1
 Branden, N. (1994), p.34. 
2
 Armed forces engaged in ‗winning hearts and minds‘ may provide some assistance to vulnerable populations, but the 
purpose of this assistance is to ultimately serve the militaries‘ agenda. The consequence is that some portions of populations 
in need may be ignored if assisting them is not in line with the militaries‘ interests; or that the assistance may be used as 
blackmail to elicit the provision of information or other services. Similarly, assistance provided by the private sector may entail 
that the populations in need may not be assisted if it significantly reduces any companies‘ profit margin. The author has 
witnessed examples of such practices in both Iraq and Afghanistan – and these practices are regularly denounced by aid 
agencies and authors alike (Bradbury, 2010).  
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humanitarian sector is understood as comprising a) agencies from the Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement and in particular the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC); 
b) international non-governmental not-for-profit organizations (NGOs) engaged in relief or 
humanitarian activities; and c) the humanitarian United Nations agency (UN). Within the UN system, 
―four United Nations entities – UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF and UNDP – have primary roles in protection 
and providing assistance in humanitarian crises‖ (UN, Undated, a)3 while OCHA, IOM, the FAO and 
WHO also contribute to it.4 The thesis focuses primarily on NGOs but also includes references to the 
other agencies when relevant. Altogether, these operational entities are referred to in generic terms as 
aid organizations or agencies throughout the thesis. UN agencies and NGOs involved in development, 
human rights or other types of activities are not subjects of interest to the present research.  
The normative dimension behind the designation of companies pertaining to the security 
industry is also to be noted. The term ‗private security company‘ for instance is perceived as less 
dramatic and less affiliated to the negatively perceived notion of mercenary forces, than ‗private 
military company‘. This is a major reason why companies providing security services (including armed 
protection) on the battlefield usually call themselves private security companies. The focus of the 
thesis is on the corporate provision of security services in conflict and post-conflict environments and, 
as such, is limited to private military and security companies (PMSCs). The privatisation of security – 
i.e. the use of corporate entities for the provision of services related to security – has to be put into this 
context. It does not encompass entities such as militia, mafia or government elements that provide 
security services without being registered as corporations.  
A deeper analysis of definitions and what they entail will be provided in the empirical chapters 
of this thesis. For now the lexical framework provided above is sufficient. 
 
Overview of the existing literature on humanitarian security: 
The study of humanitarian security in the discipline of International Relations is a recent field. It 
has essentially developed in parallel to the increasing number of acts of violence perpetrated against 
humanitarian aid agencies and their personnel. Authors are often (former) aid workers and, as such, 
the literature has essentially developed in reaction to aid agencies‘ deteriorating security. This means 
that its primary focus has been to seek answers to the many security-related questions faced by 
humanitarian organizations. Until the mid to late 1990s, most aid agencies‘ approaches to security 
were unsystematic and consisted essentially of post-incident tactical responses at field level. The 
publication of the seminal Operational Security Management in Violent Environments (Van Brabant, 
2000) provided the first systematic conceptual framework to humanitarian security. This manual, which 
has just been updated by Van Brabant (Van Brabant, 2010) with the support of an Advisory Board 
                                               
3
 The acronyms respectively stand for Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; World Food 
Programme; The United Nations Children's Fund and United Nations Development Programme. 
4
 Through the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, other UN agencies and non UN organizations cooperate together to 
strengthen humanitarian assistance. The acronyms respectively stand for the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs; the International Organization for Migration; the Food and Agriculture Organization; and the World Health 
Organization.  
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composed of humanitarian security managers, paved the way for a conceptualisation of humanitarian 
security.  
In parallel to these efforts, the literature has also expanded in reaction to the humanitarian 
community‘s need to better understand the security incidents they were facing. A number of authors, 
the most prominent of which are Larissa Fast, Adele Harmer, Dennis King, Mani Sheik and Abby 
Stoddard, have compiled data about security incidents and provided subsequent analysis. While their 
efforts have greatly contributed to better understanding of aid agencies‘ sources of insecurity, the 
existing analysis is at times contradictory, and disproportionately focuses on severe acts of violence as 
opposed to other causes of incidents such as those due to illness or stress.  
The literature that examines the interactions between international aid agencies and private 
military and security companies remains limited, to date. While the first publication on the topic was 
released in 1999 (Bryans et al., 1999) no more than thirty academic articles - many by the same 
authors - have been published on the subject since. Nevertheless, this literatue has been essential in 
raising aid workers‘ awareness of the subject, in particular by highlighting the opportunities for, and 
risks of, privatising security for humanitarian organizations.  
Both strands of the literature fail to explain the processes that lead organizations to approach 
security differently. Indeed, there has been only a limited amount of research that delves into this area, 
and most works focus primarily on the differences between non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
and United Nations (UN) agencies. Although such a distinction is relevant, it is also limited in scope, 
particularly as it does not account for the conceptual and operational similarities that also exist 
between NGOs and UN agencies. More importantly, the literature does not provide explanations about 
how aid organizations come to adopt one security posture or another. For instance, it reveals some of 
the reasons why aid agencies outsource their security to a PMSC, yet does not offer any explanation 
about how such a decision is taken, particularly when it is considered controversial within the aid 
community. 
 
The research questions: 
It is commonly accepted in the aid sector that the practices and subsequent reputation of a 
single agency have the potential to affect the whole humanitarian community in a given context of 
operation. A point in case is Somalia in the early 1990s, where a few aid organizations opted for armed 
protection despite the reluctance of the majority of the aid community to do so. This however, resulted 
in ‗crime displacement‘, whereby aid organizations which had continued operating without armed 
protection increasingly became victims of acts of violence – to the extent that almost all agencies 
eventually had to contract armed security providers.  
Put yourself in the position of a humanitarian organization‘s country director whose staff is 
increasingly at risk, but still willing to deliver aid in a dangerous zone. Furthermore, criminality is rising 
and the premises of the organization are vulnerable to robberies and sometimes violent attacks. The 
director is aware that there are various private military and security companies offering services that 
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could potentially secure both the staff and the organization‘s premises. Perhaps another humanitarian 
organization whose office is located in the same area may have already chosen such an option. Their 
headquarters are increasingly putting pressure on them, as they want them to decide whether, and 
how, the organization should stay and continue operations, or evacuate the country. As the security 
situation deteriorates and the needs of the population are growing; what should this country director 
do? In other words, when facing the dilemma of having to choose between staying in an extremely 
dangerous situation at their own risk or giving up and leaving behind populations in need, can 
humanitarian actors see the use of private security as a solution? This example is perhaps rather 
extreme – any answer to this question would be context dependent, and in complex environments one 
option is rarely enough to provide an acceptable solution, but it is a blunt though effective example of 
the questions that may arise. 
The fact that aid agencies practice security differently is not a problem per se. The problem lies 
in the implications that each approach to security carries with it. As can be seen, these implications are 
evident in regards to the aid sector as a whole, but also for the populations being assisted. Aid 
agencies are not ahistoric players that remain outside of a given conflicts‘ dynamics. The nature of 
their operations as well as the ways they interact with their environment have a potential to contribute 
to either the improvement or the deterioration of a situation. This is particularly true in complex 
environments, where the choices made by humanitarian organizations to ensure their security 
contribute greatly in framing the way they operate and interact with their surroundings, as well as their 
understanding of the security situation itself. 
These problems explain the drive to better understand aid agencies‘ approaches to security. 
The following questions in particular need to be answered: what are the different approaches to 
security that exist in the aid sector? What are the implications of each approach for the aid sector and 
for its target populations? Given that some practices are deemed controversial, how are these 
approaches being conceived - in other words, what are the processes that lead an organization to 
adopt one practice over another? These questions constitute the core concerns of this thesis.  
Indeed, the objective of the present thesis is to study the conception and practice of security by 
humanitarian international aid agencies (IAAs), including their relation with private military and security 
companies (PMSCs). It should be noted that the thesis‘s centre of gravity is international aid agencies‘ 
uses of security. As such, PMSCs are not at the centre of this study but are used as a reflection of 
IAAs‘ security practices.  
The thesis adopts a critical constructivist approach that implies studying the co-constitution of 
aid organizations‘ identity and interests. As such, the general thrust of the thesis‘s argument will be 
that IAAs‘ identity and approaches to security are mutually constituted. It will provide evidence of this 
by first highlighting the dominant discourses framing aid agencies‘ identity, and the processes by which 
particular views are reproduced. It will then study the dominant representations in security 
management and reveal how they relate to IAAs‘ identity. This in turn will allow identification of the 
implications of aid agencies‘ security and underscore the potential negative impacts that security 
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practices carry with them. The thesis will then offer recommendations to potentially improve these 
practices. It is however to be noted that although the thesis is grounded on empirical research, it 
primarily aims at setting out a framework for analysis as a necessary preliminary step to understanding 
humanitarian security.  
The choice of a critical constructivist analytical framework is primarily based on two 
considerations. First, studying IAAs‘ security management implies a level of analysis that focuses 
primarily on non-state actors rather than on the state itself. Second, the choice is based upon the 
assumption that security can be better understood if taken as a process, a constant construction; any 
attempt to define security is necessarily constrained to an agent (or community of agents), a context 
and a period. This assumption is also framed by the authors‘ own experience in humanitarian security 
management.  By doing so, the thesis recognises an interaction between the researcher and the object 
of study, which highlights the need for a reflexive approach to studying humanitarian security. Its 
methodology will then highlight the author‘s assumptions and steps taken to overcome them. 
In addition to conceptually framing the research, another potential value of using a critical 
constructivist approach is that the thesis may shed light on the concept of ‗security‘ itself. The question 
of ‗What is security?‘ has become an ongoing debate, particularly since the broadening and deepening 
of the security studies agenda in International Relations. The latter refers to widening the neo-realist 
concept of security by not limiting it to the study of military threats, and through the inclusion of a wider 
range of potential threats ranging from economic and environmental issues to human rights. The 
former corresponds to the change of the level of analysis; instead of focusing primarily on states, 
deepening the agenda of security studies implies studying other levels of analysis, down to the level of 
individuals and up to the level of global security, by way of regional and societal levels. Aid agencies 
being non-state actors, do not own armies or police forces; this assumes therefore that they have 
approached security differently from states. The need for originality that this implies may bring new 
perspectives on the concept of security. 
The treatment in this thesis of international aid agencies as referent objects of security presents 
an original approach to studying security. In addition, it is also the first critical constructivist study of 
humanitarian security practices, particularly with reference to corporate security providers. Since the 
development of a ‗humanitarian security‘ is a rather recent trend, many questions that are raised by 
this phenomenon remain unanswered. Through its extensive interviews, fieldwork in Afghanistan and 
Haiti, literature review and analysis, this thesis will contribute original approaches and add to the 
existing knowledge by collecting and handling primary sources, further analysing the notions of identity 
and security, and will also shed light on the existing cliché-laden knowledge of the dynamics that 
animate the IAA and PMSC communities.  
 
Methodological considerations: 
The thesis provides a qualitative analysis of humanitarian security. In addition to a review of 
the academic and professional humanitarian literature, the methodology used is based mainly upon 
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interviews and participant observation. Altogether, the study of IAAs‘ approaches to security was done 
through the analysis of both their discourses and practices.  
Interviews were chosen as the primary data collection technique as they allow the researcher 
to gain an understanding of people‘s personal experiences, an understanding which is critica l when 
analysing security-related issues. Interviews also provide access to the context and meaning behind 
an actors‘ behaviour (Seidman, 1998). Interviews were carried out both at headquarters and field 
level. Interviews at IAAs‘ and PMSCs‘ headquarters allowed information to be obtained from a senior 
management perspective. However, the headquarters visited while conducting research were all 
located in Western countries and a headquarters‘ perspective is not enough to build a comprehensive 
understanding of the reality of humanitarian security practices. Therefore, to complement this 
perspective, interviews were also conducted at field level in Afghanistan and Haiti. These fieldwork 
sites were chosen based on the following criteria:  
 The countries selected needed to face a humanitarian crisis; 
 This crisis needed to occur in a context of (perceived) high insecurity, so that security       
becomes a key issue for the personnel operating in the field; 
 The crisis was to be of a different nature. As will be detailed in the next Chapter, 
Afghanistan is an international conflict that can be looked at through the prism of the Global War on 
Terror, where most of the fighting occurs in rural areas; Haiti, for its part, is a localised crisis, and most 
of the fighting takes place in the capital city of Port-au-Prince;  
 All three types of humanitarian actors needed to operate in the area: UN agencies, 
ICRC and NGOs 
 Both local and international private military and security companies needed to be in 
operation. 
Ultimately, these two countries were chosen because they are contextually different yet show 
similar patterns in the way humanitarian action is implemented. 
 
A total of 153 semi-structured interviews were undertaken for this study, including 56 in 
Afghanistan and 38 in Haiti. Other interviews were done in the United Kingdom, United States, France 
and Switzerland. All but 19 interviews were face-to-face, while 18 out of these 19 were by phone and 
one through email exchanges. The interviewees consisted of the following:  
 77 international NGO representatives, ranging from security officer in the field to security 
manager at HQ level, and also including country directors; 
 20 UN agency representatives;  
 7 international donor country directors or representatives, including DfID, ECHO, SDC  and 
USAID5; 
 3 ICRC representatives; 
                                               
5
 Respectively UK Department for International Development, European Commission Humanitarian aid Office, Swiss Agency 
for Development and Cooperation, United States Agency for International Development. 
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 32 private military and security company representatives, ranging from operator (also 
known as ‗shooter‘) to CEO; 
 14 key informant interviewees, including for-profit development agencies‘ representatives 
and academics.  
The total of representatives working in the aid and private security sectors reaches respectively 
107 and 32. Naturally, these numbers do not include many informal conversations and off-the-record 
meetings.  
Interviews were organized in four phases, starting with 39 interviews held at HQ level and 
conducted in the first half of 2006. Interviews in Afghanistan were organized in two steps, first in 
September-October 2006 and then in March 2007. Interviews in Haiti were conducted in May-June 
2007. Overall findings were confirmed through a last set of interviews held at HQ level in late 2009 to 
early 2010. 
 
Gathering information on security matters in conflict areas can prove challenging. The topic, 
being one of particular sensitivity to many interviewees, they were guaranteed discretion. As a result 
and in order to balance confidentiality with transparency, the current thesis attributes outcomes and 
quotes on a limited basis only; as a consequence a list of the persons interviewed will be provided in a 
separate non-public appendix to the thesis (see Appendix 3: List of Interviewees). 
The manner in which interviews are conducted, how questions are constructed, presented, and 
the answers all impact on the quality and quantity of data collected. All of the interviews followed a 
semi-structured format with a list of pre-defined questions to direct the conversation. Semi-structured 
interviews are useful in that they follow a specific agenda to ensure that key questions, either common 
or tailor-made, are being asked to participants. They also allow flexibility as new questions can be 
introduced during the interview as new issues emerge. The pre-defined list of questions consisted of 
two different sets of questions (one for aid workers and another for security contractors) which were 
systematically asked, but also included additional questions tailored to the interviewee‘s 
responsibilities and experience.  
The selection of participants followed a ―purposive sampling‖ process, meaning that they were 
selected because they met certain characteristics and were particularly relevant to the research. This 
approach is popular in qualitative research and when building samples of a limited size (Robson, 
1993). Attaining a statistically robust sample of participants was not the intention of this research. 
Rather, the focus was to achieve a sample that would provide sufficiently diverse responses and 
provide deep insights into on-going social and ‗political‘ processes. The author‘s primary concern in 
building the sample was to obtain a good view of what was typically happening among key 
‗stakeholders‘. Stakeholders were individuals or organizations who have an interest or a role in issues 
pertaining to security. For Afghanistan and Haiti, the sampling process started before the actual 
fieldwork, based on preliminary research that helped identify likely stakeholders. Once interviews 
started, respondents were added on an on-going basis. Patton distinguishes at least sixteen different 
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approaches to purposive sampling (Patton, 1990) of which the author combined four in the process of 
fieldwork to further expand the sample. First is ―snowball sampling‖: at the end of interviews with most 
participants, the interviewer would ask for suggestions as to how other individuals that could be 
contacted. In many instances this provided for good interviewees. Second is ―opportunistic sampling‖, 
by remaining receptive and observant throughout daily activities as well as interacting with a variety of 
individuals, the author identified and gained access to new participants. For example, when assisting 
in security meetings held at field level. Third is ―maximum variation sampling‖, which purposefully led 
the author to pick participants from both ends of an organization‘s hierarchy, from field worker to head 
of organization and security specialists. Fourth is ―stratified purposeful sampling‖, which aimed to 
identify participants that could illustrate characteristics of particular subgroups of interest, in other 
words, those who were working in each of the three types of organizations selected for study. Lastly, 
the sample was also enriched with key informant interviews, notably with representatives of the for-
profit development sector and from academia. 
 
Participant observation took place through both fieldwork and the author‘s position as the 
European Interagency Security Forum (EISF) Coordinator. The rationale for this was varied. First, a 
qualitative approach allows for a proximity to people that enables a more authentic understanding of 
the realities and the details of their everyday lives (Oakley and Marsden, 1990). Second, behaviour is 
significantly influenced by the setting in which it takes place, so one should try to study it in situations 
where all contextual variables are operating (Gilbert, 2001). Third, to capture social and power 
relations, one should directly observe verbal and non-verbal interactions between people.  
According to Klotz and Lynch:  
 
[p]articipant-observation and ethnography best capture the intersubjective nature of reality and 
dialogical aspects of knowledge claims. These methods openly implicate the researcher in a way that 
turns to their advantages what tends to be derided by other as bias. By creating experiential knowledge, 
these methods force the researcher to confront interpretive problems on a different level than that of an 
interviewer who only briefly encounters an interviewee. This requires more openness to hermeneutic 
issues, as well as a different style of communicating research findings, often in forms more akin to 
autobiography than history. Yet their inherently contemporaneous nature also limits the range of 
applicability in historical settings, precluding any claims that these represent the ‗best‘ tools for all 
constructivist research (Klotz and Lynch, p.107, 2007).   
 
Participant observation was conducted both in the everyday context and on special occasions, 
such as important meetings or post-incident management cases. In particular, the author took 
advantage of continuous immersion as both the EISF Coordinator and as a consultant in humanitarian 
security issues within the international humanitarian community at large to actively observe how aid 
agencies approach security, and how they relate to PMSCs. While working as consultant allowed 
access to insiders‘ perspectives into aid agencies‘ security management, the position as the EISF 
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Coordinator placed the author at the centre of information and provided a wider view of the topic. 
These activities allowed the development of a web of connections within both the humanitarian 
security and the private security sectors. In addition, the author has been involved in several pieces of 
research throughout the process of this thesis, either as lead author, co-author or as peer-reviewer. 
Examples of these include co-authoring research on remote-management practices in Afghanistan 
(Stoddard, Harmer and Renouf, 2010) and peer-reviewing documents such as the revised edition of 
the Operational Security Management in Violent Environments manual (Van Brabant, 2010) as well as 
Stoddard et al‟s comprehensive study on the relations between aid agencies and private security 
providers (Stoddard et al, 2008). In short, all of the author‘s professional activities undertaken in the 
period of preparing this thesis were directly related to the subject of study.  
Finally, and in addition to the aforementioned research field trips to Afghanistan and Haiti for 
this thesis, the author also returned twice to Afghanistan, and once to Haiti, immediately after the 2010 
earthquake. These additional trips proved useful in complementing understanding of the humanitarian 
security dynamics previously studied. There was also a benefit – from an anecdotal perspective – 
from previous field experiences in particular in Iraq and in Democratic Republic of Congo as well as 
testimonies from colleagues working in other humanitarian crises, in particular in Nepal, Somalia, 
Sudan, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. 
 
In addition to a review of the existing academic literature on IAAs in relation to PMSCs, the 
analysis of humanitarian security is based on evidence collected throughout research. As will be 
presented in Chapter Two, these are made up of representative and credible professional 
documentation such as reports, policy papers, mission statements, etc, of the selected organizations 
as well as interviews and observations. These provide background, complementary or inside 
information that help to identify critical issues, triangulate conclusions and increase their reliability, as 
well as identify important informants.  
The wealth of data collected necessitated a rationalisation of the information. This was done 
through the use of several tables, which were eventually gathered into two recapitulative tables, and 
the compilation of all documents organised both thematically and chronologically. Altogether, what 
was looked for were elements of information which would confirm or refute the thesis‘ arguments, as 
well as offer new aspects for consideration.  
The first table provided a list of the interviewees, the date and location of the interviews and 
their responses to all of the questions they had been asked. It highlighted instances where contractual 
interactions between IAAs and PMSCs were found, and, when relevant, also included author‘s 
comments. While the data was arranged according to chronological order, it was also coded in 
different colours. This colour coding allowed for the identification of elements of interests for 
subsequent analysis. For example, instances where different interviewees would express similar 
views, thus highlighting similarities between them, would be specifically colour-coded. This would later 
                  22 of 257 
allow for a cross-cutting of the information provided, based on interviewees‘ location, function, or the 
type of organization they worked for.  
The second table provides a list of international aid agencies with key organizational 
information, including the year of their creation; whether they have a wide or narrow mandate; their 
stated mission; their areas of operations, their annual budget; their source of funding; their number of 
staff; whether they are signatories of the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief; which values others than the ‗humanitarian 
principles‘ they refer to; and the source the information collected originates from. This table serves as 
a critical basis for the organization of IAAs according to three ideal types (see Chapter Four).  
In addition, the academic literature and professional documentation collected was classified in 
different thematic folders (and organised chronologically inside each folder). For instance security-
related documents were divided among a broad theoretical literature on the concept of security; an 
‗analytical‘ humanitarian security literature (such as academic peer-reviewed papers); a ‗practical‘ 
humanitarian security literature (such as NGO security handbooks), etc. Regarding this last point, 
project and security related documentations were gathered from interviewees, such as original 
proposals, technical briefs, security policies and country security plans, in-depth studies by related 
consultants, minutes from public or internal meetings, public statements, leaflets, evaluation reports 
and accounting documentation whenever possible. While many were public documents some were 
also internal ones.  
Altogether, the data was triangulated from interviews, authors‘ observations, and documents 
collected. On the one hand, interviewees‘ responses were put into perspective with official and internal 
documentation, and on the other, many of these documents were discussed with interviewees to 
gather their views about them. Last, the overall findings of the thesis were shared and tested through 
a last set of interviews held in late 2009 to early 2010. 
 
Taken as a whole, the methodology used for the present research provides a comprehensive 
and robust basis for an understanding and analysis of the dynamics of security as conceived and 
practiced by two different sorts of non-state actors at both headquarter and field levels.  
 
Structure of the thesis: 
The thesis proceeds in the following manner: Part One provides the background analysis by 
contextualising the research and providing an outline of the state of the relations between IAAs and 
PMSCs (Chapter One), reviewing the existing literature on humanitarian security and on privatisation 
of security (Chapter Two) and presenting the thesis‘s conceptual framework (Chapter Three). Chapter 
Three provides the rationale for the choice of a critical constructivist analysis and will introduce 
humanitarian actors as referent objects of security. It will also set the framework of the empirical 
analysis by unveiling humanitarian actors‘ identities and interests in relation to security.  
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Part Two will provide the thesis‘s empirical analysis. Its chapters examine international aid 
agencies‘ approaches to security in three steps.  
First, Chapter Four will review humanitarian organizations‘ identity. It will underscore how the 
production of IAAs‘ identity is the result of debates and struggles both within these organizations as 
well as with the outside world. It will reveal however, that these dynamics are not similar from one 
organization to another, which is why further distinctions will be made among humanitarian 
organizations in the form of a typology of aid agencies. Three main ideal–types of aid agencies will be 
identified, namely Deontological, Solidarist and Utilitarian organizations. Among these, a particular 
focus will be given in the thesis on five selected NGOs, namely Médecins sans Frontières (MSF), 
Oxfam Great Britain (OGB), Save the Children UK (SC), CARE, and International Relief and 
Development (IRD).  
 Chapter Five will then study how aid agencies conceive and manage their security. By doing 
so, it will emphasize how these constitutive processes relate to aid agencies‘ identity and will reveal in 
particular how differences in identity are paralleled with differences in interests. Among the different 
conceptions and practices of security, the thesis will highlight the dominant representations and 
examine how they are shaped by the identiry of the IAAs‘ – and conversely, how this identity is shaped 
by their security practices. It will examine how humanitarian security was gradually developed, spread, 
internalised and reproduced by emphasizing the dynamics within the aid sector as well as within aid 
agencies. By doing so, it will demonstrate that the professionalization of IAAs‘ security management 
has lead to the paradox whereby a harmonization and polarization of security approaches are 
concomitantly observed. 
Chapter Six will confirm the interplay between aid agencies‘ identity and their respective 
approach to security by studying their engagement with PMSCs. To achieve this, it will first provide a 
detailed picture of the private military and security industry and reveal its interests with regard to the 
aid sector. It will underscore in particular the need to distinguish different types of PMSCs – the 
Guardian, Unarmed and Weaponised companies – and highlight how security companies use 
humanitarian ethics as a legitimising factor. The chapter will then present the thesis‘s findings 
regarding IAAs‘ engagement with PMSCs and then demonstrate that aid agencies‘ positioning towards 
PMSCs is shaped by their identity. 
All of these chapters draw on the qualitative data collected through reviews of the literature, 
official documentation and extensive field interviews. By engaging with empirical evidence, these 
chapters explore the processes of construction, in particular the dynamics by which aid agencies‘ 
identity and security are (re)produced. 
 
Part Three will present the thesis‘s implications and conclusion. Chapter Seven will then offer a 
summary of the key findings as these relate to the key research questions and hypotheses laid out in 
the present chapter, followed by a discussion of the thesis‘ main theoretical and empirical 
contributions. In particular, it will argue that the research adds a new perspective to the existing 
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knowledge about humanitarian security, and, by doing so, confirms the relevance of a critical 
constructivist analysis in the field of International Relations. Further, and in light of the thesis‘ 
implications for aid agencies‘ approaches to security, the chapter will consider the consequences of 
ignoring the interplay between IAAs‘ identity and security when studying humanitarian security. 
Building on the findings of the research, it will then provide a new definition of humanitarian security as 
well as further reflections on the concept of security in this context. 
Last, the final chapter will look at the policy implications of the thesis for international aid 
agencies‘ approaches to security. It will argue in particular that aid agencies‘ approaches to security 
are based on premises and assumptions that need to be highlighted in order to reveal their 
implications for aid agencies‘ security. The thesis will demonstrate that approaches to security reflect 
aid agencies‘ distinctive baggage. As such, they are not immune to the premises and assumptions that 
shape an agencies‘ identity. Understanding what these are helps to reveal the weaknesses of 
humanitarian security management and highlights areas that need further improvement, including the 
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Aid workers and private security contractors agree that the first step to a proper security 
assessment is to undertake a situational analysis. Before taking any further action, one needs to fully 
understand the environment in which one is operating. This implies not only becoming aware of the 
specificities of the operational context (history, people, institutions, culture, societal dynamics, etc.), but 
also being aware of one's own identity and the  type of activities one is engaged in, as well as a 
thorough understanding of the 'other's' identity and activities i.e. the beneficiaries or the client. 
Understanding these ensures that the goods and services provided are appropriate and relevant. In 
addition, on-going or regular assessments make certain that the activities remain appropriate for the 
context. Conflict and post-conflict environments are not only complex because they are made up of 
intertwined layers, but also because their constitutive elements are perpetually in flux. The example of 
the 2003 Iraq war is telling: what began as a traditional face-to-face conflict between a national army 
and an invading force changed rapidly into a complex war made up of a number of different conflicts: 
Iraqi nationalists together with Islamists against the multinational forces in the so-called Sunni triangle; 
Shi‘a militias - and what soon became the police force -  against Sunni insurgents (who themselves 
eventually became recognised neighbourhood watchmen) in Baghdad; Shi‘a individuals supporting 
Muqtada Al-Sadr against other Shi‘a supporting Sayyed Abdul Aziz al-Hakim in the Southern 
provinces; a primarily Shi‘a national army against Shi‘a militias in Basra; Sunni and Shi‘a groups 
fighting alongside against the United States Marines in Fallujah and Najaf; and finally, Arabs against 
Kurds and Turkmen in Kirkuk. While the above list does not even take into consideration the tensions, 
and at times different and/or conflicting interests among the international forces, or the many ways 
neighbouring countries influence the conflicts‘ dynamics, it illustrates the complexities of this war. 
Similarly, the current situations in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Gaza 
Strip, Haiti, Somalia, Sudan, are also examples of complex and ever-evolving emergencies.7 The 
complexities of these evolvements are one of the reasons why situational analysis is the crucial first 
step in any security assessment. As any aid workers and security contractors would, this thesis first 
situates the ensuing analysis by providing a background of the subject of study. It then looks at the 
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 James, W. (1909), p.31. 
7
 A complex emergency is defined as ―a humanitarian crisis that requires an international response that goes beyond the 
mandate or capacity of any single agency. Complex emergencies are typically characterized by: extensive violence and loss 
of life, massive displacements of people, widespread damage to societies and economies, need for large-scale, multi-faceted 
humanitarian assistance, hindrance or prevention of humanitarian assistance by political and military constraints and 
significant security risks for humanitarian relief workers in some areas‖ OCHA (2004a, p.2). For more information see Duffield, 
(1994); Goodhand and Hulme (1999); Maynard, (1999).  
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consequence of changes in contemporary warfare on humanitarian action. Secondly it provides a 
comprehensive overview of the current relations between international aid agencies (IAAs) and private 
military and security companies (PMSCs) in the context of the thesis fielwork undertaken – namely in  
Afghanistan and Haiti. 
1.1. Changes in contemporary warfare and consequences for humanitarian 
action 
1.1.1. Non-state actors’ part in changes in contemporary warfare 
Whether one agrees that the end of the twentieth century has seen the appearance of 'new 
wars' or not (Kaldor 1999; Kalyvas, 2001; Berdal 2003), there is little doubt that contemporary warfare 
has changed drastically in recent years. As compared to a few decades ago, when most wars were 
international – waged between two or more states - violent conflicts are considered to be more internal 
in nature since the end of the Cold War, even if international actors are involved (Keen, 1997; Kaldor, 
1999). The evolution of warfare is also evident in the recent academic emphasis on the asymmetry of 
wars, where fighters and their methods are of a different nature from traditional armies battling one 
another: insurgents or gangs versus an institutionalized army; use of terrorist actions as tools for 
waging war against forms of ―human warfare‖ (Coker, 2001); but also the advent of, what has been 
termed, the 'fourth generation of warfare.'8 In addition, fighters have evolved in their number and 
nature. On the one hand, the last decades have seen a fragmentation of non-state actors (militias, 
warlords, ideological combatants, insurgents, terrorists, rebels, and criminal gangs among others), and 
on the other hand a diversification of the traditional international military actors (with the appearance of 
'coalitions of the willing'; peacekeeping missions made up of primarily with personnel from the Global 
South rather than Western countries; private military and security companies, etc.) The dynamics 
among these actors have also evolved, with local and transnational networks working, trading or 
competing with the different types of non-state actors, and at the same time, international actors 
involved in joint operations but still failing at times to cooperate adequately. Even the notion of 'sides 
has become disputable; if we consider countries where newly-established governments, supported by 
the international community, who participate on both sides by becoming involved in criminal or 
insurgent activities.9 Another dimension of the evolution of warfare is within the legal framework of war: 
We concomitantly notice a 'judicialisation' of conflicts with the appearance of the international courts at 
a global level (the International Criminal Court) or local levels (Rwanda, Cambodia, Sierra Leone 
courts) but also a challenge to the legitimacy of the traditional laws of war (through the emergence of 
extraordinary renditions; or the establishment of the Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, and Bagram 
prisons for 'enemy combatants'). Lastly, overarching paradigms framing military actions and providing 
their justification have also evolved, moving away from the ‗right to intervene‘ (introduced at the end of 
                                               
8
 The ‗Fourth generation warfare‘ concept represents conflicts that are characterized by a return to decentralised forms of 
warfare, away from states‘ control. For more information, see: Lind et al (1989); Lind (2004); Echevarria II, (2005).  
9
 For example, the brother of Afghan President Hamid Karzaï has long been suspected of facilitating the drug trade (Risen, 
2008).  
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the 1980s) to the current ‗stabilisation process‘, by way of the transition from ‗peacekeeping‘ to 
‗peacebuilding‘ operations, from ‗war against terrorism‘ to ‗preventive‘ wars,  from ‗provision of 
democracy‘ to ‗reconstruction and state building‘ (Biermann and Vadset, 1998; Diehl et al., 1998; 
Chandler, 2002; Frum and Perle, 2003; Bellamy and Williams, 2004; Weiss, 2004; Jackson, 2005; 
Williams and Bellamy, 2005; Harlow, 2008). 
Considering the above, there are convincing reasons to suggest warfare has indeed evolved 
since the end of the Cold War. As the 'greed and grievance' debate has shown (Berdal and Malone, 
2000; Collier and Hoeffler, 2000) many conflicts start for certain reasons (primary causes of war 
include the geopolitical, religious, economic, cultural, ideological, survival or existential) but their 
continuation is often due to reasons other than those that contributed to their eruption; from the 
emergence of new actors, new grievances, to the establishment of a profitable war economy, etc.  
In part, for the reasons noted above, international aid agencies, as well as private military and 
security companies, are not acting in isolation. Their presence and actions have direct and indirect 
effects on the dynamics of conflict. Contractors, for instance, can contribute to a conflicts' escalation 
through the provision of military or security services to the fighters. Similarly, aid provided by 
international agencies may be misappropriated and may therefore also strengthen parties to the 
conflict and allow them to continue fighting (Shearer, 2000; Pérouse de Montclos, 2001; Kenyon 
Lischer, 2003). Much has changed since the time when parties to the conflict would agree to a 
temporary ceasefire so that a neutral internationally-recognised institution – the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) – could access the wounded and treat them. Today, even the 
much respected International Red Cross and Red Crescent movement is being targeted by all sorts of 
actors, from criminals (demands for ransom to release personnel in Haiti)10, to armed political actors 
(2003 bombing of the ICRC office in Baghdad) and is even the victim of repetitive 'collateral damages' 
(see for instance the 2001 mistaken bombing of an ICRC warehouse in Kabul (ICRC, 2001) or the all-
too frequent examples of the movement‘s emergency vehicles being directly targeted). In short, 
humanitarian actors have been affected by the changes in warfare, as well as having been part of its 
evolvement.   
1.2.2. Increase in aid agencies’ perceived insecurity 
Although the first killing of a United Nations member of staff on duty happened as early as 
1948,11 one of the consequences of recent changes in warfare is a dramatic alteration in aid workers‘ 
personal safety. Indeed, all types of humanitarian actors and agencies have been involved in serious 
security incidents at some point. Whether local or international NGOs, United Nations agencies or 
members of the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement, all types of humanitarian organizations have 
lost staff in the line of duty.  
                                               
10
 In this case, the Haitian Red Cross worker was killed while his ―family had been negotiating a ransom with his captors‖ 
(Edinburgh Evening News, 2005). 
11
 Commandant René de Labarrière, a French Military Observer in the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization 
(UNTSO), became the first UN peacekeeper killed in the line of duty on 6 July 1948 (UN, Undated, b). 
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This observation however, is an over-generalisation. To give a subtler and more accurate 
picture: some NGOs have had no casualties in their history, while others are regularly confronted with 
incidents of all sorts. Certain conflicts are notorious for being particularly dangerous, including 
Afghanistan and Somalia – while other conflicts remain relatively safe for aid workers or have only 
pockets or phases of instability. Other areas, although they are not at war, are still dangerous for 
humanitarian personnel – for instance parts of Haiti, Mexico, and Venezuela - largely due to high rates 
of kidnapping. The specific vulnerabilities of each of these actors and the type of threats they face are 
various and often dependant on time and place. Research shows that IAAs have increasingly been 
victims of dangerous incidents, however since the aid worker population has also dramatically 
increased over the last decade, it remains unclear whether aid workers are more at risk than before.12 
Despite several attempts, there is no comprehensive analysis of incidents linked to aid workers, in part 
because the task of data collection for security incidents is extremely difficult.  
The very definition of a ‗security incident‘ varies between languages and contexts.  Linguistic 
variations occur because authors sometimes disagree on how to define an ‗incident‘.  Contextual 
variations result from the fact that the same event may or may not be considered as an ‗incident‘ 
depending on where it occurs, its intensity, its type, as well as its victim(s) and those who write the 
security report on it. Witnessing someone shooting in the air may be seen as an incident by a 
humanitarian working in a rather peaceful environment, but considered as a ‗normal‘ event by an aid 
worker living in a conflict zone and accustomed to hearing gunfire. While the former may report it, the 
latter may not. As the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) 2009 report states: aid workers ―employ a 
distinct definition of ‗major security incidents‘. [For instance,] kidnapping is counted here only if the 
victim was held for over 24 hours, and incidents are only recorded if they result in a death, abduction 
or serious injury‖ (Stoddard et al., p.2, 2009,).  
In addition, ‗near misses‘ ought also to be taken into consideration. ―A ‗near miss‘ is where it 
appears that a security incident came close to occurring. This ‗near miss‘ may reveal a weakness in 
security procedures or new information about security threats‖ (Mayhew, p.39, 2004). Frequently 
however, near misses are not reported since their non-occurrence is narrowly interpreted as an event 
that has not significantly disrupted workflow. 
Lastly, to be comprehensive, any calculation of security incidents among aid workers has to be 
based on a precise figure of the total number of aid workers. However, since no one knows for sure 
how many humanitarians are operating, this ‗denominator‘ remains approximate.  
Research has shown that there might not have been a dramatic increase in security incidents 
per capita, but it is widely recognised that there has been a spectacular escalation in the actual 
number of aid workers becoming victims of security incidents.  
                                               
12
 Although ―[b]oth absolute and relative numbers of attacks against aid workers have increased over have past three years‖, 
―[t]he three most violent contexts for aid work – Sudan (Darfur), Afghanistan and Somalia – accounted for more than 60% of 
violent incidents and aid worker victims‖. ―Across the rest of the world … the security situation is improving, albeit only slightly, 
with attack rates declining‖. Stoddard, A.; Harmer, A; DiDomenico, V. (2009). This report is the single most extensive effort to 
map security incidents against aid workers globally. As the authors note, it also has some caveats – for instance, the aid 
worker population (the ‗denominator‘) is only an estimate.  
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The number of incidents is not the sole indicator of change in a given environment. Access to 
(and lack thereof) the beneficiaries of aid is also telling. Fewer incidents may be recorded in an area 
not necessarily because actors are better at preventing them or protecting against them, but simply 
because they avoid this area. An increasingly frequent strategy implemented by IAAs consists of 
restricting movement to and within hazardous areas.  
While an increase in IAAs' insecurity has yet to be empirically confirmed, there is mounting 
evidence that the feeling of insecurity has dramatically increased among aid workers. They may 
statistically not be more at risk than a few decades ago, but they largely share the perception that their 
work is more dangerous than it was. This is highlighted by research as well as anecdotal evidence, for 
example the Haitian NGO worker who explained that ―we have fences, we have barbwire, we have 
CCTVs, we have bodyguards, and then also armoured cars and flak jackets, but we are still not safe; 
we have escalated our security measures, but we remain unsafe‖.13  
Katy Barnett writes that:  
 
[i]t is widely held that humanitarian work is getting more dangerous. Many humanitarian organizations in 
Europe and the United States see their staff and assets worldwide at growing risk as a direct 
consequence of the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. There is talk of humanitarians being ‗soft 
targets‘. The backdrop to this is a world involved in more conflicts than ever before, where respect for 
civilian life can be negligible. Humanitarians feel increasingly exposed to violence in general, and 
increasingly targeted. This feeling is echoed by donors, training providers and the carers who deal with 
the fallout of security incidents (Barnett, p.24, 2004). 
 
Yet according to Stoddard et al (2006b, p.1), ―[o]pinions differ on the causes and extent of the 
problems – overly close cooperation with military and political actors in the post-9/11 environment, new 
global threats posed by transnational terrorist movements and a rise in general criminality in many 
developing countries have all been cited – but whatever the assumed cause, a pervasive sense of 
growing danger has prompted changes in policy and in the conduct of field operations.‖  
Altogether, aid organizations have to address both the actual insecurity their staff face and their 
staff‘s perception of their insecurity.  
1.2.3. The professionalization of humanitarian security management 
Confronted with the 'fog of war'14, aid workers have always had to ensure their own safety and 
security one way or another. According to Hugo Slim, ―many agencies in World War II wore khaki and 
slotted in beside the Allied advance, liberation and occupation of Europe. Many Quaker Ambulance 
Units worked directly with military forces although some were unusual by insisting on wearing grey not 
khaki‖ (Slim, 2003). This earlier form of embedded relief is something which would nowadays be 
rejected by the majority of IAAs as it would negatively impact their perceived neutrality; it shows 
                                               
13
 Interview 118.  
14
 The ‗fog of war‘ is a term used to describe Karl Von Clausewitz‘s observation that inherent uncertainties exist in theatres of 
war, due to limited information about one‘s capability and intent. 
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however that aid workers were already concerned with ensuring their security in some way. The ICRC, 
for instance, has traditionally negotiated access to those populations-in-need to ensure that relief 
workers would not be targeted by any parties to the conflict. They also strive to prevent any confusion 
through the use of emblems recognised in international law, specifically the Red Cross, and later the 
Red Crescent, and now including the Red Crystal (ICRC, 2009). Negotiating access however has not 
always been successful or safe.  
In the last decade, aid agencies' approaches to security have taken a new direction. The 
disturbing mismanagement by IAAs of the post-genocide crisis in the Great Lake Region of East 
Africa,15 as well as a range of major security incidents such as the 1996 assassination of six ICRC staff 
in Chechnya, the 2003 bombing of the United Nations office in Baghdad and the 2004 violent killing of 
Margaret Hassan (Iraq Country Director for CARE), have led aid workers to put greater emphasis on 
security management. While security management was somewhat ad hoc until the late 1990s, the 
combination of incidents lead to a greater awareness that more structured and informed procedures 
were needed. This in turn, led to a professionalization of humanitarian security risk management.  
The move toward professionalization can be depicted as a slow-moving ripple-effect that has 
only gradually permeated the humanitarian community, and is still expanding. However, we can now 
identify landmark moments in the development of this professionalization such as the creation of the 
Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD) in 1984 – and its sudden expansion 
in 1995,16 the establishment by RedR of highly respected safety, security and risk management 
training workshops in the mid-1990s17 following an OFDA-funded Interaction-driven sets of trainings, 
and the publication of the Operational Security Management in Violent Environments by the Overseas 
Development Institute in 2000.  
Chapter Five of this thesis provides a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of humanitarian 
approaches to security. For the purposes of this overview however, humanitarian security 
management can be understood as composed of four elements:  
 the human element; 
 the organizational framework; 
 the material element; 
 ethical guidance. 
                                               
15
 ―...without anyone realizing it, humanitarian agencies had engaged mass murderers and war criminals by the score as local 
staff, and the perpetrators of the genocide had reimposed a murderous authority over hundreds of thousands of non-
combatants under the nose of the international community. A more perverse outcome from humanitarian ‗good works‘ is 
difficult to imagine, and it provoked at CARE Canada and elsewhere, a great deal of introspection as well as a search for 
solutions, information and understanding.‖ Bryans et al. (1999, p.1). For more information, see: Minear and Weiss (1995); 
Uvin (1998). 
16
 The UNSECOORD ―acts on behalf of the Secretary-General and the Heads of United Nations agencies, programmes and 
funds to assure a coherent response by the United Nations system to any emergency situation. It is responsible for all policy 
and procedural matters related to security, and, on behalf of the Secretary-General, takes decisions related to all aspects of 
evacuation‖ (UN, 2004, p.31).  
17
 RedR is considered as having played a seminal role in providing humanitarian security trainings; many risk management 
trainings still use the RedR founding methodology. Its website indicates that ―We have been running safety, security and risk 
management training since the mid-1990s. We have an excellent reputation in this area and run an extensive programme of 
courses both in the UK and overseas, using a team of skilled trainers and partner organizations‖ (RedR, undated, website). 
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The ‗human element‘ consists of raising the awareness amongst aid workers to the security 
risks and how to deal with them through training, capacity-building and information-sharing.  
The ‗organizational framework‘ deals with the need to structure the security thinking and 
practices; this is done through the designation of authority and decision-making powers, but also 
through the development of security strategies, policies, plans, standard operating procedures and 
guidelines within each organization. Furthermore the allocation of funds specifically for security 
management allows for the application of these policies and plans.  
The ‗material element‘ of humanitarian security management includes equipment (radio 
communications, fencing, sandbag fortifications, global positioning systems, first aid kits, fire 
extinguishers, etc.), software (for mapping, communications etc.), or anything that supports aid 
workers in managing their security, including the applicable elements of research (databases of 
security incidents for instance).  
However, the defining element of humanitarian security is ‗ethical guidance‘, which consists of 
widely-shared humanitarian values and ethical tools such as codes of conduct. Although 
disagreements exist, these values provide a common set of written and unwritten rules that guide 
agencies‘ actions, including the ways they manage their security. Chapter Four of this thesis will 
develop these ethical aspects further, but the case of armed protection can be used as a preliminary 
illustration: although a number of IAAs are employing armed protection in certain contexts, they 
nevertheless tend to agree that this option should be avoided as much as possible (Stoddard et al., 
p.9, 2008). 
The professionalization of the IAAs‘ security risk management in the last decade can be viewed 
through the prism of these four constitutive elements. With regard to the human element, 
professionalization is evident on many levels; raising aid workers‘ awareness on security matters is 
now increasingly systematic. Pre-deployment briefings include security components; international as 
well as national staff members are, in greater numbers, attending safety and security training sessions 
of all sorts, ranging from crisis management to driving training; several IAAs have developed their own 
training systems via CD-ROMs or online modules,18 and humanitarian vocational centres increasingly 
include a security component in their curricula.19 In addition, several security collaboration mechanisms 
such as the European Interagency Security Forum (EISF), the American NGO coalition, InterAction‘s 
Security Advisory Group (SAG), as well as the Afghanistan NGO Security Office (ANSO) and the 
Somalia NGO Safety Program (NSP), have shown an improvement in IAAs‗ information-sharing and 
coordination mechanisms on matters of security. These collaboration mechanisms also play a key role 
in promoting good practices within the humanitarian community at large. Similarly, and despite its 
imperfections (Micheni and Kuhanendran, 2010), the Saving Lives Together initiative has contributed 
to improving UN-NGO security collaborations. Most of these aspects of the human element of 
                                               
18
 See the Basic Security in the Field CD-Rom Course from UNOPS. NGOs such as CARE and Christian Aid have also 
developed such tools.  
19
 See for instance trainings offered by Bioforce, Humacoop, RedR, etc. 
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humanitarian security management were developed in the last fifteen years and have played a large 
part in the professionalization of IAAs.    
 
IAAs organizational frameworks have also contributed to the professionalization of 
humanitarian security management. An increasing number of aid agencies have recruited full time 
security managers or designated security focal points at headquarters and field levels (Mujawar, 
2009). Many also have developed their strategic vision and policy orientations on security matters, as 
well as related guidelines and country-specific and/or region-specific security plans. Several 
organizations, including humanitarian donors such as the European Commission Humanitarian aid 
Office (ECHO), have produced security manuals that are shared widely and freely among the aid 
worker community.20 Following the bombing of its office in Baghdad, the United Nations have 
transformed the UNSECOORD into the United Nations Department for Safety and Security (UNDSS), 
providing the department with additional funding and personnel.21 At the same time, several 
international protocols aimed at protecting aid workers operating under the United Nations banner 
(either as part of UN organizations or NGOs subcontracted by a UN agency) have been adopted. This 
is the case of the 1994 Convention on the Security of United Nations and Associated Personnel (UN, 
1994) and the 2005 Optional Protocol of the General Assembly (UN, 2005) as well as specific Security 
Council resolutions in 1999 and 2003 (UN, 1999a; UN, 1999b; UN, 2005).22 Last but not least, 
humanitarian donors have allocated increasing portions of their IAA budgets to improving their 
security.23 Although it is occasionally allowed, donors are generally reluctant to provide funding for an 
agency to invest solely in security risk management. It is more common for donors to authorise a given 
percentage of the project budgets they fund to be spent on security-related costs. IAAs have created 
an increasing demand for security services, as a result, many former aid workers have set-up 
consultancy groups focusing solely on the provision of such services to humanitarian actors.24 This in 
turn, guarantees a certain respect for the ethical aspects of humanitarian security as aid workers pass 
on knowledge and guidance to future generations.  
Since aid agencies have always used technical tools and technology in their risk management, 
it is difficult to determine whether the ‗material‘ element of humanitarian security risk has been further 
professionalized. On the one hand, equipment such as satellite phones and radio communication have 
long been part of the aid workers‘ tool box, there is however anecdotal evidence that, on the other 
hand, more aid workers have been trained to use, and are becoming reliant on, increasingly 
                                               
20
 See for instance, Cutts and Dingle (1998): Lloyd Roberts (1998); Van Brabant (2000); Wesbrock T.J. and T. (2000); 
Mayhew (2004). 
21
 ―The UN Department for Safety and Security was created in 2004 as the successor to UNSECOORD, with a higher level of 
leadership in the UN system, greater resources, conceptual and strategic innovations and a clear vision for enhancing 
security to enable vital programming.‖ (Stoddard et al., 2006b, p.3). 
22
 However, members of independent humanitarian organizations have less protection, legally speaking, than most of them 
probably think (Mackintosh, 2007). 
23
 Despite anecdotal evidence illustrating this claim, there are no comprehensive pieces of research on IAAs‘ funding 
allocation for security. This can be explained by different reasons, including the fact that security costs are often split between 
different budget lines, making them difficult to isolate; also, some IAAs have been poor in keeping track of their expenses. For 
additional explanations, see Stoddard et al. (2009). 
24
 For instance: the Armadillo Group, Clarity, the Centre for Safety and Development, Other Solutions, Tricky Locations, etc. 
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sophisticated equipment. More accurately, the IAAs further understanding and use of equipment and 
software reflects a wider societal trend towards the increasing dependence on technology in those 
countries where the organizations are headquartered. In conjunction with mounting interest from 
academics on humanitarian security management, IAAs have also recently started to develop 
databases of their security incidents, enabling them to better understand and manage the risks.25 
Although these initiatives are fairly recent, they do indicate a professionalization of humanitarian 
security risk management. 
Lastly, with regard to ‗ethical guidance‘, professionalization of humanitarian security risk 
management has developed through an evolution in IAAs‘ thinking and practices. Traditionally, 
security has been regarded by aid organizations as just one programmatic component among many. 
Indeed, other components such as gender, the protection of vulnerable populations or HIV and AIDS 
were mainstreamed in many programs and projects. Program managers were responsible for the 
security of their program. Until recently, there was no specific guidance on how they should actually 
ensure this security. The last fifteen years have seen significant changes in this area, as traditional 
humanitarian security management has proven insufficient to enable programs to be implemented in 
hazardous environments.  
An illustration of this dynamic is the development by the United Nations as well as by 
InterAction and other NGOs, of ‗Minimum Operating Security Standards‘ (MOSS).26 These standards 
are both straightforward to understand and easy to remember, and offer both guidelines and objectives 
for organizations to improve their security management.  
Another illustration of the move toward further professionalization of the ethical aspects of the 
humanitarian risk management is the current efforts by the International NGO Security Association to 
develop a code of conduct for humanitarian security practitioners. Although this example is of more of 
an anecdotal nature, it demonstrates the trend toward an institutionalization and professionalization of 
questions relevant to security. 
As was noted above, all too often, when IAAs move toward an institutionalization and 
professionalization of their security management, it is often the result of security incidents. Given this 
context, donor agencies are now systematically asking organizations requesting funding to outline their 
risk reduction strategies in their project proposals. This however, is not always sufficient as the 
measures outlined are not necessarily particularly detailed. The donors‘ request for such outlines could 
be considered as more of a ‗disclaimer‘ in case anything happens to the organization they are funding, 
than an effective risk mitigation measure.  
IAAs hold a range of responsibilities under criminal and civil law, which has encouraged 
organizations to put more emphasis on the duty of care they have toward their employees. In 
                                               
25
 CARE, Save the Children, World Vision, the UNDSS for instance have created and use their own databases. In addition, 
several other actors followed a similar move and created global aid workers‘ incident databases: the Humanitarian Outcomes‘ 
Aid Worker Security Database, CSD‘s SIMS-ON, iMMAP‘s OASIS and Insecurity Insight‘ humanitarian workers‟ project.  
26
 As an example, InterAction‘s MOSS five standards comprise Organizational Security Policy and Plans, Resources to 
Address Security, Human Resources Management, Accountability and Sense of Community.  Other NGOs such as CARE, 
Christian Aid and Save the Children US have also developed their own MOSS.   
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particular, these duties have become more pronounced in the United Kingdom with recent changes to 
the Corporate Manslaughter Act. It is worth specifying however, that although the duty of care requires 
organizations to take appropriate measures, anecdotal evidence shows that such a move is not always 
seen as positive by aid workers. Indeed, these measures are sometimes described by (cynical) aid 
workers as serving to protect management and the organization against possible lawsuits rather than 
to actually improve staff security. 
Faced with an increasing number of threats and security incidents, humanitarian agencies have 
certainly allocated more time and resources27 to improving their security risk management, which has 
led to their further professionalization. Although progress is real it should not, however, be overstated. 
As Vincenzo Bollettino writes: ―[d]espite broad acceptance of the need for better security management 
and coordination, many humanitarian organizations remain ambivalent about devoting increased 
resources to security management and security coordination‖ (Bollettino, p.263, 2008). Post-incident 
analysis shows for instance that the risk mitigation strategies and procedures are often of poor quality, 
that aid workers‘ behaviour is not always appropriate and that funds requested or measures needed 
for proper improvements in risk management are not always allocated or taken.28  
Putting more emphasis on security management could have meant getting closer to the armed 
forces, who are the traditional security actors in conflict. However as Spearin notes:  
 
Though some NGOs are willing to engage with militaries for the sake of protection and deterrence, they 
remain torn about the impact this decision has on the image of humanitarianism. … Different goals, 
interests, priorities, and timetables still exist between NGOs and militaries. Humanitarianism‘s underlying 
rationale of assistance on the basis of need as an inalienable right frequently clashes with the agendas 
of armed actors that are political and selective. What is more, … it also makes it more likely that 
humanitarianism becomes a means to an end. In an era of counterinsurgency and the military necessity 
of winning hearts and minds, … many NGOs have stressed that there should be a clear division of 
labour and that NGO reliance upon militaries should only be in the last resort. Similarly, should militaries 
be actually involved in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, this should only be a temporary measure 
conducted on the basis of dire need that the humanitarian community cannot immediately address for 
reasons related to scale, safety, and logistics. Reliance on the PMSC industry, therefore, seemingly 
provides the flexibility many NGOs desire (Spearin, 2007a). 
 
It is then worth wondering whether the input of professional security providers would and has 
proved useful in improving IAAs‘ understanding of sound security management. Indeed, in a striking 
parallel where humanitarian agencies have increasingly been victims of violence, the number and 
diversity of commercial entities offering security services has dramatically expanded. However, among 
                                               
27
 Although the amount earmarked for security management varies considerably across the NGOs, the security budget 
allocated at headquarters ranges from 15,000 USD to 2 million USD annually (Mujawar, 2009).  
28
 According to the October 2008 report of The Independent Panel on Accountability, a dysfunctional United Nations security 
management system, a lack of adequate supervision and training, and significant lapses in judgment and performance all 
played a major role in the 2007 terrorist bombings of UN offices in Algiers, which killed 17 staff members (Zacklin 2008). 
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the various measures taken by IAAs to improve their security, the contracting of private military and 
security companies has been, and remains, one of the most controversial. 
1.2. Overview of the relations between IAAs and PMSCs 
Because this thesis presents an analysis of aid agencies in reference to corporate security 
providers, an overview of IAAs‘ relations with PMSCs is necessary. This section presents this 
relationship in the context of Afghanistan and Haiti, where fieldwork was undertaken. 
 The only comprehensive outline of relations between PMSCs and IAAs is by Abby Stoddard, 
Adele Harmer and Victoria DiDomenico in their October 2008 report entitled ―The use of private 
security providers and services in humanitarian operations‖ (Stoddard et al., 2008).29 This thesis will 
draw extensively on the findings of the Stoddard et al. report, as well as subsequent exchanges with 
the authors. According to the report‘s findings,  
 
[a] majority of aid workers surveyed report that the contracting of certain security functions to external 
professionals has become increasingly common worldwide. Despite some early worries and alarming 
predictions, however, the use of commercially contracted armed protection, including armed guards and 
armed escorts, remains very much the exception, and is confined to particular contexts. Rather, the most 
commonly contracted services from international private security providers (PSPs) are security training, 
risk assessment and security management consulting. … Importantly, local PSPs are used much more 
often and in many more environments than international PSPs, and from these contractors the most 
commonly used service is unarmed guards for facilities and premises. Exceptional though it may be, the 
use of contracted armed security is nevertheless a reality for the international humanitarian community. 
Every major international humanitarian organization (defined as the UN humanitarian agencies and the 
largest international NGOs) has paid for armed security in at least one operational context, and 
approximately 22% of the major humanitarian organizations reported using armed security services 
during the last year (Stoddard et al, p.1, 2008) 
 
Stoddard et al chose not to focus solely on security companies but to encompass the wider 
concept of ―security providers‖, thus encompassing any entity that is a supplier of security services in 
exchange for financial compensation, including governmental forces and/or militias. Despite a focus 
that is specifically limited to the corporate security industry as well as a narrower geographical scope, 
Chapter Six will add to Stoddard et al‟s findings by emphasizing the links that exist between IAAs‘ 
identity and their approaches to PMSCs.  
1.2.1. A review of IAAs and PMSCs’ presence in Afghanistan 
War not only kills people, it affects their lives in many ways. Despite the billions of dollars spent 
on aid in Afghanistan since 2001,30 the humanitarian situation in the country remains dire. There have 
been definite improvements in certain areas – most notably in infrastructure (re)construction – but 
                                               
29
 This author was a peer reviewer for this report. 
30
 According to ACBAR, ―donors committed to give $25bn aid since 2001 but have only delivered $15bn‖ (Waldman, 2008, 
p.5). 
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many of the population‘s basic needs remain unanswered. Not only is Afghanistan ranked 181st out of 
182 countries on the United Nations Human Development Index for 2009 but its economy is largely 
dependent on foreign aid, with some 90 percent of the Afghan government budget coming from 
international donors (Reuters, 2009). 
According to the 2010 Humanitarian Action Plan for Afghanistan (UN, p.29, 2010), the most 
pressing humanitarian issues in Afghanistan include, but are not limited to:  
- Civilian casualties, destruction of infrastructure and private property, population 
displacement, attenuation of basic social services, health and reproductive health services, loss of 
livelihood opportunities and lack of access to basic governmental services and assistance; 
- The extreme poverty and underdevelopment in Afghanistan – 42% of the population live 
on less than $1 per day – which makes the population more susceptible during crises and 
emergencies; unequal distribution of wealth and assets; disproportionate effects of poverty on 
vulnerable segments of the population;  
- Global high food prices (and related phenomena such as food export bans in 
neighbouring countries), which are placing non-agricultural households into deepened poverty and 
food insecurity. Related high prices of agricultural inputs such as fuel and fertilizer, as well as drought, 
are preventing Afghan farmers from profiting; 
- Displacement induced by conflict, drought, poverty, and the forced return of some 
vulnerable refugee populations and economic migrants. 
 
Nearly half of the Afghan population is living in poverty. Poverty is understood as a lack of 
material assets (including, for instance, a lack of adequate housing, money, land and/or livestock) but 
also encompasses a broader conception of poverty as a marginalization from access to essential 
services: primarily education and health, security and opportunities for employment.31 As reported in 
2009, the country is still facing a severe humanitarian crisis:  
 
… the vast majority of the assistance provided in Afghanistan is based on the notion that Afghanistan is 
a post-conflict developmental context or even today a counterinsurgency stabilization effort and it is only 
recently that humanitarian needs have grow in recognition. This is despite the fact that most indicators 
point to a humanitarian situation beyond what we normally see in traditional humanitarian contexts 
(Geirsdottir, p.2, 2009).  
 
Aid is provided by a multiplicity of actors, ranging from the traditional humanitarian and 
development organizations such as international and local NGOs, United Nations agencies, the 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, but also and controversially, by non-traditional 
actors such as international companies, civil-military Provincial Reconstruction Teams, military units, 
etc.  
                                               
31
 For more information, see ACBAR (2008).  
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Humanitarian organizations first arrived in Afghanistan in the 1980s, during the Mujahidin war 
against Soviet troops. Several of them, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, Aide 
Médicale Internationale, International Rescue Committee, or Madera have not left the country since. 
Others such as the Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees (DACAAR), supported Afghans that 
had taken refuge in Pakistan or Iran and started operating in Afghanistan only in recent years, 
accompanying refugees in their return home. Lastly, a significant number of humanitarian 
organizations with no previous experience of Afghanistan joined the international humanitarian and 
reconstruction effort following the fall of the Taliban regime in December 2001. By March 2007, the 
number of such organizations had stabilised, with 1,168 non-governmental organizations registered 
with the Ministry of Interior (277 international NGOs and 871 national NGOs).32  
Figures relating to the number of aid workers in the country are less precise. According to the 
Deputy Minister of Economy Nizari Hashimi, there were roughly 67,000 aid workers involved in 
humanitarian projects in Afghanistan in March 2007. However, a study done by the Humanitarian 
Policy Group in September 2006 (Karim, 2006) reports a figure of only 25,000 to 35,000. Given the 
huge difference in staff numbers between NGOs,33 it is difficult to estimate with any accuracy.  
With the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, a plethora of new players appeared on the scene to 
take part in the effort to reconstruct the country. This multiplication of players has confused the 
populations, who are often unable to distinguish between the different aid organizations, Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), reconstruction enterprises or foreign armed forces. Indeed some 
military personnel move around in civilian clothing, some enterprises claim to be carrying out 
humanitarian projects, some aid organizations have militarised their profile, and the PRTs (made up of 
military and civilian personnel) are undertaking both military operations and aid to the civil population 
simultaneously. As a result, the great majority of the Afghan people are not able to identify the different 
players and simply regard all these organizations, with their different interests and operating methods, 
as ‗NGOs‘. In this overall confusion a number of tragic events, such as the murder of five members of 
MSF in 2004 leading to the organization‘s withdrawal from Afghanistan, are not easily forgotten (MSF, 
2005). Recent events have given rise to fears of an increase in the number of attacks on any target 
perceived to be ‗Western‘. 
The number of private military and security companies operating in Afghanistan is not known. 
Despite tremendous improvements, there has been no proper registration process and several official 
lists of PMSCs exist. The best calculation has been provided by Susanne Schmeidl, in her seminal 
research on the perception by the Afghan population of PMSCs (Schmeidl, 2007). According to 
Schmeidl, there are 88 named security companies that are operating in Afghanistan, but this figure 
could reach as high as 140. In 2007, a rough figure of 20 - 25,000 security contractors was given by a 
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 Interview 78. In May 2010, the Afghan Ministry of Economy indicated in a press release that ―over 1,200 national and 301 
international NGOs are currently registered in the country‖ (IRIN 2010a)  
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 In March 2007, DACAAR for instance had 1,100 staff while Médecins du Monde had 17.  
                  39 of 257 
well-informed UNAMA official.34 Nevertheless, these figures are likely to change rapidly with the 
government declaring its intention to begin disbanding security companies. 
PMSCs all arrived in Afghanistan either with the coalition forces in autumn 2001, or in the 
aftermath of the regime‘s fall. At an international level, two events made PMSCs‘ presence in 
Afghanistan suddenly more noticable: first, through the arrest and conviction of Jack Idema in 
September 2004 for running an illegal private prison under the cover of an authorised activity 
undertaken by a private security company, and second, through the highly visible protection DynCorp 
was offering to President Karzaï. DynCorp then became renowned for rude behaviour exhibited by its 
staff.35 According to one respondent, ―in 2004, the US ambassador warned the DynCorp Country 
Manager to have a lower profile otherwise they would be expelled.‖36 Some even say that the bomb 
that targeted their premises on the 29 August 2004 was a consequence of their poorly-perceived 
behaviour and therefore should not have come as a surprise.37 
 
Nine years after the fall of the Taliban regime, the security situation in Afghanistan remains 
dire. According to the well-established Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO):  
 
NGOs were again subjected [during this third quarter of 2009] to a series of serious attacks including 
murders, ambushes, abductions, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and complex attacks. … Attacks 
and threats by Armed Opposition Groups still account for 70% of all NGO incidents and produce most 
NGO casualties. Although criminal incident rates against NGOs have fallen by 50% since 2007, the 
murder rate of NGO staff has remained relatively constant and accounted for almost half of NGO 
fatalities this quarter (ANSO, p.1, 2009. Emphasis original). 
  
As a result, more than half of the country‘s thirty-four provinces are no-go areas for foreign aid 
workers. Indeed most of the victims of violence against aid worker‘s are Afghan, this ―is not surprising 
given they travel much more frequently (and often exclusively) into high-risk areas and are more 
vulnerable and exposed to general crime‖ (ANSO, p.1, 2009). 
The situation in Kabul is also is far from ideal. While the further construction of walls and fences 
effectively denies Afghans access to a good part of the city, armed opposition groups regularly 
manage to mount impressive attacks on the increasingly fortified capital. This included the assault of a 
United Nations guesthouse in the early morning of the 28 October 2009, killing five UN staff and the 
three attackers. More would have probably been killed if some of the staff, who happened to be part of 
a UN close protection team, had not taken up  weapons and fought back, effectively slowing down the 
attackers until the arrival of external support. 
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 Interview 61.  
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 Including the slapping of an Afghan minister by a DynCorp contractor in 2006. 
36
 Interview 49.  
37
 Several interviews with PMSC and humanitarian representatives, September 2006 and March 2007. DynCorp 
representatives could not be confronted with these allegations since requests for an interview were repeatedly refused.  
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The price paid by aid workers in Afghanistan since 2001 is high. In 2009 alone, ANSO reported 
19 aid workers killed,38 all Afghans. Aid workers are, however, only a tiny portion of the victims of 
violence. Afghan civilians are the greatest victims of the war. If numbers tend to render suffering 
anonymous, they are still revealing: 2,412 civilians were killed in 2009 alone (a 14 percent increase 
over 2008), including 596 by international and Afghan forces (UNAMA, p.7, 2010).  
As shown in Renouf and Carle (2007), the deterioration of the security situation has affected 
humanitarian organizations in Afghanistan, and forced them to change their operating methods and 
procedures. Most agencies reinforced their low-profile strategy, removing visible logos, using 
unmarked vehicles, reducing the expatriate presence, increasing responsibility given to local personnel 
with project management from a distance, even conducting clandestine operations. A few agencies 
repatriated their staff and put an end, temporarily or permanently, to their programmes in some parts of 
the country, or even left Afghanistan altogether. Some organizations opted for a ‗bunkerisation‘ 
strategy or for a harder stance (use of armed guards and escorts, high walls and fences, armoured 
cars, cameras, etc.) often through private security services. Chapter Six will provide a fuller picture of 
aid agencies‘ use of PMSCs in Afghanistan. 
1.2.2. A review of IAAs and PMSCs’ presence in Haiti 
Haiti is characterised by a history of military coups, violence, humanitarian crises – including 
the massive earthquake in January 2010 - and several failed attempts by the international community 
to provide security in the country. In early 2010, The International Crisis Group estimated that the 
earthquake killed an estimated 222,570 people, injured 300,572 and displaced around 2.3 million 
people at the peak of displacement. The ICG also reported that it: 
 
… produced enormous devastation that threatens political and socio-economic stability and poses huge 
recovery and reconstruction challenges. Historical institutional and governance weaknesses and deep 
poverty compound a major humanitarian crisis that could become very difficult to control if the security 
environment deteriorates further (ICG, p.i, 2010).  
 
Such dire analysis has to be located within Haiti‘s historical context. Chronic political instability 
and the government‘s historical non-delivery of services has had disastrous effects on its development. 
Up to the point, that, in 2010:  
 
[a]bout three-fourths of the population lives on less than two dollars a day and more than half live on less 
than a dollar. Between 1990 and 2007 the GDP per capita growth rate for Haiti averaged -2.1 percent. … 
Almost half the population has no access to clean drinking water one-third has no sanitary facilities, and 
only ten percent has electricity. Less than half of the children attend elementary school and more than 
half the population is illiterate. Estimates of the unemployment rates - given the size of Haiti‘s 
underground and informal economies, an accurate count is impossible - range between 50 to 70 percent. 
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 Down from 31 NGO deaths (six international and 25 Afghans) in 2008. 
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… According to the UN Development Program‘s Disaster Risk Index, Haiti is one of the most vulnerable 
countries to natural disaster. From 1900 to 1999, … Haiti experienced sixteen hurricanes, twenty-five 
major floods, one earthquake, and seven droughts. … By several indexes Haiti again, ranks close to the 
bottom. … The ‗weak state index‘, used by the Brookings Institution, ranked Haiti 129th on a list of 141 
developing or transitional countries. The independent Evaluation Group of the World Bank—using 
different measures—ranks Haiti as one of the twenty-five ‗Low Income Countries under Stress,‖ or 
countries that are ―characterized by weak policies, institutions, and governance‘ (Pace and Luzincourt, 
p.8, 2010). 
 
Although organizations involved in development activities have been present in Haiti for 
decades (Pace and Luzincourt, 2010), humanitarian agencies began large-scale operations following 
the 1991 coup against Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who had been elected President in December 1990 in 
the first democratic elections in Haitian history. In the absence of specific figures, the number of both 
international and national NGOs operating in Haiti is estimated to be somewhere between 3,000 to 
10,000.39  
The United Nations started operating in Haiti in 1993 and a Multinational Interim Force was 
created in 2004 following President Aristide‘s coerced departure. The same year, the United Nations 
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was established in response to the failing international 
initiatives in Haiti. Its mandate, as presided over by the Security Council, was to provide security and 
stability as well as support to the political process whilst bolstering human rights through international 
military, police and civilian components. Until the 2010 earthquake, the humanitarian component of the 
United Nations‘ integrated approach had been subordinated by other priorities related to stabilisation, 
reconstruction and good governance. In 2010, the Security Council reinforced the overall force levels 
of MINUSTAH and mandated it to support the humanitarian and recovery efforts in collaboration with 
OCHA and the United Nations Country Team.  
Assistance and stabilisation efforts are being implemented nearly all over the country, but it is 
Haiti‘s capital that attracts most attention. While the security situation in Port-au-Prince – and to a 
lesser extent in the city of Gonaïves – is a cause for concern, the rest of the country faces less security 
issues. The country‘s history in producing gangs and, in Port-au-Prince, the high proportion of 
extremely poor areas (slums) controlled by criminal networks, have contributed to recurrent instability 
and a kidnapping ‗industry‘. The situation had improved, in particular thanks to the 2007 MINUSTAH 
offensive against gang structures which led to a decrease in kidnappings and armed attacks, but 
politically and economically motivated unrest has still led to violent demonstrations – notably the April 
2008 riots against high food prices. Following the earthquake, stabilisation in Haiti remains subject to 
many unpredictable variables.  
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 As of October 2010, the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation, in charge of registering NGOs, was not able to 
present exact figures. Further, and given that OCHA‘s online contact directory was far too incomplete, the figures presented 
here originate from two sources identified on the Internet: the Unites States Institute for Peace stated that ―at least 3000 
NGOs‖ were operating in Haiti as of September 2009 (USIP, 2009, p.1), while Paul Collier, Professor of Economics at the 
University of Oxford, argued in a March 2010 news article that the total number of NGOs reached 10 000 (Collier, 2010, 
website). 
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The private security industry in Haiti has been growing throughout the last decade. Prior to the 
earthquake, the industry was composed essentially of around 30 locally-registered PMSCs (MJSP, 
2007) such as Thomas Sécurité or Quality SA, with only a handful of international PMSCs, including 
Control Risks, Page Group and Virtual Defense & Development International, Inc (VDI). Before the 
earthquake the services offered by local companies consisted mainly of guarding compounds and 
providing physical protection to businesses and to the small wealthy part of the population; the 
international PMSCs offered a limited number of services to international multinationals, international 
organizations and Haitian corporations and embassies. After the earthquake, an undetermined number 
of international PMSCs entered the scene, including GardaWorld, Hart Security and Triple Canopy. 
News reports indicate that some companies such as Red24 or Global Rescue reached Haiti very soon 
after the earthquake as they were privately hired to find missing foreigners (Woolhouse and Chase, 
2010, website40). As an anecdotal note, the domain name ―Haiti-Security.com‖ was registered by 
another international company only a few days after the earthquake.  
As assessed in June 2008 by the Security Advisor of a major European NGO, aid agencies in 
Haiti need to invest further in safety and security training, as well as in information sharing and 
analysis. The report, which was shared under the condition of anonymity, also recommended that ―a 
closer cooperation with other safety and security actors is envisaged, ranging from UNDSS, the Inter-
Agency Security Committee41 and private security companies‖ (Anonymous, p.5, 2008). Chapter Six 
will provide details about aid agencies‘ actual engagement with PMSCs in Haiti. 
There are many reasons why aid agencies see the use of private security services as 
presenting an opportunity to improve their work. However, as Spearin writes, ―hiring PMSCs may 
alleviate some NGO concerns, but leaves others untouched and poses new ones that must be 
managed‖ (Spearin, p.60, 2005b). At a time when the debate regarding the preservation of the 
humanitarian space42 is livelier than ever, there is no question that the presence of PMSCs adds a new 
dimension to the problem.  
 
1.3. Conclusion 
In order to build a solid foundation for this thesis, a contextual background has been provided 
on the interactions between international aid agencies and private military and security companies. By 
recalling the contemporary changes in warfare, it has been shown that humanitarian action has been 
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 The full reference of quotes originating from the Internet can be found in the Bibliography. 
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 The IASC is ―a unique inter-agency forum for coordination, policy development and decision-making involving the key UN 
and non-UN humanitarian partners‖ (IASC, 2009, website).  
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 According to the IASC, the term ―‘espace humanitaire‘ was first coined by former Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) 
President Rony Brauman, who described it in 1990 as: ―A space of freedom in which we are free to evaluate needs, free to 
monitor the distribution and use of relief goods and have a dialogue with the people‖. It still lacks a formal definition, which 
has allowed it to mean different things to different actors and organizations. The various ways in which the term has been 
used have included the following: a) the denotation of physical locations that are outside the realm of attack by any parties to 
the conflict; b) the respect for the core humanitarian principles of humanity: independence, impartiality, and neutrality; c) the 
ability of international aid and protection agencies to mitigate the situation of civilians affected by the conflict; d) the operating 
environment that is conducive to effective humanitarian action. Interestingly, and despite the absence of a common 
agreement on its definition, there is widespread understanding that in recent times, there has been a steady and incremental 
erosion of humanitarian space‖ (IASC, 2008, p.1). 
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dramatically impacted by these changes – as much as it has been part of them. While aid workers 
have increasingly been victims of acts of violence; private military and security companies have 
mushroomed. As a result of the professionalization of IAAs‘ security management, in conjunct ion with 
the diversification of the type of services provided by PMSCs, there have inevitably been small yet 
gradual exchanges between the two communities. As the brief overviews of Afghanistan and Haiti 
have shown, the scope and type of exchanges vary depending on the context. They also reinforce the 
argument that ―private military firms cannot simply be ignored: the fact that humanitarians and private 
military/security companies are operating in the same theatres means that their actions affect a mutual 
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Chapter 2 – Conceptualising Humanitarian Security: Current 
Analysis and Gaps in the Literature 
 
 






There is an abundance of academic literature on humanitarian issues. The interest in this 
subject developed incrementally at the end of the Cold War, at a time where humanitarian intervention 
was an emerging paradigm and humanitarian actors the ‗new heroes‘. However the concept of a 
humanitarian ‗action‘ soon became politicised and its reputation became more problematic. With the 
fallout from the 1993 ‗Battle of Mogadishu‘44; the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and insufficient response s 
from both Western governments and aid agencies during and after the massacres; the ironicly named 
‗humanitarian bombing‘ undertaken during the 1999 war in Kosovo; it soon became clear that 
conflictcs cannot be resolved by the distribution of aid alone. Academic literature played an important 
role in the shift in attitudes towards humanitarian intervention: from initially praising aid workers and 
advocating for a right to intervene, members of the academic world became increasingly critical of both 
humanitarian intervention and humanitarian action.  
Literature pertaining specifically to the security management of international aid agencies has 
developed gradually in the wake of the increase in acts of violence against humanitarian organizations. 
The first major work on this subject was published in 2000 by Koenraad Van Brabant in the form of a 
security manual (Van Brabant, 2000). Since then most of the literature on humanitarian security has 
been oriented towards practitioners. As a result, it is essentially published in professional journals as 
opposed to academic ones, is heavily normative and, as some have put it, ―ha[s] been elaborated as a 
series of technical responses to operational problems without meaningful policy debates among 
international agencies on coherent security strategies‖ (Bruderlein and Gassmann, p.78, 2006). The 
focus of the literature is essentially twofold: understanding the features of security incidents aid 
agencies face, and developing ideas for security management that are in line with the specific nature 
of humanitarian action. Nonetheless, as the present chapter will argue, the literature on humanitarian 
security barely tackles the diversity that exists within the aid sector; it rarely considers the specific 
identity of each humanitarian organization, which often results in inaccurate conclusions and 
uninformed suggestions. 
Academic interest in private military and security companies (PMSCs) has increased alongside 
the rise of the private security industry. Nevertheless, the number of academic contributions remains 
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1993. Somalia became after that the symbol of the unacceptable costs of humanitarian intervention. 
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relatively limited. The two main reasons for this are firstly, that security privatisation is a very recent 
phenomenon and secondly, that it was somewhat secretive for many years. Prior to 1998 (Shearer, 
1998), no systematic study had been carried out. However, following the brutal killing of four 
Blackwater private security contractors on 7 April 2004, in Fallujah, Iraq, the growing use of PMSCs 
was quickly placed under a spotlight. An increasing number of academic articles, and an even greater 
number of journalistic articles were then written on the subject. This interest can be explained by the 
‗myth‘ surrounding mercenaries, the precursors of the current PMSCs, who made it a ‗sexy‘ subject of 
study. More importantly there was an increasingly obvious necessity to better understand the 
numerous issues linked to the growing privatisation of security.  
Among the academic and non-academic books written on the subject of humanitarian action, 
none deals solely with the relations between private military and security companies and humanitarian 
actors. A few tackle the issue, but only superficially (Musah et al, 2000; Mandel, 2002; Singer, 2003; 
Avant, 2005).45 Similarly, only a limited number of academic articles focus predominantly or exclusively 
on this relationship (the most prolific authors being Cockayne, Renouf, Singer and Spearin). This can 
be explained partly by the fact that authors were primarilly interested in analysing PMSCs in relation to 
states or multinational corporations. It is only recently that authors have sought to analyse the 
relationship between security privatisation and humanitarian action. As a result, several gaps are to be 
noted. The literature fails in particular to provide an understanding of the processes that lead an 
agency to consider using private security services. While authors provide different reasons for 
choosing PMSCs, they do not shed light on the debates, hesitations or tensions that exist when an aid 
agency decides to contract a PMSC. Nor do they explain how different aid agencies come to the 
conclusion that PMSCs should be hired – or not.  
 
This chapter‘s focus is twofold: first it offers an analysis of the literature on humanitarian 
security management and then discusses its failure to study the correlation between aid agencies‘ 
identity and their approach to security. The second section examines the literature that has looked 
specifically at the interactions between PMSCs and international aid agencies (IAAs). While focusing 
on the different topics that emerge through a thematic analysis of the literature, the chapter reveals 
that the literature has failed to provide an understanding of the processes that lead an agency to 
consider using private security services.  
 In addition to referring to academic works, the literature review also includes articles, reports 
and conference outcomes written by private security and humanitarian actors. Indeed, the sources of 
information are so limited that an extensive review of available non-academic analyses and data is 
necessary.  
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2.1. The humanitarian security literature: insufficient consideration given to 
the interdependency between IAAs’ identity and their security  
 
The literature‘s focus on humanitarian security management has developed in reaction to the 
increasing numbers of security incidents aid workers have been confronted with. As explained earlier, 
until the 2000 publication of the seminal Van Brabant‘s manual (GPR8, for Good Practice Review 8, as 
it is known), only a handful of papers tackled the subject. The International Red Cross Committee 
(ICRC) published a report of a seminar on the security of humanitarian personnel in the field in 1997 
(ICRC, 1997); François Grunewald distributed a study on aid workers‘ security in 1998 (Grunewald, 
1998); Mario Bettati published an analysis of a survey regarding the ―Protection for non-governmental 
organizations on hazardous duties‖ in 1999 (Bettati, 1999). It must be noted that since 2002, Abby 
Stoddard and Adele Harmer‘s extensive work has made an important contribution to widening and 
deepening the knowledge pertaining to humanitarian security management. In addition to tackling a 
number of different sub-topics pertaining to the field of humanitarian security, their publications were 
widely distributed within the aid community, contributing to further raising awareness on the issue and 
shaping discussions around it.  
As of now, the literature that deals with humanitarian security can be divided into two major 
areas: the analysis of security incidents faced by international aid agencies; and the conceptualisation 
of humanitarian security. These two areas of study will be the subjects of the following two sub-
sections. The last sub-section will discuss the gaps in the literature and in particular the limited 
analysis of the correlation between aid agencies‘ identity and their approach to security. 
2.1.1. The literature’s analysis of IAAs’ security incidents 
Despite an increasing number of studies analysing acts of violence against aid workers since 
the mid-1990s, there remains much uncertainty about the scope and nature of security incidents. As 
explained in the previous chapter, this is as much due to incomplete information about incidents that 
occur all over the world, as it is due to a lack of a common consensus about what defines an ‗incident‘ 
or an ‗aid worker‘, or of a common denominator for the total number of aid workers. 
In 2010 Larissa Fast published a brilliant meta-analysis of the literature on humanitarian 
security incidents (Fast, 2010). She divides the literature into three categories: the ―usual suspects‖; 
those whose data originate directly from within the humanitarian community; and related research. The 
first category includes authors whose figures are most commonly cited, such as Kate Barnett; Larissa 
Fast; Elizabeth Rowley; Mani Sheik et al; and Abby Stoddard et al. The second category includes 
authors, such as Dennis King, whose data originates directly from the humanitarian community (as 
opposed to news reports or elsewhere), and aid agencies‘ own compilations of incidents. The third 
category is a body of literature that mostly examines particular issues (such as illness among 
expatriates); the use of small arms and light weapons; or specific populations (for example, a given 
NGO or region). She argues convincingly that, altogether: 
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… the data presents some contradictory findings, particularly regarding who suffers more. Among those 
counting fatalities, King suggested NGO personnel die more often than UN personnel (59 percent versus 
41 percent), and Abbott‘s research, depending on the time frame, proposed both IGOs and NGOs as 
experiencing the largest percentage of fatalities. Both rely upon news sources for their data. Sheik and 
colleagues reported NGO numbers increasing and UN and peacekeeper deaths stabilizing, and the 
ODI/CIC [Stoddard et al] study conveyed a decrease in UN and ICRC fatalities, with a shifting burden to 
NGOs and from international to national staff between 1997 and 2005. From 2006 to 2008 this changed, 
with UN and NGO rates increasing, as did the rate of attacks against international staff. Both Abbott and 
Rowley report a greater risk from armed groups or insurgents as opposed to criminals, which the 
ODI/CIC study corroborates. Buchanan and Muggah, however, offer a contradictory assertion: ‗Yet it is 
criminal violence committed with firearms — not attacks by armed combatants — that remains the most 
significant threat facing workers‘. Again, while it is difficult to compare numbers, these conflicting data 
demonstrate the challenges of research on this topic.  
Nor does the research definitively lay to rest debates about the relative impact of security and safety 
incidents. While a number of studies (Abbott, 2006; King, 2002b, 2000c; Rowley, 2005, 2007; Sheik et 
al., 2000; Stoddard et al., 2006) cite intentional violence as the cause of the majority of deaths, others 
(Lange et al., 1994; Martin, 1999; Peytremann et al., 2001; Ryan and Heiden, 1990) point to safety 
incidents as being more significant. 
Nevertheless, several patterns converge across studies. The numbers of incidents are increasing, even 
if the rates of violence fluctuate some over time. NGO staff appear to experience more risk, as do 
national staff (see Fast and Rowley, 2008). Intentional violence emerges as the leading cause of death 
(above 50 percent) in the majority of studies, with the exception of those that examined both morbidity 
and mortality. In other words, incorporating illness (for example, evacuations and missed work days) into 
the overall picture tends to reduce the import of violence for mortality figures (Fast, 2010, in press).  
 
Two points are to be taken from this meta-analysis. First, that the existing literature is 
incomplete, and focuses disproportionately on severe acts of violence as opposed to other sources of 
incident such as illnesses or stress – figures that are arguably more difficult to gather. Second that, in 
absolute terms, aid workers are increasingly finding themselves to be victims of acts of violence. In 
relative terms however, uncertainty remains, as the increasing number of incidents is paralleled by the 
increasing number of aid workers – thus confusing claims that they are actually more at risk. One must 
be aware of the fact that the current literature does not give an exact picture of the situation, though 
aid agencies and members of the academic community have increased their collaboration, notably 
through security collaboration mechanisms such as the EISF and the SAG.  
 
Another confusion which stems from the literature is that authors disagree on the reasons that 
lead aid agencies to face a real or perceived increase in acts of violence. A number of authors argue 
that sources of incidents are primarily exogenous to aid agencies. The ICRC was already observing in 
1997 that a key reason for the deterioration in aid agencies‘ security were changes in their operating 
environment: ―Until recently, humanitarian agencies had felt that they were sufficiently protected by 
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international humanitarian law, which was more or less honoured by all parties to the conflict‖ (ICRC, 
1997, website). Seven years later the ICRC maintained its position, arguing that  
 
[t]he ‗classic‘ security environment is commonly described as one where the main risk is that of finding 
oneself ‗in the wrong place at the wrong time‘. It is worth noting … that according to the ICRC‘s 
experience this type of security environment remains by far the most widespread in the world today. … It 
therefore seems legitimate to ask what is really new today. From an ICRC perspective, what is new in 
the present context is the global nature of the threat, the fact that it is not necessarily geographically 
circumscribed (Krähenbühl, p.507, 2004).  
 
Other commonly used arguments in favour of an exogenous explanation of security incidents 
are that aid agencies are targeted because they are seen as collaborating with foreign armed forces or 
are (seen as) part of UN‘s integrated approaches. For instance Barnett (2004), Krähenbühl (2004) or  
Bruderlein and Gassman (2006) argue that such ‗politicisation‘ of aid either blurs the line between aid 
agencies and military/political institutions or transfers the risks to aid agencies, seen as comparatively 
‗soft targets‘. Likewise, the literature also frequently refers to the multiplication of actors involved in the 
provision of aid, from armed forces to corporations or private military and security companies, 
contributing further to the confusion of actors on the ground and the dilution of the humanitarian 
principles. As Stoddard et al explain: 
 
A theory often cited for the apparent rise — and one that is believed deeply by certain aid organizations 
who have suspended operations as a result — is the securitization of aid by western governments in the 
global counter-terror campaign, which has created a political association of aid organizations with this 
western agenda. Another explanation has militants choosing aid institutions as soft targets, for the 
purpose of sparking conflict or general disorder. Others refute the importance of the targeting issue, 
insisting that the majority of violent incidents are crimes of opportunity having nothing whatever to do 
with politics of humanitarian action and everything to do with its material resources. … Some in the 
humanitarian community have also posited a growing environment of impunity, spurred by such events 
as abuses of prisoners under GWOT [Global War on Terror], which has had the effect of easing 
pressures on allies and foes alike to respect internationally sanctioned principles of humane treatment 
and human rights (Stoddard et al, p.36, 2006a). 
  
Some, however, disagree with the view that aid workers are victims of confusion. Hammond 
puts it best when she writes: 
 
Casting a cloud of confusion around … attacks leads to the false assumption that the perpetrators‘ 
actions can be explained as a misunderstanding or as a mistake. The implication is that clarifying roles 
and objectives, and defense of the so-called humanitarian space by which providers of relief demand or 
are guaranteed access to civilians in conflict areas, will end confusion in the minds of would-be 
attackers, thereby making aid workers safer. … The assumption that violence stems from confusion, and 
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that as such it is not purposeful or meaningful is naïve and dangerous. … Their attacks should be seen 
not as the result of extreme confusion but as deeply conscious acts aimed at exploiting humanitarian 
symbols and garnering as much attention as possible for the cause that the perpetrators believe to be 
serving (Hammond, p.176, 2008).  
 
In explaining the cause of violence perpetrated against humanitarian organizations, the 
literature also pinpoints a number of elements that are indigenous to aid agencies, these are incidents 
that they have a role in the occurrence of; this is both a systemic problem and one that varies from 
agency to agency. Regarding the former, several authors such as Grunewald (1999) and Bollettino 
(2008) argue that the sheer increase in the number of aid workers and of aid agencies as well as the 
greater involvement of aid agencies in crisis areas contributes to an increase in the risks of being 
victims of acts of violence.  
Also, Bollettino pinpoints the absence of ―common professional security standards and limited 
success with inter-agency security coordination‖ (Bollettino, p.263, 2008). In addition, participants in a 
1997 ICRC-led seminar on security considered that ―[c]ompetition for funding and the popularity 
achieved in the media and amongst donor governments when assisting victims in unsafe environments 
mean that security considerations [are] ignored or relegated to minor importance‖ (ICRC, 1997, 
website).  
Agencies are also said to be individually (partly) responsible for the deterioration of their 
security. While Grunewald denounces agencies‘ limited institutional memory, leading to poor analytical 
planning and prevention skills or policies, others have linked security incidents to the poor quality or 
relevance of programmes being implemented by some aid agencies. Bruderlein and Gassman add 
that  
 
[a] key aspect of the current insecurity is not that conflict situations have become much more violent in 
recent years, but, rather, that the staff of international agencies have become more exposed to security 
risks in conflict zones. This increased exposure to risks has much to do with agencies‘ changing 
operational objectives and methods (Bruderlein and Gassman, p.66, 2006). 
 
Joe Weber (2008) on his side recalls that individual aid workers are also to blame for their 
inappropriate behaviour. 
According to research conducted by Fast between 1999 and 2002,  
 
… four characteristics are associated with higher levels of insecurity: organizations carrying out two or 
more types of activities combined with the provision of material aid; operational organizations; those 
organizations working with both sides of a conflict; and those organizations that are more integrated into 
the local community in a country (Fast, p.140, 2007). 
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Due to the methodology adopted however, these findings are to be limited to the case studies – 
Angola, Ecuador and Sierra-Leone - used in Fast‘s study.  
 Overall, Fast argued in her 2010 meta-analysis of the literature treating of security incidents 
that  
 
… a disconnect exists between two streams of the literature in relation to causation. One stream 
advances an epidemiological approach that emphasizes ‗proximate causes‘ of violence against aid 
workers based on empirical evidence, while another tends to speculate about ‗deep causes,‘ often 
without corresponding evidentiary support (Fast, 2010, in press). 
 
She comes to the conclusion that these alternative explanations need to be studied further and, 
possibly, amended as each brings a set of different conclusions for aid agencies. Indeed, authors 
arguing that insecurity is mainly exogenous to aid agencies imply that they have a limited control over 
factors that can mitigate their insecurity. On the contrary, authors pinpointing indigenous factors imply 
that aid agencies have an important role to play in improving their security.  
Altogether, and despite much improvement by the aid sector in putting their efforts together to 
analyse security incidents that concern them, the lack of data as well as of systematic, expository, 
investigative post-incident analyses still leave aid agencies confused. Acknowledging this confusion, 
this thesis will probe further into understanding how agencies perceive insecurity, and shape their 
approach to security accordingly.  
2.1.2. The conceptualisation of humanitarian security 
The conceptualisation of humanitarian security has been a gradual process, yet much of its 
theoretical basis was put forth by Van Brabant‘s manual (Good Practice Review 8, GPR8). Three 
aspects are key in understanding this conceptualisation: the correlation between the humanitarian 
principles and humanitarian security; the development of the Security Management Framework; and 
the place of the ‗security triangle‘.  
It is worth noting here that the concept of humanitarian security developed independently from 
the concept of ‗human security‘ proposed in 1994 by the United Nations Development Programme; 
even if they share common concerns for populations‘ security, the latter holds a specific people-
centred view, while the former focuses first at the level of humanitarian organizations.  
 
2.1.2.1. The correlation between the „humanitarian principles‟ and humanitarian security: 
The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs 
in Disaster Relief has been signed by 436 aid agencies so far46. Its first four articles reaffirm what are 
known as the ‗humanitarian principles‘. They state that:  
                                               
46
 As of March 2010. As a comparison, Stoddard identifies 260 major international humanitarian NGOs (Stoddard, 2003). 
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 ―The right to receive humanitarian assistance, and to offer it, is a fundamental 
humanitarian principle which should be enjoyed by all citizens of all countries‖. This right is referred to 
the as the ‗humanitarian imperative‘. 
 ―Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without 
adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone‖. In other words 
that aid is impartial. 
 ―Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint‖. This means 
that the provision of aid is neutral. 
 ―We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy‖. This 
implies that the provision of aid is independent.  
 
Three of these principles are reiterated in the General Assembly Resolution 46/182, whereby 
―Humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the basic humanitarian principles of 
humanity, neutrality and impartiality‖. Although the scope, applicability and actual applicat ion of the 
humanitarian principles is much disputed by the literature and aid agencies alike, they are generally 
accepted as framing ‗humanitarian action‘ – i.e. assistance provided on the basis of these principles. 
 
When it comes to security a number of authors and aid agencies purport a positive correlation 
between the respect for these principles and improved security. For instance the two security manuals 
of the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC) recall that the respect for 
the ―Fundamental Principles‖ – including humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence – are a 
key component of effective security (IFRC, 2007 a, b). One of the manuals states that a way to reduce 
the likelihood of a threat is to ―operate transparently and in accordance with the fundamental 
principles‖ (IFRC, p.27, 2007b).  
This positive correlation between humanitarian principles and security is frequently 
emphasised. The Director of Operations of the ICRC recalls that  
 
… in a polarized environment there are almost always expectations that any player present on the 
ground ought to take sides. One is friend or foe, ally or enemy and, whatever the choice, a choice has to 
be made. This makes it all the more complex for organizations such as the ICRC, working on the basis 
of the principles of independence and neutrality, to get their message across. This imposed polarization 
results in an increased importance of how the legitimacy of humanitarian action and in particular of the 
ICRC‘s neutral and independent way of operating is perceived. This development entails two specific 
risks: that of being rejected and that of being instrumentalized. … In the aftermath of 11 September 
2001, the relevance of neutral, impartial and independent humanitarian action was questioned. Through 
its operations in the field, the ICRC seeks to demonstrate in concrete terms that its operational approach 
is not only credible but necessary in a polarized world (Krähenbühl, p.511, 2004). 
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In other words, the ICRC argues that the actual and perceived respect of the humanitarian 
principles contributes to it being distinct ifrom the parties to the conflict and therefore not being seen as 
a threat by anyone and this is what allows it to operate safely. Similarly, Donini et al established that:  
 
… our data shows that the higher the international political stakes are for major donors (for example, 
Iraq, and Palestinian territories), the stronger the perceived need - from the perspective of communities 
themselves - to respect humanitarian principles. … Neutrality and impartiality are not theoretical 
concepts or pie-in-the-sky constructs; they are essential ingredients for effective humanitarian action. 
―Neutrality is not an abstract notion in Iraq,‖ our country study concluded, ―but is regarded by 
communities and most remaining humanitarian organizations as an essential protection against targeted 
attack (Donini et al, p.9, 2008). 
 
Nevertheless, several authors and aid workers question the ‗protective power‘ (Hammond, 
2008) held by the humanitarian principles. For instance according to Larissa Fast,  
 
[i]mpartiality is something that many aid workers and organizations believe provides implicit protection 
from harm, but it is unclear to what extent belligerents evaluate or even take into account the perceived 
neutrality or impartiality of an agency. … We do not know if aid workers and organizations are attacked 
because the attackers perceive an organization as helping the other side (partiality to one side) or 
because of the media attention that often accompanies an attack on humanitarians, or both, or whether it 
is related more to aid agencies being ‗soft targets.‘ … It is one thing to imply an attack was political or 
targeted, and another to assume it is because of a loss of neutrality or impartiality (Fast, 2010, in press).  
 
Similarly, Laura Hammond notes that ―[l]ocal communities‘ impressions are hardly ever 
expressed in terms of the organization‘s commitment to impartiality, neutrality or independence‖ 
(Hammond, p.193, 2008). Christian Olsson (2007) deconstructs aid agencies‘ claims of neutrality by 
arguing that by operating in highly political environments, their actions are implicitly politicised by 
actors around them 
  
While the rationale for this positive correlation between humanitarian principles and security is 
based on operational experience, there are various reasons to dispute it. For instance Bruderlein and 
Gassman explain that ―[r]elying on the principle of independence is increasingly problematic 
considering the significant growth of U.N. and non-U.N. international agencies in recent years, and the 
parallel increased dependency of these agencies on large donors, such as the European Union and 
the United States who, themselves, pursue political agendas‖ (Bruderlein and Gassman, p.72, 2006). 
In addition, as an aid worker states in a professional journal, ―our humanitarian mandate fundamentally 
contradicts the interests of local parties who utilize violence to advance their interests‖ (Sherman, p.7, 
2005).  
In other words, the positive – or negative - correlations between humanitarian principles and 
security remain uncertain.  The reasons for this will be discussed later in the thesis. 
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2.1.2.2. The „Security Management Framework‟ at the core of humanitarian security: 
 With the spate of security incidents involving aid workers in the 1990s, it soon became clear 
that aid agencies had much to do to improve their approaches to their security. As Charles Rogers 
wrote in 1998,  
 
NGOs must take a new look at their approaches to security management. Given the nature of our work 
and mission, the security management model we follow is very different from that of the military or even 
multinational enterprises. We cannot operate out of secure compounds, protected by the latest high-tech 
security equipment, and venturing out only under heavily armed escort. We have a different agenda. We 
must be where the people are, to live among them and to identify with their suffering, if we are to remain 
true to our calling and organizational ethos. So, in our approach to security, the accent must be on 
prevention, not on protection (Rogers, p.2, 1998). 
 
Two years later, the GPR8 manual offered a concept of security that follows a project 
management cycle pattern - theoretically allowing organizations to tackle all of the steps for proper 
security. The ‗security management framework‘, as it is known, starts by giving consideration to the 
specificities of each organization and to each context; it continues with a risk assessment to 
understand the particular threats and the organizations‘ particular vulnerabilities; it then considers the 
‗security triangle‘ (see below), which allows framing for the next step: planning. Typically, security 
planning involves two dimensions: articulating standard operating procedures of dos and don‘ts in 
order to prevent an incident from happening, and contingency planning, which provides guidance for 
how to react when incidents actually occur. The aftermath of an incident is also addressed and the 
ways in whicg the subsequent analysis should lead to a review of the agency‘s threat, risk 
assessment, security strategy and planning.  
Several security manuals have adopted a similar approach. The IFRC security manual (IFRC, 
2007b) for instance, develops a ‗security management process‘, which includes four phases – 
assessment, planning, implementation and reviewing - all of which are mainstreamed by constant 
situational analysis. This framework means that aid agencies have a set of key security policies and 
country security plans that staff are made aware and trained in; and that the necessary resources are 
budgeted and allocated. Indeed, and contrary to the widely held belief among aid workers, 
humanitarian security is not merely a technical task whereby a security officer adds bars to windows, 
but a very strategic one, where all stakeholders are considered and where every aspect of the project 
management cycle is reviewed in order to ensure that the delivery of aid can be done reasonably 
safely and securely and with the best possible mitigating measures to avoid an incident - be it a war 
related threat, or simple crime. This then implies that security is not only the responsibility of a security 
officer, but involves all staff at every level of management, including the CEO and Board members – 
eventually allowing the organization to develop a culture of security. 
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While the security management framework provides a reasonably holistic approach to security, 
several authors remain critical of aid agencies‘ limited understanding and implementation of this 
framework. As Bruderlein and Gassman argue, ―there is a dearth of strategic thinking in the 
development of international agencies‘ security responses, and this absence is one of the most striking 
limitations on the adequate provision of security‖ (Bruderlein and Gassman, p.78, 2006). Likewise, 
Bollettino contends that ―an overly narrow focus on operational readiness for field operators […and 
lack of] strategic-level thinking about security and crisis management‖ are among the major obstacles 
to improving security management (Bollettino, p.266, 2008). In other words, these authors argue that 
the problem does not lie in the absence of a theoretical framework for humanitarian security 
management, but is due to inadequate interpretation and application of this framework by aid 
agencies. As evidence that this framework has retained relevance and is still useful for aid agencies, 
the GPR8 manual security management framework has been only little edited during its recent 
collective revision.   
 
2.1.2.3. The „security triangle‟ – a disputed concept:  
 The issue of security for humanitarian non-state actors is scarecely touched upon in the 
literature that pertainis to the wider field of International Relations. Avant however, delves further into 
this topic and what it means for the concept of security. As she explains:  
 
… international NGOs and transnational corporations think about security, and how to achieve it, 
differently than states have traditionally done and that these differences have consequences not only for 
which problems are addressed, but for whether and how violence is used in the communities where they 
operate. I describe how the efforts of non-state actors to treat issues of protection from loss as ‗apolitical‘ 
have yielded a more inclusive and process-oriented conception of security that rests on the notion of a 
security triangle – quite different from the absolute divides, enmity and emergency powers associated 
with state-based security. Because of what they see as the limits to their legitimate claims and actions, 
non-state actors have tended to use the language of security differently in ways that also portend 
different behavio(u)r. The way non-state actors have used security suggests potential for the idea of 
security itself to be transformed where non-state entities play a larger role (Avant, p.143, 2007. 
Emphasis added).  
 
A major contribution of the GPR8 manual has been the development of the ‗security triangle‘ 
concept. This concept rests on the idea that, when framing their security strategy, aid agencies have a 
choice between three different approaches, known as ‗acceptance‘, ‗protection‘, and ‗deterrence‘, 
drawn on paper as the three corners of a triangle. As the manual states:  
 
An acceptance strategy tries to reduce or remove threats by increasing the acceptance (the political and 
social ‗consent‘) for your presence and your work in a particular context (politicians and the military call 
this ‗winning hearts and minds‘). A protection strategy uses protective devices and procedures to reduce 
the vulnerability of the agency, but it does not address the threat. In technical jargon this is called 
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‗hardening the target‘. A third approach is to deter a threat by counter-threat. This ranges from legal, 
economic or political sanctions to, most prominently, a counter-threat of defensive or offensive use of 
force (Van Brabant, p.58, 2000).  
 
The manual also adds that ―acceptance is about making more friends, protection about 
sheltering at a distance, and deterrence about intimidating your enemies‖ (Van Brabant, p.58, 2000). 
Intimidation, however, is not limited to the use of force; threatening to close projects and to withdraw 
from an area is sometimes a powerful tool of pressure. Nor is acceptance limited to sharing cups of 
tea: it includes developing broad-based relationships through entering in formal agreements, 
socialising and paying attention to the need for different interactional and negotiating styles; it also 
provides guidance on meetings and how to convey messages diirectly, as well as implicit methods of 
communication such as appearance and behaviour; it tackles the politics of staff hierarchies; and 
states how the design and implementation of the programmes can enhance or lead to a loss of 
acceptance.  
What is clear from the security triangle concept is that aid agencies are primarily drawn to the 
acceptance approach. As Michael O‘Neill, head of security for Save the Children US explains, 
acceptance as a foundation for humanitarian security management conforms to IAAs values: ―because 
acceptance is consistent with this relationship-driven development approach … it is usually the 
cornerstone of effective security management in a development context‖ (O‘Neill, p.22, 2008). This 
focus on acceptance has been repeatedly confirmed by aid workers. In their ―Security Perceptions 
Survey‖, Larissa Fast and Dawn Wiest (2007) for instance show that ―Respondents [to their survey] 
rated acceptance security measures much more favorably than they did deterrence or protective 
measures‖ (p.4); also, ―respondents rated armed escort the lowest of all security measures‖ (p.12). 
Consequently, authors recommended that ―[a]gencies that privilege protective and deterrent measures 
should revisit the importance of acceptance measures as a security management strategy that makes 
staff feel more secure‖ (p.18).  
Acceptance practices are however being questioned. For instance Fast and O‘Neill recall that: 
 
[although m]ost NGOs today claim acceptance as a foundation of their security strategy, how each NGO 
implements acceptance however, differs substantially. Many take a ‗passive‘ approach, assuming that 
doing good programming will win the consent of the local population and acceptance will automatically 
follow. Others take a more ‗active‘ approach, deliberately working to gain and sustain consent from all 
stakeholders. The continuum of implementation, from passive to active, is evidence of the diverse ways 
in which NGOs apply acceptance. This diversity in implementation suggests that the acceptance 
approach remains inadequately understood in conceptual and operational terms. … A persistent and 
thorny problem with an acceptance approach is the diversity of missions, mandates and values among 
humanitarian agencies. … While many NGOs may claim to use acceptance as a primary means of 
improving the security of their staff, it is not at all clear how they define acceptance, how they implement 
it in practice, whether or not it is effective, or the circumstances under which it is, or is not, effective. 
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Many questions still surround our understanding of acceptance and its effective application (Fast, 
O‘Neill, p.6, 2010). 
 
 Likewise, a 2004 report on security of humanitarian personnel states that ―[t]here is broad 
consensus within the humanitarian sector that security management should aim for acceptance of the 
organization by all actors‖. It also underscores the different problems that come with the acceptance 
approach, including  the fact that ―acceptance requires careful image management‖; ―acceptance does 
not work for all threats‖; ―Humanitarian organizations have minimal information about how they are 
perceived‖; ―the acceptance approach is accommodating rather than challenging‖; and ―acceptance 
can be confused with leverage‖ (Barnett, p.29, 2004). 
Given the difficulties in relying solely on an acceptance, the literature repeatedly emphasises 
that aid agencies ought to implement a careful balance between the acceptance, protection and 
deterrence approaches, adapted to the specificities of each organization and each context. 
Nevertheless it is also clear that, as a concept, the ‗security triangle‘ has sometimes been poorly 
understood, where for instance  aid workers have been lead to believe that they have to choose one 
approach instead of combining all three. Due to on-going confusion about the ‗security triangle‘ 
concept, ―[t]he revised GPR abandons the concept of the triangle in order to avoid this confusion, but 
maintains a focus on these three core security approaches‖ (Harmer, p.3, 2010). 
2.1.3. The correlation between IAAs’ identity and their security is little studied in the 
literature 
It is evident to any aid worker that approaches to security vary widely from one organization to 
another. While some will have dedicated headquarter-based full-time security managers, others will 
only rely on locally recruited security focal points; while some will adopt a visible and hardened 
posture, others will opt for a low profile; while some will act as frontline organizations, other will remove 
their staff from any conflict zone. As Sam Sherman writes:  
 
… many aid agencies and their staff invoke a variety of approaches and strategies. Some focus on 
grassroots support and involvement, attempting to circumvent the dearth of public order and establish 
deeper understandings of the local society, culture, customs and politics. But an apparent waning 
respect towards the neutrality of humanitarian agencies seems to suggest additional strategies are also 
needed. Other humanitarian groups seek to more effectively manage their safety and security by sharing 
information more effectively – but the diversity of humanitarian actors and their opinions has thus far 
made this difficult. Moreover, some aid groups simply hire more security guards, and install stronger 
gates and higher walls. As NGO workers become more targeted both criminally and politically through 
robbery, kidnapping, and assault, they frequently search for approaches that can reduce their 
vulnerabilities to violence and security incidents – incidents that can eventually shut programs down 
(Sherman, p.6, 2005). 
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Oliver Behn and Madeleine Kingston argue that ―[t]he way an NGO manages risk depends 
heavily on the organizational mission and culture‖ (Behn and Kingston, p.9, 2010). 
Several authors have pinpointed how differently aid agencies approach security. Stoddard and 
Harmer for instance explain that ―[a]lthough the major United Nations and NGO humanitarian actors 
universally concur on the importance of security, in actual practice the level of sophistication and 
investment into security measures varies enormously from one to another‖ (Stoddard and Harmer, 
p.32, 2006a). According to OCHA for instance, the key elements of non-UN approaches to security are 
that: 
 
[i]n approaching security, non-UN humanitarian organizations attach paramount importance to securing 
―acceptance‖ for their actions. They manage security as an integral part of their operations, they 
decentralize this responsibility, and they ensure that it is complemented by appropriate technical support. 
These four key elements [are] acceptance, integrated management, decentralization and technical 
support (OCHA, p.2, 2004b). 
 
The report further argues that UN agencies would be well inspired to follow the NGOs‘ 
approach to security. As Stoddard and Harmer note: 
 
[i]n October 2003 the Secretary-General announced a plan to reconfigure, strengthen, and modernize 
the UN security apparatus - a process that has recently begun under the new Under Secretary General 
for the Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS). At the same time he cautioned that the United 
Nations must not ‗‗succumb to a ‗bunker mentality‘ and shrink from the work the world‘s people expect it 
to do.‘‘ Yet many of the organization‘s humanitarian agencies and their partners fear this is precisely 
what has happened since the [2003 Baghdad] Canal Hotel bombing (Stoddard and Harmer, p.32, 
2006a). 
 
This is in line with Bruderlein and Gassman‘s observations. They recall the distinction, and 
tensions, between two approaches to security - the system-based approach and the community-based 
approach - and argue that these: 
 
reflect the two distinct operational identities of the United Nations. Its first identity is as a state-based 
multilateral organization assisting its member states in fulfilling their national policy agenda. Its second 
role is as a civil society organization serving specific constituencies such as refugees, children, and 
victims of war. Debates between the two security approaches conceal the inherent political tensions 
between governmental and non-governmental institutions both in terms of operational end goals and the 
means of achieve them (Bruderlein and Gassman, p.85, 2006).  
 
Although it is clear that ―[d]ifferent contexts, organizational values, principles and missions, 
perceptions of security, risk thresholds and human and financial resources all contribute to different 
management approaches‖ (HPN, p.1, 2010), most of the work focuses primarily on the differences 
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between NGOs and UN agencies. Barnett (p.79, 2004) highlights the particularities of security 
management in different organizations, distinguishing in particular between the Red Cross / Red 
Crescent movement, UN agencies, International NGOs and local NGOs. Her report is the only 
contribution in the literature that distinguishes between such a variety of aid agencies. Although it  
gives a good description of  their different approaches to security, it does not take into account the 
conceptual and operational similarities that also exist within organizations pertaining to different type. 
For example, when a Red Cross society‘s approach to security shares similarities with an international 
NGO –as this thesis will demonstrate - distinguishing them solely on the basis of their institutional 
structure does not provide an accurate picture of the different approaches to security. Also, the report 
(like much of the literature on this subject) merely describes the different approaches to security 
without addressing the processes that lead organizations to adopt one security posture or another.  
A major contribution of the current thesis will be to provide clarity on these differences and 
similarities and the rationale behind them. It will argue in particular that each agency‘s approach to 
security is deeply influenced by its identity – and affects the identity in turn. As Bruderlein and 
Gassman rightly noted (p.68, 2006) ―the professionalization of security management is not without 
major consequences for the identities and mandates of international agencies‖. This will be returned to 
in the later empirical chapters. 
 
2.2. The literature on the PMSC-IAA nexus: insufficient consideration given to 
the processes that shape IAAs’ approach towards PMSCs  
Authors contributing to the study of the interaction between aid agencies and private military 
and security companies have contributed greatly to shaping an analytical framework with which to 
examine these interactions. Privatisation of security is only a recent phenomenon and was initially 
dealt with by aid agencies with a limited understanding of its complexities, and with little or no 
consultation with other humanitarian organizations. The literature has put the subject in the spotlight, 
allowing an open discussion and providing a number of answers to questions that had remained 
unanswered by aid agencies.  
The current section analyses this important contribution by first presenting an overview of the 
literature, then highlighting the topics discussed. Despite the literature‘s involved analysis of PMSC-
IAAs relations, it has failed to provide sufficient consideration of the processes that shape aid 
agencies‘ attitude towards private military and security companies. Mirroring the previous section, this 
section concludes that a study of aid agencies‘ identity is necessary to fully understand how they 
position themselves in regards to PMSCs.  
2.2.1. An overview of the literature studying the PMSC-IAA nexus 
Reference to PMSCs in relation to humanitarian action remained anecdotal in the academic 
literature until the end of the 1990s. While no books focusing solely on the interactions between 
PMSCs and IAAs have been written, the first paper on the subject was the 1999 report produced by a 
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joint project between CARE Canada and the University of Toronto, entitled Mean Times – 
Humanitarian Action in Complex Political Emergencies – Stark Choices, Cruel Dilemmas.  It 
recommended that ―NGOs should consider the privatization of security for humanitarian purposes‖ 
(Bryans et al., p.2, 1999). Since then no more than thirty academic articles have been published on the 
subject, and many by the same authors, in particular James Cockayne, Jean S. Renouf, Peter W. 
Singer and Christopher Spearin.  
While most authors are scholars, several authors are former aid workers, and less than a 
handful are representatives of the private security industry, with Doug Brooks in the lead for the latter 
group. As a result, the literature focuses heavily on the many real or perceived risks – rather than 
opportunities – related to the use of PMSCs. While some authors highlight the positive aspects of the 
privatisation of security, most raise concerns about it. These concerns are essentially ethical as well as 
practical and led many authors to adopt a normative approach and to providing recommendations. 
These are at times generic, but also often very detailed. Cockayne, for instance, suggests an entire 
clause that could be included when drafting contracts for private security services (Cockayne, p.31, 
2006). Many of the real and perceived risks posed by PMSCs to aid agencies are also faced by other 
users (issues of mismanagement for instance) or entities operating in the same areas as PMSCs (risk 
of being the victim of a contractor‘s wrongful action for instance). Some risks however, are limited to 
IAAs, due to the specificity of humanitarian action. The various risks and opportunities raised in the 
literature will be further elaborated below. 
Given the documented risks related to the outsourcing of security, the United States private 
military and security companies‘ association has created its own publication, the Journal of 
International Peace Operations. The ‗journal‘ however acts more as a showcase than an academic 
journal, employing no system of peer-reviewing. At the same time, it is said to be widely read47 and 
regularly publishes articles related to humanitarian assistance.48 Although not academic, publications 
of this nature are useful from a research perspective as they offer an opportunity to examine the 
industry‘s views on international assistance. 
Outside of this publication, the number of authors from the private security industry and the 
scope of their writing, especially on their interactions with humanitarian actors, remains minimal. This 
may be an indicator that contractors are less interested or preoccupied with IAAs than aid workers and 
researchers are by PMSCs engaging with the humanitarian sector. 
Until recently, there were no publications providing a comprehensive picture of the state of 
relations between private military and security companies and aid agencies. Tony Vaux, Chris Seiple, 
Greg Nakano and Koenraad Van Brabant published a report in 2002, but it was based on a survey of 
twenty organizations only; as it states, ―the scope of the studies is not exhaustive, but rather a 
snapshot of the issue‖ (Vaux et al, p.6, 2006). Later, both Singer and Cockayne based their respective 
                                               
47
 According to the IPOA website: ―In January 2007, the Journal was described by The Philadelphia Inquirer as one of the 
most influential periodicals in publication today. Published bi-monthly, the Journal has a combined print and online circulation 
of more than 16,000 copies, and is read by senior executives, government policymakers, and practitioners in the field of 
peace operations.‖ IPOA (undated, website). 
48
 One of the author‘s articles originally published in a humanitarian publication has been republished in the JIPO. 
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papers on evidence through extensive number and types of interviews (Singer, 2006; Cockayne, 
2006). Many authors however encouraged further research and reflections on the subject. This 
happened with the publication in 2008 of the ODI HPG report on The use of private security providers 
and services in humanitarian operations written by Abby Stoddard, Adele Harmer and Victoria 
DiDomenico (Stoddard et al, 2008).49  
The 2008 ODI HPG report provides the only comprehensive picture through ―the map[ping] of 
practices, the examin[ation] of trends in contracting and related policies, the approach of the private 
security industry towards humanitarian interests, as well as the potential implications of interaction 
between these two sectors‖ (Stoddard et al, p.1, 2008). This report is based on 241 key informant 
interviews and a survey. According to the authors:  
 
[t]he survey fell short of its response target, which was not a numerical goal but rather intended to obtain 
broad representation. However, the survey did meet the target of garnering responses from all UN IASC 
members, all of the largest NGOs and the participation of mid-range and smaller NGOs. As such, the 
authors are confident that the survey responses provide a reasonably representative picture of PSP 
(private security providers) usage internationally, with the important caveat that findings do not 
necessarily reflect the practice of the national Red Cross societies and the IFRC (Stoddard et al, p.5, 
2008).  
 
While all of the respondents to the survey as well as the vast majority of key informants were 
employed by NGOs, the United Nations or the Red Cross movement, only thirty-two security providers 
were interviewed. The report therefore offers an approach which strongly emphasises the 
humanitarian viewpoint. Nonetheless, the ODI report represents the only comprehensive picture to 
date of the humanitarian sector‘s use of PMSCs, and as such will be referred to frequently in the 
present thesis. 
Between this thesis and the ODI report there exist several important differences in researching 
the subject. While the present thesis looks only at private military and security companies, the ODI 
HPG study‘s definition of private security providers is wider as it encompasses not only PMSCs but 
also ―any arrangements paid for by a humanitarian agency for a security service or function‖ (Stoddard 
et al, p.4, 2008). Security services provided by PMSCs, governments or militia are thus also taken into 
consideration. Such a scope is in line with the report‘s stated objective to study the use of private 
security providers and services by humanitarian agencies. However, it does not offer a conceptual 
reflection on the different issues and questions related to the privatisation of security in the realm of 
humanitarian operations. For this reason and by its nature – even if providing a crucial analysis of the 
interactions between PSPs and IAAs – the report is only a snapshot that will become rapidly outdated.  
                                               
49
 The author peer-reviewed the ODI HPG report and participated in the dissemination of its findings through the European 
Interagency Security Forum. 
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While there existed no lack of interest in understanding the interactions between PMSCs and 
IAAs, the reasons why it proved so difficult to provide a comprehensive picture are well explained by 
Cockayne, who writes that: 
 
… the lack of discussion seems to result from a combination of factors:  
. ‗embarrassment‘ amongst users because of the ‗tension between the moral or ethical high ground that 
they want to take… and the ethical deviations that some of these security needs require‘, which even 
produce ‗feelings of horror and outrage of having to work with … private security service providers‘   
. attendant ‗sensitivity‘ to the bad publicity for users that might result from them openly discussing their 
use of commercial providers    
 . concern about the proprietary nature of contractual information  
. a preference for focusing attention on state failures to provide security for humanitarian staff, rather 
than commercial solutions 
. a consensus that security is ‗a prerogative of the particular agency‘, not properly a matter for other 
organizations to comment upon (Cockayne, p.7, 2006).   
 
Several authors highlight the lack of transparency on this subject from both IAAs and PMSCs 
(Vaux et al, 2002; Singer, 2006; Stoddard et al, 2008). While aid workers remain discrete as they are 
concerned with organizational reputational risks, contractors refer to contractual obligations that forbid 
them from disclosing any information that may, in their opinion, jeopardise these contracts. The 
challenge of obtaining information from both IAAs and PMSCs even drove Michael Von Tangen to 
boldly name his paper “Private Security Should Not Be A Grubby Little Secret‖ (Von Tangen, 2004). 
Similarly, Stoddard et al specify in their report that due to the sensitivities of this subject area, their 
study ―included writing a ‗Confidentiality Undertaking‘, which was then reviewed and endorsed by the 
UN‘s Office of Legal Affairs to ensure careful use of any sensitive security information. ...  Even with 
these confidentiality assurances in place, however, the research team encountered difficulties in 
accessing some of the key United Nations individuals deemed important to the research‖ (Stoddard et 
al, p.6, 2008). In the case of the present thesis, as an active member of the nascent humanitarian 
security community, the author faced no major difficulties in reaching the relevant key informants, 
which wil be furthur discussed in the next chapter. 
Interestingly, despite the fact that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) plays a 
major role among the humanitarian actors in dealing with PMSCs, this role is rarely mentioned in the 
literature, nor sufficiently analysed. In common with other IAAs, the ICRC‘s interaction with PMSCs 
can be studied both from a user‘s and a stakeholder‘s perspective. It shares, along with other aid 
agencies, the occasional use of private security services as well as sharing a presence in the same 
operational areas as PMSCs. In addition, however, the ICRC‘s involvement with the private security 
industry is also unique since part of its mandate is to engage with all armed actors present in conflict 
zones – mainly in order to disseminate the fundamentals of international humanitarian law. Few 
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authors however study the ICRC‘s specific role in dealing with PMSCs.50 This thesis will attempt to 
further the understanding of the implications of this peculiar interaction.  
2.2.2. The literature focuses on a limited number of topics 
All the authors studying the interactions between PMSCs and IAAs agree that the privatisation 
of security has direct and indirect links with humanitarian action. Sometimes these links are 
conceptually defined, Christian Olsson for instance suggests that the two sectors share existential 
characteristics which make them look similar in the eyes of the local populations where they intervene 
(Olsson, 2007), but most of the time these links are very practically demonstrated. Singer for instance, 
begins several of his papers by presenting the types of activities once reserved for the traditional aid 
actors that have now been outsourced to the private security industry. Other authors put an emphasis 
on the security services of all sorts being contracted by the aid agencies, and going as far as calling 
PMSCs ‗aid enablers‘.  
Since the direct and indirect links between the two communities are not in doubt, some authors 
then analyse the reasons and the ways these two communities have become closer with time. Several 
insist on the fact that IAAs start using private security services after a security incident or following a 
deterioration of security in a given area. According to Stoddard et al (2008), perceived savings in staff 
costs and time, as well as administrative flexibility are also reasons - particularly for the UN and 
international organizations. NGOs, for their part, identified a lack of in-house expertise as among the 
most important reasons for contracting out security; which they do so for risk analysis, staff training, 
professional advice on managing a particular crisis such as a kidnapping, armed and unarmed 
protection, etc. Several authors also pinpoint the liability concerns from IAA management. In addition, 
Vaux et al (2002) explain that following a shift in the way security is managed, the outsourcing of 
security management became more acceptable, or sometimes was seen as the ‗least bad‘ solution. 
According to Vaux et al: ―American NGOs use security companies not because they want to but 
because they must‖ (Vaux et al, p.26, 2002). While these arguments focus on IAA‘s move toward 
increased outsourcing of components of their security, some authors such as Singer or Stoddard et al, 
also look at the dynamics from the other side. They show how the humanitarian sector has been 
considered by the security industry as a potential ‗golden pot‘, firstly for the potential scope of contract 
opportunities, but also for the fact that working with IAAs enhances their image and contributes to their 
legitimisation.   
 
The bulk of the literature focuses on the pros and cons of outsourcing security. The list of 
arguments in favour of, or against, the use of PMSCs is long and touches upon a whole range of 
different issues. The author has nevertheless identified five thematic areas into which arguments can 
be classified:  
                                               
50
 Among others: Singer (2006); Cockayne (2006); Carbonnier (2006); Avant, (2007); Spearin, (2008). 
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Identity: this theme relates to the identity of the two sectors, in particular how this relates to 
their ethos and personnel, and the consequences of interaction on their respective activities (Shearer 
1998; Von Tangen, 2004; Bjork and Jones, 2005; Singer, 2006; Spearin, 2007b; Stoddard et al, 2008);  
Ethics: many ethical concerns are raised in the literature, sometimes related to the general 
privatisation of security and other times limited to the interactions between private security providers 
and IAAs (Mills and Stremlau, 1999; Von Tangen, 2004; Spearin, 2005; Cockyane, 2006; Olsson, 
2007); 
Operational issues: including the question of costs, staff selection, contract management, 
payment practices, etc (Cillers and Mason, 1999; Musah and Fayemi, 2002; Vaux et al, 2002; Singer, 
2003, 2004; Spearin, 2005a; Cockayne 2006, 2008);  
Accountability and regulation of PMSCs: explores how PMSCs are regulated (or not), what 
proposals are made to improve this regulatory framework and what is, or could be, the place of 
humanitarian actors in this process; and 
Peace operations related issues: this thematic area studies the role of PMSCs in peacekeeping 
operations as well as in peace-building, and consequences for those processes.  
Apart from the last two themes which extend well beyond the scope of the present thesis, all of 
these arguments are developed below.51 As noted above, the literature focuses far more on the 
concerns raised by the privatisation of security than on praising the opportunities created by them. 
 
2.2.2.1. An analysis of the arguments pertaining to PMSCs and IAAs‟ identity: 
According to the different authors, the issues and concerns related to the appearance of those 
new actors in areas traditionally occupied by humanitarian actors are numerous, although largely 
interrelated. The research has established four categories in which the arguments related to the 
‗identity‘ of the two sectors can be considered: culture clash, perception, competition and 
independence.  
 
Culture clash.  
As Singer writes:  
 
[t]he first and perhaps most obvious source of tension arises from the very different worlds that military 
firms and humanitarian agencies inhabit, and the possibilities for misunderstanding that this contains. … 
Firms come in with their own expectations, often shaped by their particular military background, and 
often have trouble understanding, not only individual NGOs, but the humanitarian endeavour as a whole 
(Singer, p.72, 2006).  
 
Such fundamental differences in identity have consequences on how each understand security 
management. As Spearin explains:  
                                               
51
 More information related to the accountability and regulation of PMSCs and Peace operations related issues can be found 
in the Appendix 1. 
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PMSC clients instinctively want ‗hardening‘ and PMSC personnel are drawn from the ranks of state 
security sectors with a mindset of physical force protection. PMSC understanding of RDA [relief and 
development agencies] operations is important to ensure feasibility and appropriateness of security 
advice to facilitate a humanitarian agenda; humanitarian clientele demand a different approach due to 
the need to be close to communities in need. Nevertheless, PMSCs are not often keen to ‗learn‘ about 
humanitarian requirements, preferring instead a more uniform approach towards their client base 
(Spearin, p.41, 2007b).  
 
Also, Kjell Bjork and Richard Jones (p.782, 2005) explain that ―in reality, private security 
companies have little to do with civilian security. … It is the background of the personnel of the private 
security companies that points to the organizational philosophy behind them, many being former 
soldiers.‖ Confirming this, Stoddard et al show that ―[m]any [respondents to the survey] noted that 
these companies have not adapted their products for humanitarian clients, and lacked a solid 
understanding of the sector‖ (Stoddard et al, p.23, 2008). 
However, the same remark can be made the other way. Several security contractors 
interviewed for this research were found to praise aid workers in public, though in private they would, 
more often than not, be critical of them. The literature focuses on the perceptions of PMSCs by their 
clients rather than the opposite. While it makes sense to study the service providers, it is also a missed 
opportunity not to also attempt to understand the provider-user dynamics. With this in mind, Chapter 
Six of this thesis will then also offer a view on how contractors perceive aid workers. 
The culture clash between security contractors and aid workers is at times exacerbated by the 
dubious connections or history of PMSCs and/or their employees. Singer for instance explains that 
―[m]any former members of the most notorious and ruthless units of the Soviet and apartheid South 
Africa regimes have found employment in the private military industry, including with firms working for 
humanitarian clients in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Iraq, Sudan and the DRC‖ (Singer, p.73, 2006). Aid 
workers are thus not very keen to work, or be affiliated, with such individuals.  
In addition, Von Tangen warns of possible conflicts of interest that need to be taken into 
consideration when employing private security guards: ―Just as bouncers in bars and night clubs have 
been known to foment trouble in order to justify their employment, private military and security 
companies have a potential self-interest in ensuring that the situation does not become too safe‖ (Von 
Tangen, p.10, 2004). Similarly, Singer argues that ―[p]rivatisation of any type always has positive and 
negative effects. This is particularly true in the military sphere, where profit motives further cloud the 
fog of war‖ (Singer, p.16, 2004). The difference between organizational culture and ethos – making 
profit versus delivering aid – is another reason provided by authors to explain the culture clash 
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Perception.  
Developing close relations with humanitarian actors is important for the PMSCs for two 
reasons. First, because by meeting a demand, they might potentially gain some contracts, and second, 
because: ―[t]hese companies clearly see their future growth and prosperity depending in part on their 
perceived legitimacy‖ (Shearer, p.76, 1998). Spearin writes that ―collaboration between NGOs and 
PMSCs serves as a way for PMSCs to enhance their reputation, given the political and moral salience 
of humanitarian activities‖ (Spearin, p.47, 2005b). On the humanitarian actors‘ side however, 
numerous authors agree that the use of PMSCs might actually compromise their perception by the 
local communities, parties to the conflict, as well as by donors, both institutional and individual. Worse 
still, Vaux et al. argue that such a stance ―could be perceived by warring factions as increasing the 
stakes and could lead to reprisals‖ (Vaux et al, p.21, 2002). Karen A. Mingst (2005), Bjork and Jones 
(2005), and Cockayne (2006) agree that the use of PMSCs by IAAs contributes to the blurring of lines 
between the military and humanitarians; being associated with a party to the conflict can actually 
increase the IAAs‘ insecurity. Robert Mandel explains clearly that ―[t]he fundamental feature of 
humanitarian operations is precisely their humanitarian character, and this can only be undermined, 
and may well be destroyed, if they are delivered at gunpoint‖ (Mandel, p.19, 2002. Emphasis original). 
These arguments however are not always pertinent since many of the services provided by PMSCs do 
not include the provision of armed services nor are they actually provided in active war zones.  
 
Competition.  
The idea, developed by Cockayne, is that PMSCs and IAAs enter into competition over 
different resources regarding: personnel (IAAs‘ security staff salaries cannot match those of the 
PMSCs); services provided (―the provision of products and services which require less focus on 
‗acceptance‘ model‖ (Cockayne, p.23, 2006)); as well as for donors‘ funds. Indeed, Cockayne argues 
that ―competition will not only see humanitarian groups assuming a direct security service provision 
role – it may also see some security providers branching out, beyond security and reconstruction work, 
into providing humanitarian assistance type services – for a profit‖ (Cockayne, p.24, 2006). He then 
concludes ―[t]he danger is that this will lead to a commercialization of the humanitarian space. That 
also opens up the humanitarian space for politicization, and even, weaponization‖ (Cockayne, p.24, 
2006). Whatever the scale of such a phenomenon, it does contribute to blurring the distinctions 
between humanitarians and the other actors operating in the field.  
 
Independence.  
Some argue that, thanks to the privatisation of security, humanitarian actors‘ protection would 
not depend on any public means (Cockayne, 2006). Further, Bryans et al argue in their report that 
IAAs should look for private protection, precisely to protect the humanitarian space (Bryans et al, p.2, 
1999). On the other hand, Shearer in particular, insists on the close relations between the private 
military and security companies and their home government: ―although their activities appear to be 
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those of an independent commercial enterprise, few act outside the national interests of the home 
states‖ (Shearer, p.34, 1998). Sharing this concern, Mandel explains that ―[t]he UNSC has recently 
decided to use private intelligence companies (…). However, UN diplomats are afraid that these 
officials will use their assignment to spy on foreign governments and pass the information on to home 
government intelligence agencies‖ (Mandel, p.22, 2002).  
 
The reflections along these four themes (culture clash, perception, competition and 
independence) highlight some of the aspects related to the specific identities of aid agencies. There is 
nevertheless a major gap in the literature, as authors do not relate aid agencies‘ interactions with 
private military and security companies to their different identities. Apart from distinguishing the use of 
PMSCs by UN agencies as opposed to NGOs, or, in one occasion, between American NGOs and 
European ones, the literature fails to consider how interactions are shaped by each aid agency ‘s 
unique identity. 
 
2.2.2.2. An analysis of the arguments pertaining to PMSCs and IAAs‟ ethics: 
Many ethical concerns are raised in the literature, some are related to the privatisation of 
security in general and others are limited to the interactions between private security providers and 
IAAs. Concerns about the outsourcing of security have existed since security was first outsourced. As 
shown elsewhere (Renouf, 2007b) there have always been voices critical of mercenaries, from the 
Carthaginian General Hamilcar, to Machiavelli, to Human Rights Watch. However, as the literature has 
shown, PMSCs‘ entrance in the humanitarian field has exacerbated some of these traditional concerns 
as well as creating new ones. 
The ethical arguments developed in the literature are here distinguished between PMSCs 
general impact on ‗conflict dynamics‘, on the ‗humanitarian principles‘ and on the IAAs‘ ‗reputation‘.  
 
Conflict dynamics.  
Slabbert argues that the problem is that: 
 
[PMSCs] cannot address the basic sources of insecurity, which characteristically lie in bad governance, 
social inequality and the highly uneven distribution of political and economic costs and benefits. Their 
presence is inherently temporary, and they may give their employers a misleading sense of 
invulnerability that reduces the incentive to seek lasting negotiated solutions to problems of political 
orders. They also have inherently tense relationships, not only with the ―rebels‖ against whom they are 
fighting, but also with the ―national‖ armies that they displace, and may well be used to control. (Slabbert, 
in Mandel, p.18, 2002).  
 
Similarly, Von Tangen explicitly states: ―I would like to stress that humanitarians must be aware 
of the potentially negative consequences of employing private firms and recognise that in doing so 
they will inevitably change the dynamics of a conflict‖ (Von Tangen, p.10, 2004).  
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Cockayne is equally direct and contends that: 
 
[t]he use of commercial security providers (particularly local commercial outfits) in the ‗humanitarian 
space‘ and in the immediate post-conflict setting may, if poorly managed, risk not only contributing to the 
insecurity of assistance providers‘ own staff, but also risk contributing to the insecurity of the local public 
in the medium to long term, by significantly impacting upon or even setting the parameters of possibility 
of subsequent security sector reform and related developmental strategies (Cockayne, p.28, 2006).  
 
The above led several authors, including Singer (2004, 2006)  and Renouf (2007a), to warn 
humanitarian users to weigh carefully the humanitarian impact they will have the potential  to provide 
by being on the ground in the short term, against the harm such contracts might potentially cause in 
the medium-longer term.  
This said, the literature also recognises that the use of private military and security companies 
can be beneficial both for the outcomes of a conflict (Shearer‘s position) and for the victims of the 
conflict. While Von Tangen (p.9, 2004) considered that ―the use of PMFs [private military firms] is not 
necessarily a bad thing,‖ Singer recalls that: 
 
[p]erhaps the largest humanitarian action carried out via private military forces was the construction and 
operation of aid camps housing hundreds of thousands of refugees during the Kosovo crisis of 1999. 
While the outcomes are generally credited to the US army, the task was in fact outsourced to 
Halliburton‘s controversial KBR division, working with UNHCR and international aid groups (Singer, p.70, 
2006).  
 
According to Greg Mills and John Stremlau, ―[i]n the horrific case of the predominantly 
Rwandan Hutu refugee camps in Eastern Zaire, mercenaries were desperately needed to provide 
minimal security for civilians and foreign aid workers‖ (Mills and Stremlau, p.7, 1999). When facing 
devastation in the field, it is human to look for immediate, pragmatic solutions; this relates directly to 
the concept of ‗responsibility to protect‘.52 Deborah Avant (2005) highlights the existing debate 
between those who suggest that NGOs are not the appropriate instruments to protect people and 
those who argue that, given the international community‘s lack of commitment, NGOs have a 
responsibility to protect the people whose life is in direct and immediate danger. Spearin nevertheless 
explains that, although sometimes providing physical protection is much more important than the 
provision of goods, ―[c]ollaboration between NGO and PMSCs, for its part, cannot provide the needed 
protection for civilians, however humane it might be. This is because PMSCs only sell defensive 
services to NGOs‖ (Spearin, p.56, 2005b).  
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  ―The international community has a responsibility to protect the world‘s populations from genocide, massive human rights 
abuses and other humanitarian crises. This responsibility to prevent, react to and rebuild following such crises rests first and 
foremost with each individual state. When states manifestly fail to protect their populations, the international community 
shares a collective responsibility to respond. This response should be the exercise of first peaceful, and then, if necessary, 
coercive, including forceful, steps to protect civilians‖ (Responsibility to protect, Undated, website).  
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Despite the vocal insistence by the security industry that they are ready to be deployed to 
ensure vulnerable populations‘ security, Cockayne notes that ―[t]o date, there are very few cases of 
formalized private security companies being contracted by the UN or other groups to provide 
protection to specific third-party vulnerable populations‖ (Cockayne, p.12, 2006). 
On the question of whether ―private military and security companies have a role in ensuring the 
security of local populations and aid workers,‖ Renouf concludes that  
 
the answer actually depends on the context, which must be carefully weighed and considered before any 
decision can be taken. Since all context analysis is itself influenced by the mindset of the analyst, 
someone sympathetic to the neo-liberal doctrine of increased privatisation might be more receptive to 
going private. A deep understanding of local culture is therefore absolutely essential (Renouf, p.33, 
2007a).  
 
Additionally, according to the classic security dilemma,53 the decision of some NGOs to use 
private military and security companies to ensure their physical protection has a double impact on 
those around them. On the one hand, the neighbours feel less protected as compared to 
humanitarians that have hired private agents, and on the other hand, armed groups might be more 
inclined to attack those who are less protected. Therefore, if they have the means, those neighbours 
might well be interested in investing in armed protection, contributing to an escalation of stakes and a 
localised arms race.  
In all cases, and as argued by several authors (Bjork and Jones, Mingst, Spearin, Cockayne, 
Renouf), the presence of security companies has also contributed to a further blurring of the lines 
among the various actors operating in the field and could have negative impacts on the preservation of 
humanitarian space. Cockayne for instance writes that  
 
[u]sing a commercial security provider may risk associating a group with a party to a conflict because the 
provider and that party share a style of dress, ethnic or social ties, formalized commercial links or 
because personnel working for the provider were previously associated with the party to the conflict. This 
jeopardizes humanitarians‘ perceived neutrality, impartiality and independence, and risks blurring 
humanitarian action and military intervention. The resulting confusion can have a serious negative 
impact on staff security for the user, and for other humanitarian groups (Cockayne, p.21, 2006). 
  
This confusion contributes to the shrinking of humanitarian space. Cockayne suggests that the 
convergence between security providers and humanitarian assistance providers through the use of 
related security staff or through the development of not-for-profit security services, ―may render 
humanitarian and commercial security providers strategic competitors for donor funds‖ and therefore 
led to a merchandising and a ―commercialization‖ of the humanitarian space (Cockayne, p.24 ,2006). 
                                               
53
 According to this dilemma, the improvement of the protection of a unity (whether at state, intra-state or individual level), 
creates always a feeling of insecurity among its neighbour; consequently, those last will also look to improve their protection 
and therefore contribute to an escalation of the tension. 
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He adds elsewhere that ―[h]umanitarians face similarly fundamental questions about whether turning to 
the global security industry increases staff security, or in fact blurs the boundaries of humanitarian 
space by associating humanitarians with military actors‖ (Cockayne, p.13, 2008a). While IAAs are 
often depicted as victims of this blur, Mingst recalls that, they also bear a responsibility for it, notably 
by accepting funding from parties to a conflict (USAID funding in Iraq for instance) but also through a 
further militarization of their security management.  
 
Humanitarian principles.  
As seen in the previous section, humanitarian actors operating in complex environments 
ensure their security with a mixture of acceptance, protection and deterrence. Seeking proximity to the 
population living in the areas in which they intervene, IAAs have generally preferred the acceptance 
approach. Implementing and communicating the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, 
independence and humanity have granted them some legitimacy to intervene in areas where other 
actors were refused access.  
Several authors argue that there is a trade-off between pragmatism and humanitarian ethics 
within the humanitarian sector. For instance, Singer explains that ―by hiring armed guards, agencies 
risk losing the perception of neutrality that they rely on to maintain their access and ensure their 
immunity from attack. Like it or not, they risk becoming associated with one or other side in the conflict, 
potentially undermining acceptance of their presence by local actors‖ (Singer, p.69, 2006). He also 
states that  
 
[t]he presence of firms might jeopardise norms of neutrality among aid groups and lead to a further 
multiplication of armed forces on the ground. Finally, if the work of PMFs [private military firms] were 
limited only to the protection of aid workers and facilities, external threats might be diverted to less well 
protected local poor and refugees. Humanitarian compounds could therefore become another symptom 
of the ―secession of the successful‖ that now characterises the split between rich and poor (Singer, p.17, 
2004). 
 
This in turn, as Von Tangen (2004) and Olsson (2007) remind us, contributes to the erosion of 
IAAs‘ acceptance by the local stakeholders, and even beneficiaries of their programmes, and as result, 
to the decrease in their security and reputations. The dynamics introduced here will be examined 
further in the empirical chapters of this thesis. 
 
Reputation.  
Along with Cockayne, several authors express the concern that ―[t]here is a genuine risk of 
highly negative publicity for organizations operating in humanitarian and post-conflict settings as a 
result of their association with commercial providers that commit abuses elsewhere‖ (Cockayne, p.21, 
2006). And as will be shown below, IAAs still have a long way to go if they wish to reduce the risks – 
including reputational risks – related to the use of PMSCs. For their part, PMSCs are keen to develop 
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further contracts and relationships in order to enhance their own image. Looking at these dynamics it 
seems that, in terms of reputation, the affiliation between PMSCs and IAAs is a win-lose game.  
Given IAAs‘ strong ethical discourses, it is surprising to notice that there is virtually no debate in 
the literature about whether aid agencies should even consider using private military and security 
companies – often seen as ‗descendants‘ of mercenaries. Following this line, one could argue that aid 
agencies ought not to contract PMSCs due to ethical considerations. It seems however that this aspect 
of the debate has been put to one side as authors and aid workers alike have implicitly accepted that 
aid agencies need security and that PMSCs fill in the gap.  
 
2.2.2.3. An analysis of the arguments pertaining to PMSCs and IAAs‟ operational issues:  
The reflection around the question of operational management touches on four points: cost, 
efficiency, market rules, and contractual relations between PMSCs and IAAs.  
 
Cost.  
One major argument in support of the use of private military and security companies lies in the 
real or perceived savings an organization will gain from outsourcing its security management to a 
PMSC. As Cockayne notes, using a PMSC may ―reduce costs of administration, training and 
replacement as staff turnover or are relocated, and also reducing insurance and opportunity costs 
(because of the freeing up of staff that would otherwise be tied down providing security)‖ (Cockayne, 
p.10, 2006). To illustrate the scale of these savings several authors compare the costs of an United 
Nations operation to the costs incurred by a using PMSCs, usually through the case studies of 
Rwanda and Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo in 1994-1995 and Sierra Leone in 1996, and 
conclude that the latter are empirically less expensive.  
On the opposite side of the argument, Singer suggests that ―it is not clear that outsourcing 
always saves money‖ (Singer, p.156, 2003) notably because, given the PMSCs‘ ‗propensity toward 
profit‘, when for instance: ―the payment amount is determined by length of time, then it is likely the firm 
will bill up to the maximum allowable period‖ (Singer, p.156, 2003). He argues that ―clear tensions 
always exist between the security goals of clients and the firm‘s desire for profit maximization‖ (Singer, 
p.151,  2003). Spearin reaches a similar conclusion, arguing that an NGO contracting a PMSC might 
very well face financial difficulties, precisely because of this type of contract (Spearin, 2005a).  
In addition, Cockayne also looks at payment practices and shows that they may affect either 
positively or negatively on the distribution of power between the leadership and their employees 
depending on whether the redistribution of income is equal or not, ―and thus may affect whether the 
use of commercial providers will benefit the local public generally, or private social groups‖ (Cockayne, 
p.20, 2006). 
Lastly, as highlighted by several authors (Spearin, Vaux et al., Singer, Carbonnier, Cockayne, 
Avant), the problem is that security is not an entitlement, a public good, but a luxury as it is reserved 
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for those who can pay. Thus, the impact for the humanitarians using PMSCs is the risk of alienating 
the local population, who cannot afford the same level of protection.  
 
Efficiency.  
Regarding the cost argument, those in support of PMSCs suggest that because of their 
corporate structure, and therefore business-oriented strategies, PMSCs offer the potential of greater 
flexibility and agility than states or international organizations. 
Conversely, using the examples of the company GSG in Sierra Leone in 1995 and of the 
contractors that refused to transport goods on the famously dangerous road between Ramadi and 
Baghdad in 2004, Singer and Avant question PMSCs‘ or the reliability of their personnel. Going further, 
Olsson argues that: 
 
… the argument of efficiency, notably of military efficiency, simply misses the point. Indeed, what is 
focused upon here is not only on the role of the PMCs per se but also on the capacity based approach 
— as opposed to effect-based approach — that leads to their involvement in contemporary conflicts. 
Indeed, by analyzing PMCs as purely technical and apolitical tools, one necessarily fails to grasp these 
political and structural de-legitimizing effects. Only a political reading, that is, a reading that considers the 
effects of processes of (de-)politicization and (de-)legitimization on social relations, can account for the 
fact that the privatizing trend might have important political consequences (Olsson, p.349, 2007).  
 
In a similar way Anna Leander also deconstructs the notion of efficiency of the private security sector 
(Leander, 2005). 
 
Market rules.  
In complex environments humanitarian actors have several means of ensuring their physical 
protection, these include hiring local informal security services, moonlighting state security forces or 
international private military and security companies. Also, when IAAs do not want to become 
associated with a particular group (ethnic group, clan, or any party to the conflict) through establishing 
protection arrangements with them, or when there are no public means available to ensure protection, 
PMSCs can be seen as the most appropriate means of obtaining protection because of their corporate 
structures. Some authors argue that signing a contract with a corporation might offer a sense of 
formality – a framework based on familiar contractual standards.  
In addition, Cockayne and others contend that hiring a PMSC may ―reduce organizational 
exposure to liability for harm to staff and third parties, because of contractual arrangements that shift 
the risk to the security provider‖ (Cockayne, p.10, 2006). However, the question of who is morally 
responsible in case of harm remains unanswered.  
A positive side of competition among security providers is that they must offer the best quality 
services when bidding. Nevertheless, Singer explains that when there are many PMSCs in 
competition, this might well have the opposite effect and therefore lead to a decrease in standards 
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(Singer, p.18, 2003). In order to reduce their prices, PMSCs might for instance recruit less competent 
or experienced personnel. It is then up to those who make the selection to be responsible for 
adequately balancing cost and quality of service.  
Another issue raised by Singer and Avant is that because a client‘s expertise and capabilities 
decrease when outsourcing functions, the organization then becomes more dependent upon the 
service provider (Singer, p.78, 2003) which in turn increases the probability that the contract will be 
extended. 
 
Contractual relations.  
The wide range of services that PMSCs offer is of real interest to IAAs. These services range 
from logistical support, context analysis, crisis and risk management to training, demining and physical 
protection of people, assets and goods. According to Stoddard et al, ―[t]he global survey findings and 
interviews suggest that support services such as training are on the whole very positively viewed‖ 
(Stoddard et al, p.23, 2008). Spearin argues that in very dangerous contexts that are unattractive to 
humanitarian personnel, protection through PMSCs might give a sense of better security and therefore 
play a role in the recruitment of humanitarian personnel for those places (Spearin, 2005a). He also 
writes that for IAAs that are already paying for security services from dubious providers such as militia, 
governmental forces, a party to a conflict or others, the use of a PMSC may actually regularise the 
provision of their security (Singer, p.71, 2006). 
Once the decision to hire a PMSC is taken, authors nevertheless underscore the issues that 
come with it. Firtsly, at the selection level, humanitarian actors face many challenges in choosing the 
most appropriate company. According to Singer and Cockayne, it is difficult to screen the companies 
and/or their staff; difficult to establish their history; or whether they have undertaken training in 
humanitarian law; respect their rules of engagement, etc. Many authors highlight the impossibility of 
finding out what other activities a PMSC might have been, or are, currently involved in, or even what 
kind of potentially questionable links the company might have with militaries, government officials and 
corporations, at either the local or global levels (Cillers and Mason, 1999; Musah and Fayemi, 2002; 
Vaux et al, 2002; Cockayne, 2006). Singer emphasizes this by saying that ―the firms are not altruistic 
by any measure. … war is business where nice firms do not always finish first. Aspirations of corporate 
responsibility and a positive image may be overridden by the need to fulfil a contract‖ (Singer, p.228, 
2003). Cockayne drives home the point:  
 
… the selection of providers is rarely governed by formal guidelines referring to relevant international 
standards (such as human rights, policing or use of force standards). Choices are usually guided only ‗by 
intuition‘ and organizational procurement policies, which are not specifically tailored to the procurement 
of security services (Cockayne, p.16, 2006).  
 
In their survey, Stoddard et al find that in the absence of specific policies the contracting of 
PSPs remains a topic of considerable debate within the UN system. Some in the organization are 
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calling for it to be regarded as a potential security strategy, while others contend that it should be 
explicitly prohibited. They add that ―[a]lthough a number of organizations reported that they were 
beginning to develop policies on PSPs, to date only a handful of the largest NGOs have internal 
guidance in this area. In the absence of guidelines covering the selection and recruitment of PSPs, 
many organizations use their regular tendering process, which focuses on cost and value for money. 
Beyond that, companies tend to be selected based on recommendations from other agencies‖ 
(Stoddard et al, p.24, 2008). 
In short, there is a lack of overall strategy on the part of IAAs when deciding to use the services 
of a PMSC, as highlighted by Von Tangen, Van Brabant and others. Cockayne for instance specifies 
that ―[p]roviders are chosen through highly decentralized processes that rely on poor market 
information, weak sanctions and make little reference to broader social impacts‖ (Cockayne, p.2, 
2006).   
Once the selection is made, a second layer of issues arise at the management level. Potential 
dangers exist, as in any contractual relationship, these include: poor contractor performance, problems 
relating to contract, unwillingness of the contractor to execute a task, etc. However, due to the 
sensitive nature of PMSCs‘ activities, Singer and Cockayne question whether the users are actually 
sufficiently prepared to deal with them. Moreover, given the complex environments in which PMSCs 
usually operate, any sustained monitoring of their activities is particularly challenging. 
Therefore, several authors conclude that when dealing with PMSCs, humanitarian actors 
should develop new approaches to the implementation of contracts and their monitoring. Singer 
concludes that ―meeting humanitarian needs with private security solutions (…) clearly carries both 
advantages and disadvantages that must be weighed and mitigated through effective policy and smart 
business sense‖ (Singer, p.17, 2004). Given Cockayne‘s (2006) suggestion that IAAs usually hire a 
PMSC ―guided only by intuition‖, one might question if humanitarian practitioners actually do have this 
―smart sense of business‖.  
Even if users were willing and able to follow all appropriate steps in order to select and use the 
best security company, they would still face difficulties in establishing some basic facts that would then 
hamper this effort. As mentioned above, it is difficult, and at times impossible, to establish the possible 
dubious links a company or its staff (managers or employees) may have. Similarly, experience has 
shown that, given the difficulty in finding appropriate staff, companies may – and have – hired poorly-
trained people or worse, individuals who were previously involved in human rights violations. Choosing 
a company on its (good) reputation is an option, however several major private military and security 
companies have already been involved in some sort of scandal. 
 
Given the stakes, many of the authors adopt a normative approach and end their papers with 
recommendations. Some, such as Van Brabant, Vaux et al., Von Tangen, Bjork and Jones, etc. 
provide advice for the users, including very detailed and practical recommendations. Others such as 
Cockayne, Singer and Renouf go a step further and encourage IAAs to participate in the 
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professionalization of PMSCs through their involvement in the global debate on regulation. In his paper 
―After Blackwater - How humanitarians can help professionalize the global security industry‖, 
Cockayne shows that humanitarian organizations face real risks in using PMSCs and as such, they 
have a real interest in participating in professionalization of PMSCs (Cockayne, 2008a). 
 
In conclusion, there is no doubt that the literature has vastly contributed to a better 
understanding of the complex relations that exist between aid agencies and security companies. 
Notably it has been instrumental in highlighting the risks for IAAs of privatising security. However, the 
picture remains incomplete in several aspects.  
First, the literature fails to provide an understanding of the processes that lead an agency to 
consider using private security services. It reveals some of the reasons why aid agencies ‗go private‘, 
yet does not offer an explanation of how such a decision is taken. This is surprising given the 
emphasis that the literature puts on the differences between IAAs and PMSCs, as well as on the risks 
of privatising security.  
Second, the literature does not deal with the relationship between aid agencies‘ specific identity 
and the construction of their orientation towards PMSCs. For example, it does not provide indications 
of the identity or the type of aid agencies that use PMSCs. As a result, we are missing a key point in 
understanding the reasons why some UN agencies or some NGOs are more prone than others to 
contract PMSCs. The current thesis will examine the processes by which aid agencies come to the 
conclusion that the use of a PMSC is necessary. By doing so, this thesis will argue that due to the 
ethos of some IAAs, they are more likely than others to conclude that the privatisation of their security 
is necessary. 
Lastly, in addition to not providing sufficient clarity about the users of PMSCs, the literature 
does not distinguish enough between the many types of corporate security providers: some companies 
for instance offer armed services while others refuse to do so. This in turn leads to dramatically 
different contractual and contextual interactions. Clarifying the differences between security companies 
is therefore necessary to fully comprehend the interactions between IAAs and PMSCs. 
 
2.3. Conclusion 
This chapter has examined two streams of literature. While the first section has looked into the 
literature engaged with the field of humanitarian security, the second section has examined the 
literature that focuses specifically on the interactions between IAAs and PMSCs.  
Regarding the former, the chapter has shown that authors studying the realm of humanitarian 
security have essentially tackled two aspects: the analysis of security incidents, and the 
conceptualisation of humanitarian security. The literature contributes to a better understanding of the 
IAAs‘ sources of insecurity and provides them with conceptual and practical frameworks to improve 
their security posture. By doing so however, this thesis argues that the literature fails to explain the 
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processes that lead different organizations to approach security differently and, similarly, does not 
provide enough attention to the correlation between aid agencies‘ identity and their respective 
approaches to security. 
While the academic contributions to the field of the privatisation of security are limited in 
number, all shed some light on the many questions raised by this recent phenomenon. The arguments 
raised by different authors are, in the vast majority, critical of the phenomenon and many propose that 
IAAs consider carefully the long-term consequences before contracting a private military or security 
company. Indeed, given the recent appearance of the phenomenon, many effects remain unknown. It 
is however striking to notice that the authors focus mainly on negative consequences, without 
considering what actually is working properly. Every day, several thousands of private security 
services are being provided all over the world, and many in complex and difficult environments. 
Though it is true to say that the consequences of any failure may be fatal, it is also worth recalling that 
the vast majority of these private services are provided appropriately. Another shortcoming of the 
literature is that despite the relevancy of the arguments raised, very few authors make any specific 
distinctions between the various PMSCs or the various IAAs, despite the fact that neither constitutes a 
homogenous block. Similarly, very few distinctions are made between the contexts where the private 
military and security companies are operating. This thesis will examine exactly those subtleties present 
in the interactions between PMSCs and IAAs.  
As Carbonnier writes, ―humanitarian crises – by their specific nature and the dramatic 
implications for the victims – highlight with particular clarity some of the main challenges and 
fundamental issues inherent in the privatisation and subcontracting of essential public services‖ 
(Carbonnier, p.413, 2006). This is the reason why researching the range of interactions between 
private military and security companies and humanitarian organizations is profoundly relelvant to the 
study of security privatisation. However, and because of, the complexity of the environments under 
discussion and the rapid pace of change in these environments, Spearin writes: ―many of the concerns 
about relief and development agencies using PMSCs have changed, so that the debates should no 
longer be perceived exactly as they were in the first wave of interaction‖ (Spearin, p.231, 2007b). This 
implies that, in order to remain relevant, any research on the subject must be conceptually developed, 
which is the aim of the next chapter. 
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“Notwithstanding hundreds of conferences, seminars and courses held every year, the simple yet incredible 






The study of security within the discipline of International Relations (IR) has, historically, 
focused on the state. Foundational, positivist theories such as realism and liberalism have set the 
framework of the debate for decades, and it is only since the 1990s that an alternative approach, 
dubbed ‗critical security studies‘ and encompassing an array of different views, has gradually emerged. 
The representations of all of these competing theories and approaches can be positioned abstractly on 
a coordinate axis, where the y-axis would be the ‗ontological perspective‘ and the x-axis the 
‗epistemological perspective‘. The top and right ends of these axes would point toward hard, strong, 
absolute conceptions and the bottom and left ends toward soft, weak, relative ones. Within the realist 
perspective on security authors such as Waltz would sit in the top right corner, while those such as 
Campbell - working with a post-structuralist perspective - would be placed on the bottom left corner. By 
locating itself on this coordinate axis – in between the origin (the 0 (zero) point) and the bottom left 
corner – this chapter grounds this thesis within the conceptual framework of the discipline of 
International Relations.  
The argument developed in this chapter is that the study of the relation of non-state actors to 
security is best explored using a critical constructivist approach. In doing so, however, this thesis 
occupies the ‗middle-ground‘ in terms of its critical position, which can be identified as using a weak 
ontology, as presented by Jennifer Mustapha. According to her,  
 
... weak ontologies respond to two basic concerns: First, there is the acceptance of the idea that all 
fundamental conceptualizations of self, other and world are contestable. Second, there is the sense that 
such conceptualizations are nevertheless necessary or unavoidable for an adequately reflective ethical 
and political life. The latter insight demands from us an affirmative gesture of constructing foundations, 
the former prevents us from carrying out this task in a traditional fashion (Mustapha, p.3, 2009).  
 
This approach allows both the study of humanitarian security as a construct, and offers 
reconstructionist suggestions on how ‗humanitarian security‘ could be defined, especially for the 
agents involved in it. 
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The reasons for using a critical constructivist approach will be presented in detail in the 
sections below but, in short, they are as follows:  
First, it assumes that security can be best understood if taken as a process, a constant 
construction, and that any attempt to define security is necessarily constrained to an agent (or 
community of agents), a context, and a period. This thesis will, however, eventually put forward a 
definition – even if contingent – of the concept of ‗humanitarian security‘. 
Secondly, this thesis assumes a co-constitution between aid agencies‘ identity and their 
approaches to security. It implies that an aid agencies‘ identity is as much a cause of its interests, as 
much as it is framed by them. The following empirical chapters will highlight this co-constitution. 
Thirdly, it adopts a post-positivist epistemology; characteristics of this epistemic attitude are its 
agent focus, context-dependency, and process-orientation; in addition, as both a researcher and actor 
in the field of humanitarian security, the author has taken a reflexive approach to this research. 
Fourthly, the thesis‘ focus on non-governmental organizations, international organizations and 
private military and security companies makes it difficult to use theories treating the state as the main 
referent object of security. In fact, the treatment in this thesis of IAAs as a referent object of security 
consists of an original approach to studying their security. 
In this thesis humanitarian security is understood as the practice of safely accessing vulnerable 
populations for humanitarian purposes. It includes the security of humanitarian personnel, of the aid 
organization‘s humanitarian programmes, as well as of its assets and reputation. As explained in 
Chapter One, humanitarian security is composed of four constituents: the human element, the 
organizational framework, the material element, and its ethical guidance. The final chapter of this 
thesis will question this working definition and offer additional elements to consider given the findings 
explored within the body of the thesis. 
The present chapter is divided into five sections: while the first section explains the relevance 
of using the constructivist approach to study the security of non-state actors, the second section 
delves into the relevancy of a critical study of international aid agencies‘ security practices. The third 
section introduces humanitarian actors as referent objects of security while the fourth section, 
unveiling humanitarian actors‘ identities and interests in relation to security, sets the framework for the 
empirical analysis. Finally, the fifth section outlines the centre of gravity of this thesis.  
 
3.1. An explanation of the relevancy of using a constructivist approach 
3.1.1. Salient points of a constructivist approach to security studies  
As summarized by Krause (p.603, 2003. Author‘s own translation), most of the constructivist 
studies adopt the following premises: 
 Global political actors – whether they be states or not – represent social constructs, and 
are products of complex historical processes that include social, political, material and ideational 
dimensions; 
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 These actors are constituted (and reconstituted) through political practices that create 
shared social understanding, allocating an identity to each actor as well as independent and variable 
interests; 
 The international system is not static and immutable, and its structures are not determinant 
for its actors as these are, first and foremost, social constructions; 
 Knowledge of these actors and the structures and practices of world politics are not 
objective as the organization and explanation of ‗events‘ in the world are generated by social 
processes that include both observers and social actors; 
 Methodologies used in these pieces of research analyse on the one hand actors‘ 
assessment of the organization of their social world, and on the other hand, the relations between 
these different assessments and the structures and social practices that condition them; 
 The objective of theory is not explanation or even prediction of causality in trans-historic 
contexts but rather the understanding of a context and gaining practical knowledge. 
 
This thesis is based on similar premises. It holds that international aid agencies represent 
social constructions and are products of complex historical processes; that these aid agencies are 
made up of individuals sharing similar ideas and sets of practices, in particular the projects that they 
perceive as first, being altruistic; second, responding to the needs of populations dubbed vulnerable; 
and third, guided by ethical principles. It then also assumes that humanitarian security is based on this 
specific identity shared by international aid agencies. A first look at humanitarian organizations as 
victims of acts of violence might lead one to conclude that they must be protected and, therefore, that 
armed protection would benefit them. An approach emphasizing that the system is not static and 
immutable highlights, however, that security is not necessarily only the fruit of material improvements, 
but may be the work of social and political interactions with well-identified stakeholders playing a key 
role in preventing any act of violence against IAAs. As shown, depicting IAAs only as comprehensive 
and objective institutions prevents us from seeing the weight of the gradually built networks behind 
individuals, and therefore specific to certain agents, contexts and periods in time. Even if successful, 
such an approach to security management does not mean that it will be successful or reproducible in 
another context. Indeed, depending on the organization, local dynamics, and time, network structures 
might also be insufficient at providing security to IAAs. This however is understood only if one recalls 
that the international system, along with it‘s agents and structures, is not static and immutable. 
Additionally, this thesis recognises an interaction between the researcher and the object of 
study, which highlights the need for a reflexive approach to studying humanitarian security. Its 
methodology will then underscore the author‘s assumptions and steps to overcome them. Lastly, the 
objective of this thesis is not to provide an a-historical explanation of humanitarian security, but to 
understand how humanitarian security is conceived and practiced in given contexts – and what this 
entails for humanitarian actors as well as for the concept of humanitarian security more broadly.  
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In addition to these premises and as will be discussed below, the thesis also adopts a 
constructivist approach because of its level of analysis – focusing on non-state actors – and its 
premise that the concept and practices of security are both a process and a construction.  
3.1.2. The level of analysis: Non-state actors  
Non-state actors and NGOs in particular, have gradually developed a structured role for 
themselves, especially in such fields as ecology, human rights, development, and humanitarian aid. 
While certain non-state actors were initially seen as agents of progressive social change, they became 
increasingly criticized for not always being what they initially seemed to be. Instead of being altruistic 
agents of change, some are seen as self-interested entities forwarding their own agendas. They are at 
times not entirely democratic but hierarchical entities concerned with their own finances and longevity. 
Many are said to be self-appointed instead of being representative and, in some instances, their 
actions may even result in increasing violence. Their impact on international politics has, however, 
grown even if the benefits of their influence are debatable. Similarly, their relation to the state – 
whether they are acting independently from it or not – is also disputed.55 As stated in a 2007 
conference supported by the United States National Intelligence Council:  
 
[m]ost benign non-state actors originate in the developed world, work within the framework provided by 
Western institutions and regimes, and act as propagators of ―western values‖ such as free markets, 
environmental protection, and human rights. From that standpoint, a key concern for the United States 
may be not that these actors have become too powerful, but that in many parts of the world their 
influence is limited – a factor that is contributing to the tilting of the global playing field away from the 
United States and its developed-world allies (NIC, p.1, 2007).  
 
From this perspective, the simple presence of non-state actors in a given context may actually 
reinforce the influence of the state from which an IAAs originates.  
Although international humanitarian law asserts that states are the prime guarantor of 
humanitarian organizations‘ security, a variety of reasons make this increasingly difficult and 
sometimes even impossible. The reasons can be as various: lack of political will, lack of capacity, 
weak states, multiplication of humanitarian actors involved in different dangerous areas including  
places where the government has no access, etc. Also, humanitarian organizations are usually averse 
to being protected by a party to the conflict, even if it is a legitimate government. Somalia is an 
extreme example: often depicted in the media as a country that has been without effective central 
government for almost two decades, it is impossible for aid organizations to rely on any state structure 
under these conditions. In addition, and following the humanitarian principles of neutrality and 
independence, international aid agencies are usually reluctant to be connected (or perceived as such) 
to any state. This often results in a similar state of anarchy as depicted in International Relations, 
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where IAAs will not, or cannot, refer to any overarching guarantor of security: in these cases, national 
security structures (if any) are seen as no more legitimate than other armed groups.  
Implemented by a variety of independent multinational aid agencies, humanitarian security is 
not under the control of states, but is however, affected by decisions taken by states. At the same 
time, states are also affected by the actions of IAAs. Indeed, an NGO whose French (national) aid 
worker for instance has been kidnapped in a given country will most likely receive some support from 
the French Government. IAAs then have an impact on norms, including on how security is conceived 
and practised.  
Studying IAAs‘ security management under these conditions implies a level of analysis which 
focuses primarily on non-state actors rather than on the state itself. The state still has a role to play – 
even its absence is a significant element and has to be taken into account in the analysis – however 
the onus is on non-state actors. As explained by Krause, ―[r]eplacing the state in the centre of analysis 
amounts prima facie to adopt a constructivist approach ... , even if such researches may not 
necessarily be assimilated to constructivist security studies and rather emanate from a social 
postmodern or poststructuralist current‖ (Krause, p.609, 2003. Author‘s own translation). As detailed 
below, the current thesis locates itself in between constructivism and postmodernism. 
3.1.3. Security as a construct  
What is security? Often depicted as a contested concept in the critical literature, security is 
said to be self-referential (Waever), ontological (Dillon), or contingent (Krause and Williams). The 
question of what is security has been debated in particular since the broadening and deepening of the 
security studies agenda.  
Depending on how one defines it, security can be a concept (national security), a speech-act 
(securitization), a practice (law enforcement), or a power relationship (‗security‘ imposed by the strong 
upon the weak).  It can also be an objective (zero crimes), a perception (‗I feel safe‘), it can be 
contingent (access to natural resources), quantitative (crime statistics) or qualitative (feeling of 
insecurity), etc. In addition, security can be defined negatively, when it is not present, as insecurity. It 
is precisely because we are insecure that we seek security – in the same way that we appreciate good 
health often only after having been sick.  
In other words, and from an individual perspective, security is relative; it is always contingent to 
something: oneself, the ‗other‘, the environment, a moment in time, a location, etc. What then is 
security? To paraphrase Wendt, ‗security‘ is what one makes of the word itself. The word then shifts 
into a definition or a meaning, which itself turns into a (ideological) position – which can lead to a given 
practice. Security is then a (subjective, relative) construct. Security can be defined, and subsequent 
approaches to security implemented, but these will necessarily be done according to a shared 
construct. Understanding the identity and subsequent interests of the one who establishes security is 
then crucial. 
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In the field of humanitarian action, security management is currently being developed by IAAs. 
Based on the premise that states cannot, or should not, ensure their security, IAAs are developing 
their own concepts and practices – albeit influenced by other sectors such as the insurance industry. 
Understanding the subtleties of humanitarian security entails an understanding of the specific nature 
of humanitarian organizations as well as the specific mindset of humanitarian aid workers. 
 
3.2. Relevancy of a critical constructivist study of humanitarian security 
management 
3.2.1. Differentiating between dominant constructivism and critical constructivism 
Alex MacLeod (2004) points to the emergence of two main currents in the constructivist 
approaches to the study of security: the first being the ‗dominant‘ constructivism and the second the 
‗critical‘ constructivism. The dominant one is widely associated with Wendt and includes authors such 
as Katzenstein, Adler and Barnett. While ontologically challenging the main positivist theories, the 
focus of the dominant approach remains the state. On the critical constructivist side, MacLeod gathers 
an eclectic collection of authors including Didier Bigo, Karin Fierke, Jef Huysmans, Bill McSweeney 
and Jutta Weldes, ―who distance themselves from the dominant constructivism through their criticisms 
of Katzeinstein‘s work, their dissatisfaction towards the work of the Copenhagen School, their 
sociolinguistic approach and their rejection of positivism‖ (MacLeod, p.12, 2004. Author‘s own 
translation). MacLeod recognises that these authors may not call themselves critical constructivists, 
but asserts that they still claim to be both constructivists and to reject the dominant constructivism. 
MacLeod then specifies that although there is no critical constructivism project per se, critical 
constructivists all agree with Weldes et al in that, 
 
1) reality is a social construction; 2) constructions of this reality reflect, order, and reify power 
relationships. In turn, certain agents or groups of agents play a key role in the production and the 
reproduction of reality; 3) a critical constructivist approach denatures dominant constructions, offers 
indication for the transformation of common sense, and facilitates the imagining of alternative ways of 
life. It also problematises conditions of its affirmations; in other terms, a critical constructivism is also 
reflexive (Weldes et al, cited in MacLeod, p.6, 2004. Author‘s own translation). 
  
In short, critical constructivism shares with the dominant current its general vision of a socially-
constructed world but finds fault with its ontological and epistemological conservatism.  
MacLeod further contends that:  
 
… critical constructivists are distinct from the followers of the Critical Theory as they do not refer to 
Gramsci or the Frankfurt School, and rarely to Marxism, and also do not share their central objective of 
emancipation. In contrast to these last, they are often less reluctant to refer to certain postmodern 
concepts, or to thinkers such as Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, but accept explicitly or implicitly 
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a form of foundationalism. They are then open to a dialogue with the latter, dialogue which seems 
unthinkable for the followers of the dominant constructivism (MacLeod, p.6-7, 2004. Author‘s own 
translation).  
 
Critical constructivism can then be located between its dominant cousin and postmodernism. It 
shares with postmodernism its interest in power relationships and the way some representations of 
the self and the way certain aspects are privileged or discarded. In addition, both have openly 
normative dimensions through their affirmation of new possible representations that follow their 
deconstruction of dominant representations.  
In addition, critical constructivism also made its mark by transposing the co-constitution 
between agency and structure onto the link between identity and interest. It is then different from both 
dominant constructivism and postmodernism as it questions the so-called causality between identity 
and interest when characterising the role of interests in the process of construction of identities. 
Dominant constructivists have tried to bridge the divide between positivists and post-positivists by 
explaining the effects of ideational factors in international relations. They believe they can develop 
causal explanations of the social world. Critical constructivists however, are sceptical of this move, 
which they judge to be overly conservative, and seek to break with scientific or causal approaches. 
They focus instead on studying constitutive processes behind ideational structures. 
When studying security, while the mainstream IR theories are concerned with ‗explaining why 
particular decisions resulting in specific courses of actions are made‘, the critical constructivists focus 
on ‗how threat perceptions and the object of security are socially constructed‘. Thus, the mainstream 
IR theories are concerned with ‗why‘ questions and with ‗explanation‘, while critical constructivist 
approach is concerned with ‗how‘ questions and with ‗understanding‘. Understanding humanitarian aid 
agencies approaches to humanitarian security is precisely the aim of this thesis. 
 
Although the division between the dominant branch of constructivism and the critical one is 
well founded, Jennifer Mustapha (2009) aptly argues that many problems arise between mainstream 
and critical theories and recalls that the term ‗critical‘ encompasses an array of different views – some 
criticising the ontology of the dominant theories, others criticising their epistemological aspects. She 
then reminds the reader that Fierke:  
 
… resists simple binaries altogether and argues for a conceptually-based understanding of competing 
critical approaches in order to avoid oversimplifying their complexities. Notably however, she does point 
out a key distinction between realist security studies and critical security studies, which relates to [an] 
earlier point about ontology. ... It is in this area of ontology that it is perhaps most warranted to attempt 
to pull out the ―critical‖ from the ―mainstream.‖ But again, this distinction must be carefully made, and is 
at its most useful when it allows us to recognize that there are powerful critiques that can be levelled 
against traditional understandings of security (Mustapha, p.6, 2009). 
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Basing her arguments on Stephen K. White‘s work on strong and weak ontologies, Mustapha 
argues that a critical post-structuralist approach can still produce claims about the ‗real world‘, but that 
such a posture requires  reflexivity about the inter-subjectivity and indeterminacy of the claims made, 
and of being accountable to them (Mustapha, p.21, 2009). 
To justify her argument, she then offers an original distinction between strong and weak 
ontologies. The former refers to the ―mainstream‖ theoretical approaches to IR, defined as modernist 
positivists, whose ―ontological commitments are framed unreflexively and there is little, if any, 
acknowledgment of their essentially contestable nature‖ (Mustapha, p.2, 2009). Weak ontology for its 
part ―does not refer to the (lack of) persuasiveness of a theory‘s ontological commitments so much as 
it refers to the process of arriving at those commitments and an acknowledgement of their 
contestability‖ (Mustapha, p.2, 2009). Mustapha then explains that:  
 
… weak ontologies respond to two basic concerns: First, there is the acceptance of the idea that all 
fundamental conceptualizations of self, other and world are contestable. Second, there is the sense that 
such conceptualizations are nevertheless necessary or unavoidable for an adequately reflective ethical 
and political life. The latter insight demands from us an affirmative gesture of constructing foundations, 
the former prevents us from carrying out this task in a traditional fashion (Mustapha, p.3, 2009). 
 
This then means that ―simply declar[ing] their contestability, fallibility, or partiality at the start 
and then proceed[ing] pretty much as before‖ (Mustapha, p.3, 2009) is insufficient, as this will tend to 
a reification of the claim, which weak ontologies precisely aim to avoid. As Mustapha contends:  
 
What is crucial in a weak ontology is that such an acknowledgement of epistemological limitations 
necessarily changes the very nature of the assertions being made. Therefore, unlike in a strong 
ontology where foundational claims are asserted unproblematically and unreflexively, in a weak 
ontology foundational claims need to be constantly affirmed, and the ethical function of theorizing 
resides in its goal of critically sustaining one‘s affirmations (Mustapha, p.4, 2009).  
 
The advantage of Mustapha‘s distinctions in analysing IR theories is evident: she allows 
poststructuralist approaches in particular to respond to the often heard criticism that while their input is 
useful, their inability or lack of will to offer alternative views of the world eventually limit their overall 
relevance. Although Mustapha uses the strong/weak ontology in order to argue that a poststructuralist 
approach to security can offer a careful yet valid reconstructive dimension, the critical constructivist 
approach can certainly also benefit the field, as will be discussed in further detail below.  
3.2.2. Reasons for a critical constructivist approach 
The bulk of critical security studies share a desire to de-emphasize the role of the state and 
reconceptualise security in a different way. Focusing on a non-statistcal approach to security, this 
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thesis will conclude by providing reconstructionist suggestions on how ‗humanitarian security‘ could be 
(re)defined, and how agents can work with this definition.  
The argument developed within this thesis is premised on a mutual constitution between the 
research and of the subject of study, using a reflexivist lens. Locating the thesis more specifically in 
the coordinate axis presented in this chapter‘s introduction, the thesis‘ critical constructivist approach 
towards humanitarian security refers to an ontologically constructivist-reconstructionist and 
epistemologically postpositivist-reflexivist approach. Adopting such an approach allows an 
engagement both with dominant constructivists and postmodernists. This approach to the study of 
humanitarian security can be a way to build bridges both within and outside of constructivism.  
The decision to take this approach to the subject is due to the following reasons: the nature of 
the subject – a study of non-state actors as objects of security; the assumption of a social construction 
of security; the authors‘ natural inclination – due to his own experience in humanitarian security 
management – in assuming a co-constitution between identity and security; and the aim to propound a 
definition, even if relative, of the concept of security. The subsequent argument will highlight the link 
between the specific identity of IAAs and the way they approach their security. It will then be 
suggested that not taking into account the co-constitution between their identity and their security 
could possibly lead to a misunderstanding of humanitarian security management. Its findings will also 
delve into the implications of research for the concept of humanitarian security. By doing so however, 
this thesis will highlight the conditions of what it affirms. As recalled by Mustapha (p.18, 2009), ―any 
ontological claims that are made should not be static and are always reflexively open to interrogation.‖ 
In other words, deploying a weak ontology allows the theorist to make claims, though not 
unreflexively. The critical constructivism of this thesis is thus resolutely reflexive. 
3.2.3. A reflexive consideration: The study and the findings of the thesis 
Alex MacLeod recalls that:  
 
… reflexivism is an important aspect of any theory which claims to be critical. It is actually fundamental 
for critical constructivism. It means first of all that the researcher must be conscious of the premises of 
his own thoughts, or even of his bias, and of the values and norms which compose any theory. There 
cannot be any separation between values and facts, or between theory and practice. Any analysis must 
always take the social context in consideration. Reflexivism subscribes to the idea of the 
incommensurability between paradigms or theoretical currents which are in opposition on the 
epistemological level, but believes that dialogue between them is possible, even desirable (MacLeod, 
p.6, 2004. Author‘s own translation). 
 
As will be further explained below, the reflexivity of this thesis stems from a) self-awareness of 
the author as both researcher and actor in humanitarian security; b) the way the research is 
conducted and humanitarian security studied; c) an openness to dialogue and to alternative views of 
humanitarian security; d) the nature of the claims of the thesis‘ findings.  
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As a practitioner of humanitarian security56, the author is familiar with the codes, language 
specificities and beliefs shared by the humanitarian community. These advantageous familiarities 
have also been utilised in many ways – as it would have otherwise been difficult to communicate 
properly, and be accepted by the aid community through the course of this research. In addition, as an 
active member of an epistemic community made up of humanitarian security professionals, the author 
shares with this network ―common normative beliefs and common perspectives on causal 
mechanisms and notions of validity, and adopt[s] common policy positions‖ (Bollettino, p.272, 2008). 
One research tool adopted for this thesis was participation-observation. Klotz and Lynch explain that  
 
[a]nalyses at the level of the international system tell little about the micro-level processes of 
socialization that reinforce institutionalized practices, traditional modes of thinking, and standard 
procedures for organizing knowledge. ... Participant observation allows researchers to see [how 
institutions are reproduced – how specific norms permeate institutional settings] more clearly (Klotz and 
Lynch, p.37, 2007). 
 
They then add that ―Cohn suggests four stages in the participant-observation process … : listening, 
speaking, dialogue and ‗terror‘, a term she uses to indicate an unnerving alienation from former beliefs 
as the participant recognizes the internalization of the organization‘s alternate assumptions‖ (Klotz and 
Lynch, p.38, 2007). 
In the author‘s case, much of the aid community‘s alternate assumptions were already 
internalised in previous experiences as an aid worker before embarking on the current research; 
therefore, there was no experience of ‗terror‘ as defined by Cohn. ‗Terror‘ however, can also be 
interpreted differently and may rather relate to an awareness of thinking in a certain way; ‗terror‘ is 
then a moment of reflexivity. This sort of ‗terror‘ was experienced by the author, first as an aid worker 
prior to working on this thesis and then as an academic when conducting research for this thesis. In 
the latter case, the author was consciously and reflexively aware of assumptions, and distanced 
himself from them in order to be able to provide a useful academic analysis. The questions asked by 
the thesis and the sources and methods used to answer them, consciously adopt an academically-
minded approach. This thesis is, however, written with the assumption that humanitarian action can 
best be understood if one appreciates the specific yet subtle nature and mindset of IAAs and aid 
workers. In that sense, the author adopts their views of the world – but this does not preclude offering 
criticisms of those views.  
 The current research is essentially of a qualitative nature. Although qualitative research has 
gained recognition as a valuable method to explore life experiences and social processes (Creswell, 
                                               
56
 The author has been employed for several years as a humanitarian aid worker and researcher in different crisis contexts 
including Afghanistan, Cuba, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Iraq, Kenya, North Korea and Zambia. In addition 
to offering consultancy services to different NGOs while working on this thesis, the author was a member of the Advisory 
Board overlooking the update of the seminal Operational Security Management in Violent Environments manual. More 
significantly, the author was the European Interagency Security Forum Coordinator for a year and half. The EISF is a network 
created to encourage collaboration and security dialogue among European humanitarian agencies. This allowed the author to 
have daily interactions with aid workers on matters of security as well as regular interactions with security contractors.  
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2003), the research is also based on personal experiences and interactions with a diversity of people 
through fieldwork. As such, it is nurtured by interpretations by the researcher and may be influenced 
by his personal values, biases or interests (Van Maanen et al., 1982). It is thus important to 
acknowledge that qualitative research does not attempt to separate the researcher from the study, to 
seek ―objective results‖ in the strongest positivist sense. In the course of this work, although sources 
were carefully selected in order to identify consistent and genuine social patterns, one cannot escape 
the fact that all data has eventually been interpreted and processed through the author‘s 
understanding of people‘s perceptions and thoughts, a cognitive process that has inbuilt limitations. 
As such, and although the thesis will shed light on IAAs‘ security practices, it will not claim to 
provide the ‗only‘ or even the ‗best‘ view; the author fully understands that humanitarian security can 
be studied from other perspectives and that these different perspectives would naturally provide 
different findings. However, while recognising that studying humanitarian security without 
understanding the subtleties of humanitarian action can lead to new thoughts and ideas, their 
relevance to aid workers as practitioners may be debatable. It is assumed in this thesis that the 
findings of the research should eventually serve both the needs of academia and those of 
practitioners in the ‗real world‘.  
It follows that a reflexive approach should also be adopted for the concluding claims of the 
thesis, as well as for the conditions of these claims. Mustapha recalls that ―ontological claims are seen 
as inherently problematic because all knowledge is situated knowledge, and there is nothing that can 
be objectively known to be True. In other words, all constructed foundations are seen as being 
inherently modernist and necessarily invoking unreflexive claims about what is‖ (Mustapha, p.18, 
2009.Emphasis original). For these reasons she argues:  
 
[f]irst, that acts of reconstruction can be critical in the most fundamental ontological sense, and they do 
not always have to look like the ‗strong ontologies‘ of either modernist traditionalist theories, or the 
alternative critical security theories that appeal unproblematically to external grounds to make their 
claims. Second, and perhaps most important of all, that acts of reconstruction can emanate directly from 
post-structuralist commitments, where deconstruction is seen as both a first step and as an ethic to 
bring to engagement with the status-quo. This engagement is necessary if we are serious about 
avoiding a paralytic disjuncture from the ‗real world,‘ where millions face corporal insecurity every day 
(Mustapha, p.21, 2009). 
  
Similarly, Burke recalls that ―[w]e live in a world where security will continue to remain one of 
the most powerful signifiers in politics, and we cannot opt out of the game of its naming and use. It 
must be defined and practiced in normatively better ways, and kept under continual scrutiny‖ (Burke, 
p.16, 2007). Besides reflecting the ethics of a researcher who is also an aid worker, this thesis offers 
acts of reconstruction as a way to ―bridge the gap‖57 between academia and practitioners. 
 
                                               
57
 In reference to Alexander George. See Nye (2008). 
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3.3. Introducing humanitarian actors as referent objects of security 
3.3.1. Establishing humanitarian actors as objects of security 
Driven by realism, the traditional approach to security is characterized by its focus on the state 
as the referent object of security. This changed with the gradual broadening and deepening of the 
concept of security. With the Copenhagen School emphasizing the social aspects of security, the 
constructivist, critical and feminist theories have further brought the unit of analysis, the referent object 
and subject of security down to the level of individuals.  
In 2008 The General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution to name the 19th of 
August as World Humanitarian Day annually in order to ―honor all humanitarian and the United 
Nations and associated personnel who have lost their lives in the cause of duty and those who have 
worked in the promotion of the humanitarian cause‖ (UN, 2008, website). According to the resolution, 
the aim however is not only to pay tribute to the fallen and honour the living, but also to recall that 
humanitarian action is about ―delivering aid, despite the risks‖ (UN, 2008, website). Humanitarian 
security is therefore not necessarily only about keeping staff out of danger, but also and most 
importantly, about enabling aid workers to safely respond to the needs of vulnerable populations. The 
designation of this special day unequivocally highlights the dangers faced by aid workers, and by 
doing so identifies them as referent objects of security.  
Designating non-states actors as referent objects of security is not new (Buzan,1991; Hemel et 
al, 2000; Gurr and Monty, 2003) but designating humanitarian actors as such, is. Humanitarian action 
is said to be based on the premise that a population (designated as vulnerable) has certain needs 
which non-state actors can respond to, in an ethical way, not motivated by profit. As will be made 
apparent in the next chapter, humanitarian action is based on a set of shared values, an 
understanding of which strongly shape aid agencies‘ identity. In turn, studying IAAs‘ identity implies 
examining how they relate to the ‗other‘. Does the construction of one‘s identity inevitably imply a 
dangerous ‗other‘? If so, what consequences does this have for aid agencies? Does it clash with their 
values? In addition, designating IAAs as referent objects of security also requires an understanding of 
how they construct their own understanding of the threats they face; what is to be secured; how this 
process of what is to be secured is developed and what are the consequences of such a process; 
whether IAAs securitize issues and if so, what issues and with what consequences, given their 
specific humanitarian ethos.  
In order to understand how the construction of IAAs as referent objects of security happened, 
the thesis will look at the developmentof the threats IAAs claim they face, and so assessing how ideas 
and values shape their protective discourses and practices. The thesis will provide an understanding 
of how such a process occurred by analysing the co-constitution between IAAs‘ identities and 
interests.  
3.3.2. Relevancy of establishing humanitarian actors as objects of security 
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Establishing humanitarian actors as referent objects of security has several benefits. To begin 
with, it allows an understanding of humanitarian security through the prism of power relationships – 
both material power and discursive power – within the aid sector as well as between IAAs and other 
actors or ‗beneficiaries‘. Indeed, examining IAAs as referent objects of security implies that they are 
capable of providing security to themselves, as well as capable of providing – or denying – security to 
others. According to some tenants of critical security studies, representations of security are always 
seen as political, operating for the benefit of some and the disadvantage of others (Fierke, 2007). 
What does this imply for IAAs whose claimed raison d‟être is to help and support vulnerable 
populations – populations whose primary need is often physical security?  
Also, and as Vaughn argued, aid agencies appear as ―unlikely securitizers‖ (Vaughn, 2009). 
Organizations that are known primarily for providing aid do not intuitively appear as possible providers 
of security. Particularly since aid agencies generally prefer non-violent means of achieving their 
missions, even in insecure environments. Identifying them as referent objects of security implies an 
understanding of how they reconcile their preference for non-violence with the necessity of protecting 
themselves. This in turn suggests that they have developed approaches to security that are different 
from the traditional ‗statist‘ approaches (based on balance of power and military confrontation). One of 
the aims of this thesis is to underscore these approaches and see how traditional approaches to 
security could benefit from them.   
In addition, depicting IAAs as referent objects of security introduces the state as a potential 
issue. As other studies of non-state actors as objects of security have shown, state-centric views of 
security maintain a certain vision of the character and location of the political community. ‗IAA security‘ 
then, introduces another vision of political community. Moving away from state-centric views down to 
non-state actors, this approach reinforces human security claims that the onus of security should be 
placed on a human level rather than that of the state, and that it should tackle a variety of threats other 
than simply military ones.  
In summary, the relevance of establishing humanitarian actors as referent objects of security 
stems from a) understanding IAAs‘ power relationships in relation to managing their security; b) 
exposing the co-constitution of humanitarians‘ security with their identity; c) underscoring the 
reproduction of a humanitarian political community; d) as underscored in the previous sub-section, 
understanding the nature of threats in the humanitarian realm.  
 
3.4. Setting the framework: Examining IAAs’ identities and interests in 
relation to security 
Constructivists study actors‘ social identities and interests. While identities provide the basis for 
interests in ‗dominant‘ constructivism, identities and interests are mutually constituted for critical 
constructivists. Indeed, the identity of an actor implies his/her/their preferences, but is also the product 
of these. Such an actor views ‗others‘ according to the identity he associates with them, while 
                  89 of 257 
concurrently reproducing his own identity in daily social practice. The producer of the identity however, 
is not in control of what it ultimately means to others; the inter-subjective structure is the final arbiter of 
meaning. As Klotz and Lynch contend, ―[m]ost constructivists treat interests as social construction, 
much like identities. … Identities and interests may not be separable variables, but they may be 
sufficiently distinguishable in their discursive content to warrant more precise differentiation, 
particularly in their potential effects‖ (Klotz and Lynch, p.83, 2007). Therefore, in order to understand 
humanitarian security management and IAAs‘ links with PMSCs, the thesis‘ empirical analysis will 
examine aid organizations‘ identities and interests in relation to security in the three following 
chapters. The author will argue in particular that aid agencies‘ identities are at the basis of their 
interests as much as they are the products of those interests. 
The thesis will also argue that every organization has a distinctive spirit – an ethos – which is 
constituted and constantly shaped through ideas and practice. This ethos is closely linked to 
organizations‘ identity and interests and it achieves their co-constitution as much as it is shaped by 
them. In the field of humanitarian action, this ethos is crucial in an organization‘s positioning of itself, in 
general and within a particular context; whether the organization is risk-averse or whether it has 
defined itself as a ―frontline‖ organization? Is it focusing on immediate life-saving activities or primarily 
long-term development projects? Is it sensitive to external pressure, be it political or f inancial? Does it 
claim to follow humanitarian principles of action? Is it receiving funding originating from a party 
involved in the conflict? Although such an ethos is not materially tangible, it is nevertheless still 
demonstrable, in a way that is similar to the way that humanitarian organizations or their employees 
have been described as part of specific epistemic communities (Haas, 1992; Nelson and Neack, 2002; 
Stoddard, 2003; Bollettino, 2008).58  
3.4.1. Understanding aid agencies’ identity 
Identity is understood in this thesis as the construction of a ‗self‘ through both the gathering of 
shared values, attitudes and norms under a single ‗self‘ which translates and gives justification to 
particular practices, and the constructed contrasting of this ‗self‘ to ‗others‘. An ‗entity‘ is then the 
product of both its internal dynamics and its interactions with its environment. As such, it is constantly 
reproduced through (self)perception and distinction from the ‗others‘. Each ‗entity‘ however is 
composed of multiple identities depending on which of its facets is made most salient, what it is 
contrasted to, or who is looking at it. For example, the variability of a man‘s identity depends on 
whether he is compared to his parents, another individual of his age, his children, an individual from 
the opposite sex, another continent, another social status, etc. For some he will be a son, for others, a 
husband, a father, a man, a white man, a rich man, etc. Similarly, the variability of international aid 
agencies‘ identity results from the natural variability of every identity that is contingent to its point of 
                                               
58
  As Stoddard argues, ―[d]espite the fact that NGOs have different mandates, organizational histories, cultures and interests, 
epistemic and collegial links among staff members of the major NGOs are strong. [...] Although it has not received much 
scholarly attention, an epistemic community has developed among humanitarian practitioners and decision makers, both in 
the field and at headquarters, where programming experience, technical know-how, values and ideas are shared, often apart 
from or in defiance of an individual organization‘s expressed mandate, or its board‘s wishes‖ (Stoddard, 2003, p.34). Similarly, 
Jones contends that PMSCs can also be equated to epistemic communities (Jones, 2006). 
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reference. ‗International Medical Corps‘ for instance, can be referred to as a non-state actor, a non-
governmental organization, a medical NGO, a humanitarian organization, an aid agency, a Western 
institutional expression of altruism, a tool of Western imperialism, etc. In this thesis, the prime identity 
which is referred to relates to the main claimed and commonly perceived function of the studied 
entities, i.e. providing aid or providing security. As such, the thesis first refers to ‗aid agencies‘ and 
‗private security providers‘. It, however, narrows down its scope to international aid agencies, and to 
private military and security companies. Such a level of analysis remains too general given the 
diversity of NGOs and PMSCs. This is the reason why the thesis will also offer a grid of analysis 
based on novel typologies of humanitarian actors and of private military and security companies, so 
that the empirical analysis is carried out at various levels. The criteria that form the basis of these 
typologies will be detailed in the following chapters.  
Defining aid agencies‘ identity implies understanding how their identity is constituted, which 
itself involves enquiring into the co-constitution between structures and agents as well as 
understanding how the current narrative, to which they identify, became dominant. The following 
chapter will identify the main features that constitute aid agencies‘ identity. According to MacLeod  
 
… apprehending the process of changing identities does not necessarily mean that the analysis should 
be reduced to the agent to the detriment of the structure. Political elites or national leaders do not 
construct identities where their willpower takes them. The ideas and values which they convey are 
necessarily based on some legitimacy. They must echo the culture, norms, history and political 
environment of the group which they are supposed to represent (MacLeod et al, p.19, 2004a. Author‘s 
own translation).  
 
In addition to revealing how aid agencies‘ identity is the product of the co-constitution between 
structures and agents, it will also highlight the way that that humanitarian values form a guiding 
reference to organizations (as much as they are shaped by organizations‘ practice). In other words, it 
will underscore how the production of IAAs‘ identity is the result of debates and struggles both within 
the organization as well as with the outside world. As will be revealed however, these dynamics are 
different from one organization to another, which is why further distinctions will be made between 
humanitarian organizations in the form of a typology of aid agencies. 
In addition, and as MacLeod and Voyer-Léger explain, ―it is impossible to clearly distinguish 
between security and identity, as the definition of the threats and the means to counter them are also 
part of who we are‖ (MacLeod and Voyer-Léger, p.75, 2004b. Author‘s own translation); drawing on 
this insight, the thesis will then also analyse how IAAs construct and represent their threats.  
In exploring the relationship between identity and security, Williams asserts that:  
 
[f]or critical constructivists, the central concern in exploring the relationship between identity and security 
is to outline how narratives of ... identity become dominant in a particular context. These, in turn, help 
set the limits for legitimate or feasible political actions. Here, identity is inherently unstable, contingent 
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and a site of constant competition. Representations of security and threat can be central in this regard, 
serving to define who ‗we‘ are and the ‗other/s‘ from whom ‗we‘ need protection. The study of identity 
then becomes the study of different representations that compete with others to provide realistic 
accounts of who a particular group is and how that group should act. The concern here is less with ‗why‘ 
actors act the way they do than ‗how possible‘ equations: ‗how meanings are produced and attached to 
a various subjects/objects, thus constituting particular interpretive dispositions which create certain 
possibilities and preclude others‘ (Williams, p.62, 2008).  
 
Critical constructivists, in other words, study how actors come to believe in a given 
representation. For this reason this thesis will identify the dominant discourses which frame aid 
agencies‘ identity and highlight how these discourses are internalised and reproduced. However, as 
Fierke recalls,  
 
… identity exists in a relationship, an idea that is often captured in the concept of alterity. Identity is a 
social category that expresses not only the meaning any one actor attributes to the self; rather self-
definitions are related to definitions the self gives to others and others to the self. Categories are thus 
intersubjective and defining of a particular community of identity and practice; they are not purely in the 
minds of individuals (Fierke, p.76, 2007. Emphasis in the original).  
 
In the present case, this implies that the research must look at both the defining characterisitics 
of an aid agency, and also who those ‗others‘ are, from whom IAAs distinguish themselves. As 
outlined earlier, this thesis will offer a typology of aid organizations and will highlight the construction 
of these identities by contrasting different types of aid agencies.  
As noted above, constructivists agree broadly that identity is based on a division between ‗us‘ 
and ‗them‘. What, however, does it imply for IAAs who claim to to be driven by ethical values which 
constitute a shared humanity? If, as Klotz and Lynch explain, ―[b]oth social identity and 
representational approaches also claim that comparison creates inherent hierarchies‖ (Klotz and 
Lynch, p.74, 2007), then how do IAAs relate not only to their ‗beneficiaries‘, but also to governments 
and other non-state actors such as private military and security companies? Is the ‗other‘ necessarily 
seen as a threat? While perpetrators of violence are naturally seen as a potential threat to operations, 
aid agencies, on occasion, also see governments‘ policies as presenting a threat. Vaughn, for 
instance, explains that governmental policies and practices such as counter-insurgencies involving a 
comprehensive approach between security and aid contribute to ‗rendering indistinct‘ (i.e. to blurring 
the lines) between humanitarian and military actions, therefore jeopardising the aid agencies‘ own 
work and security. IAAs then securitize indistinctiveness‘ as, they argue, that such ―indistinctiveness 
poses an existential threat both to their material security and to their identity‖ (Vaughn, p.269, 2009). 
In these cases, and as will be underscored in  Chapter Five, the securitization in the face of an issue 
that poses a ‗threat‘ may be the first step in ensuring their security, but it also contributes to 
(de)legitimising their own actions, both internally and externally, which in turn contributes to shaping 
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their identity. By studying international aid agencies‘ construction of identity, this thesis will then 
explore who are the IAAs‘ and who are the ‗others‘,, what threats IAAs are said to be facing and how 
these threats are constructed and securitized. Given the possible tensions between value-driven aid 
organizations and security management, the thesis will then also question how aid agencies‘ 
approaches to security affects their identity as well as their legitimacy.  
3.4.2. Understanding humanitarian actors’ interests in relation to security 
Aid agencies have a multiplicity of interests, ranging from ideational to material, from 
reputational to financial. However, given the scope of this thesis, it will focus primarily on aid agencies‘ 
interests in matters pertaining to security. Fierke argues that  
 
[w]hile realists view interests as material and objective phenomena, social constructivists tend to argue 
that interest flows from identity and is thus not first and foremost a material property. ... In this respect, 
identity belongs to a field of practices, within which objective goals and thus interests are constituted. 
While there is a relationship between identity and interests, neither is stable … and both may be 
transformed through interaction (Fierke, p.80, 2007).  
 
In order to study international aid agencies‘ interests, this thesis will examine what these 
interests are, and how, through a study of IAAs‘  representations of themselves and of PMSCs, they 
are constructed.  
Klotz and Lynch note that, ―[f]or constructivists, interests are the product of constitutive 
processes that lead people, as individuals and members of collectivities, to synthesize a wide range of 
needs and desires‖ (Klotz and Lynch, p.104, 2007). Because interests are here limited to aid 
agencies‘ choices in security, this thesis will then study how aid agencies conceive and manage their 
security. By doing so, it will emphasize how these constitutive processes relate to aid agencies‘ 
identity and will reveal in particular how differences in identity are paralleled with differences in 
interests. It other words, the thesis will argue that aid agencies‘ approaches to security vary from one 
type of aid agency to another. Klotz and Lynch further argue that ―[l]ike identities, interests are neither 
self-evident nor static; their formation is a process that needs to be explained. Conceptualizing 
interests as the product of interactions and institutionalized identities presumes intersubjective 
content‖ (Klotz and Lynch, p.95, 2007). Thus, this thesis will stress different approaches to security, in 
particular contrasting IAAs‘ preferences within the aid sector as well as outside of it, in comparison to 
PMSCs‘ own preferences. While doing so however it will be emphasised that interests remain 
dynamic and will therefore proceed with caution when characterizing these preferences. 
Among the different conceptions and practices of security, this thesis will highlight the 
dominant representations and examine how they are shaped – but not determined – by IAAs‘ identity. 
It will examine how humanitarian security was gradually developed, broadened, internalised and 
reproduced by emphasizing the dynamics within the aid sector as well as within aid agencies 
themselves. It will for example examine how the humanitarian security focus on the ‗acceptance 
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approach‘ is a result of a given conception of security, where some dominant representations of the 
self lead IAAs to conclude that the acceptance model is the most valid one. According to Hopf,  
 
[b]y making interests a central variable, constructivism explores not only how particular interests come 
to be, but also why many interests do not. The tautological, and therefore also true, most common and 
unsatisfying explanation is that interests are absent where there is no reason for them, where promised 
gains are too meagre. Constructivism, instead, theorizes about the meaning of absent interests. Just as 
identities and interests are produced through social practices, missing interests are understood by 
constructivists as produced absences, omissions that are the understandable product of social practices 
and structure (Hopf, p.177, 1998).  
 
Similarly, this thesis will look at alternative conceptions of the acceptance model. The 
‗deterrence approach‘, which may include the use of private military and security companies, is often 
seen as one alternative. However, by highlighting the influence of humanitarian values on aid 
agencies‘ approaches to security this thesis will underscore that the ‗deterrence approach‘ remains 
the least preferred one despite calls for a more ‗muscular‘ provision of aid. The author will then 
propose that unless IAAs or PMSCs‘ identities or their representations change, it is unlikely that 
deterrence becomes the preferred approach. 
 
In line with a critical constructivist view, this thesis will highlight the co-constitution between aid 
agencies‘ identity and interests through the identification of dominant discourses and practices. It will 
argue that aid agencies can be organized in three different types and reveal how each type of aid 
agency approaches its security accordingly.  
 
3.5. The thesis’ centre of gravity 
Klotz and Lynch explain that ―[c]onstructivists see ‗security‘ as a relationship historically 
conditioned by culture rather than an objective characteristic determined by the distribution of military 
capabilities. Consequently, [they] favour methodologies that acknowledge contingency and context‖ 
(Klotz and Lynch, p.17, 2007). Contingency however, does not mean exclusivity, and contextualisation 
does not mean that a phenomenon is necessarily restrained to a single context only. Therefore, the 
thesis‘ methodological approach adopts a fine balance between a) contingent and relatively stable 
agency and b) context-dependency and continuity among contexts.  
The thesis‘ centre of gravity is the study of humanitarian organizations‘ approaches to security 
through an examination of their identity and interests. Private military and security companies are not 
at the centre of the study but are used as a reflection of IAAs‘ approaches to security. Therefore the 
centre of gravity of the thesis is the international aid agencies themselves, divided into different types.  
The level of analysis of the thesis could have been solely on ‗aid agencies‘ and ‗private military 
and security companies‘ but it is suggested that the aid sector is too diverse for such a wide focus to 
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be relevant enough. Instead it will distinguish between ‗Deontological‘, ‗Solidarist‘ and ‗Utilitarian‘ aid 
agencies, and within PMSCs, between ‗Guarding, ‗Unarmed‘ and ‗Weaponised‘ companies. The 
rationale behind these typologies, as well as their constitutive criteria, will be further detailed in the 
following chapters. While researchers encounter a variety of different identities, Klotz and Lynch argue 
that:  
[c]onstructivists agree in principle that identities are inherently contestable but remain at odds over when 
to treat these social constructions as relatively fixed. The terminology of representations tends to signal 
the view that identities are too unsettled and overlapping to be treated as variables. However, not all 
researchers who adopt the terminology of roles or norms treat identities as stable or accept the notion of 
variables. [Klotz and Lynch‘s] response is empirically oriented: some identities, in certain circumstances, 
may be more stable than others; some may be more inclusive than others; and some may be more 
hierarchical than others (Klotz and Lynch, p.70, 2007. Emphasis added).  
 
In line with such an approach, the thesis contends that it is indeed possible to identify the main 
features of IAAs and PMSCs, providing a contrast between the relationships of various aid agencies 
towards PMSCs. This however, is only relevant if simultaneously recognising the contingency of the 
typology offered. Dividing aid agencies into three types is not a clear-cut exercise – and one should 
expect to see a cross-over between the three proposed types of aid agencies, however, (re)production 
of identities and identifiable patterns in the aid sector allow for a relatively stable and insightful 
comparison between IAAs.  
 
While humanitarian action is present in a variety of countries, the present thesis narrows its 
geographical coverage, focusing on those places where international aid agencies and PMSCs are 
concomitantly operating. Ultimately, Afghanistan and Haiti were chosen because they are contextually 
different yet show similar patterns in the way humanitarian action is implemented. This allows for an 
identification of, both details contingent to a context, and generalizations reproducible from one 
context to the other. 
Critical constructivists emphasize when, how, and why particular practices become relatively 
fixed while others remain fluid. This is accomplished through an exploration of contexts, within which 
meanings form structures. These contexts however need not be geographic and the details need to be 
balanced with broader generalizations. As Klotz and Lynch recall, ―[t]he more credible claim combines 
the insights of studies that rely on generalization with others that stress details‖ (Klotz and Lynch, 
p.21, 2007). Located between conventional constructivism and postmodernism, the thesis will study 
international aid agencies‘ approaches to security through a fine balance between contingent (details) 
and relatively stable agency (generalization) and between context-dependency (details) and continuity 
among contexts (generalization).  
It is to be noted that although the thesis is grounded on substantial empirical research, it 
primarily aims to set out a framework for analysis as a necessary preliminary step to understanding 
humanitarian security. The reason being that the research has been conducted upon the inference 
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that such framework was missing and as such, needed to be devised prior to any further specific 
empirical research. As such, humanitarian security is here being analysed through a wide portfolio of 
aid organizations. Nevertheless and in order to contextualise its findings, the thesis will also focus on 
five selected NGOs, namely Médecins sans Frontières (MSF), Oxfam Great-Britain (OGB), Save the 
Children UK (SC-UK), CARE, and International Relief and Development (IRD). In addition to operating 
in both Afghanistan and Haiti, these organizations were selected for the fact that each sheds light on a 
different aspect of the three ideal–types of IAAs. In other words, these NGOs have not been selected 
for being representative of the aid sector as a whole, but rather to specifically illustrate the distinctions 
between the three ideal–types of aid agencies. As will be further explained in Chapter Four, MSF was 
identified as a Deontological organization; OGB as an agency sitting in between the Deontological and 
Solidarist ideal–types; SC-UK as a Solidarist NGO; CARE as an organization sitting in between the 
Solidarist and Utilitarian agencies; and IRD as an Utilitarian NGO.  
According to Klotz and Lynch ―[a]ny choice of methods necessarily draws on select evidence 
and limits the range of possible interpretations. In defending these interpretations, scholars will 
inevitably weigh generality against details, even though neither will make universal claims‖ (Klotz and 
Lynch, p.107, 2007). The research could have compared international aid agencies security practices 
in Haiti versus those in Afghanistan, but it will instead focus on showing the continuity of identity and 
interests between a humanitarian organization‘s headquarters and its field offices compared to other 
aid agencies. The arguments of the thesis are not developed through a comparison of geographic 
case studies, but rather through the comparison across three types of aid agencies – Deontological, 
Solidarist and Utilitarian – including the five aforementioned NGOs. The author will naturally 
contextualise some of his affirmations and findings, but will also show the continuity of an 
organization‘s identity and interests beyond geographical contexts. The reason for such approach lies 
in the specific structures of aid agencies. They are organized in the form of a concentric web, with the 
headquarters (HQ) at the centre, and a multiplicity of field offices at regional and/or local levels. 
Studying field levels without taking into consideration headquarters would ignore the cultural, social, 
economic continuity which exists between HQ and field offices. While looking at the dynamics at field 
level is crucial, a comprehensive understanding of an organization‘s approach to security necessitates 
looking at it both at horizontal and vertical levels. Despite acknowledging recurrent tensions and 
disagreements between HQ and field offices, the thesis will reveal a continuity of identity and interests 
that exists between a humanitarian organization‘s headquarters and its f ield offices, and that this 
continuity tends to over-ride the specific context. 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
By locating this thesis in the field of critical security studies, the present chapter has outlined 
the conceptual framework of the research. The chapter first grounded the thesis in the constructivist 
approach by emphasising its onus on non-state actors and highlighting its assumption that security is 
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a construct. By providing the rationale for the study of humanitarian security through the lens of a co-
constitution between identities and interest – which is the focus of the three subsequent empirical 
chapters – it also showed how potentially conducive a critical constructivist approach is to the study of 
humanitarian security. Further, the chapter has established the relevance of examining international 
aid agencies as referent objects of security. Lastly, this chapter presented the centre of gravity of this 
thesis: humanitarian aid agencies, in relation to private military and security companies.  
This chapter also presents the claims regarding the originality of this thesis which are two-fold. 
Firstly it represents the first critical constructivist study of humanitarian security practices, with 
particular reference to private military and security companies. Second, it is the first piece of research 
to study humanitarian organizations as referent objects of security.  
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In the eye of the average individual donor, there is little difference between giving money to  
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) or to International Relief and Development Inc. (IRD); both are 
NGOs and both are working in emergencies to provide assistance to those in need. Both are also 
accountable to a board of directors with no financial interests in the programs or operations of the 
organization, they share practices, customs and norms; ultimately, both are ‗doing good‘. Yet, no aid 
worker would ever say that MSF is anything close to IRD. Although both agencies are not for profit 
non-governmental humanitarian organizations, the mindset of their respective constituencies, the 
values which guide them, the way they manage their operations and their sources of funding puts 
them at odds with one another. The diversity within aid agencies should not be underestimated. While 
many are involved in development activities, some are involved in both development and humanitarian 
activities, and a handful are in humanitarian activities only. In addition, the values that drive an 
organization, the size of the organization, the number of staff, the annual budget, the countries of 
operation and the number and type of donors differs vastly from one organization to another.  
In other words, humanitarian agencies do not constitute a set of identical organizations; each 
has its own specific identity. As explained in the previous chapter, ‗identity‘ is understood as the 
construction of a ‗self‘ through, firstly, the gathering of shared values, attitudes and norms under a 
single ‗self‘ which translates and gives justification to particular practices (including security practices), 
and, secondly, the constructed contrasting of this ‗self‘ to ‗others‘. A critical constructivist study of the 
identities of international aid agencies (IAAs) requires an understanding of how that identity is 
constituted and is evolving. This itself involves enquiring into the co-constitution between structures 
and agents as well as understanding how the current narrative with which they identify was 
internalised and reproduced and eventually become dominant. In addition, it is also necessary to look 
who form the ‗others‘ against which humanitarian organizations distinguish themselves and what, in 
comparison, are their own defining characteristics and interests. The present chapter will then discuss 
how the production of IAAs‘ identity is the result of debates and struggles both within the organization, 
as well as with the outside world. It will underscore the fact that these dynamics do not display 
similarities from one organization to another, which is why further distinctions will be made amongst 
humanitarian organizations in the form of a typology of aid agencies. The chapter will achieve this by 
                                               
59
 Quoted in Hackney, S. (1999), p.102. 
                  99 of 257 
providing evidence that every organization has a distinctive spirit – their ethos – which is constituted 
and constantly shaped through ideas and practice. This ethos is closely linked to an organizations‘ 
identity and interests, as it accompanies their co-constitution as much as it shaped by them. Building 
on this, three main types of aid agencies will be identified. 
The present chapter is then divided into three sections. The first part offers a typology of 
humanitarian organizations based on their ethos. The second section provides empirical evidence 
validating the constitution of three types of international aid agencies. The last section reveals who the 
‗others‘ are from whom aid agencies distinguish themselves and what, in comparison, are their own 
defining characteristics. 
 
4.1. A typology of humanitarian organizations  
The diversity in the aid sector has already been recognised in the literature. Different 
typologies of humanitarian organizations have been provided. Slim, as early as 1997, distinguished 
between ―deontologist‖ organizations, which perceive some actions as good in and of themselves, and 
―consequentialists‖, who see the goodness of an action as being measured by virtue of its 
consequences (Slim, 1997). Schloms also distinguishes between different sources of moral obligation 
and argues accordingly that aid agencies ―may obey only the humanitarian imperative (the affective 
approach), may turn towards its own principles and mandates (the introvert approach), or may rely on 
its political environment (the extravert approach)‖ (Schloms, p.8, 2005. Author‘s own translation). 
Although revealing of different approaches to ethics, these morally based distinctions do place enough 
not emphasise enough the capability of organizations to put into practice their claims of ‗doing good‘. 
The 2002 ‗Guide to NGOs‘ differentiates between the Emergency Response NGOs, the Development 
NGOs, and Multi-sectoral NGOs (Frandsen, 2002). Such distinction is rather arguable as in reality the 
nexus from emergency to development is more blurred than clear. Stoddard et al distinguish between 
the religious, the ‗Dunantists‘ and the ‗Wilsonian‘ NGOs (Stoddard, 2003). This typology rightly 
highlights differences among European and American NGOs and the religious variations of each60, but 
does not include aid agencies other than NGOs. Weiss offers a spectrum ranging from ‗classicists‘ to 
‗solidarists‘, along with ‗minimalist‘ and ‗maximalist‘ categories of each as well as ‗political 
humanitarians‘ (Weiss, 2006). The typology was however disputed by leading members of some 
agencies as oversimplified and incomplete.61 Donini et al (2008) have also distinguished among 
‗principled‘ and ‗pragmatic‘ aid organizations. These names however, are misleading as all agencies 
include a degree of principled responses and pragmatism. MSF for instance, often described as the 
archetypally principled organization claims to be pragmatic in its interpretation of humanitarian 
principles.62 Similarly, World Vision has called for a ‗principled pragmatism‘ when engaging with armed 
actors, underscoring further that the two notions are not antithetical (Thompson, 2008). Dijkzeul and 
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Moke‘s typology is probably the one that resonates most with aid workers. They ―offer a ‗mental map‘, 
which plots organizations on two axes according to the nature of their relationships with governments: 
from ‗Independent‘ to ‗Public Service Contractor‘ on one axis, and from ‗Impartial‘ to ‗Solidarity‘ on the 
other.‖63 Another added value of this typology is that it includes the full variety of providers of 
assistance, ranging from NGOs and UN agencies to churches and private companies.  
As Stoddard argues ―[t]here may in fact be no satisfactory way of categorizing NGOs according 
to their philosophy, and there are potentially unlimited ways of carving up the community according to 
which of the humanitarian principles and values are emphasised, and in what operational context‖ 
(Stoddard, p.28, 2003).  
The variations in these typologies stem from the criteria chosen to differentiate aid agencies. 
As a result, while MSF and the ICRC are, in one typology, located at opposite ends of a spectrum, 
they are located at the same end in another.64 While several of these typologies recognise that 
references to humanitarian values is a relevant criteria to distinguish aid agencies, they all fail to 
capture the tension between aid agencies‘ value-driven identities and their actual capability of putting 
these into practice. This tension is best illustrated if two main criteria are confronted: values on the 
one hand, and ‗operationalization‘ of values on the other. These actually constitute the crux of IAAs 
ethos. 
4.1.1. Underlying aid agencies’ ethos 
The present thesis argues that every aid agency has a distinctive ethos which is constituted 
and constantly shaped through ideas and practice. This ethos is constituted at two levels: the 
ideational level characterised by the guiding values of agencies and the practical level, based on their 
operational approach.  
As outlined in Chapter Two, aid agencies have a strong commitment to a common set of 
values. If they are not direct signatories of the aforementioned Code of Conduct for the International 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief, all of the major international 
aid agencies still refer to one or several of its principles.65 This is also true for UN agencies involved in 
relief activities. Aid organizations do display recognition of these principles, whether in their internal 
documentations such as annual reports, statutes, mission statements, etc, or on their website. These 
principles also serve as benchmarks to differentiate between ‗humanitarian action‘ (which is based on 
the needs or the rights of the identified vulnerable populations) and ‗assistance‘ (which may be simply 
defined as helping others) be it for the ‗giver‘s‘ political, economic, military or other interests.  
However, these principles more often than not serve as guides to an organization rather than 
being strictly implemented by them. This may be due to the fact that the ‗operationalization‘ of these 
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principles is challenging and is frequently the result of competing interpretations.66 Drawing on the 
arguments of Hugo Slim, Dijkzeul and Moke note that:  
 
[m]any of these differences stem from the lack of shared agreement on definitions of the principles at 
the heart of humanitarian action. As Slim has outlined, different players have different concepts of these 
core ―humanitarian principles‖ — humanity, neutrality, impartiality and solidarity. Many organizations and 
their staff lack a thorough understanding of them, or apply them inconsistently. This has significant 
consequences for their operational choices in the field on issues such as the willingness to accept 
armed military escorts, or restrictions imposed by a party to a conflict. … While a number of other 
humanitarian organizations claim to be neutral or include references to neutrality in their literature, Slim 
is certainly correct when he suggests that most are just repeating a slogan. Many humanitarian 
organizations — and scholars — should think through more clearly their use of these terms and their 
applicability to their actions (Dijkzeul and Moke, p.675, 2005).  
 
The next factor that goes into constituting an aid agencies‘ ethos is their operational approach. 
This is intrinsically linked to the previous point, as operations are guided by the values of an 
organization. In the words of the ICRC‘s director-general, ―the [humanitarian] principles are not 
primarily moral values, but rather a means to secure access to those who suffer the brunt of conflict 
and violence and to enhance the effectiveness of aid‖ (Gnaedinger, 2010, website. Emphasis added). 
Vaughn also contends that ―by articulating and performing these principles, humanitarian 
organizations lay claim to a unique identity, and it is by virtue of this identity that organizations claim to 
merit special treatment in the midst of armed conflict‖ (Vaughn, p.270, 2009). 
 ‗Operations‘ consist of the nature of the programmes, their locations and their source of 
funding. The nature of the programmes refers to an organizations‘ mission or mandate – implementing 
a variety of types of projects or developing an expertise on just a few, such as health, food or 
refugees. The location of the projects indicates the relative ‗frontline‘ or ‗risk averse‘ nature of an 
organization. The source of funding, in particular the amount of private versus institutional funding, 
highlights their actual capacity in choosing and implementing projects. Indeed, an organization with 
limited private funding is, for instance, less likely to be operating in areas where there is little interest 
from institutional donors. In other words, the amount of non-institutional or non-earmarked funding is 
indicative of an aid agencies‘ capacity to ‗operationalize‘ their self-proclaimed impartiality and 
independence. 
 
Humanitarian principles are, however, not the sole values aid agencies refer to. As will be 
discussed later, their emphasis varies between organizations. The core of aid agencies ethos 
therefore revolves around a) what importance they attach to the humanitarian principles, and b) how 
they actually put these principles into practice. Based on these distinctions, it is possible to 
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differentiate aid agencies. This thesis offers an original typology of aid organizations - that 
nevertheless remains conventional as it builds upon previous contributions. 
4.1.2. Discerning ideal–types of aid organizations 
As independent agencies, every humanitarian organization has its own identity and interests. 
Similarities however, can be found amongst agencies,  even if each is characterised by its own ethos, 
it is possible to distinguish three ‗ideal–types‘ of aid agency based on ethos: Deontological, Solidarist 
and Utilitarian. Although all three types of agency are guided and implement their programs according 
to some set of values, the reference to these values and the ways they impact the implementation of 
programmes differ. 
The ‗Deontological‘ organizations judge the appropriateness of an operation based on the 
action‟s adherence to core humanitarian principles, in particular impartiality, independence and 
neutrality. In the face of a given dilemma,  aid organizations of this kind will decide to take a decision 
based upon respect of the humanitarian imperative (saving lives), but in compliance with a strict 
respect for humanitarian principles.  
Interpretation of those principles and an ability to live by them differs between agencies. It is 
therefore necessary to distinguish further between ‗Maximalist‘ and ‗Minimalist‘ positions within the 
Deontological organizations. The former, typically the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) and Médecins sans Frontières (MSF), have both the will and means to live up to their claims; 
the latter, comprising organizations such as Action contre la Faim (ACF), Concern Worldwide, 
Médecins du Monde (MDM) or the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) refer to 
the humanitarian principles as much as possible, but are likely to compromise these depending on the 
context (funding, political pressure, level of security, etc). As Alexander Cooley and James Ron note: 
 
Some INGOs may resist material pressures, either because of idiosyncratic funding patterns, unique 
organizational cultures, or remarkable leaders or coalitions. Others may even define themselves in 
opposition to the mainstream, condemning their rivals‘ marketized or ―corporate‖ mentalities (Cooley 
and Ron, p.8, 2002).  
 
For the same reasons, Islamic Relief (IR), Oxfam GB (OGB) and Première Urgence (PU) are located 
at the margin between this sub-category and the following ideal–type.  
 
The ‗Solidarist‘ types of organizations are defined by the relation they have with the vulnerable 
populations. Many of these agencies are involved in activities other than purely humanitarian ones as 
they aim to tackle the root causes of populations‘ vulnerabilities. Their values often emphasise their 
claimed proximity to vulnerable people, and these organizations call for solidarity, equity, humility, 
peace, social justice – and for some, faith, love, hope and compassion. As such, a distinction can be 
made between the ‗Secular‘ Solidarists and the ‗Denominational‘ Solidarists. Into the former camp 
would fall organizations such as ActionAid (AA), Cesvi, Intersos, Merlin, Save the Children UK (SC-
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UK), Solidarités International, UNICEF or Welthungerhilfe. Into the more overtly religious group would 
fall organizations such as the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), Christian Aid (CA), 
Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Medair, Muslim Aid, or Tearfund (TF). Many of the Solidarists are torn 
between respecting humanitarian principles and engaging in activities that are not purely humanitarian 
in nature. Some organizations are located at the margin between either of the Solidarist sub-
categories and the third ideal–type. These are CARE US, the International Relief Committee (IRC), 
Mercy Corps, UNHCR or Save the Children US (SC-US).  
 
The last category is that of ‗Utilitarian‘ organizations. They believe that the value of an 
operation is determined by its utility – in other words an operation is worthy if it eventually brings an 
improvement to the condition of the vulnerable populations. According to this ethos, the relation 
between the operations and their positive or negative outcomes depends on the circumstances, and 
no principles are absolute or necessary in themselves. Such organizations prefer to make decisions 
based firstly upon the priorities they choose, which are based upon the wider environment in which the 
organizations locate themselves, i.e. political but also geographical, financial or religious dimensions. 
Their action is informed by humanitarian ethics, but their interpretation of these values is broad and 
flexible. Absolute respect for the humanitarian principles is not considered as essential, so long as the 
utilitarian organization perceives itself to be ―doing good‖. Morals, defined here as the (subjective) 
distinction between ‗right‘ and ‗wrong‘, are an essential component of their ethics. Organizations such 
as CHF International (CHF), International Relief and Development (IRD), the UN Development 
Program (UNDP), or the UN World Food Program (WFP) are included in this category. 
 
Based on this typology, agencies can be located on a spectrum. Similar to the ‗mental map‘ 
used by Dijkzeul and Moke, the spectrum represents an imaginary continuum of agencies that aid 
workers integrate through experience.67  
 
Figure 1 - Typology of international aid agencies (“Spectrum”)68 
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A blurring of the three ideal–types is inevitable – hence some organizations sit at the margin 
between two types; none of the ideal–types is stable, but rather, they are  tempered by realities on the 
ground. And although organizations‘ identities are sufficiently stable to locate them along the spectrum 
at this instant, their identities are bound to evolve. As Ryfman puts it, aid agencies ―go through cyclical 
crises and regularly remodel their identity‖ (Ryfman, p.28, 2007).  
However, the typology does provide a basis for a thorough analysis of the way each type of 
organization interacts with its environment and in particular, operates and manages its security. 
 
4.2. A body of corroborating evidence in the constitution of IAAs’ identity  
The previous section revealed that aid agencies can be divided into three types based on their 
ethos, which identifies the distinctive spirit of an aid agency. The following sections offer a body of 
corroborating evidence that allows for such distinctions. It is however, important to state that, by doing 
so, the thesis does not claim to reveal causation between a set of ideas or practices and the identity of 
an organization, but instead to underscore correlations that contribute to forming a body of 
corroborating evidence. Indeed, following its critical constructivist agenda, this thesis recognises the 
contingency of its claims – as well as the complexity of the humanitarian enterprise.  
Aid agencies do share common features. Ryfman for instance, rightly shows that NGOs have a 
―striking similarity in their concerns‖ (Ryfman, p.28, 2007). Partly because of this, humanitarian 
organizations are often depicted in the news as part of a group of undifferentiated organizations, and 
are often praised or criticised as a whole. Such an a-historic view, however, does not do justice to the 
multiplicity of organizations and dynamics and is not helpful in understanding who they are and how 
they manage their security. A critical constructivist approach to understanding aid agencies‘ identity 
reveals how their identity is (re)produced, which means examining the co-constitution between 
structures and agents as well as discerning ways the current narrative with which they identify was 
internalised and reproduced to eventually become dominant.  
The current section argues that aid agencies are the product of an era – as they are created 
and evolve in reaction to events; and that they are constituted by a range of features, of which self-
proclaimed values is a major one. These are being constantly reproduced by the personnel and 
constituencies of each organization through a formal and informal system of transmission and 
reproduction. This contributes to gradually fixing a dominant narrative and set of practices within each 
organization, which in turn contributes to forming the organization‘s ethos, made up of both its mindset 
and its operational practices. The dominant narrative and practices are sometimes challenged, and 
this may lead to the repositioning of an organization, yet they are nonetheless helpful in differentiating 
one organization from another.  
The present section will first place the aid agencies in the contexts of their creation and 
evolution, then identify the dominant discourses and values which frame their identity and study how 
these discourses are internalised and reproduced. 
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4.2.1. Aid agencies are the evolving product of an era  
Essentially created and adapting themselves in reaction to an event, whether international or 
localised, in a given period in time, aid agencies are the product of an era. Although some 
organizations‘ founding moments placed them in opposition to their societies‘ dominant values and 
narratives (such as the ICRC, Save the Children UK, the IRC or Oxfam), most are very much 
influenced by them. This is the case for the range of organizations created under the post-Second 
World War‘s ‗never again‘ motto, as well as of those created by leftists from the 1970s. These 
dominant values and narratives, or opposition to them, have contributed to shaping the ways 
organizations both perceive themselves and operate. As Ryfman explains, ―[p]osition, size, place in 
society, relations with the political world and the state and so on depend on the historical 
circumstances in which private humanitarian action came into being in a given country and then on the 
extent to which it expands into the international field‖ (Ryfman, p.23, 2007).  
Indeed, international aid agencies share the fact that most of them were created in reaction to 
an event, usually a conflict or a (natural or man-made) disaster. Massive tragedies often send a 
shockwave which acts as a catalyst for raising awareness of an issue, putting people and effort 
together and gathering funds.  
The International Committee of the Red Cross was created in 186369 on the initiative of Henry 
Dunant as a reaction to his unexpected encounter with the battle of Solferino four years earlier. The 
horrors he witnessed – in a single day, about 40,000 soldiers on both sides died or were left wounded 
on the field – led him to:  
 
… push for the creation of a neutral and impartial organization to protect and assist the war wounded. 
He also suggested that voluntary relief societies should be established to care for the injured – an idea 
that would eventually lead to the formation of National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. In 
addition, he proposed that an international principle be created to serve as the basis for these societies, 
an idea that developed into the Geneva Conventions (ICRC, Undated, website).  
 
The ICRC is a unique organization in many ways: first, it is worth recalling that ―[c]ontrary to 
popular belief, the ICRC is neither a non-governmental organization (NGO) nor an international 
organization. It is not an inter-state body either. It is a private agency, governed by a committee of 
between 15 and 25 exclusively Swiss members, who set policy and decide on strategy‖ (ICRC, 
Undated, website). Up until the early 1990s, only Swiss citizens were allowed to serve as ICRC 
delegates abroad. More significantly, and as the custodian of the Geneva Conventions and the 
guardian of International Humanitarian Law, the ICRC has a mandate from the international 
community. All of these specificities are related to both the historic conditions of the ICRC‘s creation 
and the following historic changes it was involved with, such as the Geneva Conventions. As such, the 
ICRC is a unique Deontological organization. 
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In the history of aid agencies, four events are particularly significant in shaping aid agencies‘ 
identity and actions: the World Wars, the Nigerian–Biafran war, the post–cold war era,  the1990s and 
the post–9/11 decade.  
 
The two World Wars contributed greatly in orienting aid agencies‘ focus towards civilians, a 
refusal to distinguish between victims of war even if this went against a government‘s policies. Among 
the international NGOs (INGOs) still operational today, Save the Children United Kingdom (SC-UK), is 
a venerable institution. Created in 1919 by Eglantyne Jebb, who, along with the co-founders, sought 
to draw ―attention to the plight of children on the losing side of the First World War‖ (SC, 2010, 
website). As in the case of the ICRC, Save the Children was well ahead of its time, in particular 
regarding its ideas about children‘s welfare, though like today it always remained part of the 
establishment. As Slim explains,  
 
British like that their charities are gently rebellious and independent, but they expect them to be 
respectable, pragmatic and constructive. … The Charity Law establishes a balanced relation between 
charities and politicians by exonerating them from taxes and protecting them against an excessive 
control from the government. In turn these charities, unelected and potentially partisan, commit to not 
directly attacking politicians. This compromise allows them to be critical but without frontally attacking 
the positions of a particular political party (Slim, p.34, 2006. Author‘s own translation). 
 
A few of today‘s most famous INGOs were created during or after the Second World War. 
Oxfam was created in 1942 by a group of Quakers, social activists, and Oxford academics as the 
Oxford Committee for Famine Relief; it opposed the British government to provide relief assistance to 
the Greek victims of both the Nazi occupation and the Allies‘ blockade (Ryfman, p.38, 2008). ―This 
opposition between humanitarian principles and politico-military decisions subject to catastrophic 
consequences for the civilian populations is not only ‗engraved in Oxfam‘s genes‘, but it constituted 
from there on a permanent characteristic of humanitarian action‖ (Ryfman, p.38, 2008. Author‘s own 
translation). Indeed, the confrontation between Oxfam and the Allied governments during its very first 
action was a sign of the tensions to come between the humanitarian drive and political and military 
interests. CARE was created in 1945 under the initial name of Cooperative for American Remittances 
to Europe ―to provide relief to survivors of World War II‖ (CARE, Undated, website); the acronym now 
stands for Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Inc. Similarly, Catholic Relief Services 
(CRS) was created in 1943, Christian Aid in 1945, Church World Service (CWS) and the Norwegian 
Refugee Council (NRC) in 1946, and World Vision in 1950. Apart from Oxfam, which is located at the 
margin between the Deontological and the Solidarists organizations, all of these agencies are 
Solidarists. 
The World Wars also served as catalyst for the creation of the constellation of agencies 
associated with the United Nations.  Among the UN agencies working in the relief sector, the United 
Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) was created in 1946 to provide emergency food and healthcare to 
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children in countries that had been devastated by World War II (UNICEF, Undated, website). The 
World Health Organization (WHO) then took over the League of Nations‘ Health Organization in 1948, 
which itself was created in 1919. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was 
created in 1950 to help Europeans displaced by the war (UNHCR, Undated, website). The birth of the 
World Food Programme (WFP) was formally established in 1961 by parallel resolutions from the Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the UN General Assembly. It is said however, that WFP‘s 
existence is ―due to the inspiration of one man, George McGovern. At the time, he was the first 
director of the newly created Office of Food for Peace in the Executive Office of United States 
President John F. Kennedy and special assistant to him‖ (Shaw, p.6, 2001). Shaw adds: ―it is 
important to understand this background as it left its mark on WFP that has remained to the present 
day‖ (Shaw, p.6, 2001) – and explains why WFP is the most Utilitarian of all UN humanitarian 
agencies. Indeed, UN agencies are all the results of political decisions made by states in the first 
place. This heavily influences their identity as in the case of the WFP. However, and with the 
multiplication of resources and a ubiquitous presence, UN agencies progressively, yet diversely, 
asserted themselves from the member-states. As explained by Ryfman, ―humanitarian action is one of 
the fields where [international organizations] can easily affirm a will to create some space and 
autonomous action‖ (Ryfman, p.39, 2008. Author‘s own translation). 
 
During the Cold War, aid agencies were both the result and part of the development paradigm 
which focused on newly independent countries. A number of NGOs in particular were created and 
funded in order to support the newly emancipated populations – and regimes. Also, ―persistence of 
hunger, which was perceived as both unbearable and an anachronistic vestige‖ of colonialism 
(Ryfman, p.43, 2008. Author‘s own translation) played a role in the continuation of previously created 
agencies.  
The 1967–1970 Nigerian–Biafran war was a major event in the founding of many key 
humanitarian aid agencies. The Irish NGO Concern was, for instance, created in 1968 ―in response to 
appeals from missionaries working in war torn Biafra‖ (Concern, Undated, website). The foundation of 
Médecins sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders, MSF) in 1971 had an impact much greater than 
the simple creation of one organization; the people who were behind it made a plea which gradually 
formed the basis of a wider ‗without borders‘ movement; Action contre la Faim (ACF) for instance was 
founded in 1979 inspired by these values, as were Aide Médicale Internationale (AMI) in 1979, 
Médecins du Monde (MdM, 1980), Solidarités International (1980) or Handicap International (HI, 
1982). Created both, under the influence of, and in opposition to the ICRC, the originality of this 
movement lay first in setting forth the basis for a permanent emergency humanitarian capacity at a 
time where there was little interest in such endeavour. Most importantly, this movement became 
famous for its tendency to pay no heed to states‘ prior agreements to work inside their borders and 
also for its vocal advocacy (témoignage) of human rights. Several of these organizations still proclaim 
their commitment to these values, even though the idea of entering and working illegally within a 
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country‘s borders is seldom done nowadays. Taken as a whole, most of the NGOs created in this 
period are Deontological organizations.  
 
The 1990s left a deep mark on aid agencies. Although the end of the Cold War initially raised 
hope that aid work would be somewhat easier to implement, the many conflicts and complex 
emergencies of the decade proved otherwise. From the Balkans war to the Somali disarray; the so-
called ‗humanitarian war‘ in Kosovo and the horrific genocide in Rwanda; the decade led to sharp 
criticism and a necessary reconsideration of humanitarian aid (Shearer, 2000; Pérouse de Montclos, 
2001). This in turn accelerated aid agencies‘ professionalization through, for instance, the adoption of 
quality standards and Codes of Conduct. These however, were not created out of nothing. The Code 
of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief 
as well as the Sphere Humanitarian Charter are the result of decades of gradually developing ideas. 
The next sub-section will present evidence to demonstrate that these are the products of two different 
approaches to aid work. 
 In the 1990s, organizations which neglected the field of emergency response in favour of 
development activities, when faced with the increasing importance given to responding to 
emergencies, had to reposition themselves – often painfully due to internal struggles – toward more 
humanitarian action. Avant recalls rightly that:  
 
[many] donors felt disillusioned by development assistance which, despite decades of investment, 
seemed to produce few tangible results. In comparison, humanitarian action became highly attractive, 
producing an immediate, visible and (at least on the surface) positive impact. With donor interest – and 
money – came many new ‗humanitarian‘ actors, some moving from other areas (like development) and 
others entirely new. Many of these had little familiarity with humanitarian principles and standards and 
launched projects in the field that threatened the security associated with the traditional acceptance 
strategy (Avant, p.144, 2007).  
 
Indeed, many of the Solidarists and Utilitarian organizations such as ActionAid, Cesvi, CARE, 
CHF, Intersos or IRD are engaged in multiple types of activities that are not exclusively humanitarian 
(such as development work, human rights advocacy, conflict resolution, community stabilisation, 
promotion of the rule of law, etc). This, in turn, means that they are torn between different priorities 
and ways of thinking which, as the thesis will underscore, problematises a strict application of 
humanitarian principles. 
 
The events following the attacks of 11 September 2001 did not bring about any fundamental 
changes in the debates surrounding humanitarian assistance which had emerged in the 1990s, but 
the attacks served to exacerbate these debates by revealing dissension within the aid community. An 
anecdotal, yet revealing, illustration of occurred in a Guardian news article disclosing the tensions 
existing between Save the Children UK and its US counterpart. SC-UK ―was ordered to end criticism 
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of military action in Iraq by its powerful US wing to avoid jeopardising financial support from 
Washington and corporate donors‖ (Maguire, 2003, website).70 This tension is a result of the differing 
orientation of SC-UK, a Solidarist organization, and SC-US, located in between the Solidarist and the 
Utilitarian types.  
As the Humanitarian Policy Group pointed out in 2003, "the war on terrorism constitutes a 
framework within which national and international policy, including humanitarian aid policy, will be 
defined and implemented‖ (Stoddard, p.1, 2003). The effects of 9/11 on aid agencies were numerous; 
they ranged from a further politicisation of public funding allocated to aid, to an increasing assimilation 
of aid agencies into the broader Western agenda and the multiplication of actors implementing relief 
assistance, including private companies and Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Altogether, the post–
9/11 effects were most prevalent in Iraq and Afghanistan71, but have also influenced dynamics in other 
contexts (Donini et al, 2004). According to Donini et al,  
 
[t]o confirm that humanitarians need to be wary of politics, even as they do their work in highly 
politicized settings is nothing new. What is new in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 eras is that the 
stakes are much higher because the extent of need has proliferated, the awareness of need has 
become more instantaneous and more global, and humanitarian action has become a multi-billion dollar 
enterprise (Donini et al, p.3, 2008).  
 
In Afghanistan, Utilitarian and a few Solidarist organizations were particularly criticised by aid 
workers interviewed for the present research, for not distancing themselves enough from US policies. 
The case of the Utilitarian IRD is particularly telling: it is the only not-for-profit NGO which explicitly 
advertises its expertise in programmes that support governmental ‗stabilisation‘ strategies (IRD, 
Undated, b, website).  
Although the manipulation and politicisation of aid have come back into fashion during the post 
9/11 decade, they are not new. They were already significant during the famine which struck Ukraine 
in 1921 under the Soviet government. Indeed, while some debates remain limited to a period in time, 
many are recurrent. Aid agencies‘ responses to these recurrent debates is diverse, yet contributes to 
challenging or reproducing their identity.  
 
Whether religious or secular, Denominational organizations, for their part, rapidly joined the 
nascent international humanitarian effort during the late 19th century, and contributed to its expansion. 
Caritas Internationalis (now a confederation of 165 Roman Catholic relief, development and social 
service organizations operating in over 200 countries and territories worldwide) was created as early 
as 1897 (Caritas, Undated, website). The Lutheran World Federation (LWF) was created in 1947 to 
                                               
70
 Both organizations are now working closely and have harmonised their policies and share resources. 
71
 For instance Hansen clearly highlights ―a fractured humanitarian enterprise‖: ―Sharp differences over humanitarian 
principles persist between agencies striving to remain at arms length from the [Multi-National Forces in Iraq] (and, in some 
locations, from Iraqi authorities) in order to safeguard their ability to operate, and the UN agencies, some international NGOs 
and non-profit corporations that remain reliant on the MNF-I for security and other forms of support‖ (Hansen 2008, p.7). 
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coordinate the activities of the many different Lutheran churches (LWF, Undated, website). Other 
Protestants are also represented, for example by World Vision (founded in 1950), which is now the 
world‘s largest NGO. Islamic NGOs have emerged from the 1980s, with the creation of the Islamic 
African Relief Agency in Sudan in 1980 (Ryfman, p.46, 2008) and Islamic Relief in 1983. Because 
they were created within the context of particular (religious) values, Denominational organizations did 
not have the same need to provide an ethical framework to their action as secular agencies. This 
explains why, even though some are culturally closer to the Deontological and others to the Utilitarian, 
all of them are Solidarists. They put more emphasis on their relations with the vulnerable populations 
than on humanitarian principles. 
 
Aid has always been shaped by ‗historic‘ events and subsequent narratives. Each aid agency 
has developed and evolved, within a certain framework. Accordingly, each has constructed a 
discourse framing its own identity. 
4.2.2. Humanitarian values and source of funding as indicators of IAAs’ identity 
The process of the construction of an aid agency‘s identity is not limited to a reaction to 
external elements. The formally articulated values, and material realities - such as the need for 
financial sustainability - play a key role in shaping an organization‘s identity.  
 
4.2.2.1. Dominant discourses framing aid agencies‟ identity: the reference to humanitarian values 
 
The ‗humanitarian‘ concept encompasses a multiplicity of elements; notably historic, ideational, 
and material. Although ―there is no single definition [of humanitarian action], and [that] no one owns 
the concept‖ (Davis, 2002, website), the objectives of humanitarian action are often accepted as 
saving lives, alleviating suffering and maintaining human dignity during, and in the aftermath of, 
conflicts and disasters, as well as preventing and strengthening preparedness for the occurrence of 
such situations.72 Humanitarian action includes the protection of civilians and those no longer taking 
part in hostilities, and the provision of food, water and sanitation, shelter, health services and other 
items of assistance, and in its strictest definition, it is not based on political, military or economic 
interests.  
Because humanitarian action focuses firstly on emergencies, the humanitarian system is 
characterised by specific funding mechanisms; these are often short term and flexible. They are also 
characterised by a certain type of human resource – often those experienced in dealing with 
emergencies. As set out in the Principles and Good Practice of Good Humanitarian Donorship: 
 
… humanitarian action should be guided by the humanitarian principles of humanity, meaning the 
centrality of saving human lives and alleviating suffering wherever it is found; impartiality, meaning the 
implementation of actions solely on the basis of need, without discrimination between or within affected 
                                               
72
 InterAction, the largest US-based NGO network, refers to the same objectives (InterAction, Undated, website). 
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populations; neutrality, meaning that humanitarian action must not favour any side in an armed conflict 
or other dispute where such action is carried out; and independence, meaning the autonomy of 
humanitarian objectives from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold 
with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented (WHO, Undated, website). 
 
Although these core humanitarian principles stem from the international humanitarian law and are 
reiterated in a UN resolution, the Humanitarian Charter and several humanitarian Codes of Conduct 
and documents, each agencies‘ interpretation of those principles and their ‗operationalization‘ differ.  
 
Despite their apparent coherence, these documents are the results of two different approaches 
to aid work. The origin of the core humanitarian principles is to be found in the ICRC. Early in its 
history the organization developed a set of four principles to orientate its actions, ‗the humanitarian 
principles‘, as they are known today:  
 
… were not, however, the subject of a systematic treatise until 1955, when Jean Pictet, in his book on 
the Red Cross Principles, defined and analysed all the values which guide the work of the Movement. … 
On the basis of this in-depth study, the Movement's seven Fundamental Principles as they stand today 
were unanimously adopted in 1965 by the 20th International Conference of the Red Cross (ICRC, 1996, 
website).  
 
The first four articles of the Code of Conduct that constitute the core of these humanitarian 
principles clearly echo the Red Cross Fundamental Principles. This approach, which provides a 
coherent framework based on a set of core principles, is often referred to as the ‗traditional 
humanitarianism‘. It is guided by:  
 
… a universal duty to act in the face of human suffering. Deriving from a sense of compassion and 
common humanity, it is governed by an ethical principle sometimes articulated as the ‗humanitarian 
imperative‘. It is governed by other rules too, most obviously by the provisions of international 
humanitarian law (IHL) which extend the humanitarian concern to the political arena, by setting 
humanitarian limits on what is permissible in the conduct of war. Traditional approaches to humanitarian 
action are needs based. The principle of impartiality is central, but stress is also put on neutrality and 
independence. Traditional humanitarianism is apolitical and wary of co-option. It sees ‗humanitarian war‘ 
as a contradiction in terms, and takes no view on (say) the legitimacy of war on Iraq, only on the way it 
is conducted. The traditional humanitarian agenda is a strictly limited agenda with relatively modest 
goals (Darcy, p.10, 2004). 
 
Deontological aid agencies such as ACF, MSF, the ICRC and IFRC, explicitly proclaim the framing of 
their actions within the core humanitarian principles.  
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Most agencies however, do not refer exclusively, or mainly, to the humanitarian principles. As 
an interviewee working for a Utilitarian organization explained ―pragmatism has also been accepted as 
a principle: since the job needs to be done there is a dilemma between sticking to the humanitarian 
principles and not having the job done, and putting the principles aside at times.‖73  
Humanitarian organizations are the result of a moment of generosity which was put into action 
– and sustained. In addition, they are fundamentally driven by an imperative to help. As such, they are 
intrinsically linked to a variety of values, whether personal, religious, moral or social.74 Eradication of 
poverty for instance, is pivotal for organizations such as ActionAid, CARE, Christian Aid, Concern, 
Muslim Aid or Oxfam GB. Others put an emphasis on the solidarity which ties them to the 
beneficiaries of their actions; this is the case for Cesvi, Christian Relief Services, Intersos, Save the 
Children, Solidarités International or World Vision. Some organizations, such as the Comité 
Catholique contre la Faim et pour le Dévelopement, Christian Aid, Church World Service, Islamic 
Relief, Medair, Muslim Aid or World Vision, refer explicitly to their religious values; these are not 
necessarily expressed in their names, but in their internal documentations as well as practices.75 
Guided by values and, their extensive experience in development activities, some of these 
organizations developed an alternative way to frame their actions and to provide coherence between 
relief and development agendas. 
The 1990s saw an increasing number of organizations, in parralel with academic discourses 
(Slim, 2001), pushing for a ‗rights-based‘ approach to humanitarian action. Such an approach does 
not describe situations in terms of human needs, but in terms of society's duty to respond to the rights 
of individuals. Rights-based humanitarianism in other words: 
 
… looks to human rights to provide its universal ethic, enshrined in legal terms that go beyond the 
narrower confines of IHL. Arising in the post-Cold War era, some interpretations of it are pro-
interventionist, accepting that armed force may be necessary to achieve humanitarian ends. More 
generally, this approach accepts that political engagement is both a proper and necessary part of 
humanitarian action. It tends to see coherence between humanitarianism and a range of other agendas 
including development and conflict reduction. … It concerns itself with tackling root causes as well as 
symptoms, with structural injustices, even power imbalances. Emergency and development work can 
and should be reinforcing, on this view, and rights provide the analytical framework that unites them 
(Darcy, p.10, 2004). 
 Traditional humanitarian values have been challenged by the tenants of this ‗new 
humanitarianism‘. The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement 
and NGOs in Disaster Relief for instance is the conciliatory result of these two divergent approaches 
to aid work. As Stockton puts it,  
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 Interview 147.  
74
 This however, does not mean that aid agencies are always doing the right thing, or that they are doing things rightly. 
Indeed, the Do No Harm framework developed in 1999 by Anderson illustrates this. 
75
 Several organizations organise or encourage staff to pray together for instance. This however, does not necessarily mean 
that denominational organizations are proselyte. On the contrary, all of those named in this research claim providing help 
regardless of beneficiaries‘ faith and beliefs, and with no will to convert them.  
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… all ten ―principles‖ of the Code of Conduct are hedged with conditions and qualifications, testifying to 
an editorial process that ensured the Code reflected, as faithfully as possible, the interests of its original 
sponsors. For example, it reads as if the Red Cross supplied the headlines of the first four principles 
while NGOs supplied the caveats; roles that were reversed for principles five to ten. This elaborate 
compromise therefore, rather ironically, resulted in a far-reaching relaxation of the unofficial rules of 
humanitarian action, for example … to espouse political or religious beliefs while distributing 
humanitarian aid. It is therefore to be expected that the signatories to the Code … present such 
diametrically opposed positions regarding US military practices in the War against Terror, whilst still 
making the plausible claim that they are acting within the letter of the Code (Stockton, p.3, 2005). 
 
 Deep divergences of views exist between aid agencies, particularly over what degree of 
political engagement is appropriate for humanitarians;76 in the words of an IRD employee: ―Are we 
principled? Yes to a degree - but at the same time we work closely with the US Government, and we 
don‘t see this as a contradiction.‖77 In reality, the difference between organizations is not neat; in 
particular since many organizations endorse aspects of both the ‗traditional‘ and ‗new‘ 
humanitarianisms (Darcy, 2004). This explains the rationale in categorising aid agencies along a 
spectrum rather than into strict categories. Nevertheless, indicative of the differences that exist among 
the five selected NGOs for this research, the three organizations closest to the Deontological and 
Solidarist parts of the Spectrum (MSF, OGB, SC-UK) have signed the aforementioned Code of 
Conduct, while the two closer to the Utilitarian part (CARE US78 and IRD) have not.  
Altogether, the degree of commitment in adhering to the humanitarian principles contributes to 
shaping aid agencies‘ ethos. This commitment however needs to be both expressed, and also 
practiced. Pursuing independence and neutrality has a cost that not all organizations are able, or 
willing, to pay.  
 
4.2.2.2. Origins of funding and its influence in shaping aid agencies‟ identity 
 
The second factor that constitutes aid agencies‘ ethos is comprised of their operational 
approach. It is linked to the previous factor, as aid agencies‘ operations are framed by their values. 
‗Operations‘ are informed by a multiplicity of aspects: the nature of the programmes; their locations 
and their source of funding. However, studying the origins of an organization‘s funding proves 
particularly relevant to understanding an organization‘s identity. 
To begin with, it‘s worth emphasising that a common aspect among all aid agencies is that 
they are not-for-profit . In contrast to private companies or for-profit development companies such as 
                                               
76
 For more information see Darcy (2004). Also according to Donini et al (2008, p.4), ―Many mainstream agencies have been 
drawn implicitly or explicitly into the service of political agendas. Only a minority have exhibited the policy determination and 
financial wherewithal to resist.‖ 
77
 Interview 142. 
78
 The case for the CARE family is original: while CARE International, CARE Australia, CARE Deutschland, CARE Japan and 
CARE Netherland have signed it, CARE US has not (Code of Conduct, Undated, website). 
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Chemonics or DAI79, they do not aim at getting richer through their activites. – even though aid 
agencies need to be financially sustainable and increasingly talk of organizational ‗growth‘.  
IAAs‘ funding usually stems from two sources: private (donation from individuals and bodies, 
traditionally located in Western countries) and institutional (ranging from grants to contracts 
administered by institutional donors). Donations are, for the most part, collected through fundraising; 
grants are usually requested through proposals that are directly related to an affected populations‘ 
needs as identified in the field; contracts are often driven by donors‘ pre-identified areas of interests. It 
is commonly argued that the more private money an agency receives, the more independent it is. On 
the other hand, the more funding it obtains from an institutional donor, the less autonomous it is when 
spending the money. In the words of a MSF staff: ―our funding is a major indicator of our 
independence: in 2008, 85 or 90% of it was stemming from private donations.‖80 This is particularly 
true for funding which is earmarked or has strings attached – i.e. when the money is given for 
particular projects and destinations that are in line with the donors‘ interests. A good part of the 
humanitarian institutional funding has similar conditions;  ―[t]he share of funding that is not earmarked 
ranges from 10% to about 50% of total income among the multilateral agencies‖ (DI, p.4, 2007). This 
means that aid agencies whose budgets originate mostly from institutional donors effectively have less 
autonomy in spending it.81  
As the table below shows, only a few organizations have a budget based on a majority of 
private donations. Some of these include Islamic Relief, Médecins sans Frontières, Médecins du 
Monde, Oxfam GB and World Vision. Several such as Concern, Church Relief Services, Church World 
Services and Intersos have a balance between the two sources of funding. Many however, including 
CARE US, Cesvi, the IRC, Merlin, Norwegian Refugee Council, Première Urgence, Solidarités and 
Welthungerhilfe rely heavily on institutional funding. This is also the case for all of the United Nations 
agencies involved in relief activities – although UNICEF makes a particular effort in attracting private 









                                               
79
 One of DAI‘s six core values is profitability: ―We must be a successful company to succeed in our mission. There is no 
conflict between financial success (profit) and mission success (development). Quite the opposite. If we succeed as a 
business, we will have a deeper development impact‖ (DAI, Undated).  
80
 Interview 149. 
81
 ―In terms of humanitarian funding for specific emergency response efforts, bilateral government funding to individual aid 
agencies for specific programs continues to represent by far the largest share (roughly 80%) of contributions‖ (Stoddard, 
2008, p.11). 
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  Organization 
Annual 
Budget  






£ 47.7 M 
$17.2 M Donations from 
overseas partners (36%);  
$11.4 M Grants (24%) 




€ 57.8 M 
62% private; 35% 
institutional; 3% other 




€ 180.7 M 
€179 M Private;  
€ 1.7 M Institutional 
Charter / Annual Report 
2008 / Website 
OGB 
(Deontological/Solidarist) 
£ 299.7 M 
£103.6 M Donations & 
Legacies; £70 M from 
Governments; £65.7 M sales  
Annual Report and Account 
07–08 / Website 
WV 
(Solidarist) 
$ 1.109 M 
42% Private cash 
contributions; 33% gifts in-
kind; 25% Gov. grants 
Annual Review brochure 








€132.3 M for 
2008 
€ 66.3 M from Governments 
and co-funders (50%); 
 €53.6 M fundraising (41%);  
€11.2 M Donated 
Commodities (8%) 
Annual Report 2008 / 
Website 
Christian Aid  
(Solidarist) 
£87.7 M / 
€94.4 M 
£28.5M General donations 
(33%); £25.7M Institutional 
income (29%) 




$ 611.2 M 
Around 45% US 
Government;  
around 30% private 
contributions; 30% 
Commodities & freight 




$ 70.9 M 
$30.2 M Government 
(42.6%);  
$26 M Public appeals 
(36.7%) 








(from July 07 
to June 08) 
$267 M US Government; 
$149 M US Private;  
$59 M Grants & Contracts 




$ 260.7 M 
79% Grants and contracts;  
17% contributions 




$ 539.1 M 
Mostly US government and 
International organizations 
Annual Report 2008 / 
Website 
Mercy Corps US 
(Utilitarian) 
$ 196.9 M 
$ 131.2 M Government & Intl 
Org.; $ 65.6 M Private 




£ 43.8 M 
Majority comes from 
institutional donors (DfID, 
USAID, EC) 
Annual Report 2008 / 
Website 
Save the Children UK 
(Solidarist) 
£ 216 M 
£102M Institutional grants 
(47%); £56.3M Donations 
(26%); £29.3M Gifts (14%)  




€ 45.2 M 
67.8 % Institutional donors; 
21.3% private donations 




€ 147.4 M 
€101.9 M Public grants 
(61.9%); €37.1 M Donations 
(25.2%) 




$ 3.390 M 
60% Governmental;  
29% private sector & NGOs 
Annual financial Report 
2008 / Website 
UNWFP 
(Utilitarian) 
$ 5.115 BN 
10 largest donors accounted  
for 82% of the resources 
received; 18 % was non-
earmarked 
Annual report 2008 / 
Website 
 
Table 1 - Overview of the private/public funding ratio in IAAs’ 2008 annual budget82 
 
                                               
82
 This table presents only a portion of the data collected. For a full overview, see Appendix 2. 
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The ICRC (and to a lesser extent UN agencies such as UNHCR and WFP) is a slightly 
different case.83 While the majority of its funding originates from institutional donors, its claim to be 
independent from them is largely true. This is explained by the fact that a good part of this funding is 
directly paid to its multilaterally-funded core budget, which is then used as its mandate dictates. This 
however, does not mean that they are immune from pressure from their donors. As Stoddard states, 
―[l]ess contingent on the vagaries of legislatures than bilateral project grant funding, core contributions 
can nevertheless be affected by downward pressures on foreign aid budgets‖ (Stoddard, p.25, 2008). 
It is nevertheless striking to see that while Maximalist Deontological organizations are 
financially independent, Utilitarian types rely heavily on governmental funding. This however, does not 
mean that financial independence automatically makes an organization principled – this is only 
achieved through action. Yet, the opposite is revealing: most aid agencies simply do not have the 
(human and financial) resources to abide by their proclaimed principles despite their will to do so. This 
implies that they might take decisions which take them away from the principled approach because 
the funding they have received is far too important to be given back84, or because they are under 
pressure from their donors to accomplish the projects. An IRD employee illustrated it well: ―We would 
continue to work if a staff member was killed – we continue the contract unless dictated otherwise by 
the donor.‖85 Furthermore, and particularly in heavily politicised contexts, some organizations may put 
aside the humanitarian principles they have agreed to in order to please a donor.86 Although all 
organizations claim to be operating in a given context primarily because of the existing needs (or 
rights)87 of the vulnerable populations, there appears to be a sense of opportunism at times. Stockton 
goes as far as saying that many organizations base their interventions on a ‗business case‘ rather 
than a ‗moral case‘ (Stockton, p.4, 2005). As an interviewee working for a Utilitarian agency went so 
far as to say, her organization ―is going into projects in which they don't necessarily have the 
expertise; there is a real sense of opportunism.‖88 Although all organizations lacking in private funding 
can be suspected of opportunism, doubts are particularly prevalent with Utilitarian organizations. 
Because Utilitarians focus on the outcome rather than the process of an action, it appears that they 
are less concerned about the origins of funding than other aid agencies. This in turn reinforces 
impressions of opportunism. IRD for instance has a remarkably wide range of ―thematic capabilities‖. It 
claims to have a ―sectoral capability in infrastructure, health, agriculture, economic development, 
democracy and governance, community development, water and sanitation, relief, and logistics‖ as 
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well as ―in public–private partnerships, multi-sectoral programming, civil–military programs, design, 
construction and engineering, management and rapid start up‖ (IRD, Undated, a, website). In contrast, 
an MSF employee explained that ―nowadays, the point is not about doing lots of projects in a context, 
but about the quality of the aid provided: we need to have a true proximity with the population; to have 
a better understanding of the contexts. After all, humanitarian action is a dedication, not a service 
delivery or a supermarket.‖89 Significantly, while MSF has a majority of private funding, IRD has a long 
list of donors that most aid agencies would refuse to be funded by, including the US Department of 
Defence, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and a PMSC (IRD, Undated, c, website). 
 
Despite its charitable intent, the realm of realpolitik also exists in the aid sector. A major 
criticism heard among humanitarian security managers interviewed for this research, is the 
(occasional) incoherence between an organization‘s discourse and its actions. From time to time aid 
organizations make operational choices that clash with their self-articulated values. Several 
interviewees referred, for instance, to the tensions between their organization‘s values and the 
acceptance of highly politicised, sensitive, counterinsurgency related funding for assistance in the ‗Af-
Pak‘ region. An InterAction policy paper states that:  
 
… in Pakistan, as well as in Afghanistan, INGO field staff remain concerned that the [US] 
administration‘s overall civilian response and aid strategy is dominated by counter-insurgency (COIN) 
imperatives. Operating out of unmarked vehicles, and with primarily local staff, InterAction‘s 
humanitarian and development member organizations work hard to maintain a measure of impartiality 
that allows us to better serve the most vulnerable communities. To that end, it is imperative that U.S. 
assistance dollars that fund NGO programs not be tied in any way to COIN language and objectives. If 
COIN language is present in funding agreements, then the ability of many INGOs and Pakistani NGOs 
to serve as partners to USAID will be limited, as this labelling is in direct tension with our humanitarian 
principles and would jeopardize our impartiality and ability to operate safely and effectively in many 




Yet at the same time, several interviewees whose agency is a member of InterAction, criticised 
their organizations for accepting the funding in the first place; one respondent, working for CARE, 
questioned whether their organization is driven by humanitarian principles: ―officially we are, yet in 
reality I have doubts. An organization which is donor oriented cannot be principled – a case in point is 
Pakistan where the funding we accepted looks a lot like a large counterinsurgency funding.‖91 
Similarly, the head of security of another Solidarist/Utilitarian organization shared his frustration: ―this 
funding is loaded with counter-insurgency language, is in violation of the point 4 of the Red 
Cross/NGO Code of Conduct as it clearly promotes  US foreign policy and goes against our strategic 
plan; when I raised these concerns with the CEO, the answer was that 'we couldn't walk off the 
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project'; now we have four staff kidnapped, the actual projects accomplished very little and we‘ll have 
to close the program due to insecurity.‖92 
As security managers often state, ‗say what you do, and do what you say‘, as inappropriate 
trade-offs can endanger the staff of an organization. To be fair though, it is worth recalling that aid 
agencies are juggling a multiplicity of sources of funding and operate in a diversity of complex 
environments. Maintaining coherence between discourses and practices is an inherent challenge 
given the nature of the sector. 
 
As highlighted in this sub-section, aid agencies‘ ethos is constituted at two levels: the 
ideational level characterised by an agencies‘ guiding values and the practical level based on their 
operational approach. The origin of humanitarian organizations‘ funding, in particular the amount of 
private versus institutional funding, influences their actual operational capacity, inhibiting their freedom 
to chooseand implement projects according to their proclaimed values. Altogether, the disparities in 
approaching humanitarian principles or in securing funds from diverse origins, contribute further to the 
differences between aid agencies. Organizations that are financially and operationally capable of 
abiding by humanitarian principles often appear to be Maximalist Deontological agencies. Minimalist 
Deontological as well as Solidarist organizations often claim to abide by humanitarian principles, but 
the reality is that many of them are engaged in activities other than purely humanitarian and/or depend 
too much on institutional funding to be able to do so. Utilitarian organizations refer to humanitarian 
principles only among other values; and in all cases, are far too dependent upon institutional funding 
to have an actual principled approach even if they wished to do so.  
4.2.3. The co-constitution between structures and agents 
The construction of an organization‘s identity is the result of processes occurring at different 
levels. According to critical constructivists, understanding the construction of aid agencies‘ identity 
implies that the analysis should not focus only at the level of the structures, but also look at the 
interplay between structures and agents. Indeed, the process of construction of an aid agency‘s 
identity depends greatly on its constituencies. Aid agencies are not empty institutions. They are 
shaped by their personnel as much as these people are shaped by the organization. Agency‘s 
discourses become dominant because they are internalised and reproduced. This process takes 
various forms, yet is rather similar from one organization to another. Consequently, the present sub-
section will not put much emphasis on the differences between the three types of aid agencies, and 
will focus instead on demonstrating the processes of co-constitution between structures and agents. 
Bloom claims that:  
 
… given the same environmental circumstances, there will be a tendency for a group of individuals to 
make the same identification, to internalise the same identity. Similarly, again given the same 
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environmental circumstances there will also be a tendency for a group of individuals to act together to 
protect and to enhance their shared identity (Bloom, p.23, 1990. Emphasis original).  
 
Unsurprisingly, transmission and reproduction of agencies‘ values and norms takes place 
through collegial work and life, in particular at field level where it is often the case that aid workers live 
and work in the same places as their colleagues. Whether working for the UN, the ICRC or NGOs, 
most aid workers interviewed in Afghanistan and Haiti were either living and working in the same 
house/office, or renting accommodation with colleagues.  
 
Most IAA employees interviewed for the present research shared their organization‘s values93, 
whether they were working at headquarter or field level. An IRD employee explained for instance that 
―yes, I share the organization‘s values, as the rest of the staff do.  Actually, employees buy alot into 
our 'community stabilisation' projects.‖94 Similarly, a SC-UK staff argued that ―For the most part both 
national and international staff buy into our values.‖95 An MSF representative shared that the ―staff do 
share the organization‘s values; the transmission happens during the selection process and then 
during trainings, programme implementation, understanding of our Charter, etc.‖96  
 Respondents added that their colleagues also shared the organization‘s values, even if it was 
sometimes less true for the personnel not directly involved in the operational activities, i.e. personnel 
working in administrative positions.  
 Wendt makes a distinction between three levels of internalization of identity: coercive, interest-
driven and normative (Wendt, p.254, 1999). On the first level, internalization is based on fear of 
punishment. On the second level, actors realise their interest in complying with the norm. Finally, on 
the third level of internalization, actors believe in the norm and it becomes a part of them. Within the 
aid sector, internalization is rarely coercive, but rather normative and interest-driven, with individuals 
sharing the interests of their colleagues or their organization. As such, the firing of an aid worker 
occurs only rarely, for instance when an employee violates the organization‘s code of conduct – seen 
as the red line not to cross – as was observed by the author in Haiti.  
 
Most interviewees explained that internalization in their organization is essentially the result of 
a transmission of the norms and values, through processes of education, communication and 
persuasion. An interviewee explained for instance, that ―the transmission is promoted through formal 
tools, such as training at the onset of employees‘ contracts, where policies, missions and annual plans 
are presented – they are all the summary of our approach. These documents are shared with local 
staff when possible.‖97 Another answered that the ―transmission is the result of a strong and militant 
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commitment from the employees and from the volunteers. In addition, integration is also made through 
the encouragement to participate on a voluntary basis with MdM‘s projects in France on Saturdays.‖98 
A CARE representative argued that ―the internalization of CARE‘s values by the staff is very strong, 
and this happens through daily practices, workshops, trainings, etc.‖99 
Similarly, Sørensen notes that the ICRC:  
 
… is certainly the only humanitarian organization that I know of, which has a written and well-publicized 
myth of origin, translated into numerous languages, that is widely used both to generate committed and 
loyal staff, and to create global awareness, legitimacy and support. The myth also plays an important 
role in ICRC‘s professional relations with other humanitarian actors on the global scene, and has helped 
the ICRC to assume a hegemonic, but not uncontested, position in the world of humanitarian agencies 
with a particular responsibility to take a lead in setting humanitarian standards (Sørensen, p.3, 2006). 
 
An employee of a Christian organization shared the information that: ―at headquarter level we 
spend a lot of time in prayer – we actually prioritise praying as our relationship with colleagues and 
partners are very important to us. At field level, we work through partners including churches and have 
a culture of sharing and giving within the communities. The local and international staff are rather 
close with each other and have developed strong bonds.‖ 100 When asked about the transmission of 
the organization‘s values, she explained that: ―everyone at headquarters is Christian: our values are 
shared with the staff during the induction; we also have weekly staff meetings (which look like a 
church assembly), prayers, etc. On the field, expatriates organize team prayers; the national staff 
benefit from an induction about our values, without however focusing on the specifically Christian 
aspects.‖ Similarly, Tearfund‘s website offers a ‗prayer zone‘, from which anyone can download a 
PowerPoint to be shown at churches as a way to gather support and prayer. The Haiti Emergency 
Appeal PowerPoint asks readers to ―pray for the successful recruitment of about 30 Haitian staff to 
work with Tearfund‘s Disaster Management Team; pray for Tearfund‘s staff to be able to coordinate 
well with other agencies; pray for safety and good radio and satellite communications for the team‖ 
(Tearfund, 2010, website). Such calls for prayer are rather unusual in the aid community and show 
clearly the strong Christian identity of the organization. 
Internalization also starts before the recruitment of staff. Medair and World Vision explicitly 
state that they recruit their international staff only from among Christians. Similarly, Tearfund states 
that ―applicants must be committed to Tearfund's evangelical Christian beliefs. You will be presented 
with our Basis of Faith declaration when filling out any online application form and will be asked to 
confirm that you agree with its statements‖ (Tearfund, Undated, website). On the other hand, Islamic 
Relief Worldwide, Muslim Aid and Muslim Hands only ask applicants to have a ‗commitment‘ to the 
organization‘s values and ethos. Islamic Relief Worldwide‘s job profile for a Communications Director 
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position states that: ―it is essential that the post holder shows a good understanding and sympathy 
with Islamic values and principles. A commitment to IRW‘s vision, mission statement and values is 
also essential‖. Not limited to Denominational organizations, secular aid agencies also request that 
employees share and commit to the organizations values. For instance, a job profile for an SC-UK 
Emergency Programme Manager position requests that applicants have a ―commitment to and 
understanding of Save the Children‘s aims, values and principles.‖ Similarly, MSF requires applicants 
to share a ―commitment to the aims and values of MSF‖ (MSF, Undated, a). This ensures an a priori 
active process of identification and assimilation.  
 
A challenge to the transmission of values lies in the fact that aid agencies are largely 
composed of personnel from the countries in which they operate – referred to as their national and 
local staff. 101 With personnel originating from different cultures, assimilationof their values becomes 
inherently difficult.  
Two unrelated reports from MSF highlight the problems faced. The first states that ―MSF 
Sudanese employees expressed a feeling of unease with MSF‘s witnessing activities. They noted also 
that expatriates may not always be aware that Sudanese authorities may have a different 
understanding of the words ‗emergency‘, ‗security‘ and ‗without borders‘ leading to unnecessary 
tensions at times‖ (MSF, p.4, 2010). The following quotes from the national staff illustrate this: ―If you 
say that ‗we are doctors without borders, we can work everywhere‘ then people think that it is another 
period of colonization‖; ―In one shop, a guy asked me: ‗You are MSF? Are you sure you are without 
borders? So why you were kicked out [from Sudan by the Government]?‘‖; ―There is a problem with 
using the word ‗emergency‘. It gives bad feelings (means that there is a big problem)‖; ―Some people 
don‘t understand the word security (when we use the word security, insecurity in our correspondence, 
during meetings, etc.). They think of something big. It is good to explain to them in simple words. 
When you say ‗security is not good‘, you better say ‗the road is not safe for this or that‘‖ (MSF, p.28, 
2010). 
In the second case, the report explains that:  
 
MSF‘s concept of neutrality was perceived differently in the Yemeni context. National staff suggested 
that it would be difficult for the community to conceive of an organization without political motivations, 
partly because of linguistic and conceptual differences in understandings of ‗neutrality‘. Given the highly 
politicised nature of Arab society, political neutrality is generally not understood in the same way that 
Western humanitarian organizations articulate the concept. For example, neutrality was not possible in 
the Iraq war or the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and individuals were generally assumed to have a 
political stance on most issues (Haddad, 2009, website). 
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It usually requires more effort and commitment to explain an organization‘s values to national 
staff, and local stakeholders alike, but anecdotal evidence shows that agencies are not necessarily 
successful in doing so. The ICRC for instance is famous for its lengthy integration courses targeting 
new international employees prior to their departure to the field and again a few months down the line. 
This, in addition to being part of a unique organization, helps to provide a shared mindset amongst the 
international staff. However, as explained by an employee ―we still have efforts to make when it comes 
to the national staff. We try to integrate them better, but they are very diverse: some are working with 
us out of conviction, others for the money – it also depends on each context and delegation.‖102 This is 
well known by aid agencies and in Afghanistan and Haiti it has meant that security managers often 
pay careful attention to drivers, guards and doormen in particular. They are usually the first point of 
contact for visitors and outsiders and need to understand the organization and explain it in a way that 
fosters acceptance.  
 
Interviewees who answered that they didn‟t share their organization‘s values didn‘t necessarily 
disagree with these values. They rather stressed that they could just as easily work for another aid 
agency instead. One interviewee explained that ―I could work for a number of NGOs but I do like the 
health programmes as, being a security professional, it gives me a dynamic to build from as it can link 
every human being.‖103 He is here referring to the fact that implementing health projects makes it 
‗easier‘ to operate in Afghanistan or Haiti: everybody, even insurgents, criminals or their families need 
medical treatment; this can then facilitate the acceptance and implementation of health activities.  
Another interviewee, working as a Global Security Advisor explained: ―I agree in principle with 
the organization‘s values, but I am focused on the work – I shy away from development discussions or 
programmatic debates.‖104 
One interviewee however was more critical of her organization: ―I have certain moral values 
and do share the organization's values on paper; but in practice, I don't think these were actualised: 
guards and drivers are paid well below what the lowest NGO would pay; the organization does not 
value its staff, which I see as a security concern. Also, they invest little in security: the organization is 
committed to work in conflict environments, but is not ready to invest in the necessary resources to 
work safely.‖105  
As Stoddard explains, ―[d]espite the fact that NGOs have different mandates, organizational 
histories, cultures and interests, epistemic and collegial links among staff members of the major NGOs 
are strong. Over the past ten years, NGOs have greatly increased their coordination, in practice and in 
principle, covering virtually every aspect of their work‖ (Stoddard, p.4, 2003). In addition, it is not only 
the case that aid organizations recruit most of their personnel from the same pool of candidates, but 
these candidates then move easily from one organization to another. As will be demonstrated in the 
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next chapter, this leads to a cross-fertilization of ideas, values, and know-how in aid agencies, and 
renders their ‗borders‘ porous.  
 
Aid agencies are very active in ensuring that their culture, values and norms are assimilated by 
their personnel. Altogether, transmission and internalization occur through a range of dynamics that 
are very similar from one organization to another. The focus of these dynamics is nevertheless 
different, this in turn, differentiates each agencies‘ respective identity at both headquarter and field 
level. 
 
4.3. The differentiation of the ‘other’ as a reaffirmation of the ‘self’ 
 In addition to studying the co-constitution between structures and agents and the construction 
of dominant narratives in the aid sector, a critical constructivist study of aid agencies implies the need 
to identify who form the ‗others‘ against which aid agencies distinguish themselves, and what, in 
comparison, are their own defining characteristics. Identity is traditionally constructed in an 
exclusionary way through narratives which constantly produce symbolic barriers between the ‗self‘ and 
‗other‘. Beliefs, attitudes and opinions of aid workers are shaped by values, norms and organizational 
culture, but also by their perception of the role that their organization plays in the international arena, 
and the status of that role.  
While the ‗other‘ is often regarded within the discipline of International Relations as an enemy, 
the ‗other‘ against which aid agencies construct their sense of themselves is not criminal gangs or 
Taliban but other members of the international community. It is common to hear aid workers 
differentiating themselves from those who they are most like – independently of the level of analysis, 
i.e. inter-organizational or intra-organizational. This is the case when aid agencies communicate their 
difference from armed forces coming from the same country as them; or from private contractors 
engaged in reconstruction activities; or from UN agencies involved in political processes. This also is 
the case within the UN family. As an HCR staffer said ―the UN needs a common denominator, but 
HCR is willing to differentiate its profile though.‖106 Similarly, in order to distinguish themselves from 
the UN political agencies, the UN humanitarian agencies in Afghanistan and Haiti paint the ‗UN‘ letters 
on the side of their car in blue rather than black. Most people are unaware of the rationale for this 
distinction, but it helps the UN humanitarian agencies to make their point to their political colleagues. 
The rationale behind aid agencies‘ differentiation from other members of the international community 
lies in their shying away from any manipulation of assistance by political, military or corporate actors. 
Differentiation among agencies also exists between organizations located at different ends of 
the aforementioned identity Spectrum. For instance The International Medical Corps (IMC) claims that 
its establishment ―… in 1984 was a development that had global significance, not because it added 
another name to the pool of international relief agencies, but because it boldly declared the 
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emergence of a new kind of relief agency. By providing health care through training, International 
Medical Corps challenged, indeed changed, the very definition of relief‖ (IMC, Undated, website). It 
also specifies that ―… unlike many other relief organizations, we stay long after the crisis has ended to 
help communities fully recover and get back to self-reliance‖. Such self-aggrandising narratives need 
however, to be qualified as many aid workers are simply unaware of the IMC‘s existence. Also, a few 
organizations, such as IRD, Médecins du Monde (MdM) and Première Urgence (PU), mention 
explicitly that their objective is ‗to go where others [other agencies] don‘t go‘. PU further explains that 
they provide assistance in areas that are most difficult to reach, and to the populations ―forgotten by 
humanitarian assistance‖ (PU, Undated, website). Indeed, the location of the projects offers another 
indication of these agencies‘ identity: operating projects in rural Helmand, Afghanistan, or the slums of 
Port-au-Prince, Haiti, is far more challenging and dangerous than in restrained Badakhshan or quiet 
Jacmel. Some agencies are then referred to as ‗frontline‘ organizations while others appear to be ‗risk 
averse.‘ For instance according to an Oxfam employee, ―compared to other NGOs, Oxfam is 
‗cautious‘, and has a ‗conservative‘ approach.‖ 107 Similarly a CARE representative explained that 
―CARE is ―conservative‘ as we won‘t take great risks.‖108 Interestingly, the ‗frontline‘ organizations are 
to be found at both ends of the Spectrum, and as the next Chapter will demonstrate, this proves true 
whether we refer to MSF or IRD. Although Maximalist Deontological organizations and Utilitarians 
disagree on how to implement humanitarian programmes, they nevertheless concur in investing 
substantial efforts and capabilities to reach out to vulnerable populations, including in the most 
dangerous areas. In Afghanistan for instance, the remaining organizations that continue implementing 
projects in the war-torn southern parts of the country are essentially Maximalist Deontological and 
Utilitarian organizations, including MSF and the ICRC on the one hand; and CHF, IRD and WFP on 
the other. In contrast, OGB, SC-UK and CARE have all left the dangerous South. 
Efforts to contrast one agency with another are also observed among organizations located in 
the same section of the ideal–type spectrum. The creation of MSF in reaction to the ICRC‘s stance 
during the Nigerian–Biafran war is a point in case. Similarly, MDM was created by Bernard Kouchner 
and others after having slammed the door of MSF and this remains a vivid memory (MDM, Undated, 
website).  
In all of these cases, where an external observer may see similarities between organizations, 
aid agencies and aid workers would rather highlight differences. This in turn reaffirms the perceived 
boundaries between the „self‟ and the „other‟. The affirmation of the ‗other‘ in the aid sector is an 
important component of the realization of identity, particularly since identity is constructed to the extent 
where one can determine those aspects which comprise the foreign. This aligns with the work of 
Campbell who claims that the conceptualisation of identity is ―constituted in relation to difference 
[rather than] fixed by nature, given by God, or planned by intentional behavior‖ (Campbell, p.9, 1998). 
As such, the identity of every entity is ―performatively constituted‖ and contains ―no foundations that 
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are prior to, or outside of, its operation‖. Campbell adds that ―the constitution of identity is achieved 
through the inscription of boundaries that serve to demarcate an ‗inside‘ from an ‗outside‘ or a ‗self‘ 
from an ‗other‘‖ (Campbell, p.9, 1998).  
 
How do aid agencies then define members of the ―in-group‖? It is both an actual internalization 
of the difference by employees, and also the agencies‘ calculated aim to influence both outsiders (by 
attracting donors‘ attention) and insiders (by building staff cohesion).  
It is rare to hear staff of organizations located at either end of the Spectrum claiming that their 
organization is anything close to those sitting at the opposite end of the Spectrum. In other words, in 
both Afghanistan and Haiti aid workers interviewed had internalised that MSF is not IRD. Interestingly, 
several interviewees working for Deontological organizations compared their agency to others by 
disapprovingly referring to other organizations‘ lack of respect for the humanitarian principles. In the 
words of an MSF employee: ―In certain contexts, many use armed escorts as they want to show their 
donors that they are capable of reaching their beneficiaries. But what worries us, is that these 
agencies don‘t see this as a matter of principle.‖109 On the other hand, several aid workers working for 
Utilitarian organizations have argued that they get the job done precisely because, as opposed to 
Deontologicals, they have a pragmatic attitude towardshumanitarian principles. The following quote by 
an IRD employee illustrates the point: ―MSF personnel are the first ones to die; they don't play the 
game, and don't share information - they are in accordance with their principle, but at what cost?‖110 
Respondents working for Solidarist organizations have claimed respect for humanitarian principles, 
but referred to their rights-based or denominational approaches as a distinctive feature. Last, 
differentiation among NGOs was also made on the basis of nationality, opposing in particular 
American to continental European ones. Although such a distinction is relevant in many ways, it is too 
narrow and underplays the similarities that exist across the Atlantic (Blanchet and Boris, 2006). 
Keen in defending their traditional identity, Deontological organizations are particularly vocal 
when it comes to differentiating their stance. A Red Cross employee explained for instance that ―other 
humanitarian organizations are not necessarily a threat but their actions still impact on us.‖111 Going a 
step further, MSF argues that ―[f]or the sake of preserving the space for impartial humanitarian 
assistance in war zones, multi-mandate organizations should make a choice between relief and 
development assistance, a choice between saving lives today or saving societies tomorrow‖ (Hofman 
and Delaunay, p.6, 2010). 
Nevertheless, the delimitation of the lines between the ‗self‘ and the ‗other‘ is also contingent to 
the situation and the audience. There have been cases where aid agencies critical of the militaries or 
of the UN have sought their support when confronted with an immediate threat. For instance in the 
DRC, during 2005 Oxfam made use of MONUC helicopters several times despite normally being 
critical of the Blue Helmets‘ actions. And despite displayed differentiation between aid agencies, 
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organizations do collaborate with each other on a daily basis or when necessary. The presence of all 
types of agencies around the same table during information-sharing meetings, as observed in 
Afghanistan and Haiti, is a case in point. The differentiation with the ‗other‘ is then often made for a 
specific audience in a specific context, such as getting donators‘ attention in a crisis by gathering 
massive media attention; or when it comes to internal team-building processes; or when an agency is 
seeking to coax a stakeholder who is critical of the broad humanitarian sector. As such, differentiation 
is also a calculation of the outcome and how it will best benefit the interests an agency.  
 
Social constructivists argue that a shared sense of identity can reduce perceptions  of 
intergroup threat. Yet in the aid sector, the ‗other‘ frequently denounced is the one who shares most 
similarities with the aid agencies. The thesis will argue in the next chapter that this has an impact on 
how aid agencies perceive and manage threats.  
 
4.4. Conclusion 
 International aid agencies‘ are not stable structures operating independently from their 
environments. On the contrary, there is strong evidence that they are created in reaction to an event, 
whether global or local, and that they are then continuously shaped both by their environment and by 
internal dynamics. However, due to aid workers‘ movements from one agency to another, and given 
the multiple interactions their personnel entertain with their external environment at all levels of the 
organization, aid agencies‘ ‗borders‘ are porous. Still, through active processes of assimilation, 
dominant discourses and practices gradually emerge and permeate each organization. In particular, 
the application of humanitarian principles as well as the ratio of private to institutional funding are good 
indicators of aid agencies‘ identities. Altogether, these form a body of corroborating evidence which 
eventually allows one to distinguish each agency‘s ethos, which is comprised of their mindset and 
operating modes. There are however similarities within these differing ethoses, which in turn provides 
a basis for identifying three ideal–types of organizations: the Deontological, Solidarists and Utilitarians. 
Identity claims are however, enhanced or undermined by certain practices. Aid agencies‘ identities 
form the basis of their approach to security management. But this is not a one-way process and this 
fact also, in turn continuously shapes their identity. 
As the next chapter will show, this typology provides a basis for a thorough analysis of the way 
each type of organizations interacts with its environment, and in particular thinks and manages its 
security. Having identified and located aid agencies in a spectrum, this will allow us to understand 
their different choices regarding security management practices.  
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Chapter 5 – Identity and Interests: Representations of Security 
 
 




Why, when faced with a given threat, does one agency decide to use armed guards, fences 
and CCTVs, while another - even if located on the same street - keeps its doors wide open? Why do 
aid agencies sometimes take different measures to mitigate a similar threat? Why do some look for 
external private security providers while others shy away from them? What are the processes that 
lead an aid organization to decide whether or not to harden its stance? How do such stances or the 
use of external security providers affect an aid agency?  
Since each organization has its own identity, each also has its own vulnerabilities. In addition, 
each interfaces with threats in its own way. Each then, has its own interests when it comes to ensuring 
its security. Threat perceptions and approaches to security are intrinsically linked with an 
organization‘s identity. Similarly, and in a cyclical way, norms and values associated with certain 
approaches to security are internalized by the personnel of an agency, to the point where they 
become part of an organization‘s identity. Indeed, critical constructivists claim that identity and security 
are not stable institutional characteristics but constant processes, which fuel each other. From this 
perspective, interests are best analysed through a dynamic study of these processes, with a focus on 
agents and on changes.  
Because the interest of this thesis is limited to aid agencies‘ preferences in security, it will 
study how aid agencies conceive and manage their security. By doing so, it will emphasize how these 
constitutive processes relate to aid agency identity and will reveal in particular how differences in 
identity are paralleled with differences in interests. Among the different conceptions and practices of 
security, the thesis will highlight the dominant representations and examine how they are shaped – but 
not determined – by IAAs‘ identity constructs. It will examine how humanitarian security was gradually 
developed, spread, internalized and reproduced by emphasizing the dynamics within the aid sector as 
well as within aid agencies.  
The first section of the chapter discusses how aid agencies‘ approaches to security vary from 
one type of aid agency to another. Given that identities are also constructed in reaction to perceived 
threats, understanding humanitarian actors‘ identities requires analysing how they construct their 
threats and are shaped by them. The second section then explores what threats are confronting 
international aid agencies (IAAs) and how these threats are constructed. Understanding how IAAs‘ 
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identities shape dominant representations in humanitarian security management is the focus of the 
third section of the present chapter.  
 
5.1. Aid agency approaches to security are contingent upon their identity  
 Critical constructivists argue that identities and interests are mutually constituted. That the 
identity of an actor implies their preferences, but is also the product of these. It is not surprising then 
that, given variations in aid agencys‘ identities, their approaches to security also vary. While the 
present section underscores these differences, the following sections will provide evidence of the 
differences in approach. By doing so however, the thesis recognizes the contingency of its claims. The 
current section provides indications of aid agency approaches to security rather than strict assertions. 
As will be discussed below, these indications are at times tempered by different contextual realities.  
 Aid agency approaches to security are shaped by both the values that drive each organization 
and the ways these values are put into practice; as a result, three approaches to humanitarian security 
have been identified. 
 
The approach to security of Deontological organizations is heavily conditioned by the 
conviction that a close respect for, and application of, humanitarian principles is the best way to 
ensure the safe continuation of their work. As emphasized in the previous chapter, humanitarian 
principles are not perceived as absolute moral values but as an ethical framework that guides  
operations. By expressing and effectively transforming these principles into a range of practices, 
Deontological organizations strive to put themselves in a position where they can be given special 
consideration – such as safe access to vulnerable populations – by all relevant parties. To do so 
however, they have to explain to all stakeholders the meaning of their humanitarian principles and 
convince them of their relevance, as well as prove that their implementation of them is coherent. 
 In other words Deontological agencies such as the Red Cross movement and Médecins sans 
Frontières are holistic in their approach to security. They do not focus as much on technical fixes as 
on political considerations.113 They then pay particular attention to the source of their funding; they 
strive to maintain a consistency to their operations; and to develop networks with relevant warring 
parties and/or criminal groups in order to find operative agreements, build trust and ensure continuous 
channels of communication. This means that, compared to other agencies, they are more successful 
in having (quasi-)permanent (expatriate) staff, including in the most dangerous areas such as the rural 
areas of Helmand and Kandahar in Afghanistan or the various slums in Port-au-Prince. In addition, 
their modus operandi implies that, contrary to many organizations which keep a low profile in 
dangerous environments, deontological organizations strive to always openly display their logo as a 
way of being distinguished from other actors. They put an emphasis on the acceptance approach but 
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also use elements pertaining to the protection approach – but keep them low-profile, in particular 
when these consist of ‗hard‘ protective measures. They occasionally use a deterrence approach, but 
this is usually manifested as a diplomatic threat rather than use of gun power. For instance, if 
threatened they would identify the source of the threat, say an armed group, and warn them in return 
that they could stop their projects and leave the area – which in turn, could potentially go against the 
armed group‘s interests. 
Minimalist Deontological organizations such as Action contre la Faim, Concern or Oxfam share 
similar views to those of the Maximalists. This is compounded by the fact that many of them depend 
on institutional funding or are not engaged solely in humanitarian activities. This then means that their 
operational choices may be limited by certain considerations and their approaches to security might 
resemble those of Solidarists.  
 
Solidarists aim and claim to be using a similar approach to security as the Deontological 
agencies, but in reality this is not the case for many of them. The reasons for this are threefold.  
First, many of the Solidarist organizations such as ActionAid, Cesvi, CARE, Intersos or Save 
the Children, are engaged in multiple types of activities not just purely humanitarian ones. This in turn 
means that they are torn between different lines of thinking, which may eventually play against a 
coherent understanding and application of their humanitarian principles. The consequence is that 
organizations engaging in activities such as development may be seen to favour one party to the 
conflict, to the detriment of the other.114 It also means that they are more likely to favour using local 
partners, be it local NGOs or community–based organizations, which in itself implies a different 
approach, and means of implementing security.  
Secondly, like the Deontological Minimalists, they might lack the private funding to be 
operationally independent. This implies that they might take decisions which move them away from 
their principled approach because they are under pressure from their donors.  
Thirdly, in addition to facing the same situations described in the previous two points, 
Denominational Solidarists such as Caritas, Christian Aid, or Muslim Aid often work through their 
particular religious network. This does not indicate that they are actively engaged in proselytising 
activities, but that through the use of their local religious networks, they have alternative ways to 
implement programmes and reach the beneficiaries. 
In other words, Solidarists refer to humanitarian principles as much as possible, but are likely 
to compromise depending on the context. Like the Deontological organizations, Solidarists prefer an 
approach to security that emphasizes acceptance – with elements of protection and deterrence – but 
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when weighing the risks that their operations entail against the benefit that they provide to the 
populations, Solidarist organizations have often relied on avoidance strategies. For some, their 
willingness to stay close to their beneficiaries means that they will attempt to stay at any cost but for 
many this willingness will cease when they realise that such an approach places their staff at too great 
a risk. This may require that they suspend or remotely manage their operations when immersed in 
increasingly hazardous environments. The practice of remotely managing projects is by no means 
limited to Solidarist organizations, but because they are more risk averse than the other two 
organization types, they are more likely to use avoidance strategies such as remote management.115  
 
Utilitarian organizations such as CHF International, International Relief and Development or 
the UN World Food Programme, are driven by the conviction that an aid operation is worthy if it 
eventually brings an improvement in the condition of the vulnerable populations. In relation to this and 
given that their main source of funding is institutional, it also means that they are more subject to 
donors‘ pressure – and political choices. They therefore, tend to adopt a pragmatic approach to 
security management whereby achieving this objective will take pre-eminence over how to achieve the 
objective. They prefer to ground their actions in a basis of stakeholder acceptance, but given that they 
favour the objective over the means, they are less reluctant to use a deterrent approach. Their action 
is driven by ethical considerations, but their definition of it encompasses a broader understanding than 
just an interpretation of humanitarian principles. As such, they are more likely to adopt a hard stance 
or ‗favouring a side‘ in order to obtain physical security.  
 
It must be specified that this thesis recognizes that aid agencys do have a lot in common; as 
an example, aid agencies all refer to humanitarian principles. Nevertheless, distinctions between aid 
agencies‘ approaches to security can still be made on the basis that, comparatively, the security 
conception and practices of some organizations – the Deontologicals – are guided more by these 
principles than other types of IAAs.  
The differences of approach to security between the three ideal–types are not clear-cut, and 
rather constitute observable trends. They do indicate however that differences in identity run parallel 
to a differences in interests.  
 
5.2. The place of the threats in aid agencies’ identities  
 It was highlighted in Chapter Three that ―it is impossible to clearly distinguish between security 
and identity, as the definition of the threats and the means to counter them are also part of who we 
are‖ (Macleod and Voyer-Léger, p.75, 2004b. Author‘s own translation); studying the construction of 
threats, this section will then analyse how ideas and values shape their protective discourses and 
practices.  
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There are different levels on which threats against aid agencies can be understood. On a 
broad level, anything which poses a danger to the survival of the organization is a threat. In particular 
anything which may have negative consequences on an organization‘s funding and reputation and 
may lead to its closure.116 Still, a distinction needs to be drawn between the threats to the survival of 
an organization and the threats to its security. Because the present research looks at the interplay 
between the identity and security of IAAs, it focuses on security, not survival. Yet because a threat 
which materializes as a security incident may still severely affect an organization, threats to security 
and to survival may meet at some point.117  
The nature of threats against an aid agency‘s security are twofold. On the one hand there are 
direct threats, and on the other, indirect ones. Each however, is perceived differently by aid workers. 
The current section will underscore the processes through which each kind of threat is constructed. It 
will argue that direct threats are constructed through processes of socialization, while indirect threats 
are the product of securitization processes.  
5.2.1. The construction of direct threats through processes of socialization  
Direct threats are extremely diverse and include anything from poor road conditions to armed 
clashes, extortion, sexual assault and floods. The ―threat portfolio‖ that the Security Management 
Initiative uses in its training distinguishes for instance, between a range of threats including: ‗political, 
social and cultural instability‘; ‗weakness of state and bad governance‘; ‗civil disorder and violent 
actions‘; ‗criminal acts and banditry‘; ‗danger of arms and explosive devices‘; ‗travel risks‘; ‗natural 
hazards‘; ‗health and stress‘; ‗infrastructure and organization‘; and ‗staff ‘ and this list is said to be non-
exhaustive (SMI, p.1, Undated). Indeed, several aid workers interviewed for the research also referred 
to ―dissatisfied beneficiaries‖. Haiti, in the aftermath of the devastating January 2010 earthquake, is a 
good illustration of this given the recurrence of aid convoys and aid distributions being looted by 
impatient or angry crowds.  
One interviewee summarized well what is at stake: ―the type of threat varies from context to 
context. Petty crimes and road traffic accidents are the most numerous, but those that concern me 
most are kidnapping, terrorist threats and armed attacks.‖118 The severity of the threat is measured not 
by the numbers threatened, but by its potential impact. As one interviewee put it: ―those threats that 
worry me most are those with the potential to snowball – affecting not only one mission, but the whole 
region or even globally; there is for example anecdotal evidence that the killing of Margaret Hassan 
[the CARE Country Director in Iraq] gave ideas to other groups to target CARE elsewhere.‖119 At 
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another level, an employee explained that ―since information travels so quickly, it‘s a challenge for us 
to influence what is being said about the ICRC – we worry that false rumours may eventually affect the 
teams in the field.‖120  
The threats confronting IAAs are constantly evolving, whether we talk of their type, their 
frequency or their impact. Kidnapping for instance was frequently cited by interviewees as a new 
threat, in particular ―since they have become generalized even in countries where they didn‘t exist 
before.‖121 Similarly, the CARE head of security commented that ―we notice a renewed emphasis on 
sovereignty, in particular in Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka, Sudan, etc, which translates through staff arrest, or 
administrative and judicial harassment against us.‖122 
The reason for the evolution of threats is explained diversely: according to the Security Advisor 
of an NGO: ―three things have changed: the origin of the threat (terrorist groups targeting us in this 
way is a new thing since groups with political claims used to respect us more), the type of threat 
(kidnapping and bomb attacks used to be less of a concern), and the frequency of the threats (attacks 
coming from criminal groups are more frequent).‖123 Another added that ―acts of terror are rather new 
– and are linked to a feeling of impunity; such threats are considered as normal procedures to some 
groups.‖124 In addition, as the number of aid agencies has substantially increased as well as their 
presence in the field, so their exposure to threats has increased accordingly. A few have also 
commented that threats and acts of violence in contexts which are not armed conflicts have also 
multiplied. All agreed that these evolutions could be linked to the changes affecting the global 
environment, including the perceived assimilation of aid agencies with a ‗murky‘ Western agenda.  
 
When is a threat really threatening? A threat may have been made yet does not pose any 
danger since the source of the threat is not capable of turning it into action. Similarly, someone may 
pose a danger without having made a threat. In other words, how do aid agencies construct the 
threats they say they face? 
The construction of direct threats in the aid sector is not the product of grandiloquent discursive 
practices such as those involved in indirect threats, or at another level of analysis, by states in the War 
on Terror or in the lead-up to the Second Iraq War (Kaufmann, 2004; Thrall, 2007; Mustapha, 2008). 
On the contrary, they are the results of a socialization process, through daily interactions and 
assimilations of peer discourses and experiences and encompass both objective and subjective 
elements. An illustration of this socialization process is the fact that the assessments of threats are 
often the result of team-work within an aid agency or among agencies. Similarly, employees at field 
level are greatly encouraged to report any security–relevant information within the agency as well as 
to other agencies, as the author witnessed during Save the Children UK security meetings in Kabul. 
These dynamics contribute to information exchange and gradual assimilation of security narratives.  
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The ‗objective‘ elements of threat construction are based on facts and statistics which a 
community of subjects (aid workers) agrees to interpret in a similar way. For example, in 2009–2010, 
several French aid workers were kidnapped in a period of a few months in Sudan, Chad, and the 
Central African Republic by the ‗African Free Eagles‘, a Sudanese group which claims to be acting in 
response to French foreign policy in Africa (Reuters, 2010a, website). It is then likely that any aid 
agency employing French personnel in the area and receiving a threat would take it very seriously. Aid 
agencies compile, share and analyse information related to the environment in which they operate, 
and this contributes to improving their understanding, awareness and preparation for the risks they 
face.  
The subjective element of threat construction is more difficult to apprehend as it depends either 
on experience or relates to an organization‘s identity. Regarding experience, it is common to see an 
individual or an organization that went through a security incident becoming, in the aftermath, more 
prone to seeing threats everywhere (Fast and Wiest, p.18, 2007). Understandably people are more 
influenced by a vivid, personal story than they are by bland statistics and facts (Schneier, 2008a, 
website). They will then need a proper and thorough reassessment of the environment and of 
themselves before being able to ‗let go‘ of their bias.  
Threat perceptions however are also related to an agency‟s identity: depending on where they 
are located in the spectrum presented in Chapter Three; IAAs will not assign the same meanings to 
the same threatening environment. Threats encompass a projection of one‘s world views. As such, an 
aid organization may decide not to work in a given area because it seems too dangerous; or may 
decide to work there, but only after having developed a thorough network of key stakeholders; or only 
with armed escorts.  
The case of humanitarian action in Southern Afghanistan supports this argument. MSF, a 
Deontological organization, has successfully expanded its operations in Helmand after engaging with 
all armed actors, including the coalition forces, the Afghan national forces, as well as the Taliban and 
affiliates. It operates through the use of highly visible expatriates and a low profile network of local 
staffers. In comparison, IRD, a Utilitarian organization, operates from a heavily fortified compound 
protected by an international private security company, and the movements of its staff are very 
restricted. OGB, SC-UK and CARE on their side, have all ceased operating and pulled their staff out 
of Southern Afghanistan when the security deteriorated exponentially. In contrast, Tearfund, a 
Solidarist organization, has kept its (unarmed) office in Kandahar, but its staff do not travel outside of 
the city. Each option is not free from reaction and carries its own consequences. Withdrawing from the 
reality of being on the ground comforts OGB, SC-UK and CARE and affirms their view that it is indeed 
too dangerous to be there. Developing a network provides MSF with further understanding and 
protection from the stakeholders; they realise that travelling there with armed escorts is precisely what 
increases the likelihood of being attacked125; yet this likelihood is exactly what reinforces the IRD‘s 
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belief in the need for further armed protection.126 Humans are frequently victims of ‗confirmation bias‘ 
according to which they are more likely to notice evidence that supports a previously held position 
than evidence that discredits it (Schneier, 2008a, website). Also, threats are perceived differently by 
agencies, not necessarily because they face different threats, but because their respective 
vulnerabilities to these threats differ.  
Altogether, because of the ‗feedback‘ that each agency receives when implementing a certain 
approach to security their identity, which is inherently linked to their security, is either challenged or 
reinforced. The success or failure of their security practices confirm or undermine the validity of their 
values, attitudes and norms. When successful, this process is progressive rather than sudden, and as 
such, is difficult to pinpoint clearly. In contrast, the process is more visible when an organization is 
confronted to a security failure. This happens every time an organization faces a severe security 
incident (such as the killing or kidnapping of a staff) for the first time. For instance, the 2008 
assassination of Pascal Marlinge, SC-UK Country Director in Chad, lead the organization to 
dramatically reinforce its security globally through the implementation of a new security strategy at a 
global level and new practices at field level. This in turn contributed to changing its attitude and norms 
towards security as illustrated by the following comment made by a SC-UK employee: ―Pascal's death 
in Chad made people stop and reflect on how this could happen on their watch. Staff begun to see the 
necessity to scale-up our security management.‖127  
It is clear however that if, for instance, a Deontological organization was to devise a new global 
security strategy that was essentially based on deterrence rather than acceptance, its place in the 
Spectrum would be questioned. Such a change in approach by the organization would likely affect its 
practices in such a way that its identity would ultimately be reshaped accordingly. This in turn would 
serve as a basis to move the organization in question towards the Solidarist or Utilitarian types. 
Equally, this dynamic holds true for organizations belonging to the latter ideal–types.  
For the most part changes in aid agencies‘ identities are not dramatic. The construction of the 
‗self‘ may evolve based on a threat, yet Rousseau shows that ―changes in opinions need not indicate 
a lack of belief, coherence or stability of beliefs. Rather, the increasing and decreasing of the salience 
of specific latent dimensions may explain the changing responses quite accurately‖ (Rousseau, p.7, 
2004). In other words, threats do not necessarily bring about a dramatic change in identity, but make 
some identity facets more salient than others: as underscored in Chapter Three, each aid agency is 
composed of multiple identities depending on which of its facets is made more salient, what it is 
contrasted with or who is looking at it. The case of the ICRC illustrates such argument. With the 
bombing of the ICRC‘s Baghdad office in October 2003 and the killing of several of its staff in different 
countries in a short time period, the environment seemed more threatening to the ICRC; it then went 
through a phase of uncertainty, where internal debates about the best way to move forward were 
frequent. Divided on whether to harden its posture or return to its fundamentals, the ICRC eventually 
                                               
126
 Interview 59. This is the crux of the normative dilemma of security, whereby stating a security claim contributes in 
producing an outcome which was to be avoided. For more information see Huysmans (2006).  
127
 Interview 148. 
                  135 of 257 
opted for the latter and reaffirmed the humanitarian dimension of its identity.128 Recalling firmly the 
necessity to remain an impartial, independent and neutral actor allowed it to re-negotiate access to 
areas which it had left, resulting in its having some of its largest operations in countries like Iraq, 
Afghanistan or Sudan.  
Critical constructivists argue that identity and interests are co-constituted. Although such co-
constitution has been argued for states (Campbell, 1998), it is more difficult to make this evident for 
aid agencies. The reason for this is that security threats against aid agencies rarely threaten their 
survival. Indeed, while a threat has direct immediate consequences at field level, it has a limited 
impact on the wider survival of an organization. A threat or a security incident may lead to drastic 
changes in a country programme‘s values, attitudes and norms, but will not necessarily affect the 
organization as a whole. As such, the process by which aid agencies‘ interests shape their ident ity is 
subtler and only gradually affects their values, attitudes and norms. Nevertheless, as shown in the 
previous chapter, norms, attitudes and values (including those associated with a certain approach to 
security) are internalized by the personnel of an agency, to the point where they become part of the 
(re)production of an organization‘s identity. 
 
Deborah Avant argues that:  
 
[w]hile states‘ identities have historically revolved around the creation of political communities of ‗us‘ and 
‗them‘, many non-state actors have mandates that stand in explicit contrast to that notion. For different 
reasons, both NGOs and corporations have specific commitments to ‗apoliticism‘; the fulfilment of their 
respective mandates requires that they do not make enemies or take sides. One might imagine, then, 
that this commitment might lead non-state actors – even those facing violent threats – to think of 
security and how to generate it differently (Avant, p.146, 2007).  
 
This however is incorrect as in reality aid agencies do differentiate between ‗us‘ and ‗them‘; the 
subtlety lies in the fact that the ‗other‘ which IAAs most often themselves differentiate from is not seen 
as producing direct threat, and when seen as a threat, is usually viewed only as an indirect threat, as 
will be discussed in the next sub-section. Avant is nevertheless correct in stating that aid agencies try 
hard not to make enemies.  
An original element of this approach of aid agencies to security is that if aid agencies are 
sometimes referred to as enemies, the opposite is generally not true, i.e. they don‟t designate people 
or groups as enemies. When asked whether their agency was viewing any actor as an enemy, none of 
the IAA representatives interviewed for this research responded positively. In other words, regardless 
of the ideal–type they wish be identified with, aid agencies have a common a reluctance to convert a 
‗threat‘ to ‗enmity‘. An employee of one Utilitarian organization explained for instance ―in Afghanistan 
we have been specifically targeted in some areas by people whose interests are threatened by our 
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programmes (such as the training of women) – but we don't see them as our enemies.‖129 Similarly a 
Security Advisor from a Deontological organization shared that ―some people must consider us as an 
enemy otherwise we would have not have two kidnapped staff as of now, but we don't see them as 
enemies – that goes against our principles anyway. There aren't any bad guys; there are only people 
to educate.‖130 Far from being a naive comment, such resilience reinforces the fact that armed, 
threatening groups, and even groups that have already been the source of acts of violence against aid 
agencies are not seen as enemies, but simply as actors to be especially wary of. 
Importantly, this holds true for former military personnel now working for aid agencies. While 
their former career taught them to identify – and fight – their enemy, their position as aid worker cools 
their ardour. Indeed, irrespective of the IAAs they were employed by, none of the former military aid 
workers interviewed in the research referred to the concept of enmity, which underscores that these 
personnel have done a good job in assimilating their peers‘ discourses and experiences. This 
contributes to demonstrating further the socialization process that exists within the aid sector, 
including in the ways aid workers view their surroundings, reinforcing institutionalized practices and 
modes of thinking.  
A few interviewees nevertheless recognized that the national staff of their organization may be 
more prone to seeing the ‗other‘ as an enemy. As explained by one: ―in polarized conflicts we also 
have polarized staff, so we need to ensure our staff respects boundaries; also we ensure diversity in 
our staff.‖131 Another confirmed that ―in some countries (especially in contexts where the international 
staff have not been around for long) our national staff do see some groups as enemies; we however 
do our best to not allow this kind of talk happening.‖132 As explained in the previous chapter, neutrality 
is sometimes culturally inconceivable. Many Palestinian national staff for example found it difficult to 
understand the principles of neutrality or even impartiality of their organization. 
Identifying a group or an individual as an enemy entails taking a political stance which aid 
agencies shy away from. Such a posture would imply that violence against the enemy is acceptable – 
but this goes against what aid agencies believe in and stand for. Such conceptual positioning is 
however challenging to maintain, not the least because belligerents – ‗unprincipled‘ actors in a conflict 
– have difficulties understanding the value of nonpartisan and impartial action. Aid actors then strive to 
‗educate‘ their audience, and because such process is hazardous, must a lso take appropriate 
measures to protect themselves.  
5.2.2. The construction of indirect threats through the securitization of indistinctiveness 
Indirect threats are elements which are formalized as threatening because of the specific 
humanitarian identity of aid agencies. Put simply, they are the negative externalities of someone else‘s 
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action. Integrated missions are an example of such threats133: in these cases, aid agencies – usually 
NGOs, when the integrated mission is UN–led,  are concerned with the tension between ―the partiality 
involved in supporting a political transition process and the impartiality needed to protect humanitarian 
space‖ (Eide et al, p.3, 2005). Their fear is that they will be perceived as taking a side and that actors 
in the conflict may then decide to oppose their work. As Jacques Forster, Vice-President of the ICRC 
explains:  
 
… the main risk I see for humanitarian action in general is its integration – willing or otherwise – into a 
political and military strategy to defeat the enemy. In other words, the subordination of humanitarian 
activities to political goals, using aid as a tool for local or foreign policy. The danger is real if insurgents, 
or parts of the population, perceive the humanitarian agencies as instruments of a foreign agenda. In 
some countries, they may even perceive such agencies are part of a Western conspiracy against Islam. 
What does such a perception entail?  
a) Security risks, not only for expatriates but also for locals working with international organizations; a 
blurring of the lines between political/military action and humanitarian/development action might thus 
have severe consequences for the lives and safety of many groups and individuals.  
b) Scepticism about the accountability of humanitarian actors if they are no longer setting their own 
objectives and have become, as it were, "second class citizens" in a broader political framework over 
which their influence is limited. 
These elements are high on the list of ICRC concerns, partly because mixing roles and perceptions can 
be detrimental to all those – including the ICRC – who aim to bring impartial and independent aid in a 
conflict situation (Forster, 2005, website). 
 
Views such as this were widely shared among aid agencies‘ representatives interviewed in the course 
of the research for the thesis. Adele Harmer has nevertheless challenged the basis of these concerns 
and argues that ―[a]ctual evidence regarding the impacts of integrated missions on humanitarian 
operations, including the security of aid workers themselves, has been weak‖ (Harmer, p.528, 2008).  
 
In this regard, the source of worry for aid agencies comes from any mechanism, institution or 
dynamic which may contribute to rendering their identity indistinct to a party to the conflict (‗blurring 
the lines‘ in the aid parlance). Militarization of aid, for instance through the use of Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams or counterinsurgency and stabilization efforts in which assistance is provided 
by armed forces or contractors ‗to win populations‘ hearts and minds‘, are seen as a threat to 
humanitarian action. This concern is not unfounded; the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office argued that:  
 
[t]he Taliban and most other [Armed Opposition Groups – insurgents] were not systematically targeting 
NGOs and seemed to be making some effort to distinguish between neutral and non-neutral actors. 
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 The Report on Integrated Missions defines ‗integrated mission‘ as "an instrument with which the UN seeks to help 
countries in the transition from war to lasting peace, or to address a similarly complex situation that requires a system–wide 
UN response, through subsuming actors and approaches within an overall political–strategic crisis management framework‖ 
(Eide et al, 2005, p.14). 
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―Neutrality and local acceptance, not the military or counter-insurgency, have become the dominant 
factors of security for NGOs in the vast areas of the country now dominated or controlled by the Taliban 
and other armed opposition groups,‖ it said. To back this assertion, ANSO said most of the 59 NGO 
staff abducted by insurgents in 2009 were released unharmed after their ―neutrality‖ and local 
acceptance were verified (IRIN, 2010c). 
  
Vaughn has demonstrated aid agencies‘ securitizing shifts conceptually ―as they argue that 
indistinctiveness poses an existential threat to their programmes and to the organizations themselves‖ 
(Vaughn, p.265, 2009). She rightly posits that aid agencies ―securitize indistinctiveness‖ in three steps. 
First, they associate their survival with the fate of vulnerable populations as well as with the 
survival of the practices that constitute humanitarianism. Aid agencies emphasize that any threat 
against them necessarily affects both vulnerable populations and humanitarian action (as the only 
independent, neutral and impartial provision of aid). In turn, the acceptance of the validity of IAA 
claims legitimates them as referent objects of security – in other words as something that needs to be 
safeguarded.  
Secondly, Vaughn contends that aid agencies securitize indistinctiveness by developing 
specific security discourses for each of their three audiences (their own staff, other humanitarian 
organizations, and donors as well as other political actors). This in turn increases the likelihood of 
being heard and eventually, supported.  
Thirdly, IAAs claim that the insecurity they face and its repercussions on vulnerable 
populations and principled humanitarianism, justify that extraordinary measures be taken such as 
―changes in policy or procedure that may inconvenience staff or initially disrupt programmes, … 
controversial methods (e.g. … use of armed guards), and significant budgetary alterations (e.g. … 
reallocation of funds to purchase security equipment)‖ (Vaughn, p.278, 2009).  
One may add that the construction of indistinctiveness as a security issue also reinforces aid 
agencies in their identity. Indeed, a successful securitization results in convincing an audience that the 
referent object is legitimate. While Vaughn recalls that ―[t]he humanitarian identity is characterized by 
the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, independence and neutrality‖ (p.269¸ 2009), 
successfully securitizing indistinctiveness then reinforces the distinctiveness of aid agencies as unique 
representatives of this humanitarian identity. This then underscores further the subtle feedback loop 
that exists between aid agencies‘ identities and their security.  
Despite the fact that aid agencies frequently adopt a common narrative relating to this 
humanitarian identity, the previous chapter confirmed that relations to humanitarian principles vary in 
practice. As Vaughn rightly puts it, ―humanitarian organizations are themselves cu lpable of a growing 
indistinctiveness, as it results, in part, from their failure to project and perform a unique, humanitarian 
identity‖ (Vaughn, p.269, 2009). However, while she aptly demonstrates the process by which aid 
organizations transform what they see as rendering their identity indistinct, into a grave security issue 
justifying the use of extraordinary measures, she does not consider the differences in aid agencies‘ 
identities. Because the securitization of indistinctiveness is based on a principled approach to 
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humanitarian action, only Deontological and, to a lesser extent, Solidarist organizations actually 
securitize indistinctiveness. This happened for instance when MSF argued that ―[i]n Afghanistan, the 
first aspect of the confusion [between humanitarian organizations and political-military institutions] was 
caused by camouflaging psychological warfare and intelligence operations as humanitarian action‖ 
(Weissman, p.3, 2004). Similarly, OGB spearheaded a Joint Briefing Paper where it denounced that 
―the use of soldiers and heavily protected contractors to implement PRT and other reconstruction and 
development projects, particularly those which serve counterinsurgency objectives, has … blurred the 
line between aid agencies and the military‖ (Jackson, p.17, 2010). Significantly, the 29 IAAs 
signatories of the Paper are all Deontological and Solidarist organizations. SC-UK on its side 
complained that ―PRTs blur the distinction between military and humanitarian objectives [and] may 
contribute to the ‗militarisation‘ of aid‖ (SC, p.3, 2004). CARE called in 2009 for a ―restriction of PRT 
and broader military involvement‖ in aid projects (Glad, p.56, 2009).  
 
In contrast, not only do Utilitarian organizations rarely securitize indistinctiveness, but they 
sometimes adopt the opposite approach. Because parts of the programmes they implement are 
serving their institutional donors‘ political objectives, the successful outcome of their operations is 
linked to the success of the wider political objectives of their patrons. As such, they require their 
donors to contribute to their security in two ways. First they request that donors provide them with 
enough funding so that private security companies can be used. A Security Director working for a 
Utilitarian organization has revealed that in one instance: ―the annual operating budget of the Security 
department is USD 700 000 but if you include in it the contracts with PSCs, it is close to six million.‖134 
As will be disclosed in the next section, very few aid agencies have the funding – and the will – to 
spend such a significant amount of money on (outsourced) security. Secondly, Utilitarian 
organizations also request that armed forces of the same country of origin of their institutional donors 
provide them security directly. For instance in Afghanistan, while many respondents said that they 
were engaging directly with the Taliban and insurgents at local level to negotiate safe access to 
vulnerable populations, an interviewee working for the Utilitarian IRD explained that ―part of our 
strategy is to be close to the US militaries; they go to a village, secure it and we come behind to 
provide development.‖135 Despite ―doing our best to provide Afghan faces‖, he openly admitted that 
they were de facto participating in the counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy, without any consideration 
for the humanitarian values and reasons underpinning them. It is then not surprising that, in contrast to 
the other NGOs selected for this research, IRD has not published any report denouncing the 
confusion between aid and military actors. Similarly in Haiti, much of the food distribution organized by 
the WFP in the aftermath of the devastating 2010 earthquake was done under the protection of US 
armed forces. In both cases, interviewees working for Deontological and Solidarist organizations have 
been extremely critical of such security practices.  
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The present section has highlighted how threats against an aid agency‘s security can be 
divided between direct and indirect threats: while direct threats are constructed through processes of 
socialization, indirect threats are the products of securitization processes. This section has further 
shown that many of the threats against aid agencies are being constructed according to the identity of 
the referent object of security. As such, threats are not being constructed in the same way by 
Deontological, Solidarists or Utilitarians. Threat perception is shaped by aid agency identity and, in 
turn, contributes subtly to making some dimensions of this identity more salient.  
 
5.3. Understanding how the identity of IAAs shapes dominant representations 
in security management 
 According to Fierke, ―[w]hile realists view interests as material and objective phenomena, 
social constructivists tend to argue that interest flows from identity and is thus not first and foremost a 
material property‖ (Fierke, p. 80, 2007). Klotz and Lynch note that, ―[f]or constructivists, interests are 
the product of constitutive processes that lead people, as individuals and members of collectivities, to 
synthesize a wide range of needs and desires‖ (Klotz and Lynch, p.104, 2007). Because interests are 
here limited to aid agencies‘ preferences in security, this thesis will then study how aid agencies 
conceive and manage their security. Klotz and Lynch further argue that ―[l]ike identities, interests are 
neither self-evident nor static; their formation is a process that needs to be explained. Conceptualizing 
interests as the product of interactions and institutionalized identities presumes intersubjective 
content‖ (Klotz and Lynch, p.95, 2007).  
This section will identify the dominant representations of humanitarian security and examine 
further how they are shaped – but not determined – by IAA identity. It will first stress aid agencies‘ 
preferences in security management, and secondly reveal under what conditions these are 
(re)defined.  
5.3.1. International aid agencies’ preferences in security management 
Security has costs. Whether an agency builds fences or relationships, both of these 
approaches to security require resources. Implementing security measures implies spending 
resources, whether in terms of wealth, personnel or time – and usually all three. Security also involves 
trade-offs, either when these resources are limited or when security measures affect an organization‘s 
ability to operate. For instance and as observed by the author in both Afghanistan and Haiti, the 
balance between security restrictions and freedom of movement is hard to find in dynamic conflict–
prone environments. Similarly, the balance between the community work of an organization and the 
necessity to protect its staff sometimes appears to be a challenge – in particular when the ‗fog of war‘ 
does not allow a proper identification of threats. Zedner explains rightly that:  
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… the pursuit of security presupposes threats against which one must be secured. And just as it 
presupposes those who must be protected against threat, so it presupposes those who threaten. The 
pursuit, to say nothing of the attainment, of security necessarily implies the identification and exclusion 
of this latter group. ... The irony is that the promise of community safety and social solidarity is bought 
only at the cost of social exclusion (Zedner, p.211, 2000). 
 
Social exclusion, another cost of security, may ultimately challenge the real or self-proclaimed 
legitimacy of IAAs where it is based on their close relation to communities. 
Security costs however, are also opportunity costs; when these costs are well accounted for, 
the resources they require are eventually balanced by the outcomes they provide – i.e. the prevention 
or mitigation of harmful events and the eventual realization of aid projects. This is particularly true for 
incidents where costs are often high, unanticipated and where handling of a particular incident offers a 
limited choice of acceptable options. For agencies operating in war zones or crime–prone areas, 
security management should be a necessity – even though this view is actually rather recent among 
aid workers. Infact the ‗classical‘ approach to security, whereby identified threats are eliminated, is 
hardly satisfactory – or even achievable – for aid agencies. Confronted by their own dilemmas, they 
have had to gradually develop their own security concepts and practices.  
What, in terms of security, do international aid agencies want? Donini et al argue that:  
 
… aid agencies have a mix of physical security and human security preoccupations. The first relate to 
personal safety of staff and agency assets, the second to the security of the persons and communities 
with whom the agencies interact. These twin concerns are multi-layered, with significant differences 
both within and between country situations (Donini et al, p.59, 2005). 
 
Humanitarian security management however focuses mainly on an aid agencies‘ and not on a 
populations‘ security – which is the preserve of human security and IAAs‘ protection‘s136 activities. The 
paradox – or conceptual myopia – is that in complex environments, no one is truly secure unless all 
are secure. An MSF staff rightly recalled that: ―we talk of aid workers‘ security, but we tend to forget 
the protection of civilian populations; we‘d rather need to remind states of their responsibilities, and 
build their legitimacy and their capacity [to protect their populations].‖137  
Donini et al explain further that:   
 
[n]ot surprisingly, aid agencies consider providing assistance as a factor contributing to improved 
security. Conversely, the denial or withholding of assistance is viewed as creating insecurity. This is 
clearly the case in Afghanistan where large swathes of the countryside are off-limits to aid workers be-
cause of unacceptable risks (Donini et al, p.59, 2005).  
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Aid agency interest in security is defined by the fact that they want to be able to safely respond 
to the needs of vulnerable populations. They don‘t simply want to be safe. They want to be safe while 
responding to populations‟ needs. There is little use in being safe if they cannot implement their 
activities: not only would they not be providing aid, but their legitimacy, and ultimately their survival, 
would also be questioned if such inaction persisted. Responding to the needs of the population is not 
a necessary guarantee of security since populations may have other (social, religious, political etc.) 
needs that aid agencies can‘t respond to directly, yet it contributes in fostering a more quiescent 
environment. This proved particularly true in Haiti where parts of the Port-au-Prince population 
remained restless until they benefited from aid projects.  
 
Human and material resources are necessary for a safe provision of aid, but they are not 
enough. What is also needed is a conception of how these human and material resources are to be 
arranged in order to safely provide aid. Aid agencies for instance often raise concerns about threats to 
their humanitarian space – usually understood as the access and freedom for humanitarian 
organizations to assess and meet people‘s humanitarian needs. It is however clear today that the 
theoretical space that insulates aid workers is increasingly unsafe. It is hardly surprising that the 
paradigm of security that protects humanitarian actors is the focus of constant rethinking as will be 
revealed below. IAAs have gradually developed preferences on how their security should be 
conceptually and practically arranged. Given the specificity of their humanitarian nature, they need an 
understanding of security which both respects their ethos and is not too costly. This implies that 
security should enable rather than restrict their operations; should not harm or threaten any of their 
constituencies and beneficiaries; and should not jeopardize their reputation and their resources. 
Humanitarian security management in other words, inevitably embodies humanitarian aid agencies‘ 
cultural and social baggage. Comprehending humanitarian actors‘ interests in relation to security 
implies understanding how these are both being constructed and how they are evolving. 
5.3.2. How and why have IAAs’ interests developed: an evolution of dominant 
representations 
It is not uncommon to meet aid workers who have been in the aid sector for two or three 
decades rambling about how things used to be better. A minority of them share bitter views on how 
their organization‘s security ought to be managed. Although commendable, it is striking to hear that 
their views are based on a conception of security which clearly does not take into consideration the 
dramatic contextual changes as well as the changes in the nature of the threats that their organization 
now faces. Despite the fact that there is no specific agreement on how aid agencies should ensure 
their security, trends have surfaced among the humanitarian community. It is possible to trace the aid 
workers‘ security thinking and practices, and identify how dominant representations have emerged, 
and alternative trends were left aside.  
 Aid agencies have always looked to protect themselves – the instauration of the Red Cross 
emblem was done precisely so that those providing help were visible to the warring parties and, as 
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such, not targeted. Most agencies‘ approach to security has been historically embodied by two 
elements: acceptance and ‗common sense‘. Acceptance implied that the aid programmes were 
implemented in conjunction, and with the consent of, the local communities and stakeholders. It was 
however not conceptually defined and relations with communities were guided more by interpersonal 
skills rather than formally included in what would later become ‗project management cycles‘. This view 
was typically, even if anecdotally, illustrated by lengthy discussions held over ‗cups of tea‘.138  
 The second aspect of this approach to security was that aid workers were encouraged, if not 
left, to use their gut feeling when taking care of their own and the programmes‘ protection. This was 
done with no guidelines, training or institutionalization of good practices, and despite the fact that 
managers were possibly lacking the requisite skills. While (the majority of) aid workers working for the 
main agencies now, cannot be described as ‗sandal wearing‘, ‗tree huggers‘ or ‗pot smoking 
hippies‘139 (though they may have been described as such in a distant past) there is no doubt that they 
have only reticently entered into the realm of security management. Indeed, ‗security‘ wasn‘t a word or 
a concept which was viewed favourably, as it was associated with the military and as such seen as 
opposing the nature of the aid work. Similarly, security precautions were easily superseded by the 
interests of the programmes. Although these approaches to security may seem naive to current 
readers immersed in the so-called ‗risk society‘140, they also have to be put into context: this happened 
in the 1970s and 1980s, well before the decade identified with ‗dirty wars‘ or ‗complex emergencies‘. 
Conditions on the ground were different, even if already challenging; aid workers tended to be more 
respected by parties to the conflict and the threats they were facing were generally of lesser 
complexity than the ones they face today. Also, apart from a handful of organizations, humanitarian 
action was seen as an adventure rather than a professional endeavour.141 In addition, the limitations 
of means of communication between the field missions and their headquarters meant that aid workers 
in the field had greater autonomy and freedom: the relation to ‗time‘ and to building relationships was 
necessarily different.  
 As discussed in Chapter One, the management of security by IAAs is recent and can be traced 
to the professionalization of the aid sector which steadily developed from the mid–1990s. This, in turn, 
led to a refining of humanitarian security management with an emphasis on coherent system 
development as opposed to an over reliance on ‗gut instincts‘, ‗common sense‘ or ‗experience‘ 
(however valid these remain). This evolution can be depicted as a wave that has only gradually 
permeated the community – and which is still spreading. Four phases can be identified in this wave: 
the first phase consists of disorientation and can be said to have happened in the beginning to late 
1990s. The second phase, which started approximately at the end of the 1990s, consists of the laying 
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of the foundations. The early to the middle of the first decade of this century then saw an 
institutionalization of humanitarian security management and from the latter part of the decade, a 
period of both harmonization and polarization has begun. In reality these phases are not clear-cut – 
on the contrary, given the fact that the waves of humanitarian security are spreading unevenly, these 
phases are actually rather blurred. The dates are only used to provide an indication of the timeframe 
and underscore the evolution in the thinking and practices of IAAs.  
 
5.3.2.1.The disorientation phase 
 The first phase, that of disorientation, corresponds to a period when aid agencies are said to 
have lost their naivety (Sørensen, 2006). Facing new and unprecedented challenges in the Balkans, 
Somalia, and central Africa, aid agencies‘ traditional landmarks became blurred. Aid workers were 
increasingly becoming victims of acts of violence; programmes were diverted by warring parties; and 
aid was accused of fuelling rather than appeasing conflicts (Rieff, 2002). Their values, attitudes and 
norms had been shaken by security incidents and forced them to adapt. In turn, it contributed to 
shaping aid agencies‘ identity by raising their self-perception as referent objects of security. For 
instance IAAs operating in Zaïre/DRC wondered what role they had in protecting victims of the 
Rwandan genocide (Avant, p.203, 2005). It was becoming evident that the management of security 
needed to be formalized, yet aid agencies struggled with the traditional conceptions of security, 
whereby enemies are identified and must be neutralized. Humanitarian organizations looked for a 
variety of new approaches, from which three main ones can be identified. Deborah Avant explains 
these thoroughly:  
 
Some [aid agencies] chose to withdraw in the face of instability, exploitation and danger – or at the very 
least to do no harm. This position held to the articulation of responsibilities in the ICRC ‗Code of 
Conduct‘, in effect suggesting that NGO action was dependent on other actors – like states – fulfilling 
their responsibilities at some minimal level. If that was not the case, and efforts to help could end up 
hurting, NGOs should withdraw. Others began to more actively consider traditional security options. For 
instance, CARE Canada, in the wake of the Rwandan debacle, published a report entitled Mean Times 
advising that relief INGOs consider the hiring of PSCs (private security companies) directly to maintain 
‗humanitarian space‘. Some went even further in developing this argument, calling the acceptance 
strategy and its ‗apoliticism‘ untenable and arguing that NGOs, and the international community in 
general, must seize a more active role that aims to shoulder the ‗responsibility to protect‘ when states 
shirk that responsibility. … The third – and now more prominent – approach to security within the NGO 
community did not accept the traditional view. While advocating the importance of remaining in the field 
it also remained true to the principles within the classic acceptance doctrine and cautioned against 
‗politicization‘ or enmity. … The key to NGO security, in this view, is to avoid taking a position as friend 
or foe, ally or enemy. Instead, NGOs should develop a pragmatic plan to insure their safety that rests on 
‗dialogue with all actors involved in or affecting the outcome of a given situation of conflict‘ (Avant, 
p.148, 2007. Emphasis added).  
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The three approaches described by Avant are withdrawal, hardening and pragmatic 
engagement. While this shows increasing differences in the way that aid agencies understand and 
manage security, similarities remain: none are free from trade-offs and costs; all need resources, and 
some need a particular expertise. From the late 1990s, a number of aid agencies – in particular 
Utilitarian organizations as will be shown in the next section – started to accept the idea that hiring 
‗security officers‘ was becoming a possibility. This however, wasn‘t easy to accept as it often meant 
recruiting former military (or, to a lesser extent, former law enforcement) personnel. It is still not fully 
accepted; as an MSF aid, interviewed in 2006, explained: ―security responsibilities are not centralized 
upon one person but rather shared among many: security is collective and the responsibility shared. 
The term ‗security officer‘ is anyway much too linked to a militaristic jargon.‖142 
Some agencies stood their ground, arguing that the use of security officers was 
counterproductive. A few also argued that they should recruit anthropologists rather than security 
officers. As early as 1999 François Grunewald called for: ―fewer security advisers, fewer fences, 
barbwires, guards, radios, bunker‖ and ―more anthropologists, sociologists, more empathy, dialogue, 
explanations‖. He added that: ―although sometimes necessary, defensive measures are a 
contradictory response to the spirit and ethics of humanitarian action, [while] security problems linked 
to a lack of knowledge of the contexts and understanding of mechanisms of violence can be avoided 
thanks to appropriate analytical means.‖ One of his papers is a good illustration of this tension. ―We 
absolutely need to avoid the UN manual ‗Security in Somalia: a guide for United Nations International 
Staff‘‖, he argues:  
 
Explanations on the socio-cultural context are limited to three pages and half and to a single map of 
Somalia‘s main clans. On the other hand, one finds 64 pages of advices on quasi-military procedures 
written in a tone which is hostile to Somali people. There is nothing to really understand the social and 
economic components of violence, nothing to appreciate the richness of the Somali culture and its 
extraordinary hospitality, nothing to support a positive socio-cultural view. Everything is put in defensive 
terms, which can only lead UN personnel on the field to adopt fearful or aggressive behaviours, which 
will then stimulate the aggressiveness of the Somali. Worse, the guide does not refer to developing the 
relations with national colleagues in times of crisis, or on how and why manage a team through an ‗inter-
clanic‘ balance; there are no advices on analysing current or future tensions, or on the importance of 
respectful dialogue with ‗the Elders‘ ... In few words, this book rather endangers those whom it is 
theoretically supposed to protect (Grunewald, p.20, 1999. Author‘s own translation).  
 
In line with Grunewald‘s approach, Mike Gent would later provide some recommendations 
originating from psychologists – rather than security officers – to aid workers on how to better weigh 
security risks (Gent, 2002). 
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5.3.2.2. The foundations phase 
The three aforementioned competing approaches described by Avant were theorised and 
framed into what was called the ‗security triangle‘; this was the ‗foundations phase‘. Acknowledging 
that aid agencies‘ security could not be ensured solely through an acceptance approach and that two 
more approaches were necessary: protection and deterrence.  
In the late 1990s, Brabant‘s Good Practice Review 8 (GRP8) also underscored that even if aid 
agencies‘ security practices have ameliorated the situation, there is much room for further 
improvement. ―What is missing is a management approach to security‖, which ―is about controlling, or 
rather ‗reducing‘, risk to a level considered acceptable‖ (Van Brabant, 2000, respectively p.9 and p.4. 
Emphasis added). This manual was very much the product of its time. As an interviewee explained ―in 
1996–1997, a working group, gathering around ten people [including the interviewee], was created to 
implement the OFDA grant provided to InterAction through its Security Task Force (which was the 
predecessor of today‘s Security Advisory Group); several NGOs such as Save the Children, CARE 
and World Vision were part of this Task Force. InterAction and RedR organized two security trainings 
accordingly, once in the US and once in the UK. The GPR8 is the verbatim of this whole effort.‖143 The 
interviewee also added that ―one of the recommendations of the trainings was to have full time 
headquartered Security Focal Point and to include a sensitisation of NGOs' executives. That 
happened in 2000, with the participation of US CEO to the executive seminar.‖ 
 
This opened the way to an institutionalization of humanitarian security management. Avant 
rightly recalls that ―[w]ith the philosophical basis of an NGO security strategy in place (the security 
triangle), a good deal of effort has been focused on developing security management language, 
processes and best practices that can be diffused … and institutionalized‖ (Avant, p.151, 2007). 
 
5.3.2.3. The institutionalization phase 
 Security had traditionally been the responsibility of the field personnel, which meant that 
security management was framed at the operational level and consequently lacked strategic thinking. 
Two main modus operandi were then developed for practice. The first one, usually known as the 
community–based one, focuses on working hand-in-hand with the beneficiary communities.144 It 
implies that communities contribute to protecting the aid workers.145  
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 An internal document to MSF named ―Proximity or the art of drinking a cup of tea‖ explains in a rather light way that ―We 
have more and more the tendency to be scotched to our computer to make nice report...with graphs or brilliant power point 
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discover the reality hidden behind the figures but you will also create a link with the population. Now, if they need help, they 
will come to you... and the day you need help, they will also come to you... because they know you‖ (MSF, Undated, b, p.1). 
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 One might question how communities themselves victims of violence can do so, yet the answer lies in the fact that 
communities, more aware of the local dynamics that may endanger the aid agencies, inform and advise aid workers on the 
steps to follow to avoid or prevent violence. Such an approach however rests on the assumptions that communities have an 
interest in the implementation of the projects, which itself implies that these must be relevant and inclusive. Unfortunately this 
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The second modus operandi, the system–based approach, emphasizes the need to follow 
common standards and procedures; to have security policies; to update country security plans and to 
conduct formal risks assessments. The system–based approach is usually replicable and, has as its 
basis, the principle that agencies need to be protected from threats, or neutralize them. The United 
Nations as well as InterAction, the largest coalition of US – based international NGOs have, for 
instance, both adopted a set of Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) which serve as a 
basis for developing institutional security strategies.146 Since 2002, the MOSS is mandatory for the 
members of the UN family, and from 2006 NGO members of InterAction have to certify that they are 
‗MOSS–compliant‘ or are working towards it. The InterAction MOSS standards are straightforward to 
read and easy to remember, and act both as guidelines and objectives. Yet they can also be limited 
on occasion, as they don‘t always take into consideration the diversity of contexts in which agencies 
are operating; though these standards usually specify that they should be adaptable to the 
specificities of every context. Similarly, World Vision has developed a user-friendly tool to asses the 
advantages and risks of interacting with armed actors (World Vision, Undated) in each situation. All of 
these tools emphasize an interplay between context and principle; each requires an interpretation of 
the principles within the specificities of the context, thus opening room for competing applications.  
 Although the two approaches are sometimes depicted as contradictory (Bruderlein, 2004; 
Bruderlein and Gassmann, 2006), aid agencies are increasingly implementing a mix of both. One 
interviewee explained that: ―a good mix of acceptance–based and system–based are needed; we 
focus on acceptance in our training, and we traditionally were all about community–based approach 
until the end of the 1990s. But new staff wanted more accountability, so it has evolved into a more 
system–based one.‖147 A balance however, is difficult to reach because, in the words of the Director of 
Security of SC-US, ―MOSS is not an acceptance oriented document – it's not even talking about it.‖148 
As another interviewee summarized it: ―procedures and policies must be followed but context specific 
measures are also necessary – and help establishing better relationships between the headquarters 
and the field. Indeed, an authoritarian approach to security or a totally community based approach 
would not work.‖149 Indicative of the differences between IAAs, among the five selected NGOs in this 
thesis, only CARE and IRD at one end of the Spectrum have developed MOSS, while MSF and OGB 
at the other end, haven‘t. SC-UK on its side, sits in the middle as it has developed a set of 14 
‗standards‘ which are close to MOSS ―but are rather ‗principles‘ so that they can be contextualised and 
interpreted.‖150 
Bruderlein and Gassman (p.87, 2006) have subsequently called for the implementation of an 
integrated security management system which, taking the best of both approaches is ―a standards–
based, centralized planning and policy structure that provides guidance regarding a set of security 
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sectors located at the periphery‖ that aims at responding to the dynamic sequence of factors and 
events that give rise to insecurity. 
As a 2004 ECHO driven report highlighted: ―relying on acceptance to generate security for 
humanitarian organizations is problematic in many contexts, and requires more skilful management of 
perceptions than many humanitarian organizations currently afford it‖ (Barnett, p.2, 2004). Similarly, 
when asked if aid agencies were accepted in Afghanistan and Haiti, most aid workers interviewed in 
this research claimed it was the case – yet rapidly qualified their assertion. Acceptance can be 
granted with efforts made, but it can then be lost rapidly; acceptance is often very localized and easier 
to obtain at the field sites than en route to these. It was also noted that while aid agencies claim to be 
accepted within the areas in which they work, it may be difficult for them to start projects in new areas: 
local dynamics are unfamiliar to aid workers and aid organizations themselves are unknown to the 
stakeholders in the area – agencies must deal with the disconnect and suspicion from both sides that 
such situations incur. Further to this, frequent economic and social divides between urban and rural 
areas mean that their respective populations react differently to outsiders‘ assistance. In addition to 
this, in contexts such as the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Sri Lanka, or Afghanistan, there are 
international or local legal prohibitions against interacting with opposing groups, in particular in the 
wake of counter-terrorism legislation.  
 
The 2004 ECHO report further states that:  
 
… there is broad consensus within the humanitarian sector that security management should aim for the 
acceptance of the organization by all actors, be it context-–based, and managed at the field level. The 
exception to this in some ways is the UN, which tends towards protective security measures, has a 
centralised security body, UNSECOORD [the former UN security agency], and uses a system of 
Minimum Operating Security Standards which largely standardises security management across the 
organization (Barnett, p.5, 2004).  
 
This seems even truer since the 2007 bombing of the UN compound in Algiers and the subsequent 
nomination in May 2009 of the new Under-Secretary General (USG) for Safety and Security, Gregory 
Starr. An interviewee reported attending a senior security meeting in autumn 2009 at which the USG 
unofficially explained that the UN ―does not use acceptance as a strategy of security [anymore]‖.151 
Such a statement underscores the paradox of the current phase, which is dominated by both 
harmonization and polarization.  
 
5.3.2.4. The harmonization and polarization phase 
The harmonization of humanitarian security management is illustrated by the fact that the 
security strategy of today‘s main aid agencies is organized in a similar way to the ‗security 
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management framework‘ advocated by the GPR8 (Chapter Two). All of the interviewees stated that 
their organization was iguided or somewhat influenced by this framework.  
In line with these findings, a recent study of NGOs‘ security documentation, in which Rowley et 
al compared twenty NGOs‘ security policies and manuals to the InterAction MOSS (Rowley et al, 
2009), underscores further the harmonization of IAAs‘ practices.  
 
 Although security practices have ameliorated the situation, there is still room for further 
improvement. The aforementioned 2004 ECHO report states for instance that:  
 
… risk analysis – the process of identifying what kind of threats different staff members may face in the 
course of their work and devising measures to reduce those risks or staff members‘ vulnerability to them 
– is widely understood to be the cornerstone of security planning. However, in practice it is often 
overlooked (Barnett, p.4, 2004).   
 
Several interviewees admitted that their organization‘s security procedures were not always 
respected by the personnel; that resources allocated to security were insufficient; that incidents were 
still frequently the results of wrongdoing by personnel or lack of understanding of their environment; 
that security training of their personnel was insufficient and training of the local partners often non-
existent; that accountability was limited including after a security incident; or that information within 
and among aid agencies wasn‘t circulating enough.152 In addition, a few also stated that their 
organization would not or had not resisted donor pressure to get engaged in emergencies before 
having appropriately assessed existing risks.153  
It is clear that despite a harmonization of security thinking and practices, and despite several 
inter-agency efforts and initiatives to improve security management at both field and headquarters‘ 
level; further awareness raising, behavioural changes and allocation of resources are necessary. This 
is particularly true, since and in spite of, the harmonization, a polarization exists between aid agencies 
and aid workers on how security ought to be managed.  
 
 Two schools of thoughts can be contrasted here: a „process based‟ one versus a „situational 
judgment‟ one. These schools of thoughts are not so much the product of strategies, but rather 
mindsets which are both innate and nurtured within each organization. The former focuses on 
reducing uncertainty, while the latter advocates for context–specific decisions. The former emphasizes 
rules while the latter fosters a shared mindset. The difference eventually lies in the level of 
responsibility which is effectively given to aid workers on the ground. While Country directors of two 
different NGOs may have the same responsibilities on paper, one will be encouraged to meet warlords 
for negotiating access while the other will be instructed to leave OCHA to do it on the aid agencies‘ 
behalf. As one interviewee put it ―in the first case [the process based], which is very Anglo-Saxon, you 
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work with ISO norms, you ‗tick the boxes‘, you read a document and sign the document. In the second 
case, decisions are made on the basis of models of reasoning and analytical tools – whereby people 
are taught to ask the right questions at the right moment.‖154 These two organizational mindsets lead 
to a great many differences when it comes to security practices in the field. The ‗situational judgment‘ 
school of thinking fosters an approach to security that is contextual, and in which the responsibilities of 
managing security are shared. In other words, security is ‗political‘ (as an integral part of the 
programmes being implemented) and decentralized. The ‗process based‘ school of thinking, in 
contrast, cultivates an approach to security that is more technical and centralized - as will be 
highlighted in the next sub-section. While the former tends to consider openness and reflection as 
important security elements, the latter tends to put more emphasis on self-defence and discipline.  
The differentiation between these two mindsets reflects the distinction between aid agencies‘ 
ethoses. For ‗situational judgment organizations‘, choices will be driven by a variety of elements such 
as contextual dynamics or the organization‘s adherence to humanitarian principles; while the choices 
of ‗process based organizations‘ will be driven by the necessity to avoid risks. Typically, Deontological 
organizations such as the ICRC, MSF or PU value situational judgment while Utilitarian ones such as 
CHF, IRD or the WFP emphasis processes. Solidarist organizations like CARE or SC–UK sit in the 
middle: these agencies are more process based yet their national staff, and particularly their field staff, 
are often in positions of situational judgment. These varying approaches to security were observed 
several times in both Afghanistan and Haiti. For instance, personnel from Utilitarian organizations – for 
example UNDP staff – would have to request an authorization from the security office before any field 
trip, while personnel from Deontological organizations – say ACF – would first do the field trip and 
then report its results to their managers or headquarters. 
As underscored in the previous chapter, the interplay between an organization‘s structure and 
its agents ensures that employees internalize mindsets and reproduce them in their daily practices. 
This in turn, also contributes to their agencies reproducing the same approaches to security. 
Consequently, it emerges that each mindset contributes to gradually accentuating differences in 
identity that exist between agencies. Depending on which school of thought aid workers are immersed 
in, the operational choices they make will be different. Choices in turn, confirm aid agencies in the 
aptness of their approach to security management. Using Grunewald‘s earlier example of the UN 
security guide for Somalia, staff facing an incident in this context would theoretically react differently 
depending on the school of thought they are influenced by. While a staff immersed in a ‗process 
based organization‘ would have concluded that to avoid the incident, they should have followed the 
guide more strictly, a staff member immersed in a ‗situational judgment organization‘ would deduce 
that they had not put enough emphasis on understanding the environment or enough effort into 
engaging with the various stakeholders.  
  
                                               
154
 Interview 134.  
                  151 of 257 
 Aid agencies have always sought to protect their staff and assets against threats. But 
approaches have evolved over time, eventually leading to a paradoxical situation whereby aid 
agencies have harmonized their security framework; yet, their operational choices are often polarized 
in practice. The implications of the current approaches to security will be discussed in the next 
chapters. While the present sub-section has highlighted how aid agencies preferences are clearly 
various and constantly changing, the next sub-section will discuss under what conditions aid agencies 
redefine their interests. 
5.3.3. How do aid agencies redefine their security interests? 
 Aid agencies preferences in security management have been, and are, defined (and redefined) 
by both the external environment and an organization‘s internal dynamics. Given the turmoil aid 
agencies have faced - particularly during the 1990s -  it would be surprising if they had not evolved in 
reaction to, and in a few cases, in anticipation of these events. This section will then develop two 
levels of analysis regarding the conditions under which IAAs think and (re)define their security 
interests. First it will look at the epistemic community which permeates the sector and allows cross–
fertilization among agencies; second it will characterize the power relationships within agencies. In 
developing these two levels of analysis however, the present section will focus on dynamics occurring 
at organizational level. As such, an emphasis will be placed on studying the dynamics at headquarters 
as opposed to field dynamics, which will be the focus of the next chapter. 
 
5.3.3.1. An analysis at the level of the humanitarian security epistemic community 
 Even if humanitarian security professionals have disagreements, they nevertheless share a 
real sense of belonging to the same community – above and beyond the boundaries between 
individual agencies. An anecdotal yet revealing illustration of this is that the author witnessed a 
number of times, in both Afghanistan and Haiti, that when security coordination meetings were 
organized by humanitarian security professionals on the ground, they frequently asked people who do 
not work for aid agencies to leave the meeting, even though these individuals might be working as 
security officers for a private company or media. A reason for this is that security-related information 
dubbed sensitive is typically shared during such meetings. The audience is automatically considered 
as trustworthy, but only if it is composed of security officers working for not-for-profit organizations.  
 As explained in Chapter Three, an epistemic community is defined as: ―a network of 
professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative 
claim to policy–relevant knowledge within that domain or issue–area‖ (Haas, 1992, quoted in 
Bollettino, 2008). For Bollettino,  
 
[e]pistemic communities share common normative beliefs and common perspectives on causal 
mechanisms and notions of validity and adopt common policy positions. These networks can facilitate 
cooperation among disparate actors facing uncertain outcomes by identifying the complex inter-linkages 
between issues and by formulating policy alternatives. (Bollettino, p.272, 2008. Emphasis original).  
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While Bollettino called for a greater role for these networks of professionals, one could argue that 
these were already playing an important role – one that has since expanded further.  
 Networks of humanitarian security professionals are constituted at both the global level such 
as: the European Interagency Security Forum (EISF), the Inter Agency Security Management Network 
(IASMN) or the Security Management Initiative (SMI); and the local level such as: the Initiative ONG 
Sécurité (IOS) in Haiti or the Afghanistan NGO Security Office (ANSO). Some are institutionalized and 
function as independent organizations, while others are informal and consist simply of regular 
meetings and information sharing. Some of the networks are limited to United Nations agencies, 
others are open to all aid agencies (Saving Lives Together (SLT) initiative) and a further number are 
limited to NGOs only (ANSO). Lastly, a few networks exist only virtually, through websites such as 
NGO Security and Patronus Analytical – yet they have proved useful in sharing thoughts, information 
and documentation. Acknowledging that aid workers can benefit from academic research on 
humanitarian security, several of these inter-agency collaborations engage with the academic sector 
and at times facilitate the connection between academia and practitioners. Also, independent 
humanitarian security consultants revolve around these networks in mutually beneficial exchanges. At 
field level, networks of humanitarian security professionals are now commonly set-up at the onset of 
each emergency response. Following the 2010 earthquake in Haiti for instance, security professionals 
were sharing information even before meeting on the ground. 
It is notable that the EISF was created by Solidarists and Deontological NGOs (including SC-
UK and OGB – later joined by MSF) in recognition of the fact that they did not feel represented by the 
US–based InterAction Security Advisory Group (SAG), composed essentially of Utilitarian and some 
Solidarist agencies (including CARE US and IRD).155 This does not indicate a formal split of the 
epistemic community along the lines of Deontological, Solidarist and Utilitarian agencies, but 
underscores different visions of security, including differences inside the community of humanitarian 
security technical experts.  
Another indicator of these differences in approaching security is the creation of an NGO 
Security Association by InterAction‘s SAG. Funded by USAID–OFDA, the aim of the association is, 
among others, to ―create a certification regime for security professionals [and] create a career path for 
NGO security professionals‖ (InterAction, p.1, 2009). Although commendable, many Deontological 
and Solidarist NGOs in particular were critical of the project because its focus on the technical aspects 
of security were too narrow. As a consequence and in order to garner their support, the SAG 
eventually had to rephrase the project to account for these criticisms.156  
Epistemic communities do contribute to the harmonization of practices but this does not 
necessarily affect the aforementioned polarization of IAAs‘ approaches to security. The reason for this 
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is that, while harmonization is often of a technical nature, the polarization is the result of political 
differences that cannot be tackled by security experts alone.  
 
 All of the humanitarian security networks are effectively linked through a non-centric web of 
regular and direct communications between members, some of whom participate in several of these 
networks. While each network has its own raison d‟être, objectives, resources, and its own dynamic; 
they often engage in similar activities such as information sharing, security coordination and support, 
and all act as trust–building mechanisms. In addition, some also collect relevant data to improve their 
analytical capacity, they provide security and crisis management support, trainings, 
telecommunications and offer themselves for representation and liaison purposes as well as being a 
platform for lobbying and advocacy. In Afghanistan, the presence of ANSO for instance helps its NGO 
members not to have to interact directly with the armed forces; this is an added advantage for both the 
armed forces who prefer one interlocutor rather than three-hundred, and for the NGOs who then avoid 
taking risks by going to military bases and being seen as interacting with the military.  
 While (neo)realists in International Relations argue that states and organizations alike are 
driven by self-interest, the daily successes of the epistemic humanitarian security community prove 
that the (neo)realist view is not always true. There is little doubt that each aid agency is, to some 
degree, driven by its own interests, yet these networks effectively allow them to overcome suspicion 
through cooperation and reap mutual gains. This is particularly evident when aid workers‘ lives are 
said to have been saved because critical information or services were shared in a timely manner; or 
when each aid agency member of a network economizes on spending by sharing the cost of a given 
service.  
 The atypical character of such processes should not be understated. An organization that has 
just been victim of a kidnapping has little interest in informing others about it.157 The organization is 
subsequently overwhelmed by the need to recover its staff as quickly and (usually) discretely as 
possible, and engaging with other aid agencies may be seen as an unnecessary burden. It also does 
not want to communicate any information before the family of the victims and relevant authorities are 
informed; it does not want to be confronted with media enquiry, and possibly criticism, that the 
kidnapping is the result of poor security management; and it is usually contractually forbidden by its 
insurance company (if it has one) to share any information about insurance or payment of ransom, 
etc. Yet, despite these severe constraints, the author witnessed repeatedly, at both HQ and field 
levels, that a minimum amount of information about a kidnapping case is rapidly shared among a 
trusted network of humanitarian security professionals (usually on a ‗need-to-know‘ basis). Indeed 
sharing such critical information has proven crucial in many instances, allowing other agencies to 
immediately take appropriate measures in order to avoid facing similar incidents. These kinds of 
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dynamics are typical of the way the immediate interests of an organization are being supplanted by 
overlapping and complementary goals of individuals and groups across agency boundaries.  
 These epistemic dynamics are a strong element of IAAs‘ harmonization of their security 
framework. For example the original author of the GPR8 has just updated it, but an Advisory Board of 
NGO security representatives was constituted to overlook and orientate the work. Beyond security 
professionals, epistemic communities allow agencies to be nodes in a multiplicity of networks, which 
gradually contributes to cross-fertilization and transfer of ideas, norms, and practices across agencies. 
There is for instance, anecdotal evidence that the year long research on NGOs‘ legal accountability by 
the Security Management Initiative (D‘Aprile, 2009) led several organizations to pay more attention to 
their responsibilities toward staff.158 
 
Networks however, are not to be taken for granted, especially as several initiatives to develop 
humanitarian security collaboration mechanisms have failed (Bickley, 2006). For instance the 
International Committee to Protect Aid Workers set-up in 1998, and the 1998 ―Project for a 
humanitarian security network‖ were both short-lived and remained unknown to the wider public.‖ A 
commonality in these failed attempts is that the initial momentum was lost, either due to lack of 
funding, lack of commitment and personal investment, or personality issues. Further barriers to 
security collaboration such as diversity in security approach, limited governance, suspicion and 
interference by authorities, staff recruitment and retention problems, and competing priorities and 
limited resources have also been identified by Shaun Bickley (2006).  
This did not discourage the PMSC Control Risks from writing a proposal in 2006 to set-up a 
security collaborative mechanism in Aceh which was sent to DfID for funding. In the words of an 
interviewee working for the company, ―we wrote a proposal as a benchmark to DfID, knowing that they 
won‘t fund it. The idea was to create a debate – and even though the proposal wasn't a competitive 
concept, it could have been useful; PSCs could provide security coordination, even if some NGOs 
would always refuse to be part of it.‖159 Although the actual reasons leading to the refusal of funding 
the proposal are unknown, there is anecdotal evidence that DfID did not consider the provider as a 
legitimate representative of the aid community.160 
Similarly, the Joint NGO Emergency Preparedness Initiative (JNEPI) - created prior to the 2003 
Iraq war and indirectly supported by the US armed forces - quickly fell into near irrelevance since most 
of the aid agencies refused to operate under the umbrella of the US military, and it was soon 
outperformed by the newly created NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq (NCCI). To encourage this 
move, a number of well-established agencies had called on ―all NGOs operating in Iraq to contact 
NCCI at their earliest convenience, become members, and actively participate in ensuring this body is 
truly representative of collective NGO interests and concerns‖ (UNOHCI, 2003. Emphasis added).161 
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Significantly, the NGOs that founded the JNEPI were all Utilitarian with a few Solidarists162, while the 
NCCI was created primarily by Deontologicals with a few Solidarists.163  
Lastly, on a wider scale, individuals try at times to worm their way into the aid sector without 
really understanding it. A striking example is the case of ―Stormhaven: a new idea in field security‖, a 
short-lived not-for-profit security collaborative proposal. Former Canadian soldiers offered to provide 
NGOs with training and equipment as well as close protection and other armed services for ―little or no 
costs.‖ The problem is that beyond an array of typographic errors and poor editing which may lead 
one to wonder whether this design was supposed to please ‗sandal wearing hippies‘, the initiative 
explained that ―We will also actively pusue [sic] and aprehend [sic] persons indicted by the ICC in or 
near our operational areas‖ and ―endeavor to introduce non-lethal technologies [in order] to deal 
humainly [sic] with child soldiers while still protecting threatened populations from them.‖164 
Unsurprisingly, an NGO security advisor replied ―Aprehending [sic] persons indicted by the ICC is of 
course a great objective, but it is incompatible with humanitarian mandate and objective.‖ Although 
naively expressed, this initiative is representative of the views shared among security professionals, 
who typically do not understand the tenets of humanitarian action and only see it as a part of a vast 
smorgasbord of dynamics that ‗do good‘. As will be discussed in the next chapter, these kinds of views 
are frequent among security contractors. 
These three attempts clearly illustrate that any outsider attempting to contribute to 
humanitarian security networks must be seen as legitimate by insiders, and abide by aid agencies‘ 
codes and cultural references. Epistemic communities are limited to entities who share common 
normative beliefs and common perspectives. But for the networks not to lose their relevance, 
outsiders‘ views and an open attitude to diversity are also necessary so that cross-fertilization does 
not end up in congenital biases.  
 
 The humanitarian security professionals comprise an epistemic community that is constituted 
from a variety of interrelated networks, which cover all aspects of security management. This 
epistemic community then plays a key role in the diffusion of ideas, values and norms; and as such, 
contributes greatly to the harmonization of IAAs‘ approaches to security, but does not necessarily 
affect the polarization of certain practices. The reason for this is that aid agency approaches to 
security are deeply engrained in each organization‘s specific identity and experiences and, as such, 
are of a political rather than a simply technical nature. Changes may occur but only gradually and in 
the long-term.  
 
5.3.3.3. An analysis at the level of the agency 
In order to understand under what conditions aid agency preferences in security management 
develop, one must also look at internal power dynamics of agencies. Given the various aid agencies‘ 
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historical reluctance to get into security management and to recruit security officers, it is not surprising 
that this recruitment, and the subsequent interactions with the security officer, may be loaded. 
Tensions are sometimes perceptible before position becomes open, when managers debate the 
necessity of having a security officer or not. The arguments in favour of having an expert is that they 
will develop security strategy and policies; support the organization when crises occur; and be the 
cornerstone for building an organizational security culture. The arguments against this are: the 
reallocation of resources that the new position requires; or the risk of recruiting former military 
personnel with little understanding of the humanitarian ethos who will inevitably clash with their 
colleagues if they do not internalize the aid workers‘ mindset. Similarly and even if the security officer 
comes with a prior humanitarian background, tensions may still exist simply because staff within the 
agencies continue refusing to accept the need for security personnel. A security advisor who found 
himself in this situation explained that although the colleagues around him accepted him the board 
members were still opposed to him on the basis that the position should not exist in their view; this 
was in spite of the fact that he proved crucial in resolving a case of kidnapping soon after his arrival.165 
Significantly, he is being employed by a Deontological organization.  
In the case of this research, 14 out of the 24 interviewees working as headquarter-based 
security managers did not come from a military or law enforcement background. Among the remaining 
10, while only two were working for Deontological organizations, four were working for Solidarists and 
four with Utilitarians. This holds true if one looks at the five selected NGOs: while the heads of security 
of MSF and OGB have civilian backgrounds, the security managers of CARE and IRD were former-
military and police officers. SC-UK, as usual, sits in the middle: its first head of security had a military 
background, but was later replaced by someone with a civilian profile. 
The creation of a head of security positions at headquarter level has only spread gradually, 
starting with Utilitarian organizations and generally moving along the Spectrum. While Save the 
Children US created its position in 2002, IRC did so in 2003, and CARE International and IMC in 
2006. Within Solidarist organizations, Tearfund created their position in 2005–6, Save the Children UK 
and Plan International in 2006 and Trocaire in 2007. Among Deontological agencies, ACF and the 
British Red Cross created their head of security positions in 2007 and MSF–Belgium in 2008. Two 
notable exceptions though are the ICRC (Deontological), whose Security Unit was created as early as 
1994, and IRD (Utilitarian) whose was created in 2008. These exceptions however are to be qualified. 
For the ICRC ―[w]hen the Security Unit attached to the Department of Operations was established …, 
an essential precondition set by operational field managers that responsibility for security 
management would not be taken away from them‖ (Krähenbühl, p.509, 2004). This eventually 
contributed to reinforcing ICRC‘s preferences for a ‗situational judgment‘ organizational mindset. IRD 
was still a young organization in the early 2000s as it was only created in 1998. This explains how the 
process of maturation into accepting the idea of having a head of security and being able to fund it 
occurred only recently. Altogether, this gradual creation of head of security positions along the 
                                               
165
 Interview 146.  
                  157 of 257 
Spectrum is revealing of the initial reluctance felt by many Solidarist and Deontological organizations 
in particular. These organizations struggled with the idea of ‗outsourcing‘ security to an expert, even if 
he/she is a member of staff.166 This echoes concerns that such a move could contribute to lessening 
the sense of responsibility towards security felt amongst the remaining staff.  
 The title given, as well as the position offered in the organization‘s chart, are revealing of the 
way an agency understands security management. Typically, a ‗Security Director‘ will have a more 
prominent positioning than a ‗Security Advisor‘. In broad terms, while the former can make mandatory 
decisions, the latter provides only recommendations. Interestingly, among the security positions 
occupied by the 24 aforementioned interviewees, all of the positions named by Deontological 
organizations were either ‗advisor‘, ‗delegate‘ or ‗security focal point‘, which tend to give a rather low 
profile to the position. In contrast, all of the security positions named by Utilitarian organizations were 
‗director‘ or ‗chief‘. As per the Solidarist organizations, one was named ‗coordinator‘, three ‗director‘, 
four ‗manager‘, and five ‗advisor‘. Similarly, in the case of the five selected NGOs, MSF-B had a 
‗Security Focal Point‘; OGB a ‗Security Adviser‘; SC-UK a ‗Head of Global Safety and Security‘; CARE 
a ‗Director of Safety and Security‘; and IRD a ‗Director of Staff Security‘.  This approach to naming the 
security position is another indicator of an agencies‘ ethos and subsequent views on security 
management. The evolution of the naming along the spectrum of agencies emphasises the correlation 
between an organizations‘ location on the spectrum and their views on security – noting that the closer 
an organization is to the Utilitarian end of the spectrum, the more likely it is to have a firm stance on 
security. It also highlights the relative level of effective responsibility which is left to field staff: while 
those working in Utilitarian organizations have a ‗director‘ who provides them with commands, those 
working in Deontological ones are guided in their own situational judgment by an ‗advisor‘. These 
kinds of dynamics reinforce the dichotomy exposed earlier between the ‗situational judgment‘ and 
‗process–based‘ organizations. 
Also important in understanding an organization‘s approach to security management is the 
relationship between security managers and Country Directors (CDs). This relationship is critical as 
Country Directors are eventually those resisting or pushing for a security culture at field level. Even 
though the security manager is an employee of the same organization, he/she is often only seen as an 
‗external‘ who is not implementing or managing security on a daily basis at f ield level. Can the 
headquarters–based head of security contact the field–based CDs directly and enforce a security 
decision or does he/she have to go through the Operations Director or Regional Director for instance? 
Some interviewees shared that they have continual issues with Country Directors who are unwilling to 
follow their recommendations. It‘s revealing of organizations‘ differing approaches to security that 
among the few interviewees who reported being able to directly oblige a CD to follow their 
recommendations, three out of four worked for Utilitarian organizations. As the Director of Security of 
one of these explained ―I have a lot of weight in all our field operations. Our policy specifies that I can 
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issue a security directive with very direct language, which I have used a few times; also, I'm involved 
in the performance evaluation of CDs and Programme Managers, whom I grade annually.‖167 Most 
interviewees however stated that since they had no direct line–management responsibilities for CDs 
they needed to go through intermediaries. In the words of the MSF-Belgium Security Focal Point: ―I 
don't have an operational mandate and can't tell a mission to 'not go there' for instance; I don't have a 
decision making role but a questioning role.‖168 Yet again, these kind of organizational structures 
underscore different approaches to security across the Spectrum of aid agencies. 
 
 The location of a security position in the organizational chart, or the relationships built by the 
security manager within the agency, provide an indication of an organizations‘ attitude to security 
management. Several interviewees explained that the creation and support of their position has, in 
turn, had a positive impact on the organization‘s ability to deal with security issues. One interviewee 
explained that ―our purpose is to enable the programmes to happen, and we achieve this through 
organizational change management – it's slower as we don't use the hammer, but it's more profound; 
there is a three year threshold: you work first with those willing to learn and because of this it will work 
and you can build on this success to attract more Country Directors to work with you: while the 
directors are supportive, the average staff member now also supports us.‖169  
On many occasions, and even if the appointment of security manager is seen as a ‗ticking-the-
box‘ exercise, such a move effectively leads to the adoption of new policies and subsequent changes 
in beliefs, attitudes and norms. As an organization changes its attitude to security – from mere 
awareness to professional security management - this in turn,contributes to (re)producing values 
accordingly and in gradually shaping the organization‘s identity This remains true irrespective of an 
organization‘s location on the Spectrum: in the words of the IRD Director of Security, ―in the beginning, 
it was staff concerns that brought leaders to consider investing in security, but now it's staff care as 
well as the dynamics set up by security management itself. We now feel better at what we do.‖170 
Similarly, the MSF-B HQ based Security Focal Point shared that: ―there is still a culture/perception that 
the security manager is the one who forbids them doing what they want; so we are taking more 
collective decisions in particular when it comes to identifying the actors and risks and build a mitigating 
strategy accordingly. Such participatory process brings more ownership.‖171  
 
 
 This section has set out the processes through which some representations of humanitarian 
security become dominant, while others are gradually left aside. By doing so, it has demonstrated that 
the professionalization of IAAs‘ security management leads to a paradox where a harmonization and a 
polarization of security approaches are concomitantly observed. The internalization of either a 
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‗situational judgment‘ or ‗process based‘ mindset then contributes to reproducing a certain approach to 
security. Each mindset in turn, contributes to gradually accentuating differences in identity that exist 
between agencies. In addition, this section has shown, through a study of agents and changes at two 
levels of analysis – epistemic and organizational – how aid agencies‘ preferences in security are 
(re)defined by their identity. It has revealed that their approaches to security are affected by 
interrelated dynamics occurring both externally and internally. Lastly, it has provided a body of 
evidence the contribution of which highlights the differences that exist between Deontological, 
Solidarist and Utilitarian approaches to security. 
 
5.4. Conclusion 
The objective of the chapter was to set out how aid agency representations of security and 
preferences in security management are shaped by their identity – and gradually shape this identity in 
turn.  
The first section argued that aid agencies‘ approaches to security are shaped by both the 
values that drive each organization and the ways these values are put into practice. It then presented 
how each type of aid agency approaches security, indicating by doing so that differences in identity 
are paralleled with differences in interests. This was illustrated by a body of corroborating evidence 
presented in the following sections. 
The second section focused on the threats that aid agencies are said to be facing and 
highlighted in particular the construction of these threats as well as their nature. It differentiated 
between the direct and indirect threats and also revealed that they are constructed differently by aid 
agencies, through processes of socialization and securitization. The analysis of aid agencies‘ threats 
demonstrated that the construction of threats encompasses both objective and subjective elements, in 
particular since the perception of threats is related to an agency‘s identity: depending on where an aid 
agency is located in the identity spectrum, it will not focus on the same threats as other agencies. The 
thesis then highlighted the fact that that norms, attitudes and values associated with certain 
approaches to security are internalized by the personnel of an agency, to the point where they 
become part of an organization‘s identity. Threat perceptions for instance, do not necessarily create a 
dramatic change in identity, but by gradually affecting aid workers‘ values, attitudes and norms, they 
do make some identity dimensions more salient than others. Lastly, the thesis iterated that while aid 
agencies perceive threats around them, they do not conceive these threats to be enemies.  
The third section of the chapter offered a study of dominant representations of humanitarian 
security with a focus on agents and changes. It traced aid workers‘ security thinking and practices, 
and revealed how dominant representations have emerged, and alternative trends have been left 
aside. Four phases of this evolution were identified: disorientation, foundation, institutionalization, 
harmonization and polarization. Today‘s harmonization of humanitarian security management was 
underlined through the adoption by aid agencies of a common security management framework and 
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set of standards, while its polarization was highlighted through the revealing of two schools of thought, 
the ‗process based‘ versus the ‗situational judgment‘ one. The differentiation between these two 
mindsets reflects the distinction between the aid agencies‘ underlying ethoses, and underscores 
further the different approaches to security between Deontological, Solidarist and Utilitarian 
organizations. 
This section also showed how aid agency preferences in security management are (re)defined 
by both the external environment and an organizations‘ internal dynamics. This was done through two 
levels of analysis: first the study of the humanitarian security epistemic community revealed the cross-
fertilization among agencies. Then the  organizational level of analysis drew attention to the power 
relationships within agencies and how these affect aid agency choices in security management. It 
revealed how the location of a security position in the organizational chart, the relationships built by 
the security manager within the agency, provide indicators of an organizations‘ involvement in security 
management, reiterating differences among the three defined–types of aid agency. 
Understanding how international aid agency identities and representations of security are co-
constituted is a necessary step to reveal the diversity of preferences in security management. This in 
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Chapter 6 – Exploring the Manifestations of the Aid Community 




“Private security companies perceive Afghans as potential enemies while we see them as 
potential friends; maybe that's the fundamental difference” 
 
NGO Country Director in Afghanistan172 
 
 
Even though, historically, they descend from mercenaries, private military and security 
companies, such as those that appeared in the post–2003 Iraq war, are a rather recent development. 
Most international aid agencies, in turn, have been operating in wars and insecure environments for 
decades and, in the case of the ICRC, for more than a century. They have faced all sorts of potential 
risks; from petty criminal acts to targeted killing; from financial crisis to natural disasters. They operate 
in environments as diverse as the slums of Port-au-Prince; the tropical forests of the Congo; the 
deserts of Sudan; the urban environment of Lagos; the mountains of Pakistan; and the rural areas of 
Zimbabwe. They have gradually learned how to ensure the continuity of their activities through ever 
improving and evolving security management practices. Given their extensive experience in the formal 
and informal handling of security, one may wonder what they gain in dealing with PMSCs. Indeed, 
while the aid community benefit from a rather positive image, the private security industry is tainted by 
largely negative representations. Yet, aid agencies do use private military and security companies. 
Emily Speers Mears posits that, ―there are three main reasons for the increase in the market for 
humanitarian security: in response to (perceived) humanitarian insecurity; as the natural outcome of a 
more general privatization of security; and as part of the wider professionalization of the humanitarian 
sector‖ (Speers Mears, p.3, 2009).  
In neo-liberal societies, where virtually anything has the potential to become a commodity, the 
security needs of aid agencies have become commodified. The question then is to understand how 
the consumers of security meet the providers of security, and what the outcomes of these encounters 
are. This will prove particularly revealing in light of the arguments developed in the previous chapters, 
i.e. that the different approaches of aid agencies to security are interlinked with their respective 
identity. Furthermore, given the tensions that exist between IAAs because of their need for security on 
the one hand, and the generally poor reputation of PMSCs on the other, the thesis argues that 
studying aid agency engagement towards PMSCs is further revealing of the aid sector‘s differing 
approaches to security. In addition, while most research on private military and security companies is 
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from the viewpoint of the state, the current thesis offers the perspective of non–state actors, namely 
aid agencies. This will put PMSCs, their ethics and attitudes to security, into a new perspective..  
The first section of the chapter provides a detailed picture of the corporate security industry; 
revelaing its interests regarding the aid sector. It examines in particular the need to distinguish 
between different types of PMSCs and highlights how security companies use humanitarian ethics as 
a legitimising factor. The second section presents this thesis‘s findings regarding IAA engagement 
with PMSCs and then demonstrates that aid agency positioning towards PMSCs confirms the 
interplay between aid agencys‘ identities and their respective approaches to security. 
 
6.1. The development of PMSC strategy regarding international aid agencies 
Private military and security companies have increasingly been utilised by governments, armed 
forces, international organizations and the private sector; and aid agencies have not stood apart from 
this trend. As noted in Chapter One of this thesis, Stoddard et al‘s research showed that ―… over the 
last five years, humanitarian organizations have increased their contracting of security and security 
related services from commercial companies.‖ It also argued that ―armed security contracting remains 
the exception (most contracts are for unarmed guards and security consultants). However, all major 
humanitarian actors report having used armed guards in at least one context‖ (Stoddard et al, p.1, 
2008).173 
The authors further note that: 
 
… for international PSPs [private security providers], the services humanitarians used most were 
security training for staff, security management consulting and risk assessment/threat analysis. The 
most popular services from local PSPs were unarmed guards (for facilities, residences and project sites) 
and physical security for premises. [ ... However] in some of the most insecure contexts, such as Darfur, 
Sudan and Iraq, humanitarian agencies have used private security in only very limited ways if at all, 
relying more on the tactic of withdrawing, suspending operations and remotely managing their 
programmes to deal with security threats (Stoddard et al, p.19, 2008).  
 
This implies that a number of aid organizations have, in some locations, preferred to alter the quality 
of their programmes by managing them at distance, or even stopped their activities altogether rather 
than use services provided by PMSCs. Financial, ideological or reputational considerations may all 
explain these choices. As shown in Chapter Two, the risks of using the security services of private 
companies are real – and diverse. Yet in the words of an Utilitarian NGO Head of Security, 
―humanitarians should learn from the private sector. Litigation, market forces and body bags will 
provoke changes.‖174 While the majority of aid workers might not be interested in contracting a PMSC, 
they still need to understand who these providers of private security are. Security companies have 
                                               
173
 The present author was one of the peer reviewers of the report. 
174
 Interview 20. 
                  163 of 257 
invaded the space traditionally occupied by aid agencies and international organizations. Blackwater 
proposed sending brigade–sized rapid reaction forces to support or replace peacekeepers in war 
zones; Pacific Architects and Engineers and Medical Support Solutions have provided logistical 
support as well as medical services for the African Union in Sudan since 2002. DynCorp recruited and 
trained the new Liberian armed forces as part of the reform of the country‘s security sector. Blue Sky 
supervised the cease-fire in Aceh; and for a number of years Centurion has been training 
humanitarians heading for high–risk zones. The current section will then examine who the private 
military and security companies are and what their interests towards the aid sector are. 
6.1.1. Typologies of private military and security companies 
 Private military and security companies, like international aid agencies, do not constitute a 
cohesive block. There are differences among them that need to be taken into account for any relevant 
analysis. First however, one must also consider the differences between mercenaries and private 
security contractors. The current sub-section will break down the various protagonists occupying the 
field of corporate security.  
 
6.1.1.1. PMSCs versus mercenaries 
When talking about the current private military and security companies, the media frequently 
refer to ‗mercenaries‘; this is a historical reference laden with negative associations. Sarah Percy 
rightly notes that:  
 
… the word mercenary has evolved into a pejorative term used to denote a disliked soldier. The 
proscription against mercenary use is so strong that the word mercenary itself has become a powerful 
political tool, which can be used to brand another group‘s soldiers and attempt to make them appear 
illegitimate (Percy, p.51, 2007).  
 
Security contractors are historically and philosophically the descendants of the mercenaries, but they 
are also different from them. It is necessary to acknowledge these differences in order to understand 
their present role in our societies.  
Historically, mercenaries were seen as foreigners fighting for money. Nowadays, 
‗mercenarism‘ is defined in various international treaties, national laws and resolutions proscribing or 
condemning the use of mercenaries; from the UN General Assembly and Security Council; the 
Organization of African Unity Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa; Article 47 of 
Protocol 1 additional to the Geneva Conventions; and the United Nations International Convention 
against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries. 
Definitions of ‗mercenary‘ are very specific, and are often credited with two characteristics: 
fighting in a conflict while being originally external to it, and second, fighting for financial gain.175 Some 
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countries, such as France or South Africa, have passed strong national laws against mercenaries. In 
all cases, engaging in or supporting mercenary activities is usually considered as both immoral and 
illegal. PMSCs in contrast are legal, and for many, legitimate entities. Being corporate entities, they 
need to respect many different types of regulation, ranging from the national laws where they are 
registered to the national laws in the countries where they operate, including international or European 
law. They are, for instance, obliged to follow the laws on the regulation of arms trade and control, 
military–type training or the domestic use of security services, etc (Krahmann, 2006). However, there 
is also a common agreement among experts that the existing regulation is not sufficient. The reasons 
lie in the fact that these regulations poorly address PMSC‘s activities and responsibilities in conflict 
zones; and because of this lack of enforcement mechanisms, authorities are prevented from 
effectively holding accountable a security contractor suspected of violation of these regulations.  
Nevertheless, if the distinction between mercenaries and PMSCs is easy to draw from a legal 
vantage point, it remains controversial from philosophical and social science perspectives. 
 
6.1.1.2. Existing distinctions between PMSCs 
Peter W. Singer‘s term ‗private military firms‟ (PMF) encompasses not only security companies 
but also any type of company involved in supporting military enterprise, even if not armed or not 
dealing with security per se (Singer, 2003).176 Halliburton, one of the world‘s largest providers of 
products and services to the energy industry, is for instance considered to be a PMF. Didier Bigo and 
Christian Olsson refer to coercive semi-private companies, in order to ―highlight the fact that these 
companies are often part of personal networks which are transversal to the simplistic public/private 
dichotomy‖ (Olsson, 2003, website. Author‘s own translation). Sarah Percy (and others) differentiates 
between private security companies and private military companies arguing that, contrary to the latter, 
PSCs do not engage in combat; are under a higher degree of state control than PMCs; and work 
alongside national military forces. However, by offering this kind of distinction, Percy does not take 
into account companies contracted not by states but by other private companies. She also ignores the 
fact that, in contexts such as Afghanistan, security companies are sometimes de facto involved in 
combat; they are not necessarily willing to engage in fighting, but their protective mission certainly 
involves this potentiality. Similarly, some authors also oppose coercive services to defensive ones 
(Spearin, p.56,  2005b; p.366, 2008). This distinction however is not valid in contexts such as Iraq. 
The September 2007 Nisoor Square incident in which Blackwater staff shot and killed up to seventeen 
civilian Iraqis, is a typical illustration of this. Their mission was of a protective, but it turned out that 
they had an offensive stance. One must consider that PMSCs are contracted for a specific mission: 
ensuring the security of their clients. They have to accomplish their contract, even if this is detrimental 
to the Coalitions‘ overall mission of ‗winning the hearts and minds‘. In the words of a contractor: 
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―[w]hat they told me was, ‗Our mission is to protect the principal at all costs‘. If that means pissing off 
the Iraqis, too bad‖ (Singer, p.6 ,2007). 
Other authors, including Mandel (2002), differentiate between security companies providing 
domestic services versus those providing services worldwide. This dichotomy is relevant in some 
cases – the guard working in a London shopping mall is therefore working for a different type of 
company than the contractor involved in the protection of State Department officials in Afghanistan. 
However, the lines between the domestic and worldwide PMSCs are becoming increasingly blurred: 
on one hand there are many ‗guarding‟ security companies operating in conflict zones; on the other 
hand there are many international militarised companies involved in countries which are not at war. 
Also the types of services, of personnel, of clients, of weapons, or the size of the company tend to be 
similar, one to another. The main difference lies in the fact that the ‗guarding‘ security companies offer 
services that are closer to (although far less developed) and limited to law enforcement. 
As explained in the introductory chapter, the choice of words is telling: ‗private security 
company‘ is perceived as less dramatic, and less affiliated with the negatively connotations of ‗the 
mercenary‘. This is why companies providing security services (including armed protection) on the 
battlefield prefer to call themselves ‗private security companies.‘  
The present thesis uses the term ‗private military and security companies‘ (PMSCs) as it 
wishes to underline that most corporate providers of security operating in war zones are lead, 
managed, and composed of former military personnel. In both Afghanistan and Haiti, the author has 
observed that many of these personnel continue thinking, operating, and using weapons and postures 
that are reminiscent of military – not civilian – tactics. This in turn, contributes to projecting an image 
that is militarised rather than civilian, something that aid agencies are sensitive to when interacting 
with these providers of security.  
 
6.1.1.3. A typology of private military and security companies 
Private military and security companies offer services designed to have strategic, operational, 
or tactical impacts on the security of persons or property. These services range from logistical support, 
context analysis, crisis, and risk management; to physical protection of people and/or goods, training 
of armed forces, and even operational command and combat. This being said, there are differences 
amongst them and it is possible to offer a typology of PMSCs. The main criterion for differentiating 
them is their function, which equates to their prime sector of activities.  
Guarding companies primarily provide local guards, who are often highly visible, uniformed 
watchmen to protect premises. They might also offer mobile and/or canine protection, but their 
objective remains the provision of law enforcement–type services with a local profile. This category 
encompasses companies as diverse as Securitas AB (260,000 people in 40 countries) or The Brink's 
Company (56,900 employees and operations in over 50 countries) to small companies offering 
services limited to one country, such as Khurasan Security in Afghanistan and Global Sécurité SA in 
Haiti. 
                  166 of 257 
Unarmed security providers offer non–lethal risk management or intelligence–type services 
ranging from analysis to private investigation and assistance with security audits and training. 
Executive Analysis; Risk&Co, Riskline177 and Stratfor fall within this category. 
Weaponised companies comprise the bulk of the international private military and security 
companies operating in conflict zones. The range of security services they offer is wide and diverse 
but they share the common characteristics of employing primarily former military personnel and being 
armed, or offering security services to an armed entity.178 The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have 
brought these companies to international attention. Aegis, Control Risks, DynCorp International, L3-
MPRI, Triple Canopy, Xe (formerly known as Blackwater) are representatives of this category. It 
should be noted that companies are included in this category as long as they or their clients are 
armed, regardless of their level of visibility (low or high profile).  
 
 
Figure 2 - Typology of Private Military and Security Companies 
 
 
PMSCs are here organised into a triangle-shape typology, with each corner representing each 
of the three types of PMSC. The purpose of this diagram is to demonstrate that, while some 
companies offer services that are limited to one type of service only (for instance contextual analysis), 
most offer several types of service. In relation to this, companies are located in a corner of the triangle 
that signifies their prime sector of activities, but are located closer to the other basic types when they 
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also share characteristics with them. This is particularly telling for companies located in the circle at 
the centre of the triangle. 
Since the market for security is rapidly evolving, companies may be placed in different 
categories over time: some are expanding the services they offer; other companies have merged, 
been subsumed into umbrella companies, or ceased operating. G4S for instance was well within the 
Guarding category until they acquired the Weaponised ArmorGroup in 2007. Now, with more than half 
a million employees in over 110 countries, the ubiquitous G4S is the largest security company in the 
world. Though the media mainly portray the activities of the Weaponised companies, it should not be 
forgotten that, when talking about the privatization of security, these companies are only the tip of the 
iceberg. As Mandel explained, ―a shocking statistic is that while national armies have shrunk about 
20%, private groups providing security have expanded to a degree that they outnumber most national 
armies‖ (Mandel, p.8, 2002).  
The criterion on which this typology is based is an objective assessment of the primary function 
of the company; this chapter will later emphasise how aid agencies often resort to more subjective 
criterion when judging the reputation of one PMSC over another.  
6.1.2. Use of ethical arguments as a legitimising factor for PMSCs 
Private military and security companies do have something in common: as for–profit 
organizations, they need to generate business and secure contracts to exist. However, the type of 
client or the type of contract they accept differs depending on each company‘s ethos. It is possible to 
make a distinction between companies that claim to abide by ethical business practices, and those 
whose contracts are not influenced by ethical considerations. The latter type consists of companies 
whose leaders are willing to sign a contract with anyone who requests their services and implement 
any type of service as long as it is legal – and sometimes when it is not. The former comprises 
companies with a focus on corporate social responsibility (CSR) and whose leaders refuse to enter 
into illegal or illegitimate contracts, or at least claim that this is the case. This issue of dubious claims 
of legitimacy is important since all of these companies have a motivation to represent themselves as 
ethical, yet they range from those that are truly guided by ethical considerations to those who pay it  
lip-service simply as a selling point. However, since we are not able to assess someone‘s sincerity 
and because the private sector‘s raison d‟être is making profit, it is assumed in this thesis that PMSCs 
claiming to be guided by respect for ethics do so primarily for commercial purposes. Furthermore, 
even ―if all companies in general claim their respect for a rigorous ethics, and for international norms 
and military codes, their social practices are not up to their claim‖ (Olsson, 2003, website. Author‘s 
own translation).  
Nevertheless, PMSCs, in particular Weaponised ones, do make substantial efforts to improving 
their ethical reputation. The following sub-section will reveal how a number of them appropriate a 
humanitarian image into their business strategies through the use of marketing, the organization of 
international events, and even the provision of assistance.  
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6.1.2.1. The use of marketing to communicate a positive image 
Ethical practice is expressed differently depending on the company, but the most visible 
example is the International Stability Operations Association (ISOA) – renamed in October 2010 from 
International Peace Operations Association - whose new name reflects a change in approach for 
international interventions (Chapter One). Although the name suggests otherwise, the ISOA is the 
most important United States lobby for (essentially Weaponised) PMSCs. As described in their 
mission statement, they aim to ―engage in a constructive dialogue with policy–makers about the 
growing and positive contribution of these firms to the enhancement of international peace, 
development, and human security‖ (ISOA, Undated, a, website). The ISOA‘s President even argued 
that we should ―recognize that there is a commercial value to humanitarian security‖ (Brooks, 2007, 
website). ISOA‘s ethical positioning is unique. Aware of the heavy focus on risks related to the 
outsourcing of security by academia, but also by stakeholders of all sorts – politicians and journalists 
in particular -  this US private military and security companies association pays particular attention to 
its branding, and has created its very own publication, the Journal of International Peace Operations. 
However, as explained in Chapter Two, this so-called journal is more like a marketing magazine than 
an academic journal (that would be subjected to a thorough peer–reviewing system). Yet, it regularly 
publishes articles related to humanitarian assistance. Entitled ―Humanitarian security and support‖, its 
September–October 2008 edition even focused specifically on issues related to the provision of aid. 
Furthermore, the ISOA has developed a code of conduct that maintains respect for the private sector‘s 
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights and of the many international treaties on human 
rights; they have put into place a complaints system for anyone to use if they witness any illegal act by 
one of its members; they have also developed and provided regular courses on humanitarian issues in 
conjunction with Washington‘s American University.179  
 
Similarly, the Unarmed company AKE has partnered with the University of Aberdeen in the 
United Kingdom to launch a short course in ―Human Rights in Conflict, Reconstruction and Disaster 
Zones: Customs, Laws, Conventions and Practicalities‖ (University of Aberdeen, Undated, a). The 
University‘s press release announces that ―[t]he course will provide an understanding of the complex 
political and legal context of human rights and international law; the issues raised and their practical 
implications, and the pertinence of these issues in terms of operation and commercial success‖ 
(University of Aberdeen, Undated, b, website).  
 
In line with this trend some companies, such as the Weaponised ArmorGroup and Control 
Risks, have developed a specific strategy to attract humanitarian organizations, be it NGOs or United 
                                               
179
 Such as the ―Humanitarian Conducted and Enhanced Operations: Specialized Training for Fields Managers and 
Independent Contractors‖ that took place on April 26–27 2007 (American University, Undated, website). 
                  169 of 257 
Nations agencies. While ArmourGroup claimed it ―subscribed‖ to the NGO–focused Code of Conduct 
of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, Control Risks states that its:  
 
… humanitarian sector practice is dedicated to helping non-governmental organizations and 
international organizations to overcome the difficulties associated with hostile environments. The team 
consists of consultants with NGO backgrounds and has experienced advisors from an NGO background 
and understands the unique situations in which humanitarian organizations find themselves across the 




The Unarmed Risk&Co (formerly known as Atlantic Intelligence & BD Consultants) have put 
into place a security training for NGOs working in conflict areas, lead by an ex–ICRC staffer. Indeed, 
several PMSCs tend to recruit former aid workers, who are appreciated both for their experience and 
for the fact that they contribute to improving the company‘s image.  
The Guarding company Wackenhut Services Inc. (WSI), for its part, offers annual 
‗humanitarian awards‘ to some of its employees.181 A Guarding company has named itself 
―Humanitarian Security Solutions Inc.‖, and another ―Sécurité Sans Frontières‖, an analogy to the well 
reputed ―without borders‖ humanitarian movement. The Weaponised Greystone Ltd offers a 
―peacekeeping package‖ including ―a flexible force with the ability to provide a properly trained force in 
a short period of time‖ (Greystone, Undated, website). The Weaponised GardaWorld prided itself on 
having won the first ‗Prize for Peace in the Middle-East‘ offered by the Foundation for Relief and 
Reconciliation in the Middle East (FRRME). It states that it is the ―First private security company in the 
world to receive an international prize for its efforts in favour of Peace‖ (GardaWorld, 2007, website). It 
must however be noted that the FRRME is not an independent prize awarder dedicated to selecting 
and nominating laureates, but a client of GardaWorld in Iraq. This type of mutually beneficial link is 
also exemplified by Andy Bearpark, who is both the Director General of the British Association of 
[Weaponised] Private Security Companies (BAPSC) and who also serves as a member of CARE 
International UK‘s Board of Trustees.  
 
Several companies also advertise themselves in ways that highlight their claims to contribute 
positively to ‗a better world.‘ The Weaponised GardaWorld for instance had a full–page advertisement 
in the September–October 2009 edition of the Journal of International Peace Operations. It pictures a 
smiling child holding wooden boards and has several key messages including large letters stating 
―protecting those who help.‖ Then written in smaller letters is ―GardaWorld contributes to making our 
world more secure‖ followed by ―we help clients in delivering government sponsored aid programs, 
infrastructure developments, governance support, economic development and national elections 
support‖ and then adds bullet points such as ―Extensive experience with NGOs globally; Local 
engagement, Culturally sensitive; Low profile approach‖ etc.  
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The Weaponised Blackwater/Xe used a similar approach and published several full–page 
advertisements picturing the company in a way that would make one think that they are heavily 
involved in providing assistance. One of these ads pictures a cute black baby who is spoon fed, 
alongside a picture of the planet Earth. Then written in large capital letters appears ―Afghanistan, 
Somalia, Congo, Bosnia, Sudan, Iraq‖ and in smaller letters ―we live in a world that gets smaller each 
day. Inescapably there are clashes between cultures and value systems. … Through selfless 
commitment and compassion for all people, Blackwater works to make a difference in the world and 
provide hope to those who still live in desperate times‖ (JIPO, p.2, 2007). 
It would be easy to argue that PMSCs engagement with the field of humanitarian assistance is 
always done with an eye on publicity. Yet, it is also the case that private military and security 
companies‘ do good deeds which are kept low–profile. In some of the most striking cases, several 
ANSO representatives (the NGO security coordination body in Afghanistan) confirmed that: ―PMSCs 
provided extraction services [for NGOs] three to four times in the last six months.‖182 ‗Extraction‘ 
happens when outsiders are used to rescue people from a (life threatening) trap. In these cases, none 
of the NGOs had a contract or even prior contacts with the PMSCs, and had called ANSO for help. 
ANSO then turned to the closest candidates to the extraction, which, in these cases, proved to be 
security companies. Nevertheless, while literally saving aid workers‘ lives, these Weaponised PMSCs 
did not ask for money or publicity in return.  
 
6.1.2.2. The use of international events 
Seeking to normalise their relations with the aid sector, PMSCs also participate increasingly in 
international events and conferences which were once limited to traditional aid actors only. For 
instance, the Steering Committee of the October 2007 Humanitarian Development Summit includes 
Doug Brooks, the President of IPOA/ISOA. The summit claims to be working with ―the leading inter-
governmental organizations‖ including several United Nations agencies; it also makes claims to 
―having strong relations with the following organizations … : Care International, Catholic Relief 
Services, Christian Aid, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International 
Federation of Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), the International Peace Operations 
Association (IPOA), Mercy Corps, Oxfam, Save The Children, World Vision‖ (HDP, Undated, website. 
Emphasis added). It is striking, and revealing of the security industry‘s efforts to be assimilated into aid 
agencies, that the IPOA/ISOA – the US lobby association for PMSCs - is included in the ―NGOs‖ list.  
Adding to this confusion, it is worth noting that on November 18, 2005, Blackwater/Xe and the 
American Red Cross jointly organized a fundraising evening for victims of the hurricanes, including 
Hurricane Katrina, that hit the US coasts in 2005. The guest of honour was the former head of the 
Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, Paul Bremer. The event gathered a complete mix of players, but 
nearly $138,000 dollars was raised during the evening.  
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More recently, following the 2010 Haiti earthquake, ISOA sponsored a summit in Miami, called 
―Haiti: Resources for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Aid.‖ The event, at which the Weaponised 
PMSCs Sabre International and Reconnaissance Group were Gold and Silver sponsors, gathered 
―representatives from international organizations, aid agencies, NGOs, the US Government and the 
private sector‖ (GIS, Undated, website) and all profits were donated to the Clinton-Bush Haiti Fund.183  
 
6.1.2.3. The provision of assistance by private military and security companies 
In addition to building a positive image of the security industry by the use of humanitarian 
branding, one may well wonder whether the future of aid assistance will increasingly be dominated by 
the private sector, including PMSCs – and in particular the Weaponised companies.  
According to the head of the UK Stabilization Unit, there are three evolving possibilities for 
‗civilian delivery models‘ and PMSCs play a role in all three of them. While their role is limited to the 
provision of security in the first two, the third model would occur when the ―government contracts a 
single organization to be responsible both for the delivery of a service and arranging its own 
protection. This could either be a consultancy or engineering firm that sub-contracts a PMSC, or a 
PMSC that develops its own advisory skills‖ (Teuten, 2009, website). Such configurations are already 
happening: the large portfolio of development companies such as Chemonics and DAI – sometimes 
heavily protected by PMSCs184 – have shown that the provision of aid can be profitable. At least two 
PMSCs have recently invested in these areas. In December 2008, the Weaponised L3-
Communications, which presents itself as a ―major provider of homeland defence products‖ (L-3, 
Undated), acquired the International Resources Group (IRG). IRG provides ―International 
development services to the US Agency for International Development, World Bank, Asian 
Development Bank, Inter–American Development Bank and others, governments, and organizations, 
including the United Nations‖ (IRG, Undated, a, website). Its paramaters of intervention are broad and 
include ―relief and reconstruction.‖ Similarly, Casals and Associates, a development company, was 
acquired in January 2010 by the Weaponised PMSC DynCorp International. A press release stated 
that ―[t]he acquisition brings together the complementary skills, experience and capacity of Casals and 
DynCorp International to strengthen the strategic expansion of DynCorp International into the 
international development field‖ (Casals & Associates, 2010, website. Emphasis added). IRG stated in 
the immediate aftermath of the January 2010 Earthquake that their disaster assistance in Haiti will 
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consist of ―damage evaluations, coordinat[ing] with local officials, and aid[ing] in the distribution of 
supply reliefs‖ (IRG, Undated, b, website). 
 
The present research reveals that at least two PMSCs operating in Afghanistan – Aegis and 
Blackwater/Xe – are directly implementing assistance projects, respectively through the Aegis 
Foundation and Aegis Hearts & Minds charitable organizations and through the Christian organization 
Foundation Stone Ministries Inc. The President of a third PMSC, USPI, is also the founder and 
President of the Help Afghan Women Project (HAWP, Undated, website). Significantly, all three 
PMSCs are Weaponised companies. 
The Aegis Foundation website states that it is: 
 
… a UK registered charity which aims to bring immediate relief to communities in post–conflict 
environments, currently Iraq and Afghanistan, through small, grass roots, community projects which are 
low cost and high impact – our unique hallmark. Since we launched in 2004, we have carried out over 
200 projects which include; installing water purification systems in schools; donating generators for 
hospitals and schools; equiping [sic] schools with basic stationery, backpacks, sports equipment, desks 
and lavatories; supplying hospitals with urgently needed medical supplies; and providing orphanages 
with basic furniture. We pride ourselves on making every single penny count by having a direct 
relationship with our beneficiaries and listening to what they really need, not just providing what we 
believe they need (Aegis Foundation, Undated, website).  
 
Acknowledging that assistance provided is often mutual, an Aegis‘ official explained that the ―Aegis 
Foundation [in Afghanistan] tends to work where Aegis works as we know that thanks to them we can 
earn some money.‖185 
Blackwater/Xe‘s representative in Afghanistan explained that:  
 
―Blackwater wanted to start a humanitarian programme in Afghanistan so they‘ve combined their efforts 
with the Foundation Stone Ministries Inc. since August 2006. Projects are on-going. We buy food, 
mattresses, beds, stoves, desks, and give them to the Red-Crescent orphanages. We also try to teach 
widows some skills in order for them to get a career. Every day, we also provide busses to teachers 
working at the Sheikhan school. We work with a local partner Foundation Stone of the Homeland. The 
source of funding comes from Blackwater (which is the biggest donor at this point), the Foundation and 
through solicitation of Afghan businesses.‖
186  
 
A visit to the Foundation‘s website complements the picture:  
 
We also provide spiritual teachings for those we work with. We have been in the ministry for 17 years as 
pastors, evangelists, teachers, and now missionaries with hearts to teach the word of God in all nations 
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of the world. One of those ways is through practical Christianity (Foundation Stone Ministries, Undated, 
website).  
 
In addition to financial support, the Foundation‘s representative also receives logistical support 
from Blackwater: ―I‘m staying inside Blackwater‘s compound and when I go outside, I‘m accompanied 
by its staff‖ explained the representative of the Foundation. It is not known how Afghans receiving 
relief items from armed Christian civilians perceive their benefactors.  
The Blackwater website at one time stated that ―Blackwater responded to the humanitarian 
crisis created by hurricane Katrina in 2005 [and] can provide a wide range of consulting, manpower, 
and material support in response to humanitarian events worldwide‖ (Blackwater USA, Undated, a, 
website). It then added that:  
 
Blackwater is capable of supporting U.S. and foreign government humanitarian agencies as well as 
supporting non–government aide [sic] organizations. We can respond as required, setting up a safe, 
Secure Zone environment complete with the entire infrastructure necessary to initiate humanitarian 
assistance in extremis (Blackwater USA, Undated, a, website).  
 
 This company, famous for the scandals it has been involved in, also had a ―humanitarian 
outreach‖ programme. Its Mission Statement stated that:  
 
Blackwater Worldwide is committed to finding inventive and effective ways for people to help 
themselves around the world. We support global stability by providing assistance to worthy charities and 
philanthropic organizations whose goals include the betterment of human conditions. Our outreach 
programs support human development, health, education, nutrition, housing and disaster relief the world 
over. When crisis or disaster strikes, Blackwater is ready to reach out and help those in need 
(Blackwater USA, Undated, b, website).  
 
It continued, providing examples of their projects, such as their involvement in the Convoy Support 
Center Scania clinic, in the South of Baghdad, and finished by stating that:  
 
Though the Global War on Terror continues unabated, acts of kindness like Operation Backpack prove 
that there is still room for hope in the world, even in war–torn Afghanistan. Blackwater Worldwide is 
proud of its employees and their dedication to humanitarian efforts throughout the world (Blackwater 
USA, Undated, b, website).  
 
In a similar vein, the Unarmed RA International, a company member of ISOA that provides a range of 
logistical services in complex environments, plays the ‗altruistic‘ card strongly. Its website has an 
extensive presentation of all its good deeds in the section ―RA International – The Spirit of 
Volunteerism‖, which boasts: 
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Lead by example, is a well known saying and this is exactly what RA International's Managers in Kabul, 
Afghanistan has taken to heart. Over the last couple of years, they have voluntarily gone the extra mile 
organizing donations and supporting charitable organizations throughout Afghanistan (RA, Undated, 
website).  
 
 More significantly, Soraya Narfeldt, the RA International Chairman of the Board of Directors 
explained in an aid focused journal that ―[l]ike all companies, we are in business to make a profit but 
we are committed to humanitarian causes, ensuring a return to the communities in which we work, 
and we encourage other companies to do likewise‖ (Narfeldt, p.67, 2007).  
In another example from another company; according to USPI‘s website, HAWP‘s current 
projects are ―humanitarian support for a program that will sponsor 750 women in teaching them 
English and computer skills for a year, hiring a teacher for an orphanage and paying her salary, 
purchasing and distribution of a truckload of coal, keeping 500 families warm for a month in the depth 
of winter‖ (HAWP, Undated, website). It further states ―HAWP is continuing their mission to give a 
helping hand to those in Afghanistan with the greatest needs.‖ 
 
The involvement of private military and security companies in Haiti is less common than in 
Afghanistan. A senior representative of the Association Professionnelle des Agents de Sécurité 
(Professional Association of Security Guards, APAS), the local Haitian guarding companies‘ lobby 
group, claimed that although most of the Association‘s member companies have a few aid agencies 
as clients, ―there is no collaboration between PMSCs and NGOs; exchanges are limited to the 
provision of the security services.‖187 APAS however pushed its members to get involved in ―social 
activities‖ including the pro bono provision of security guards to NGOs during aid distributions. Mario 
Viau, the CEO of PaP Sécurité also created the Fondation Haiti Secours, whose activities are said to 
have included food distribution during floods in Gonaïves.  
Similarly, the Weaponised PMSC Reconnaissance on its side, claims to have adopted a 
―Social Responsibility scheme, through which [they] have made significant donations on a monthly 
basis to schools, orphanages, medical centres and regional charities‖ (RG, 2010, website).  
The post–earthquake phase however has seen the appearance of a new type of security 
provider. The response to the Haitian disaster proved to be the first project of the newly founded NGO 
Humanitarian Defense (HDF), a US–based not-for-profit organization that claims:  
 
We can go anywhere and perform any humanitarian task, on our own. If people are hungry, we will take 
them food; if they are in danger, we will protect or relocate them; if they are ill, we will provide the best 
medical treatment. We can dig wells, install septic systems, and teach indigenous people how to 
maintain anything we provide (HDF, Undated, website).  
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Further to this, their stated mission is: ―to facilitate humanitarian and NGO operations through 
the provision of local intelligence, transportation and logistical support and effective, low–profile 
security‖ (HDF, Undated, website). HDF‘s Director is also the Business/Political Manager of the 
Weaponised PMSC Precision Risk Management Group. HDF‘s experience in Haiti however, serves as 
a reminder that optimism and willpower are not enough. It was reported in March 2010 that HDF:  
 
… is in need of help after a series of missteps during its inaugural mission – providing security and 
logistics support in Haiti after the Jan. 12 earthquake. ―We did whatever we could to get there on the 
ground because we thought the situation was dire, and now we have these bills hanging over us and I 
don't know how we're going to deal with it," director Charles Clifton said yesterday. Over 25 days, the 
group racked up $15,000 in bills for a rental car and phone calls from Haiti to the United States, and it's 
appealing to donors to cover the expenses (Gibson, 2010, website). 
  
Overall, the implementation of assistance projects is perceived positively by private security 
contractors; in the words of an employee working for a Weaponised company: ―I hope that PMSCs will 
be more involved in humanitarian activities since there is so much more to do than only security.‖188 
Similarly, another Weaponised PMSC staffer explained that, ―because Afghanistan is a conflict setting, 
PMSCs will always be involved in assistance projects.‖189 In addition, PMSCs are sometimes also 
perceived by contractors as indirectly implementing assistance projects, since ―PMSCs are mainly 
here to protect companies that are in general present to rebuild the country.‖190  
 
The assistance provided by PMSCs in Afghanistan and Haiti is extremely limited and 
humanitarian action is not at stake because of it. However, given the existing debates about the 
competing involvement of the private sector in relief activities (see Chapter Two), the increasing 
involvement of by private military and security companies in the field needs to be addressed.  
According to a 2005 study on the perceptions of international efforts by the local population:  
 
… local communities were more concerned that aid was delivered, and less concerned about who 
delivered it. When assistance was needed, it did not much matter whether it was provided by military 
personnel or civilians. Yet local people were quite able to distinguish among international institutions. … 
In Afghanistan, people made fewer distinctions among NGOs, perhaps reflecting comments by a senior 
government official that all NGOs were corrupt, and a growing disenchantment with the aid effort 
(Minear and Donini, 2005, website).  
 
The assistance provided by PMSCs is often either financial or involving the distribution of non–
food items. The capacity–building oriented projects (teaching skills to widows or women), which imply 
medium to long–term involvement show a marked commitment from PMSCs. The existence of the 
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needs they are assisting in is not contested here, though it is worth noting that the selection and 
implementation of the projects remains ad hoc, that there are no signs of comprehensive 
pre-intervention needs assessments, no coordination with other actors, no quality control and also no 
ambition to address the underlying causes of the problems. Also, most of the PMSC assistance is 
provided by Weaponised companies. This is both because they have an operational footprint in areas 
where populations are in need of support, and because the provision of aid is seen as contributing to 
the improvement of their reputation and a move away from the image of blood-thirsty mercenaries. 
 
Branding a positive image is a common feature of the private sector. Corporate social 
responsibility, whereby businesses embrace responsibility for the impact of their activities on the 
environment, consumers, employees, communities, stakeholders and all other members of the public 
sphere, is now commonly practiced. However in the case of the private security industry, one notices 
in addition to ‗traditional‘ corporate social responsibility activities, there is a gradually emerging 
phenomenon whereby PMSCs are appropriating and integrating humanitarian representations into 
business and security strategies.  
6.1.3. Private military and security companies’ approaches to the humanitarian sector 
 The author observed in both Afghanistan and Haiti that, irrespective of the type of companies 
they work for, private security contractors have a rather negative perception of both aid workers‘ and 
aid agencies‘ management of security. Furthermore, most contractors interviewed in the course of this 
research proved critical of the aid sector at large. Humanitarians are seen as not intervening enough 
in dangerous areas – where contractors say the needs are most critical. Some, such as the Security 
Manager of a Weaponised company in Afghanistan, also don‘t understand why ―NGOs don‘t give 
more importance to PMSCs. I don‘t see why having armed guards on your compound alter[s] your 
neutrality.‖191 Similarly, the Director of a Haitian Guarding company explained that ―NGOs don‘t 
understand that the nature of insecurity has changed; they see themselves like missionaries and 
believe they are untouchables because they are here to help. On the other side, NGOs that worry me 
most though are the proselyte ones. They believe that they are protected by the archangel Gabriel – 
and that he replaced his broadsword with a Kalashnikov.‖192 
 The most commonly shared view is that NGOs are ―disorganized, arrogant and narrow 
minded‖193 while the UN are often criticised for being ―ineffective.‖194 By contrast the ICRC stands out 
and is perceived as doing a ―good job‖ and having a ―good understanding of the security 
necessary.‖195  
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In addition, and this will be developed in the next section, interactions between aid agencies 
and private military and security companies are limited by the fact that the two sectors have distinctly 
different security cultures. As Spearin rightly put it:  
 
NGOs prefer the acceptance model whereas PMSCs are more comfortable with the protection and 
deterrence models. It is true that for NGOs, reliance upon PMSCs implies recognition of the current 
limitations of the acceptance model. … In contrast, retired military personnel now working for PMSCs 
are more inclined to adopt the aforementioned ―hardening‖ stance towards security. … What is striking 
is that these differences exist even though one might believe that PMSCs would readily respond to the 
particular requirements of their NGO paymasters. Various reports, however, find that PMSCs are often 
unwilling to change their expectations and are wilfully ignorant of the deep ―epistemic‖ differences 
pertaining to humanitarian security (Spearin, p.7, 2007a). 
 
 As outlined in Chapter Two, a majority of security contractors interviewed for the thesis 
believed there is a culture clash between themselves and the humanitarians. This holds true, 
irrespective of the type of company they work for. The reason for the clash is most often said to be 
due to the differences in their backgrounds: ―most of the security guys are ex-army members. Most 
armies are right-wing while most of humanitarians are left-wing. Most security groups are dismissive of 
tree huggers and the reciprocity is true‖196). Disputes are also due to differences between their 
personalities: ―a lot of time it has to do with the individuals‖197. However, all believe the relationship is 
workable. This clash can be overcome ―if people discuss more with each other―198; ―when NGOs see 
the quality of our infrastructure, training, their relations with us improve since it's a matter of 
perception‖199; ―they can work together but it requires, on both sides, a type of person that 
understands this kind of stuff. You have to understand what NGOs are doing and where they are 
coming from. NGOs probably see PMSCs as mercenaries. While some PMSCs will have cowboys‘ 
behaviour, others will go underground‖200; ―we have to realise they are not blue–flower students of 
Arts, they have to understand we are not mercenaries.‖201 
 As a contractor employed by a Weaponised company pointed out, ―regardless of how we 
perceive humanitarians, we have a commercial interest to keep in touch with them.‖202 A pragmatic 
approach is, therefore, often adopted. Personal relationships and expertise are then used to bridge 
the gap between contractors and aid workers: contractors believe that the cultural clash is eventually 
overcome when their offer of security meets an existing demand.  
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 A number of security companies from all three types of PMSCs see the aid sector as a 
potential market, and therefore try to engage with it for that reason. One respondent employed by a 
Weaponised PMSC even explained that its company had actively, yet unsuccessfully, lobbied USAID 
in order to get funding for providing security for NGOs.  
 Efforts to get closer to IAAs are both formal and informal as PMSCs try to develop a ―gradual 
relationship by interaction and with time.‖203 The provision of training as well as the free sharing of 
services and products such as situation reports, are seen as entry points to the aid market. In addition, 
informal contacts and exchanges are also used to get closer, to the extent that some contractors 
admit that their company recruits among ex–UN or ex–NGO staff specifically for this purpose. Most 
interviewees stated that PMSCs are more proactive in getting aid agency interest, rather than aid 
agencies soliciting for their services. There is however anecdotal evidence that the level of solicitation 
from PMSCs toward the aid sector has decreased in the last few years; this may be due to the fact 
that many companies have realised that their efforts to attract the aid clientele have not really paid off. 
A few contractors highlighted the fact that NGOs in particular can‘t always afford the services offered 
by PMSCs. While some PMSCs try to adapt their services, or ask NGOs to club together in order to 
share the costs, others simply chose to not include NGOs as potential clients. 
 Although the aid market will never be the most lucrative for security companies, several 
contractors interviewed insisted that PMSCs are gaining more respectability vis-à-vis the aid workers. 
In turn, PMSCs are well aware that in addition to potential contracts, developing links with 
humanitarians may also help in improving their own reputation and image. Increasedinteractions of all 
kind with the aid sector are seen as contributing greatly to their normalization and overall 
legitimization.  
 
 As is evident from the above section, private military and security companies do not constitute 
a cohesive or uniform block. They can then be divided in three categories, namely the Guarding 
companies, the Unarmed security providers and the Weaponised ones. Each has its major sector of 
activity, even though there are close interactions amongst them. They nevertheless all share a for–
profit motive and, as such, many, in particular the Weaponised companies, try hard to build a positive 
image around them; this is done through an appropriation and branding of humanitarian values, and, 
for a minority, the delivery of aid projects. Although security contractors have similar views about aid 
workers and how to interact with the aid sector irrespective of the type of companies they work for, the 
next section will argue that, in contrast, aid workers‘ receptiveness to PMSCs‘ differs. 
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6.2. In search of security: when consumers of security meet providers of 
security 
 Critical approaches to security highlight the concrete effects produced by particular 
representations of identity and interests. In light of this view, the current section first presents the 
thesis‘s findings regarding aid agencies‘ engagement with PMSCs, and will then examine how aid 
agency identity and approaches to security affect their relation with private military and security 
companies.  Second, it will discuss the nature of aid agencies‘ orientations towards PMSCs. Lastly, 
the section will shed light on how aid agencies deconstruct the security industry‘s efforts to 
appropriate humanitarian values.  
6.2.1. IAA engagement with PMSCs is relative to the ethos of each humanitarian 
organization 
This thesis has found both a harmonization and polarization of aid agency approaches towards 
PMSCs, although polarization was far more prevalent. The reason for such a prevalence is that for 
most aid agencies, the use of a corporate security provider, in particular Weaponised companies, is 
seen not only as a technical option in the search for the improvement of security but as a political 
issue that concerns all managers – as opposed to only the security personnel.  
 
Harmonization happens at a technical level, while the polarization occurs at a political one. At 
the technical level, the author observed a harmonization of practices, through the development and 
sharing of internal policies regulating agencies‘ interactions with the corporate security industry. For 
instance ‗good practices to contracting PMSCs‘ were regularly shared among EISF and SAG 
members. From a political standpoint however, not all aid agencies have the same approach to 
PMSCs. Indeed, although all three of the types of aid agency examined have used corporate security 
services, their respective approach to the security industry differs significantly. 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Deontological organizations approach security in a way 
that is heavily conditioned by their humanitarian principles. This requires them to reach out to the 
parties in conflict in order to explain their ethos, and forge agreements on operating modalities. 
Deontological organizations are rather more reluctant to either outsource their security to a third party, 
or favour options that entail the use of weapons. Resorting to either option would entail that they 
would have to rely on companies that do not share the same mindset as them. It would also put them 
at risk of being seen as a party to the conflict or of having something to protect or hide, and as such, 
of losing their perceived neutrality. This in turn would likely prevent them from operating in areas 
controlled by opposing armed forces.  
Since they would only favour the deterrence strategy in exceptional circumstances, meeting 
points with PMSCs may occur but only rarely. In the words of a Red–Cross worker, ―PMSCs are not a 
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first option for us – even our guards are our employees.‖204 Likewise, the MSF CD in Haiti explained: 
―both the humanitarian principles and our professional ethics forbid us to use private security 
companies.‖205 Oxfam‘s head of security argued that ―we need to understand PSCs precisely to 
maintain distance from them.‖206 The Security Advisor of another Deontological organization 
explained: ―the Board took the decision to not use PMSCs on principle, but when we had staff 
kidnapped, we realised that our networks would not be enough to free them and that negotiations 
were necessary. We had internal discussions and concluded that we didn‘t have the experience for it. 
We consequently used a [Weaponised] PMSC, but that‘s a one-off.‖207 
 
The Solidarist approach to private military and security companies is ambiguous. The majority 
are inclined not to use corporate security services, in particular if these services involve the use of 
weapons. This position is driven firstly by their values: both their humanitarian principles and their 
wider charitable ethics. Though it is also driven by financial considerations: many of the smaller 
Solidarist NGOs cannot afford corporate security services as a long term operating strategy. 
Nevertheless, a few Solidarists also adopt a practical view on the privatization of security and are not 
against outsourcing elements of their security to a PMSC if need be. This is particularly true for aid 
agencies that sit between the Solidarist and Utilitarianapproach. As a result, Solidarist approaches to 
PMSCs are divided: some categorically refuse to have anything to do with them, while others support 
contractual relationships with PMSCs. 
For instance, while a representative of an agency explained that ―we have no contract with any 
PMSC, but if we had funds for it, we would buy some of their analysis‖208, others stated that ―we have 
no contracts with PMSCs … because there is a sense that it is inappropriate‖209; ―we wondered at 
some point whether we should have an armed guard, but we decided against it, for the principle of 
it‖210; or ―our concern regarding PMSCs relate to their values. They are much driven toward 
commercial interests. They may have problems with acceptance/cultural sensitivity. We don‘t feel very 
secure with the macho guys.‖211  
On the other hand, another Solidarist NGO Security Advisor claimed: ―PMSCs have significant 
knowledge, capacity, even without using guns. If they have the expertise and you have the resources, 
why not use them – but you have to manage them very properly with clear terms of reference.‖212 
Likewise, the Safety and Security Advisor of another Solidarist/Utilitarian NGO explained that ―we 
usually rely on our guards, but having a guard force is difficult to manage, so if PMSCs are accepted 
I'd be in favour of using one (such as in Haiti or in some African countries). But only for non–armed 
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services though.‖213 CARE‘s head of security in Afghanistan explained that ―we don‘t like working 
directly with [PMSCs] but in some places we use them for the provision of guards; it's more a logistic 
hassle that is resolved.‖214 The view of Save the Children‘s head of security best epitomises the 
tensions and contradictions that exist among Solidarist organizations: she commented that: 
―traditionally we hire our own guards. The problem with PMSCs is that they are highly difficult to trust. 
Yet, we outsource increasingly as it is easier to manage. We'd however never employ Blackwater or 
anybody associated with them. Would we use them more in the future? There is a huge internal 
resistance on the ground of principles – using them does not fit easily with the acceptance policy.‖215 
 
As explained in Chapter Four, respect for humanitarian principles is not considered as 
essential by Utilitarian organizations, as long as they perceive themselves to be ‗doing good.‘ Since 
they tend to adopt a pragmatic approach to security management, whereby achieving the objective 
takes precedence over how to achieve it, Utilitarian organizations are more likely to go private – but 
only if this option is seen as getting them closer to their objective.  
The Director of Security of IRD explained for example that: ―we have five contractual relations 
with PMSCs [including four Weaponised and one Guarding], in Iraq, Afghanistan and Haiti. Although 
the PMSCs we use are lumped in the same group as Blackwater, there is no comparison possible: 
they have a lower profile and no visible weapons, strict rules of engagement, different types of 
weapons and ammunitions, training, etc – we needed to fine tune some aspects but are now very 
comfortable. I believe we'll still have these contracts in the future – it puts us ahead of the game 
because we've already accepted them and shaped them to our advantage; NGOs are blocking 
themselves in not working with them.‖216  
Similarly the Deputy Chief of Security of a UN agency commented that ―the UN are already 
using local armed guards – does it mean we crossed the Rubicon already? What‘s the difference with 
using more experienced American guards? It is more a normative and emotional issue rather than a 
security one. PMSCs are always considered as an option by us, and the UN are increasingly happy to 
use them.‖217 
As explained in the previous chapter, aid agencies‘ differences in approaching security are not 
clear–cut between the three types of organization. The same applies to IAA approaches to PMSCs. 
Trends however have been traced, and the following sub-sections will provide a body of corroborating 
evidence that support these.  
6.2.2. Aid agencies’ engagement with the private security industry 
The present sub-section offers an overview of the thesis‘s findings regarding aid agency use of 
PMSCs‘ services. A distinction is made between findings at field level, originating from interviews and 
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observations in Afghanistan and Haiti, and information collected through interviews with 
headquarters–based humanitarians. As the headquarters staff have a wider perspective than those 
based in a particular country, it is not surprising that some agencies that are cited as not using PMSCs 
in either Afghanistan or Haiti are still named as using corporate security services in other countries. 
Altogether, these findings provide a picture that nevertheless remains consistent from headquarter to 
field levels.  
It is worth nothing however, that given the limitations of the methodology used for the present 
research (see Chapter Three), and given that the field of humanitarian security is rapidly changing, the 
author recognises that these findings are not exhaustive. Present and possible future evolutions are 
acknowledged, and the next chapter of the thesis will offer an analysis of the future of humanitarian 
security management.  
 
6.2.2.1. Aid agency engagement with PMSCs – headquarters’ perspective 
Table 2 below illustrates the use of the three types of PMSCs by aid agencies globally – as per 








Has not used 
any PMSC 
Deontological 
ACF / CRF / ICRC / 
IFRC* / MDM* / 
MSF–B / MSF–H* / 
OGB 
ACF / BRC / IFRC / 
MDM / MSF–H 




AA / CARE US / 
CARITAS / CRS / 
CWS* / PLAN / SC–
N* / SC–UK* / 
TROCAIRE* / 
UNHCR / WHH / 
WV 
CA / CARE US / 
CARITAS / 
DACAAR / PLAN / 
RI / SC–UK  
CARE US / 
CARITAS / UN–
IOM / UNHCR  
Mission East / 
Tearfund /  
Utilitarian 
CHF / IMC* / IRC / 
IRD / SC–US  
IMC / IRC / IRD / 
MC / SC–US  
CHF / IRC / IRD / 
UN WFP  
– 
 * = provision of unarmed guarding services   
 
Table 2 - Overview of IAA use of PMSCs 
 
What one notices is that all types of organization use PMSCs. Apart from two Solidarist NGOs 
(Mission East and Tearfund), all aid agencies that have been consulted as part of this research have 
used, or are using, security services provided by PMSCs in some form.  
A few distinctions are nevertheless necessary and two major aspects need to be emphasised: 
first, when using Guarding companies, Deontological organizations tend to use armed services less 
than Utilitarians do; second, Weaponised companies are mostly being used by Utilitarian agencies as 
well as by organizations sitting at the margin between the Solidarist and Utilitarian types. 
In addition, many Deontological and Solidarist organizations such as ActionAid, Action Contre 
la Faim (ACF), the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC), have used 
both Guarding companies and Unarmed ones, but refused to engage with Weaponised companies. A 
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notable exception however is the use by MSF–France of a Weaponised company in Iraq. Much 
decried by other sections of the MSF, this remains an exceptional case due to the particular history of 
the agency in Iraq, and does not represent a trend. Similarly, after much heated internal debate, MSF–
Holland has used the services of a PMSC to provide advice in the release of one employee who was 
held hostage for nearly two years in the Russian Caucasus. Several employees explained off-the-
record to the author that the experience was not successful and it subsequently remained a one–off. 
In contrast, the use of Weaponised companies by Utilitarian organizations appears to be part of long–
term operating strategies and is accounted for in plurennial budgets. 
Like other Deontological organizations, the ICRC has used and uses PMSCs. This use is 
essentially limited to guarding services, provided either by local Guarding companies or local 
branches of international Weaponised companies (for example, the ICRC employed ArmorGroup in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Lifeguard in Sierra Leone). Nevertheless, as the 
recognised guardian of international humanitarian law (IHL), the ICRC engages with PMSCs in 
different ways to other IAAs. It began studying PMSCs as early as 1997 when the activities of 
Executive Outcomes first shed light on PMSCs. A working group incorporating different departments 
from within the ICRC was created in 2001 with the objective of framing the organization‘s approach to 
the corporate security industry, particularly with regards to the rights and obligations delineated under 
IHL. According to several ICRC interviewees, the aid agency constantly looks for a balance between 
the need to engage with PMSCs and the unwillingness to debate the legitimacy of their actions.218 As 
such, it has refused to provide training to PMSCs regarding their rights and obligations towards IHL, 
but the publication of legal papers and the participation in international conferences have contributed 
greatly to  clarifying the status of PMSCs and their employees vis-à-vis IHL. As an ICRC staffer put it: 
―if you throw people out of the realm of law, you can‘t expect them to respect the law.‖219 
 Altogether, these findings do reiterate the different approaches taken by the three different 
types of IAAs‘ with regard to the the use of PMSCs. 
 
6.2.2.2. Aid agencies’ engagement with PMSCs in Afghanistan 
The following table presents the findings of the thesis regarding the use of PMSCs by aid 








Deontological - - - 
Solidarist 
CARE US / 
CARITAS / UNHCR  
CA / CARE US / 
CARITAS / 
DACAAR  
CARE US / 
CARITAS / UN–
IOM / UNHCR  
Utilitarian IRD / UNDP  IRD / MC  IRD / UNDP  
 
Table 3 - Overview of IAA use of PMSCs in Afghanistan 
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While a few aid agencies have contractual relations with PMSCs in Afghanistan, some have 
informal contact, and most of them have no contact at all. Among the twenty-three NGO 
representatives that were interviewed in Afghanistan for this research, six representatives – working 
for Care International, Caritas Germany,220 Christian Aid, DACAAR, International Relief and 
Development and Mercy Corps – acknowledged that their organization is using, or has used, 
corporate security services. Among these six NGOs, two are Utilitarian, one is sitting between the 
Utilitarian and Solidarist delimitation, and two are Solidarists. In other words, no Deontological 
organizations were found to be using PMSCs in Afghanistan. 
Only one of these NGOs (a Utilitarian) used a PMSC for the provision of armed guards, and 
two organizations had contracts that included the possibility of calling for an armed Quick Reaction 
Force (QRF). Training (first aid, security…) of guards, drivers or general staff was the most commonly 
used service. Some contracts are limited to, or include, the sending of electronic daily situation 
reports, access to a web portal of information, fortnightly security meetings, pre-trip approval or 
management in the case of kidnapping. Five different companies were used for the provision of these 
services: ArmorGroup, Centurion, Control Risks, Global, Hart and Strategic Security Solutions 
International.  
Regarding United Nations agencies, each operates within a framework specified in their 
Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS). These are designed in the headquarters in New 
York but contextualised for each country of operation. If the MOSS specifies that the agencies need 
guards, it is then up to agencies to recruit them, based on a recommended list. In other words, 
strategies regarding UN‘s interactions with PMSCs in Afghanistan change from one agency to 
another. However most UN officials interviewed in Afghanistan for this research acknowledged their 
agency is using private security services. These agencies include, but are not limited to: IOM, 
UNAMA, UNDP, UNHCR, UNOCA, and UNOPS221 – amongst which, the humanitarian agencies are 
all Solidarist or Utilitarian organizations. The services provided included training, mine clearance, but 
also armed and unarmed static protection as well as armed mobile escorts. Campus Integrated 
Logistics & Security Ltd, Compass, Global Strategies Group, IDG Security, Kroll, Ronco Consulting 
Corp., Strategic Security Solutions International and US Protection and Investigations, LLC are the 
PMSCs that are currently employed or have been hired in the past.  
The use of PMSCs by UN agencies nevertheless differs from one agency to another.  As an 
example, following the May 2006 riots, the UNHCR decided to use a local PMSC to protect its main 
compound in Kabul. The choice of a local Guarding PMSC was made on the basis of cost. In contrast, 
armed Ghurkas from the Weaponised IDG–Security have been used to protect the UN compound in 
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Kandahar. A UNOPS respondent explained that by transferring the risk to a third party (the PMSC), it 
allowed the UN to operate in dangerous places. The contract with IDG started at the beginning of 
2006 following the deterioration of the situation in the South and lasted until the beginning of 2007. In 
charge of the security for the compound, Ghurkas stayed inside the compound and supervised inner 
Afghan unarmed guards (chowkidors) as well as outer armed Afghan guards. Compass Security 
replaced IDG in February 2007. The new contract, whose value reached over USD3 million222, was 
signed for one year. 
In addition, exchanges of information also exist between some agencies and PMSCs, even 
though respondents have complained that the flow is mostly going one way: to put it bluntly, 
contractors are demanding information while the UN security staff are kind enough to share it. 
However, two high-ranking officials working for the United Nations Department of Safety and Security 
(UNDSS) both complained that some PMSCs are ―directly copy–pasting our information and then 
selling it.‖223 Both respondents explained that they talked to the companies and tried to make them 
respect the copyright, but were unsuccessful.224 
 
6.2.2.3. Aid agencies’ engagement with PMSCs in Haiti 
The table below reveals the use of PMSCs by aid agencies in Haiti. It nevertheless focuses on 
NGOs as opposed to the UN, as the latter had a specific set-up whereas all UN agencies in Port-au-














AA / CRS / Plan 
SC-US / WHH / WV 
- -  
Utilitarian CHF / IMC / IRD  CHF / IRD CHF / IRD  
 
Table 4 – Overview of IAA use of PMSCs in Haiti 
 
The majority of humanitarian agencies in Haiti do not use any services provided by private 
military and security companies. However, twelve international NGOs – ActionAid, Action Contre la 
Faim, Catholic Relief Services, CHF International, International Medical Corps, International Relief 
and Development, Oxfam GB, Plan International, Save the Children US, Welthungerhilfe, World Vision 
and a European Red–Cross society225 – were identified in this research as using the services of a 
security company (though two had ceased doing so after a year). There is anecdotal evidence that 
this number increased with the influx of aid organizations after the 2010 earthquake. All three types of 
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aid agencies are using or have used PMSCs in Haiti, even though only Utilitarian agencies were found 
to contracting Weaponised companies. 
The situation of the United Nations was slightly different from NGOs since most of the UN 
agencies were sharing the same central compound (known as Hotel Christopher) until it collapsed 
during the earthquake. According to a UN Security staff member, the UN were (prior to the disaster) 
using 170 non–armed UN security personnel, in addition to 180 armed guards provided by PaP 
Sécurité and Global Sécurité, two local Guarding companies.226 In addition, several UN interviewees 
have reported that: ―the UN recommended that we use a guarding company to protect our home.‖227 
Overall, the services used by aid agencies were limited in scope and consisted of the provision 
of armed and unarmed guards, armed escorts, training, risk assessments and risk analysis. Two 
Utilitarian NGOs also used close protection services for its international staff travelling in hazardous 
areas. The companies used were the Guarding Caffington Services, Condor Security, Corvington 
Sécurité, National Security, PaP Sécurité, PSS, Quality SA, Thomas Sécurité and three Weaponised: 
Control Risks, Blue Hackle, Virtual Defense and Development International, Inc (VDI).  
It is worth noting however, that the quality of the guarding services – by far the most popular of 
the services provided to aid agencies – is rather low with poorly trained, ill equipped, badly paid and 
mis-managed guards. In one case, the (only) guard at a UN staff house nearly killed the expatriates 
who were spending time in their garden; this happened in July 2006, when he accidentally fired while 
cleaning his shotgun. On other occasions, the author observed that many guards were inadvertently 
pointing their guns at staff and guests around them. It was also noticed several times that, due to the 
guards‘ limited understanding of French, as well as the expatriates‘ inability to speak Creole, they 
could not always interact with one another. 
 
Altogether, the various approaches towards PMSCs by the five selected NGOs are indicative 
of the different IAAs approaches to corporate security. Among the Deontological NGOs, MSF and 
OGB have hired security companies, but this only happened rarely and was mostly limited to the 
contracting of Guarding and Unarmed companies. Among the Solidarists, while SC-UK had a similar 
stance to MSF and OGB, CARE on its side hired Guarding, Unarmed and occasionally, Weaponised 
companies. The Utilitarian IRD repeatedly contracted all three types of PMSCs, at both headquarters‘ 
and field levels.  
Overall, these findings reveal that all three types of aid agencies have contracted, or are 
contracting, private military and security services, yet the extent of this interaction, as well as the types 
of companies being used, vary significantly from one type of agency to another, underscoring aid 
agencies‘ different identities and approaches to security. Though again, subtleties need to be 
acknowledged, as do localised contexts, in order to explain explain counter–intuitive findings. 
Altogether, interactions between aid agencies and PMSCs are mainly determined by a mix of 
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principled and pragmatic considerations. The difference lies in the weight that agencies lace upon 
their values compared to practical considerations of security.  
6.2.3. Aid agencies’ interests in private military and security companies’ services 
The following sub-sections will present the thesis‘s findings related to aid workers‘ interests in 
PMSCs.  While doing so, the ideal–type of humanitarian organization that aid workers who are being 
quoted work for is specified. This allows underscoring how the personnel of each ideal–type of 
organization has internalised its organization‘s views on security, reproducing by doing so the three 
aforementioned different approaches to PMSCs. 
  
6.2.3.1. Aid workers’ perceptions of PMSCs 
As a general trend, whether at headquarter or field level, aid workers raise more concerns 
about PMSCs than praise their qualities. This negative perception is more prevalent among 
employees of Deontological and Solidarist aid agencies than Utilitarians, and is explained by diverse 
reasons. The first reason relates to the image security contractors create, in particular the ‗cowboy‘ 
attitude ascribed to Weaponised PMSCs. As the Head of Mission of a Solidarist NGO in Haiti stated, ―I 
once met personnel from [the PMSC] Steele Foundation, and I had the impression that I was in front 
of international bandits.‖228 In the words of a Deontological organization employee, ―I see PSMCs as 
providers of armed services. But as an NGO, our professional ethics require that the people see us as 
a non–armed organization.‖229 These often–heard criticisms nevertheless show that aid workers‘ 
awareness of PMSCs is mostly limited to the visible presence of private security personnel in the 
streets and that the average aid worker does not know that some PMSCs adopt a very low profile – 
making them virtually unnoticeable to an inexperienced eye.  
Some aid workers – a majority of whom were working with Deontological organizations – also 
argued that not only do security contractors look dangerous, but their presence actually feeds 
insecurity. As the Oxfam Country Director in Haiti argued ―a whole industry benefits from insecurity, 
and has an interest in the continuation of insecurity. Actually, there‘ve been cases where security 
guards contributed to security incidents.‖230 These kinds of claims are explained either by the fact that 
PMSC employees are poorly trained and poorly paid, or by the fact that they contribute to the 
confusion between the military and the civilians and, with their military profile, create resentment 
among the population against all foreigners. The lack of accountability, regulation and training, as well 
as security guards‘ poor weapon handling, were also frequently heard criticisms. A few respondents 
also explained that by bringing in more weapons, through their links with local existing militias, or in 
Afghanistan by ―sucking away the personnel we wanted to disarm through DDR [Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration]‖231, the presence of PMSCs makes the disarmament process more 
difficult. Similarly, an Oxfam employee in Afghanistan questioned PMSCs‘ activities: ―are contractors 
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protecting warlords? You never know who is inside their cars.‖232 Last but not least, several 
employees of Deontological and Solidarist organizations underlined that using PMSCs – usually to 
seek protection against Taliban or affiliates in Afghanistan, and against criminal gangs in Haiti – 
contributed to rendering aid agencies in a oppositional stance, irremediably closing the doors to future 
negotiations. And since a hard stance is not a guarantee of full security, this meant, in turn, that they 
couldn‘t access areas under armed groups‘ control.  
 
Despite the criticisms, positive elements of PMSCs were also noted by some interviewees. 
Interestingly, these were expressed mostly by respondents working for Utilitarian or a few Solidarist 
organizations. They argued that PMSCs are technically skilled233 or, in the words of a security officer 
working for a Utilitarian/Solidarist UN agency, they ―serve a very important role which is risk 
absorption.‖234 As an employee of a Solidarist NGO pointed out that many perceive PMSCs as a 
―necessary evil‖235 or, in the words of a Utilitarian NGO Country Manager in Afghanistan, ―a fact of the 
landscape.‖236 Some respondents acknowledged that PMSCs will be increasingly needed, in 
particular, and as the Country Representative of a Solidarist NGO in Afghanistan expressed, ―there is 
not much difference whether we have our own guards or if they are provided by a company.‖237 Also, 
several interviewees highlighted that without PMSCs the organization of safe elections in Afghanistan 
would not have been possible.238 
 
Aid representatives, whose organization has used the services of a PMSC, have mixed views 
on the companies. The CARE security officer in Afghanistan explained his satisfaction with the 
services provided by a PMSC: ―it‘s more legitimate than I thought it would be. They use weapons but 
as long as they don‘t have a cowboy behaviour it‘s ok. They are quite disciplined and organized. [They 
offer a] reassuring professionalism.‖239 Another interviewee, working for a Solidarist NGO, added that 
―the industry needs to evolve more; for the moment their evolution is expanding and restrictive; but it 
has to be [a] cost effective innovative solution.‖240 The Security Manager of a Utilitarian NGO in Haiti 
explained that he felt confident working with security contractors as ―they are very professional.‖241  
Other respondents however articulated quite a negative attitude towards the company they had 
hired. A head of mission in Afghanistan employed by a Solidarist NGO shared that:  ―a PMSC per se 
is not a bad thing. … [but] personally I don‘t like these people, essentially because of their 
appearance: it creates a distance and superiority (they wear sunglasses, they drive cars without plate 
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numbers, etc.). I can understand why Afghans feel bad‖.242 For others, such as the Country Director of 
a Solidarist NGO, the muscular approach of several PMSCs was deemed problematic: ―PMSCs just 
provoke people to shoot at them‖.243 As will be developed in the following sub-section, two concepts of 
security – deterrence versus acceptance – confront one another.  
 
―Yes for sure‖, this is the most commonly heard answer among Deontological and most 
Solidarist organizations‘ staff to the question of whether they perceive a cultural clash between aid 
agencies and private military and security companies. Several reasons are given to explain this view. 
First, the PMSCs‘ motivations are questioned; as the CD of a Solidarist/Utilitarian agency put it, 
―NGOs are here for the benefit of Afghan people while PMSCs are here for financial reasons or ill–
political reasons even if individuals might be sincerely willing to help Afghanistan.‖244 Second, the 
different backgrounds are also emphasised: ―usually NGO staff comes from the middle classes, with 
postgraduate backgrounds, while most PMSC are ex-military or police or wannabe military or 
police.‖245 Third, respondents have pointed at the different conceptions of security, according to a 
Solidarist–NGO employee, ―contractors don't give importance to the same things that we do; in terms 
of security they will first consider their clients' security, possibly to the detriment of the population; we 
always reconsider the relevancy of our work, of our presence.‖246 Fourth, PMSCs‘ relations to the host 
country also present a challenge , as the head of office of a Deontological organization explains: ―they 
feel the need to carry guns at all times as they don‘t trust the locals.‖247  
 
Despite the perceived clash, several aid workers who were interviewed kept an open attitude 
toward contractors. Further revealing of the differences in aid workers‘ approaches to PMSCs, those 
respondents were almost exclusively working for Solidarist or Utilitarian agencies. In the words of a 
Utilitarian agency staffer: ―yes there is a cultural clash, but yes we can work together; we can figure 
out how we can share space, especially if they were providing the type of security we could really use, 
that would match our needs.‖248 Similarly, the security officer of an organization sitting between the 
Solidarist and Utilitarian divide explained that, ―the business is rather flexible so I don‘t see a cultural 
clash happening.‖249 This view was shared by other Solidarist organizations‘ employees: ―there is 
definitely a difference of culture, but not a clash as long as you clearly define where you work 
together‖250; ―the existence of a clash depends on the type of services provided.‖251 Another 
interviewee working for a Solidarist agency claimed that, ―it's like the militaries; if there is some 
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transparency in their work you have to consider all possibility to improve security, perhaps not directly 
but through ANSO and joint meetings.‖252 
 
6.2.3.2. Different conceptions of security risks 
While all actors involved in insecure environments seek security, their understanding of what 
being safe means varies greatly. Private security contractors and aid workers look at security from 
their respective vantage points, and these function according to their mandate or respective 
objectives. That there is some tension between them on security matters is no surprise given the very 
different nature of their responsibilities. An aid worker employed by a Deontological organization 
illustrated this by saying that ―private military and security companies perceive Afghans as potential 
enemies while we see them as potential friends; maybe that's the fundamental difference.‖253  
In contrast, when asked whether aid workers should armed protection, one contractor 
explained that ―it‘s their call. But on my side, it‘s a difficult call because I have a duty of care for my 
guys; in Iraq and Afghanistan, you need weapons, but in other situations, it's not necessary.‖254 
According to another contractor, ―it‘s best to be protected by the local population but it‘s also highly 
naïve [to believe they can protect you].‖255 Similarly, a Haitian security provider noted: ―security guards 
without weapons are like lame ducks waiting to be shot at.‖256 Some PMSCs believe that, thanks to 
their militarised profile, they are less likely to be attacked than NGOs, who are being perceived as soft 
targets. 
Handicap International‘s guarding system in Afghanistan is at the polar opposite of most 
PMSCs‘ concept of ideal security. Present in the country since the 1980s, this Deontological 
organization supports the physical rehabilitation of victims of war using local health structures. Seizing 
the opportunity to offer jobs to the disabled people they help, most of their guards are actually 
handicapped. But as specified by their representative, thanks to their low profile: ―the guards did save 
us during the May 2006 violent riots.‖257 The contrast here with the Weaponised PMSC DynCorp 
International is striking: it has adopted a highly visible stance that was widely perceived as aggressive 
and disrespectful (Schmeidl, 2007). Few were surprised when a vehicle-born improvised explosive 
device – a car bomb that was among the first major attacks in post–Taliban Kabul – shook their 
heavily protected Kabul office on the 31st of August 2004 and killed 17 people and wounded 45. These 
kind of differences in approaching security are critical in a country where the insurgents have shown 
interest in negotiating with aid agencies regarding the issue of humanitarian access, but have warned 
that ―they would attack aid convoys which use armed escorts from the Afghan police or private military 
and security companies‖ (IRIN, 2010b, website). As Fabrice Weissman argues,  
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[m]ilitarizing humanitarian convoys or facilities simply transform them into military targets. The medical 
aid organizations currently operating in Afghanistan, closely protected by international forces or pro-
government security forces, have bitter experience of this logic. Seen as legitimate targets by 
insurgents, healthcare facilities have become part of the battlefield and deserted by the local population. 
We should remember that one of the great innovations introduced by modern international humanitarian 
law is to proclaim the demilitarization of health and relief facilities and their personnel, which is the only 
way of guaranteeing impartial access to all victims of a conflict (Weissman, In press).  
 
Nevertheless, an observer adopting a strictly technical understanding of a context may 
conclude that a threat can be countered or protected from by adding a line of defence in between, be 
it armed personnel, fences with barb wire, armoured cars or aggressive driving. For instance it was 
observed that IRD send international staff to monitor their projects –even if these are being 
implemented in insecure areas – but in order to ensure their security, a private security company is 
sent ahead of the internationals so that they could ‗secure the site‘. Once is done, the expatriates are 
flown in by helicopter. In other cases, and when available, the internationals were being protected by 
soldiers from the Coalition. While these mechanisms may provide a sense of protection to the 
international staff, it undeniably contributesto: a) putting further distance between the community and 
the international staff visiting them, and most importantly b) endangering the communities by 
identifying them as (seemingly) collaborating with the ‗international forces‘. Yet, accomplishing the 
mission remains the priority: in the words of a Utilitarian NGO staffer ―when we arrive with PSCs and 
by helicopter, the communities are initially sceptical, but we send community outreach people before 
we start our projects; we ask for their specific needs, we try employing them for cash for work – and at 
least we are there doing the work.‖258 Such a view aptly illustrates the Utilitarian tendency to focus on 
the goal regardless of the means used to achieve it.  
 
The Country Director of a Solidarist organization summarizes the issue in a few words: ―when 
you put your security in PMSC hands it changes your own understanding of the situation. For 
business purpose as well as based on their background, I have the impression they see thing as more 
dangerous than they actually are. … PMSC approach to security management is often making the 
target harder and forcing on deterrence. A major challenge for these PMSCs is NOT to make the 
target harder.‖259 Two conceptions of security here confront one another. While aid workers evolve in 
a community where the concept of ‗enemy‘ is not even considered; security contractors, 
predominantly former military and law enforcement personnel, tend to (re)produce security discourses 
and practices based upon the figure of the enemy and the relationship between ‗them‘ and ‗us‘.260  
6.2.4. Deconstruction of the use of ethical arguments by PMSCs 
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Does the use of ethical arguments and practices by PMSCs make a difference? Do 
humanitarian organizations hire PMSCs that emphasise their regard for ethics over ones that do not? 
The answer to this question is again, a nuanced one.   
Deontological organizations have a strict understanding of humanitarian principles and believe 
that these principles can only be respected by truly not-for-profit non-governmental organizations. 
Therefore they are critical of any kind of organization that claims to respect humanitarian principles, 
but does not abide by an actual ‗principled‘ approach. As a result they are not receptive to PMSCs‘ 
ethical/humanitarian discourses, they are more likely critical of it. 
At the other end of the Spectrum, Utilitarian organizations share with PMSCs a blurred 
common ground over ethics, and are more receptive to the private security companies‘ ethical 
discourses.261  
Solidarist agencies often have a divided view regarding PMSCs‘ ethical arguments. While a 
majority do not buy into the idea PMSCs propogate about themselves, for the same reasons as 
Deontological organizations, a few nevertheless put their distrust aside and adopt a practical stance 
towards PMSCs. 
 
6.2.4.1. Arguments opposed to PMSCs’ appropriation of humanitarian values 
There is a global debate amongst security contractors, governments, and civil society that 
revolves around the regulation of the private security industry: primarily how regulation might be 
enforced and violations sanctioned. Since the private security industry is not about to disappear, the 
best approach might therefore be to regulate PMSCs‘ activities through national and international laws 
and ensure that these laws are enforced, particularly in war–torn areas. However, despite both the 
existence of such laws in a few countries and international efforts toward regulation, as well as the 
private security industry‘s own efforts to regulate itself, PMSCs remain de facto largely unregulated. 
 
A closer look at ISOA‘s strategy to ―transfer the legitimacy of international organizations and 
humanitarian NGOs to the private military industry‖ (Olsson, 2003, website. Author‘s own translation) 
thus gives rise to an uneasy feeling. Somehow, and despite its intentions to produce the opposite 
effect, ISOA‘s effort looks like an aggressive way of promoting peace. Why so? One of the main ways 
by which PMSCs (supposedly) involved in the promotion of peace, yet seeking to appropriate 
humanitarian values for financial gain, attempt to derive legitimacy, is through their ethical positioning. 
They do this in a number of different ways; from implementing self-imposed codes of conduct and self-
regulation; respecting the laws of war; attempting to brand their corporate social responsibilities, 
including the provision of assistance. These strategies have in common the attempt to seem like they 
are pursuing a moral obligation that exists in all cultures: to save lives. At such an abstract level, no 
one can question the rectitude of this claim. However, as Wolf-Dieter Eberwein adeptly explains, 
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―morality is [usually thought of as] compatible with law, but it can always justify behaviour that is not in 
accordance with it‖ (Eberwein, 2006, website. Author‘s own translation). In other words, by focusing 
on relevant, but somehow secondary issues, PMSCs divert the debate away from the main issue: 
regulation. By seeking legitimacy through their moral and ethical positioning, PMSCs are able to avoid 
committing themselves to stricter standards of respect for the law.  
The case of the British Association of Private Security Companies (BAPSC) is a perfect 
example. The BAPSC is a lobby group composed of Weaponised companies whose objective is ―to 
promote the interests and regulate the activities of UK–based firms that provide armed defensive 
security services in countries outside the UK‖ (BAPSC, Undated, website). In order to achieve this, 
―the BAPSC and its members recognize that their objectives will best be achieved through effective 
self-regulation‖ (BAPSC, Undated, website). Self-regulation consists of imposing certain standards of 
quality in their recruiting, training and other activities, all of which is perceived as a proof of their 
ethical standards. Thus PMSCs pushing for self-regulation gain greater legitimacy, and, consequently, 
more contracts. Self-regulation however, is based on a system of self–proclaimed legitimization rather 
than law. In contrast to a system of sanctions established that is law and is based upon an 
enforceable regulatory framework; the sanctions in a self-regulated system are not legally binding but 
constitue a, unenforceable, moral code.  
Moreover, where violations are uncovered through the ISOA‘s complaint‘s system or the 
BAPSC‘s principle of self-regulation, sanctions consist at worst of being expelled from the lobby 
group. A company that loses its membership from these groups might fear a negative report in the 
media – yet no eviction has occurred to date. Furthermore, the ISOAs‘ complaint-filing system 
presupposes that someone who has witnessed an abuse committed by a security contractor in a war 
zone, knows which company the contractor belongs to, knows that the company is a member of ISOA, 
knows that such a complaint system exists, has access to the internet and is able to understand the 
English website and launch a procedure in the United States. It also requires that the PMSC does not 
retire from the lobby group, as Blackwater/Xe did following the aforementioned Nisoor Square 
shooting scandal. This is not to say that the system of filing complaints or the push for self-regulation 
are not positive steps, but it‘s unsurprising that no complaints have ever been filed.  
 
While ISOA‘s development of a Code of Conduct can be seen as a constructive step toward 
appropriate behaviour, it must not be confused with the Code of Conduct for the International Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief. In simplistic terms, while the latter is 
based on the principle of ―saving lives‖, ISOA‘s Code of Conduct emphasizes the doctrine ―watch what 
you shoot.‖ Article 9.2.2, for example, specifies that ―[a]ll Rules of Engagement should be in 
compliance with international humanitarian law and human rights law and emphasize appropriate 
restraint and caution to minimize casualties and damage, while preserving a person's inherent right of 
self-defence‖ (ISOA, Undated,b, website).  
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The concept and practices of corporate social responsibility have both their defenders and their 
critics. The former argue that CSR contributes to broadening companies‘ interests beyond immediate, 
short–term profits. The latter contend that in their pursuit of the bottom line, corporations are distracted 
by CSR; or that CSR serves only as a fig leaf. While the PMSC Kroll states that it ―is extending its 
contributions to the public good through its Corporate Social Responsibility initiative‖ (Kroll, Undated, 
website), Joel Bakan notes that although  
 
… today‘s leading CEOs cultivate passion and seem genuinely concerned about how their corporations‘ 
actions affect social and environmental interests, not just their stockholders‘, … the ‗best interests of the 
corporation‘ principle [is] now a fixture in the corporate laws of most countries [ ... and compel] corporate 
decision makers always to act in the best interests of the corporation, and hence its owners. The law 
forbids any other motivation for their actions, whether to assist workers, improve the environment, or 
help consumers save money. They can do these things with their own money, as private citizens. As 
corporate officials, however, stewards of other people‘s money, they have no legal authority to pursue 
such goals as ends in themselves – only as means to serve the corporation‘s own interests, which 
generally means to maximize the wealth of its shareholders (Bakan, p. 37, 2004. Emphasis added).  
 
The author goes on to argue that CSR ―holds out promises of help, reassures people, and 
sometimes works. We should not, however, expect very much from it. A corporation can do good only 
to help itself to do well, a profound limit on just how much good it can do‖ (Bakan, p. 50, 2004). As 
Bakan aptly demonstrates, corporations are legally obliged to put their interests before ‗others‘. It is 
then not surprising that PMSCs‘ ‗humanitarian‘ branding does not receive a very positive response 
from aid workers. 
 
From a broader perspective, a PMSC‘s ethical actions (namely self-regulation, implementation 
of codes of conduct, assistance projects) might be said to seduce two types of people: those already 
predisposed to believe in their ethical position, who consider that private military and security 
companies do indeed offer the best option for improving peace and stabilization operations; and those 
that have a limited understanding of the exact nature of humanitarian action, who see it as a technical 
operation that entails few skills besides logistical efficacy. In other words, it is only those that are not 
aware of the historical debates and issues regarding humanitarian action who will be seduced by this 
kind of behavior. 
Aid workers have struggled with ethical considerations and complexities since the very 
inception of humanitarian action. And still today, aid workers are involved in continual debates over 
moral considerations. Therefore, they are all too well aware of ethical issues and, as such, are much 
less likely to concur with PMSCs presentation of themselves as ‗ethical‘, seeing it merely as a 
marketing strategy. Nevertheless, as underscored in the two previous chapters, Deontologist and 
Solidarist aid agencies are more sensitive than Utilitarians to any discourse or action that can 
threaten, or cause more confusion, about the values and operating modes of humanitarian action.  
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6.2.4.2. Provision of assistance by private military and security companies 
The assistance projects implemented by foundations supported by PMSCs, often confused 
with ‗humanitarian action‘ by some, are seen merely as a functional task by Deontological and 
Solidarist employees. These projects are implemented without consideration for the basic principles 
that guide humanitarian action, protect beneficiaries and focus on the needs of populations.  
PMSC assistance is often provided in a manner contrary to humanitarian principles since these 
projects are primarily implemented for self-interest – in order to improve the public image of the 
organization, get closer to the communities in order to be accepted and protected (or at least, not 
targeted), or to ensure PMSC employees maintain positive morale, etc. In the words of two 
contractors, ―humanitarian activities done by PMSCs are done for public relations‘ purposes‖262, ―these 
projects are always helpful in order to get information.‖263 Another explained – off the record – that his 
company would distribute presents to families of people they‘d killed, but that the main reason for such 
‗generosity‘ was to be able to continue operating in the area without further antagonizing local 
populations. Similarly, as a leaflet from the Weaponised PMSC Opus Risk Management states, ―[we] 
implement Community Programs to manage issues of mutual interest between stakeholders. The aim 
is to contribute to community development by involving people with the project in collaboration with 
host communities and their representatives while enhancing social and economic development. By 
involving communities in the project, clients can benefit from: a human intelligence gathering tool; a 
better understanding of the community‘s perspectives and a leverage to enhancing its commitment; a 
better knowledge of business partners and stakeholder relations risk factors‖ (Opus Risk 
Management, Undated, website). It is doubtful whether the company would present the same 
arguments to the communities they utilise while pretending to help them.  
These findings echo the widely heard criticisms of aid exploitation by militarised actors, leading 
to poor quality projects. As a Deontological NGO employee summarized it, ―[PMSCs‘ assistance] is 
more of a marketing strategy than actual assistance.‖264  
Similarly, several organizations have noted the limited (or negative) results of ‗quick impact 
projects‘ (QIPs) made by military–dominated institutions – including PMSCs. For instance a collective 
of NGOs in Afghanistan denounced these QIPs, saying that:  
 
[d]evelopment projects implemented with military money or through military–dominated structures aim to 
achieve fast results but are often poorly executed, inappropriate and do not have sufficient community 
involvement to make them sustainable. There is little evidence this approach is generating stability and, 
in some cases, military involvement in development activities is, paradoxically, putting Afghan lives 
further at risk as these projects quickly become targeted by anti-government elements (Action Aid et al, 
p.1, 2010).  
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Significantly, all of the NGOs signatories of the pamphlet are Deontological and Solidarist aid 
organizations. This positioning is revealing of the polarization of practices that exist among aid 
agencies, in particular when the debate involves political considerations. As will be demonstrated 
below, employees of Deontological and Solidarist organizations are more preoccupied with the impact 
of PMSCs on the conceptualization of ‗humanitarian space‘ than those working for Utilitarian agencies.  
 
Asked what they think of PMSC initiatives to provide assistance, several humanitarians 
interviewed for this thesis criticised them.  Interestingly – and further revealing of aid agencies‘ 
different approaches to PMSCs - respondents critical of PMSCs‘ involvement in aid were all 
employees of Deontological or Solidarist organizations. For instance the Coordinator of a Solidarist 
NGO in Afghanistan argued that ―individual contractors probably do so with a charitable intention but 
certainly don't respect the principles of ‗do no harm‘; they give without knowing the structure or the 
real needs.‖265 Similarly, a Deontological organization staff member explained that ―I don't think they 
do so to save lives, but rather to be accepted; it's hypocritical. Everyone to his trade; doing 
humanitarian action requires knowledge of the field, the projects, the population, the needs, etc.‖266 A 
Country Manager working for a Deontological NGO, echoing the concern of others, was more 
preoccupied by the negative impact privatization of this type of aid has on humanitarian space: ―I don't 
know of any PMSC doing 'humanitarian' activities, but if they do so, they certainly destroy our 
humanitarian space.‖267 
In contrast, a few respondents (employed by Solidarist and Utilitarian organizations) had 
developed a pragmatic approach to PMSCs‘ assistance projects.  For instance, the Head of Mission of 
a Solidarist NGO explained that ―it does not bother me if they provide some assistance, especially if 
aid workers are absent; if there is an emergency and they are the only ones – and if they clearly say 
who they are – why not?‖268 The Country Manager of a Solidarist/Utilitarian NGO argued that ―at a 
personal level, I see there are so many needs that I understand; I don't think charity is bad, but I don't 
think it will improve the situation in the country. [However,] if a company wants to do charity, they 
should have a full time dedicated person working with locals.‖269 
 
Some private security contractors do not understand why humanitarian organizations are not 
implementing projects in certain dangerous areas, despite the difficult living conditions of the 
population. They believe that they could provide the necessary protection for the aid workers to 
intervene, even in the most remote and hazardous places. While this position is both understandable 
and honourable, it reduces aid agencies to service providers and humanitarian action to a purely 
technical task, seeing it as merely providing goods. Humanitarian action is however far more complex 
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than that, and humanitarian projects are full of pitfalls. Indeed, it is precisely because they take place 
in complex political, social and economic environments that aid agencies have been struggling since 
their very inception to operate within some kind of coherent framework. As interviewees working, in 
particular, for Deontological and Solidarist organizations have repeatedly explained, humanitarian 
principles and humanitarian codes of conduct are precisely what generate this framework.  
 
6.2.4.3. PMSCs’ use of marketing strategies 
The pictures available on the Aegis Foundation website (created by the PMSC Aegis) are 
noticeably unique in their character. While the faces of the Iraqi and Afghan beneficiaries of the 
foundation‘s projects are clear, the faces of the (armed and geared-up) security contractors delivering 
the supplies are blurred. Although anecdotal, it illustrates contradiction between the will to ‗promote‘ 
an overall image of a ‗good doer‘, and the belief that it is necessary to blur the donator‘s face to 
protect his identity. Incidentally, it also encourages the viewer to think that security companies are part 
of the problem, not part of the solution.  
Throughout their history, aid agencies have received much criticism because of their emotion–
oriented, a-historic, victim–focused marketing strategies – to the point that some called it ‗disaster–
porn‘ (Bear, 2009, website). As a result, it was specifically included in the aforementioned Red Cross 
and NGO Code of Conduct that humanitarian marketing should be respectful of disaster victims. Its 
article 10 states that:  
 
In our information, publicity, and advertising activities, we shall recognise disaster victims as dignified 
humans, not hopeless objects. Respect for the disaster victim as an equal partner in action should never 
be lost. In our public information, we shall portray an objective image of the disaster situation where the 
capacities and aspirations of disaster victims are highlighted, and not just their vulnerabilities and fears 
(Code of Conduct, Undated, website). 
 
Although there is still room for improvement (Kennedy, 2009), it has long been accepted that, 
as far as they are able, disaster victims are the primary agents of their own survival and recovery. Lilie 
Chouliaraki notes that IAAs ―offer a trajectory of humanitarian communication, which suggests a clear, 
though not linear, move from emotion–oriented to post–emotional styles of appealing‖ (Chouliaraki, 
p.117, 2010). Although not all PMSC advertisements are as troubling as the aforementioned 
Blackwater‘s spoon fed African baby, there is little doubt that security companies would do well to take 
heed of the lessons learned by aid agencies. Not only are such ads disrespectful to the people 
portrayed, but they are also counterproductive to their objectives in the sense that they literally horrify 
aid workers who see it.  
 
6.2.4.4. PMSCs’ perceived professionalism is more important than their humanitarian branding 
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The majority of aid organizations are not convinced by the use of ethical arguments by 
PMSCs. This does not mean they are insensitive to PMSC corporate branding. Indeed, further 
distinctions ought to be made between companies, even within the same type.  
Although Weaponised companies tend to adopt a harder stance towards security management 
than Guarding and Unarmed firms, not all Weaponised companies use muscular approaches in 
dealing with security issues. To illustrate the point, Control Risks and Blackwater/Xe offer similar types 
of services, but they differ in the way they deliver these services. Control Risks is seen as indulging in 
less ‗cowboy‘ behaviour than Xe – and this is why aid agencies opting for a Weaponised company use 
them rather than Xe. All of Xe‘s efforts to brand itself with an ethical/humanitarian image fall short in 
comparison to Control Risks‘ perceived professionalism – and lower profile. A head of Security 
working for a Solidarist/Utilitarian NGO explained that: ―we did use Control Risks for a review of our 
procedures after an incident. We went through a very long process of selection as we wanted 
someone who would truly understand us – their recommendations were actually very relevant; they 
fully understood our principles and ways of operations and offered different options.‖270  
From the humanitarian security professionals‘ perspective, a further distinction can be made 
inside each of the three types of PMSCs. Most security managers will distinguish between those that 
have a good reputation and those that do not. In the word of an NGO Global Security Manager: 
―PSCs‘ reputation is one of the most important elements for NGOs to consider when contracting 
them.‖271  Reputation however is not built on the humanitarian branding of the company – as shown 
earlier, most aid workers are insensitive to these types of marketing; reputation is built on the 
perceived professionalism of the company, in particular its capacity to understand aid agency–specific 
mindsets and security approaches. In the words of a Solidarist/Utilitarian NGO employee, ―there is a 
value in distinguishing between PMSCs; when comparing PMSCs we look at their Code of Conduct, 
Rules of Engagement, registrations, etc. Some NGOs are guilty of putting all PMSCs in the same bag 
without distinguishing between them.‖272 
Inevitably there are cases when a less reputable or flexible company is contracted by an aid 
agency. This may be explained by a poor understanding of the corporate security market on the part 
of the aid workers hen they made their choice. Several interviewees based at headquarters level 
explained that they faced cases where a field office would hire a security company – sometimes 
armed – without informing the headquarters about it. This inevitably led to a poor selection process 
and often poor supervision of the company. This happens when little consideration is given to the fact 
that the cheaper option is not necessarily the best – in particular when it comes to security. Training, 
equipment, the retention of good staff are usually reflected in the prices. Therefore, the less expensive 
companies are usually not those with greater integrity. It is however likely that with the increasing 
attention given to security management and subsequent staff sensitization, associations between aid 
agencies and ‗cheap‘ security companies will gradually decrease.  
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It is striking to notice how aid workers internalise and reproduce the views of the organization 
they work for, whether at field or headquarters level. Interviewees‘ attitudes towards PMSCs have 
repeatedly fallen in line with the attitudes of the aid agencys who employ them. A noteworthy example 
of this is the former Security Manager of a Solidarist NGO who was interviewed again after he became 
the Director of Security of a Utilitarian organization.273 While he vehemently opposed the outsourcing 
of security in the former position, he openly supported it when in the latter position. As he explained, ―I 
was initially critical of PMSCs as many were new and not trustable, but working with them showed me 
we could benefit from them. [Using them] puts us ahead of the game.‖274  
Nevertheless, for a majority of aid workers – particularly those employed by Deontological and 
Solidarist agencies - PMSCs‘ efforts to integrate humanitarian values into their corporate strategies 
are merely seen as cynical marketing methods rather than a genuine subscription to the tenants of 
humanitarianism. Furthermore, these aid workers would probably prefer that PMSCs abstained from 
such moves as this also contributes to rendering indistinct the differences between the aid sector and 
the security industry. There is little doubt however, that this is precisely what motivates the 
appropriation of humanitarian values by security companies. 
In other words and to most aid agencies‘ dismay, PMSCs are unlikely to cease appropriating 
humanitarian values in their corporate branding strategies. 
 
6.3. Conclusion 
This chapter‘s objective was to reveal the respective approaches and interests towards 
security of IAAs and PMSCs. As part of the assessment, further distinctions within the security 
industry were necessary, which were discussed in the first section. The second section then examined 
the diverse ways IAAs relate to PMSCs and looked in particular at how their ethos affects their 
interaction with them.  
 The chapter first highlighted distinctions between PMSCs and mercenaries, as well as different 
labels ascribed  to security companies. It then offered a functional distinction of security companies by 
differentiating the Guarding PMSCs from the Unarmed and Weaponised ones. It offered further 
distinctions based on PMSCs appropriation and integration of humanitarian representations into 
business and security strategies. Several cases were used to illustrate the point, such as ISOAs 
attempts to blend in with aid agencies, or the industry‘s use of ‗humanitarian marketing‘ and 
international events to create a positive image around them. The first section closed by underscoring 
PMSC efforts in the provision of assistance as well as their pragmatic rapprochement with aid 
agencies.  
 The chapter‘s second section revealed that despite the security industry‘s efforts, aid workers 
are more critical of PMSCs than supportive. Similarly, it underscored that PMSC ‗humanitarian‘ 
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branding does not receive a very positive response among aid workers. It nevertheless highlighted 
that even though all three types of aid agencies use corporate security services, they do not share the 
same approaches to private military and security companies. Deontological organizations are those 
who try hardest to ‗operationalise‘ the humanitarian principles. As such, they are the least receptive to 
PMSC discourses and approaches, and contractual relations happen only at the margins, in particular 
with Weaponised companies. Solidarists try to follow a similar stance but they struggle to do so. This 
is because they are multi–mandated or don‘t have enough private funding, they are not as able to 
abide by their principles as much as they would wish. They tend not to be attracted to using PMSCs 
but have less difficulty than Deontological organizations in using them. Utilitarians for their part are 
most prone to using PMSCs for two reasons: they share with PMSCs a generic ethical representation 
and they are less reluctant to use a deterrent approach if it helps them achieve their objectives. The 
section then deconstructed the use of ethical arguments by PMSCs and underscored aid agencies‘ 
different interests in PMSC services, providing by doing so a body of corroborating evidence in 
support of the main argument.  
Collaboration with PMSCs occurs when aid workers and security contractors both share the 
same understanding of the origin of their insecurity (the risks) and how to deal with this insecurity (risk 
prevention or mitigation). Yet, as seen in previous chapters, aid agencies‘ perception and 
management of risks differ from one ideal–type to another. This however is not widely understood and 




































                  202 of 257 
Chapter 7 – Conclusion and Implications of the Research  
 
 
“Who you choose to manage your security impacts how you perceive the environment and how the 
environment perceives you” 





“The search for static security … is misguided. The fact is security can only be achieved through constant 







The overall aim of this research was to understand international aid agencies‘ approaches to 
security. This aim was catalysed by the author‘s field observation that aid agencies confronted with 
the same security threat often reacted differently to it, despite having a similar conceptual security 
management framework.  
Upon discovering that the existing literature on humanitarian security fails to explain the 
processes that lead organizations to approach security differently, the thesis provided a qualitative 
analysis of aid agencies‘ conceptions and practices of security. By doing so, the research has 
underscored that aid agencies do not constitute a cohesive block – nor do their views on security 
exhibit great cohesiveness. In addition, it has further highlighted the process of co-constitution 
between aid agency identity and their interests in security. Three different approaches to security were 
discussed, each of which resulted in different preferences on the part of IAAs in their dealings with 
private military and security companies. Altogether, the findings of the research shed light on both aid 
agencies‘ approaches to security and the concept of ‗humanitarian security‘ itself. Indeed, the 
preceding chapters have demonstrated the contingency of security by highlighting how an 
understanding of aid agencies‘ approaches to their security necessarily implies looking at who they 
are and where they come from.  
Concluding this thesis, this chapter provides a reflection on the research and delves into the 
implications of these findings. A summary of the key findings is provided in the first section of this 
chapter, followed by a discussion of the main theoretical and empirical contributions. The third section 
looks at the ways that this thesis‘ facilitates a deeper understanding of ‗humanitarian security‘, and 
also addresses the potential for future research. The last section looks at the policy implications of the 
thesis for international aid agencies‘ approaches to security.  
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7.1. A summary of the key findings 
The main aim of this thesis was to form an understanding of the different approaches to 
security that exist within the aid sector; what the implications are of each approach for both the aid 
sector and for the targeted populations; and, given that some security practices are deemed 
controversial, how are these approaches being conceived – in other words, what are the processes 
that lead an organization to adopt one practice over another. 
The research was underpinned by two main premises (based on the author‘s prior experience 
as an aid worker): first that there exists a relation between aid agencies‘ identity and the way they 
practice security; second that ‗security‘ is a social construction rather than a fixed concept.  
Implementing a critical constructivist approach, the thesis studied the co-constitution of aid 
organizations‘ identity and interests. It argued that IAAs‘ identity and approaches to security are 
mutually shaped, and evidence of this was clarified into in three steps. First, it offered a typology of 
three ideal–types of IAAs (Deontological, Solidarist and Utilitarian) and highlighted dominant 
discourses framing each type‘s identity as well as processes by which particular views are 
reproduced. Secondly, it identified the dominant representations in security management and revealed 
how they relate to IAAs‘ identity. The thesis found that the evolution of IAAs‘ security management 
leads to a paradoxical situation where harmonization and polarization of security approaches can be 
concomitantly observed. Two approaches to humanitarian security management were then 
contrasted: ‗process based‘ versus ‗situational judgment‘. The former focuses on reducing uncertainty, 
while the latter advocates for context–specific decisions. The difference eventually lies in the level of 
responsibility which is effectively given to aid workers on the ground and this reflects the distinction 
between IAAs‘ identities. This contrast within IAAs‘ approaches to security is repeatedly found from 
headquarter to field level. Additionally, after distinguishing between three types of private military and 
security companies (Guarding, Unarmed, and Weaponised), the thesis revealed that IAAs‘ interactions 
with PMSCs is indeed contingent upon their identity. It underscored that Deontological, and some 
Solidarist, organizations‘ ‗political‘ approach to security lead them to minimise the use of corporate 
security services that might put them at odds with a ‗principled‘ understanding of humanitarian action. 
On the other hand, the thesis also underscored that the Utilitarian, and a few Solidarists‘, ‗technical‘ 
attitude to security results in contracting security providers that adopt a harder stance on security 
measures. 
In the end, what is seen from the empirical data collected at headquarter and field levels 
significantly supports the main argument of the research. From their inception, down to the 
implementation of their programs, humanitarian organizations build and reproduce a dominant 
discourse that is transmitted and internalised by their personnel. This discourse, along with the 
material and financial constraints faced by each organization, gradually shape aid agencies‘ identities. 
When it comes to security, IAA‘s identity does frame their approach to security, including the way they 
engage with PMSCs. In turn, the successes or failures of these approaches to security contribute to 
shaping aid agency identities through a subtle (although very real) feedback mechanism. The findings 
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of the research then confirm that aid agency identity and their approaches to security are mutually 
shaped. 
This thesis has demonstrated the necessity and value of identifying distinctions among aid 
agencies when studying humanitarian security, otherwise one would find it difficult to understand the 
reasons behind the concomitant harmonization and polarization of their practices. It also gives hope 
that aid agencies‘ approaches to security may be reconciled, but only if IAAs first go through a 
thorough self-reflective analysis of their conceptions and practices of security. Such self-reflection may 
nevertheless be challenging given that all actors are caught in their own subjective framework. 
Researchers – as external stakeholders – may play a role in accompanying aid agencies down this 
path. 
 
This thesis also demonstrated the relevance of using a critical constructivist framework to 
study humanitarian security practices. Adopting this kind approach allows humanitarian security to be 
studied as a construct, this subsequently allows for reconstructionist suggestions on how 
‗humanitarian security‘ can be defined. This thesis then suggests that IAAs require a more 
comprehensive understanding of how their identity and practices affect their security and offers 
hereafter a definition of ‗humanitarian security‘ that is grounded in the findings of the research. As will 
be seen, the main contribution of this definition is to highlight the necessity to approach security 
reflexively. While this holds true for humanitarian security, the thesis also implies that competing 
concepts of security (national security, human security, environmental security, collective security, 
etc.) are all valid, but only within the limitations of their frame of reference. As such, any conceptual 
framework used should then adopt a reflexive approach, including the conditions for this frame to be 
asserted. 
 
7.2. A discussion of the thesis main theoretical and empirical contributions  
 
 Humanitarian security is a fairly recent and little explored field of study. Yet there is a definite 
push towards a deepening of the topic by a number of authors and practitioners and the present 
research continues this ‗dialogue‘. However, it does not ‗oppose‘ the main strand of thinking on 
humanitarian security but adds to it, in particular since no author had previously studied the interplay 
between identity and security. A few (Barnett, 2004; Bruderlein and Gassman, 2006) have mentioned 
it, but their analysis remains limited. In contrast, this thesis confirms the co-constitution between aid 
agencies‘ identity and their approach to security; it also underscores the processes through which 
humanitarian security is conceived, leading to the current paradox of a harmonisation and polarisation 
of practices. Similarly, very few authors have studied the interactions between aid agencies and 
PMSCs; by studying the processes that lead IAAs to conclude that outsourcing their security to a 
private entity is their best option, the thesis provides another means of approaching the existing 
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understanding of IAA-PMSCs interactions. Altogether, the present research makes original 
contributions at both theoretical and empirical levels.  
7.2.1. Contribution of the thesis to the discipline of International Relations 
First, the picture that emerges from this research helps identify the merits of a core concept of 
critical constructivism, namely the co-constitution between identity and interests. While identities 
provide the basis for interests in ‗dominant‘ constructivism, critical constructivists maintains that 
identities and interests are mutually constituted. Indeed, the identity of an actor implies their 
preferences, but they also the product of these. In line with a critical constructivist view, this thesis has 
underscored the co-constitution between aid agencies‘ identity and interests through the identification 
of dominant discourses and practices. It has argued that aid agencies can be organized into three 
different types and revealed how each type of aid agency approaches its security accordingly. Aid 
agencies approach security in ways that is framed by their understanding and ‗operationalisation‘ of 
humanitarian principles. Their identity is, in turn, confirmed or undermined by the outcomes of their 
security choices; this however is a very subtle mechanism which is hard to pinpoint at the level of the 
agency (but easier to observe at field level, where a country-mission‘s survival may be at stake). The 
thesis then confirms, through the underscoring of these constitutive processes, the relevance of a 
critical constructivist analysis in the field of International Relations.  
By doing so, the findings complement the existing literature about humanitarian security. 
Authors have already helped develop an understanding of humanitarian security (in particular through 
the analysis of incidents and through the provision of a conceptual framework such as Brabant‘s 
Security Management Framework). They have also helped in developing an understanding of IAAs‘ 
relations with PMSCs (in particular by studying differences in their identity, ethics, and conceptions of 
security), but none had yet tackled the interplay between IAAs‘ security and their identity. Rumours 
existed in the aid sector about differences between American and European NGOs and between 
NGOs and United Nations agencies, but no study had analysed these differences. The present 
research confirms – and qualifies – these differences, and demonstrates the mechanisms that lead 
agencies to adopt one security posture over another.  
 
A second contribution of this thesis to the wider field of IR is that it brings a new perspective to 
the concept of security. Indeed, as is seen in the research – with the identification of three ideal–types 
of aid agencies, their ethoses and subsequent approaches to security – the ways to conceive and 
practice security change from one organization to another. These findings reinforce the view, 
expressed in Chapter Three, that security is necessarily contingent. There is no concept of security 
which is independent from the subjects, or from the context, in which they evolve. The interpretation of 
the context itself is framed by the identity of the subjects – i.e. identity is defined by the subjects‘ 
cultural, social and symbolic baggage, as much as these are being shaped by identity; this constant 
inter-subjective exchange is the final arbiter of meaning.  
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Another component of the contingency of security is that it depends on how the ‗other‘ 
perceives the ‗self‘ – security is then subject to perceptions. This is the crux of the security dilemma. A 
defensive behaviour can be seen as offensive by an outsider – which in turn complicates confidence 
building and favours suspicion, and may lead interlocutors to an increased perception of insecurity. 
Security is potentially a major concern where perception is misguided. Yet in complex environments, 
threats are diffuse. Actors are hardly able to identify their threats‘ capability and intent, and as such, 
rely essentially on perceptions – with all the flaws that implies.  
As a matter of fact – and this constitutes another aspect of the subjective dimension of security 
– perceptions are inherently subjective, and as such, are very susceptible to bias. As Schneier puts it, 
―[w]e worry about the wrong things: paying too much attention to minor risks and not enough attention 
to major ones. We don't correctly assess the magnitude of different risks‖ (Schneier, 2008a). In a 
paper called ‗The Psychology of Security‘ (Schneier, 2008a), Schneier has identified a number of 
biases that have been scientifically demonstrated and showed how these affect our perceptions. He 
highlights among others the framing effect (―peoples' choices are affected by how a trade-off is 
framed. Frame the choice as a gain, and people will tend to be risk averse. But frame the choice as a 
loss, and people will tend to be risk seeking‖); the control bias ("people are more likely to accept risks 
if they feel they have some control over them‖); or the availability heuristic (―people assess … the 
probability of an event by the ease with which instances or occurrences can be brought to mind. In 
other words, in any decision–making process, easily remembered (available) data are given greater 
weight than hard–to–remember data‖). Indeed, Stewart rightly argues that, ―perceptions remain a 
fundamental component of security calculations and although the reliance upon them may be reduced 
it cannot be removed‖ (Stewart, p.7, 2006). This means that biases must be taken in consideration 
when dealing with security. 
 
In addition to confirming the co-constitution between identity and interests, this research has 
also revealed that this co-constitution is a constant process. Identity and interests continuously fuel 
each other in a feedback loop – even this is more subtle in the case of IAAs. Aid agencies approach 
security is, based on who they are; yet, the successes and failures that they face also shape who they 
are and how they view the world. This in turn highlights the continuous evolving nature of security: it is 
inherently dynamic, and is context and actor dependant. From an external perspective one can see 
that security is both the fruit and the seed of this constant power dynamic. And from the perspective of 
the subject, one can observe that security must also be continuously maintained since, a) threats and 
vulnerabilities vary in time and space, and b) our relations to others and to the wider environment also 
affect our security and perceptions of it. Security can be compared to a river: its flow is composed of 
constantly ‗new‘ water yet it remains the same river. In addition, depending on the volume and depth 
of water, the declivity, the nature of the river‘s bank as well as the surrounding obstacles, its scope is 
also always changing. Any conceptualization of security must take into account the ever-changing 
nature of security.  
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The most important consequence of the contingency and subjectivity of security is that any 
conception or practice of security must be reflexive. This reflexivity has to be acknowledged in two 
ways: first assumptions and biases about oneself and the environments one faces must be identified. 
As demonstrated, human beings, like aid agencies or states, are prone to deceptive perceptions and 
bias. Secondly, any approach to security must not only confront ‗others‘, but itself too. In other words, 
any entity engaged in security must understand what its responsibilities are in the secure or insecure 
character of a situation and how does its approach contributes to further (in)security. 
Claiming that security is necessarily contingent and subjective renders impossible any attempt 
to define security solely as a fixed, objective concept. Nevertheless, and despite critically 
deconstructing the concept of security, a resolutely reflexive approach to security allows for its 
reconstruction. This implies that any definition of the concept of security has to be contingent and to 
recognise this contingency. What is crucial for this kind of approach is that the acknowledgement of 
epistemological limitations necessarily changes the very nature of the assertions being made.  
 
The research has argued that any definition of ‗humanitarian security‘ must take into account 
the contingent, subjective nature of security: the fact that security is a continuous process, and must 
be reflexive. On the basis of the preceding analysis, this thesis offers, in the next section, a definition 
of ‗humanitarian security‘ which takes these aspects into consideration.  
7.2.2. Contribution of the thesis to the study and practice of humanitarian aid 
This thesis‘ contribution to the study and practice of humanitarian aid is twofold. First, it offers a 
unique typology of international aid agencies. Second, it also offers a new angle of analysis for private 
military and security companies. Both contributions prove essential for a relevant understanding of 
humanitarian security. 
Even though the thesis‘ distinction of international aid agencies as Deontological, Solidarist or 
Utilitarian builds upon previous academic contributions, it adds significantly to these existing 
distinctions. First, the thesis‘ typology includes both international non-governmental organizations and 
United Nations agencies; this reveals the relevance of studying these organizations together. Second, 
by actually locating a high number of organizations in each of the three ideal-types, the typology goes 
beyond previous contributions which remained too generic to be applicable. This in turn allows for an 
empirical use of the typology, as it is done in the present research. Though this thesis concurs with the 
existing idea that aid agencies can be distinguished based on different approaches to ethical values, 
this thesis adds to these existing typologies by examining organizations‘ actual capability to live by 
their stated values. This permits the author to underscore the incoherence which sometimes exists 
between aid agencies‘ stated values and their actual practices.  
Additionally, the typology offered here, allows for an exploration of the relationship between 
identity and security, with particular regard to PMSCs. As such, it is the first research which 
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underscores how dominant representations in security were devised, eventually explaining why today‘s 
security practices are concomitantly harmonised and polarised.  
 
This thesis‘ analysis of the privatisation of security from the perspective of international aid 
agencies sheds new light on private military and security companies and their attempt to use 
humanitarian ethics to improve their legitimacy. It reveals however that aid workers‘ receptiveness to 
these efforts is limited at best, and negative at worst. As such, the research underpins that instead of 
instrumentalizing humanitarian representations, PMSCs should rather focus on their core activity – the 
provision of security – in ways that grant them respect for the quality of their work.  
In addition, the thesis is also the first piece of work which looks at security contractors‘ 
perception of aid workers, and reveals that irrespective of the type of companies they work for, private 
security contractors have a rather negative perception of both aid workers and aid agencies‘ 
management of security. Additionally, the thesis underscores that PMSCs, despite this negative 
perception, adopt a pragmatic approach towards aid agencies, as multiplying interactions of all sorts 
with the aid sector is seen as contributing greatly to their normalization and legitimacy. In contrast, the 
thesis reveals that if all three types of aid agencies have contracted PMSCs, they do not share the 
same approaches to them. Deontological organizations are the most critical of PMSC discourses and 
approaches, and contractual relations happen only at the margins, in particular with Weaponised 
companies. Solidarists tend not to be attracted by PMSCs but have less difficulty than Deontological 
organizations in using them. Utilitarians for their part are most prone to using PMSCs. Such 
differences in approaching PMSCs need to be underscored if one wants to understand the implications 
of each type of IAAs attitude to security. 
 
7.3. Implications of the thesis for the study and practice of humanitarian 
security and for future research 
In order to understand the implications of this research as regards to the concept of 
humanitarian security, one must look at what may be inferred from the research regarding the 
interplay between identity and security. This section first provides a new definition of humanitarian 
security based on the findings and implications of the research and then reflects on the thesis‘ 
implications for future research. 
7.3.1. Implications of the research for a definition of humanitarian security 
As explained in the Chapter Three, the thesis aims to serve both academia and the real world, 
in this case the humanitarian community, and as such, aims to offer a reconstruction of the concept of 
humanitarian security. As Mustapha explained: 
 
[f]irst, acts of reconstruction can be critical in the most fundamental ontological sense …. Second, and 
perhaps most important of all, acts of reconstruction can emanate directly from post-structuralist 
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commitments, where deconstruction is seen as both a first step and as an ethic to bring to engagement 
with the status quo (Mustapha, p.21, 2009).  
 
However, in line with the critical approach of the research, it is contended that reconstruction 
necessarily implies adopting a reflexive approach as a condition for these claims to be asserted.  
 
Any definition of ‗humanitarian security‘ would benefit from previous work on the 
conceptualization of security.  Korkmaz recalls that ―the debate on the understanding of security is not 
simply supposing that security is [an] ‗essentially contested‘ concept. Rather, the task is to eliminate 
the vagueness ―by giving a definition of the term that will permit a decision as to its applicability in a 
given situation‖ (Korkmaz, p.25, 2007). During the Cold War, IR scholars relied to some extent on 
Wolfers‘ definition277 and ‗security‘ was essentially studied as an attribute of the state, and as such, 
linked to military perspectives.278 The post–Cold War era has seen a proliferation of attempts to define  
the concept of security in isolation and in relation to other concepts. However, despite Mesjasz‘s 
identification of four attributes that constitute the core concept of security (Mesjasz, 2008), security‘ is 
more often than not defined in relation to other concepts, such as the state (national security), the 
human (human security), the environment (environmental security), etc. As introduced in Chapter 
Three, this remains an area of active attention, with contributions to the debate from a number of 
perspectives: including constructivists; the so–called Copenhagen school; critical security studies, 
which includes post-structural perspectives; the Welsh school and feminist positions.279 However, 
despite the many definitions of security encountered in the IR literature, Gibson nevertheless argues 
that, ―the key constituents of security that theorists do agree upon, include: some referent object – an 
asset – to be made secure; a wilful, malicious, capable agent that threatens this asset; and, some 
form of counter–measure, or protection, deliberately placed to oppose the threat in defence of the 
asset. Where these three components intersect is what theorists understand by the concept of 
security‖ (Gibson, 2010, website).  
 
Up to this point, humanitarian security has been defined in this thesis as ―the study and 
practice of safely accessing vulnerable populations for humanitarian purposes. It includes the security 
of humanitarian personnel, and of the aid organization‘s humanitarian programmes, as well as of its 
assets and reputation. The onus is not only on aid workers‘ security, but on their ability to safely 
access and serve populations in need.‖ However, given the findings of the present research, such a 
definition now proves incomplete. It does not recognise the contingent and subjective nature of 
                                               
277
 ―Arnold Wolfers has offered an adequate, dual, definition of ‗security‘. In ‗an objective sense‘, according to Wolfers, 
security ‗measures the absence of threats to acquired values‘. In a subjective sense, it measures ‗the absence of fear that 
such values will be attacked‘. The concept thus combines a physical condition with a state of mind. This helps to explain why 
discussions of security can often turn on whether there is any objective validation for a subjective claim of insecurity‖ 
(Freedman, 2004, p.247).  
278
 For instance according to Ian Bellamy, ―Security itself is a relative freedom from war, coupled with a relatively high 
expectation that defeat will not be a consequence of any war that should occur‖ (cited in Buzan, 1991, p. 16).  
279
 For an overview of each of these perspectives, see Smith (1999). 
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security and its implications for aid agencies; it does not refer to the populations and wider 
environments in which aid agencies operate; nor to the ways and means necessary to achieve and 
maintain security; and because it is made unreflexively, it does not acknowledge the value–laden and 
normative character of its expression.  
 
Given the findings of the research, several additional points have to be taken into consideration 
for the definition to be complete. First: the onus must be on the possibility of reaching people who, 
given contextual circumstances, are deemed potentially vulnerable and are, as such, likely to 
appreciate and benefit from external support. It must not preclude the nature of this vulnerability, and 
must acknowledge that the group of people whose lives has been severely disturbed and harmed are 
the primary agents of their own survival and recovery.  
Second: the definition must emphasise that the objective of the external interveners is to 
provide assistance, which will contribute to improving, or giving them the means to improve, their 
situation. This implies that assistance to these populations is conditional upon this prime objective; 
however, it must be done in accordance with basic human needs that have been identified and/or 
were commonly expressed, and in ways that are politically, socially, ethically and culturally 
appropriate. In other words, assistance cannot be imposed, or used for other purposes such as 
political or financial gains, or provided in ways that go against the interests of the populations 
concerned.  
Third: the definition must specify the referent object(s) of security; in other words, who and/or 
what is to be secured. By doing so, it must recognise aid agencies‘ shared identity, but in a way that 
also acknowledges the diversity of the aid sector.  
Fourth: the definition must refer to threats that may prevent external interveners from reaching 
and supporting the populations deemed vulnerable given contextual circumstances.  
Fifth: it must consider the ways and means to do so. Additionally, it must specify that, given aid 
agencies‘ ethos, these approaches must be harmless to local populations and respectful of local 
concerns and particularities; likewise, a definition of humanitarian security should be inclusive, rather 
than exclusive of populations.  
Sixth: the definition must show elements of reflexivity, i.e. demonstrate that both the thinker 
and practitioner of humanitarian security are aware of the contingent nature of security, as well as of 
their responsibilities in rendering the situation more or less secure.  
Seventh: for the definition to be pertinent for both thinkers and practitioners, the definition must 
be theoretically sound and policy relevant. 
7.3.2. A new definition of humanitarian security 
What then is humanitarian security? On the basis of the analysis provided in the previous 
chapters, it can now be defined as: ―Collective approaches that ensure humanitarian aid agencies 
safely access and support vulnerable populations in their own recovery. While also ensuring that aid 
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agencies‘ staff, programmes, assets and reputation are protected as much as is possible from real or 
perceived threats. These approaches must be conceived and implemented in ways that effectively do, 
and are seen as doing, no harm. The approaches must be respectful of local considerations; ethically 
coherent with agencies‘ declared values; inclusive, as is realistically possible, of the local populations; 
and contribute to improving the overall situation.‖ 
 
Some would argue that, although specific, this definition remains too wide as it leaves itself too 
open to interpretation. First, what are the ‗approaches‘ and how many are needed? Do they refer to a 
necessary respect for humanitarian principles, or is the use of military force (done in a way that it 
could be said by some to be respectful of local considerations) considered acceptable? Such criticism 
would be relevant, yet any further specifications on the ‗ways and means‘ would then not be 
representative of the whole spectrum of non-profit, non-governmental and international aid agencies. 
Indeed, given the normative power of definitions, it would not be surprising that Deontologicals in 
particular, would restrict the definition and include an explicit reference to humanitarian principles. But 
the effect of such a strict definition would be likely to exclude aid agencies that are not seen as 
sharing their values.  
Secondly, the notion of a ‗threat‘ could be more specific. As it stands now, two interpretations 
are possible. Either the context of the definition makes clear that threats refer to ‗security threats‘, or it 
implies that anything can be a threat; from a criminal act, to a natural disaster, but also including lack 
of funding or available human resources. The latter interpretation implies that security a) necessarily 
encompasses more elements than just physical considerations circumscribed by technical answers, 
and b) that security is a collective responsibility that is shared across an organization. This does not 
however, preclude its daily management being delegated to a security manager. Although the second 
interpretation widens the scope of humanitarian security, both interpretations are plausible.  
Thirdly, given its ‗emancipatory‘ connotation, the reference to ‗contributing in improving the 
overall situation‘ would certainly raise the eyebrows of IR scholars‘ who are critical of Ken Booth‘s 
emancipatory project (Booth, 2005). It is nevertheless included a) as a reference to aid agencies‟ 
claimed emancipatory objective, and b) in order to emphasise the normative power of security 
(Huysmans, 2006) and the subsequent responsibilities of security thinkers and practitioners. In 
addition, it is done reflexively, i.e. in ways that acknowledge its contestable nature. 
Fourthly, some could be ironic about the length of the definition. Yes, it is long, but this is a 
consequence of both the inherent complexity of humanitarian action, and the need to underscore the 
contingent, subjective and reflexive dimensions of security. 
  
In the definition, the reference to ‗collective approaches‘ is made to emphasise a) the 
interconnectedness between aid agencies, and in particular the fact that one agencies‘ security 
choices is likely to affect other agencies‘; and b) the fact that security is necessarily a collective 
responsibility that is shared across an organization. However, it does not refer to the concepts of 
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‗common security‘ or ‗collective security‘ as developed by the Palme Commission's 1982 report 
―Common Security – A Blueprint for Survival. Neither does it refer to some critical security authors 
(Møller, 2000), as these conceptualizations would imply that the security needs of all aid agencies are 
similar, or could be transferred to a ‗super-agency‘, while as the research has revealed, their security 
is contingent upon their respective ethos.  
The reference to ‗doing no harm‘ refers to Mary Anderson‘s approach (1999) whereby aid 
agencies are encouraged to limit the potentially negative effects of their actions. Not only is this 
approach well known amongst aid workers, but, by requiring aid agencies to assess their own 
practices and their unintended consequences, it also puts an additional emphasis on the necessity to 
implement security reflexively. It does not, however, preclude them from using violence in cases of 
self-defence, solely as a very last resort.  
The focus on the marginal value of security is based on the acknowledgement that resources 
are finite and that their distribution across an organization is the result of political choices. In order to 
prevent an agency – or manager – from making ill-informed decisions that could jeopardize the safety 
of their constituency, the definition refers to the marginal value of the costs of security as explained by 
Baldwin:  
 The marginal value approach is the only one that provides a solution to the resource allocation problem. 
This approach is not based on any assertion about the value of security to all actors in all situations. 
Instead, it is rooted in the assumption that the law of diminishing marginal utility is as applicable to 
security as it is to other values. Asserting the primacy of security is like asserting the primacy of water, 
food, or air. A certain minimum amount of each is needed to sustain life, but this does not mean that the 
value of a glass of water is the same for a person stranded in a desert and a person drowning in a lake. 
As King Midas learned, the value of an increment of something depends on how much of it one has. … 
According to the marginal value approach, security is only one of many policy objectives competing for 
scarce resources and subject to the law of diminishing returns. Thus, the value of an increment of [ ... 
security ... will vary ... ], depending not only on how much security is needed but also on how much 
security the [subject] already has. Rational policy–makers will allocate resources to security only as long 
as the marginal return is greater for security than for other uses of the resources (Baldwin, p.20, 1997).  
 
In other words, the marginal value approach is used as a benchmark so that ‗enough‘ resources are 
invested in security despite competing priorities. 
Last, it is understood that the definition is contestable. The research offers a foundational claim 
about what is humanitarian security, but acknowledges both the changing nature of security as well as 
the contingency of the definition to this thesis‘s findings. It therefore remains open to alternative 
interpretations. As Møller claims: 
 
 [e]ven though a consensus thus seems to be emerging on the need for a certain widening [of the 
concept of security], disagreement persists about where to draw the line. As will be argued in the 
following … there is no ‗correct‘ answer to questions such as this. It is a matter of definitions, which may 
be more or less useful or relevant, but neither right nor wrong. To expand the notion of security too far—
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say, to include the absence of all types of problems—would not be practical, since it would merely 
create the need for an additional term for ‗traditional security‘, now relegated to being merely one 
species of the genus ‗security‘. Not to widen the concept at all might, on the other hand, relegate 
‗security studies‘ to a very marginalized position, if (as seems likely) traditional security problems will be 
perceived as having a sharply diminishing salience (Møller, p.3, 2000). 
  
This is a similar approach to the the definition of humanitarian security to the one used in this 
thesis here. Expanding or narrowing the definitionare both possible options and neither endevor would 
be right or wrong. However, in doing so, the key factor would be to do it reflexively and to 
acknowledge how the expansion or diminution is contingent to one‘s views. 
 
The research has offered a definition of ‗humanitarian security‘ which can be used by 
academics and practitioners alike. By doing so, it recognises both the specificity of humanitarian 
action – in particular the claim that genuine aid is based on needs/rights, not political, financial, or 
other considerations – and the responsibilities of aid agencies and humanitarian security managers in 
their approaches to security.  
7.3.3. Implications of the thesis for future research 
The present research has provided a framework for analysis as a preliminary step to engaging 
in further substantive empirical research; while also acknowledging the inherent limitations of such an 
exercise. As such, it recognises that there is a need to research which of the three aforementioned 
approaches to security best balances all the factors: aid agency needs to safely support populations 
with the necessity of doing no harm; being respectful of local considerations; being ethically coherent 
with their stated values; being as inclusive as is realistically possible of the local populations; and 
contributing to improving the overall situation. This kind of research may be done through a further 
comparative study between the different approaches to security. For this, a number of aid agencies 
from each ideal–type would have to be selected; their practices of security studied in a number of 
different contexts; and their achievements in terms of humanitarian operations would have to be 
comparatively assessed, including a comparison of populations‘ and stakeholders‘ perceptions and 
satisfaction.  
Equally, research has to investigate other gaps in the knowledge about humanitarian security. 
This thesis has posited that very little is known about the motivations and intentions of the perpetrators 
of violence against aid workers. Filling this gap can be done at two levels. First, through direct 
interactions with instigators of violence. Naturally any such encounter would have to be well prepared 
and would have to be based upon a comprehensive risk analysis; and if the risks were deemed too 
high, an alternative option would be to interact with former instigators of violence – such as 
demobilised and reintegrated militiamen. Secondly, the lack of systematic and thorough post–incident 
analysis needs to be dealt with. Filling this gap would help to better understand the circumstances that 
lead to incidents. This however cannot happen without the aid community‘s active involvement. 
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Fortunately, such efforts can be built on the basis of existing collaborative efforts. A positive outcome 
would be that such research would set forth the basis for determining the threshold point above which 
the cost of security is too high – whether in terms of the potential violence it underpins, or in terms of 
the negative effects it produces. Such processes would, in turn greatly contribute to aid agencies‘ 
adopting a reflective analysis of their practices.  
Lastly, the thesis also sets forth the basis for a reflective conceptual analysis of security. By 
confirming that security is necessarily contingent and subjective, the thesis challenges current 
positivist views that analyse security as a fixed concept. As attested in this research, there is no 
concept of security which is independent from the subjects or from the context in which they evolve. 
This opens the door for the analysis of security to adopt a reflective view. Understanding this would, 
hopefully, help us to understand the premises and assumptions behind theories of security. Similarly, 
it would also allow practitioners of security – including states‘ armies, police forces, private military and 
security contractors, etc – to question what their responsibilities are in the secure or insecure 
character of a situation and how their approaches to security contribute to further (in)security. 
 
7.4. Implications of the thesis for international aid agencies’ approaches to 
security 
As revealed in the research, each ideal–type of aid organization has definite preferences 
regarding security management. As such, humanitarian security is shaped differently depending on 
aid agencies‘ respective priorities. Approaches to security reflect an aid agencies‘ respective cultural 
and social baggage. This in turn implies that aid agencies‘ approaches to security are nevertheless 
based on premises and assumptions which need to be explored in order to reveal their implications for 
aid agency security. Understanding what these premises and assumptions are helps reveal the 
weaknesses of humanitarian security management and highlights areas that need further 
improvement.  
The current section first deciphers the premises and assumptions present in each type of aid 
agencies‘ humanitarian security management, and subsequently offers suggestions for aid agencies 
to improve their security.  
7.4.1. The premises of Deontological, Solidarist and Utilitarian organizations’ approaches to 
security 
The approach to security by Deontological organizations is strongly framed by the conviction 
that close respect for, and application, of humanitarian principles is the best way to ensure the safe 
continuation of their work. However, such views are based on the premise that humanitarian principles 
in and of themselves offer 'protective power‘ (Hammond, 2008). This is because Deontological 
organizations believe that potential authors of security threats are sensitive to an agencies‘ identity 
and posture. This in turn is based on the assumption that these potential perpetrators of insecurity are 
a) interested in differentiating aid agencies; b) are aware of the differences among agencies; and c) 
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have a specific interest in not harming aid agencies which adopt a ‗principled‘ approach. The present 
research has underscored that, when appropriately implemented and communicated, humanitarian 
principles can surely be powerful tools for operating safely in difficult environments. However, the 
protective power this provides is dependant on a number of conditions. First, it necessitates that aid 
agencies who frame their security approach within humanitarian principles need an excellent 
understanding of the contexts in which they operate and know in particular who the different 
stakeholders are and what their interests are. Secondly, an agency must have, and maintain, 
coherence between their principles and their operations (including the source of funding, the staff 
selection and transmission of values, their advocacy profiles, and the types and ways their programs 
are being implemented) and ensure that parties to the conflict perceive this coherence. This in turn 
implies that such ‗principled‘ approaches are deeply engrained in organizations‘ policies and 
operations and are proactively and constantly explained to relevant parties. One can only observe that 
this proves difficult to achieve for a number of aid agencies.  
In addition, not only is the protective power of humanitarian principles conditional, but, 
independent of aid agencies‘ efforts to respect these, the respect for these principles may, in certain 
circumstances, be pointless. This is particularly true when the rationale for acts of violence against aid 
agencies is criminal in nature – robbers and rapists are most likely to be indifferent to an 
organization‘s aim or posture. While a ‗principled‘ approach might appeal to politically motivated 
perpetrators, it bears little weight with criminal offenders, who are particularly difficult to reason with.  
Having said that, it is nevertheless worth recalling that according to Donini et al, ―[w]hile 
humanitarians would like to think that more rigorous respect of humanitarian principles acts as their 
best protective shield, this remains true more in the negative than in the positive in the sense that 
non–respect of principles increases staff insecurity.‖ (Donini et al, p.25, 2008). In other words, if the 
relevance of humanitarian principles in providing security remains unclear, any re-conceptualization of 
humanitarian approaches to security would benefit from adopting a precautionary stance: aid 
organizations have an interest in recognising that the internal coherence built upon a ‗principled‘ 
approach to security is likely to affect how they are being perceived by perpetrators of violence. The 
trick is to find – and constantly reproduce – the fine balance that exists between the principled 
framework and the need for flexibility. Nevertheless, and even if IAAs are able to keep a consistency 
between their claims and practices, they should also be cautious about developing a false sense of 
security based on holding a coherent posture. 
 
Although the Solidarist organizations‘ approaches to security are said to be similar to 
Deontological organizations, the thesis has shown that this is not always true in practice. Their views 
are based on the premise that they have the means to implement a ‗principled‘ approach to security, 
yet this approach is necessarily conditional. The relevance of humanitarian principles in providing 
security to Solidarists may be questioned if one looks at the discrepancy that exists between the 
number of aid agencies that claim to abide by the principles, and the lack of strict commitment to 
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putting them into practice. The problem lies in the fact that many aid agencies refer to the principles 
but cannot implement them. In the words of a member of SC-UK staff, ―do we respect the 
humanitarian principles? Yes absolutely. But if the rhetoric is easy, their practical application is 
difficult…‖280 The impossibility of their implementation does not come from aid workers‘ un-willingness, 
but is due to three factors. First, organizations which rely heavily on institutional funding have less 
flexibility in designing and implementing their operations compared to those with private funding. As 
such, they are more susceptible to donor pressure and policy framework for interventions - as 
illustrated by a CARE employee: ―CARE is donor oriented and as such it‘s very difficult to remain 
respectful of our principles.‖281 In addition, even if they manage to be effectively independent from 
their donors‘ policies, they might not be perceived as such – particularly by the instigators of violence. 
Secondly, putting humanitarian principles into action is resource and knowledge intensive. Small 
organizations in particular may not have the in-house capacity to engage in proper situational analysis 
or proper relationship building. Likewise, working ‗on both sides of a conflict‘ requires additional 
capabilities for an effective presence. Thirdly, it may prove difficult for multi-mandate organizations 
(whose activities are not purely humanitarian) to strictly follow humanitarian principles while being 
concomitantly involved in other activities. For devotees of a strict interpretation of humanitarian action, 
the only ambition of this kind of action is to provide a decent means of survival – not rebuild countries, 
support political processes or prosecutions against human rights‘ violators (Hofman and Delaunay, 
2010). It is indeed challenging to remain neutral – and be perceived as such – when engaging in 
activities which may go against a party‘s interests.  
 Additionally, as explained in Chapter Five, Solidarist aid agencies are more prone than others 
to use local partners, either because they are ‗risk avoiders‘ as opposed to frontline organizations, or 
because, as Denominational organizations, they rely more on religious networks.  This risk avoidance 
is often characterised by a reliance on remote management of their programs.282 Remote 
management is a commonly used practice yet it is not devoid of its own problems (Stoddard et al, 
p.10, 2010). In addition, the management of security risks in remote management practive is a 
challenge, and depends broadly on an organization‘s approach to security and attitude towards risk. 
Even if remote management decreases the vulnerability of some staff, it also has the potential to skew 
perceptions of insecurity by the now–distant staff – which then makes it difficult to go back to prior 
modes of programming and can prolong the arrangement longer than may be necessary. In addition, 
remote management also affects the quality and effectiveness of the programmes, as well as their 
efficiency and accountability (Stoddard et al, p.8, 2010). Eventually, a poor response to the needs will 
negatively impact an organization‘s legitimacy, and therefore security. 
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 As can be seen, Solidarist approaches to security generally lack overall coherence. The 
tension comes from the discrepancy between organizations‘ wish to be respectful of the principles, 
and their limited ability to actually put them into practice. Yet, they might not be aware of such a 
discrepancy – and therefore not be aware of the lack of coherence they project. Understanding this 
lack of coherence is then, a first step, before any reconceptualization of their approach to security can 
take place. 
 
Utilitarian organizations‘ approach to security is based on a conception of ethics which is far 
broader than humanitarian principles and that comprises basic moral considerations of ‗right‘ versus 
‗wrong‘. On this basis, the rationale behind their security approach can be divided simplistically into 
three steps: a) Utilitarians consider they need to get the job done; b) they nevertheless acknowledge 
that they can‘t be accepted by all parties; c) partiality or deterrence are consequently understandable.  
In other words, their views on security are based on the premise that, given the moral rectitude 
of their programs, a confrontational approach might sometimes be necessary. As such, they assume 
that they have the right to defend themselves through favouring a side or adopting a firm stance. 
These views are further compounded by the fact that, as major recipients of institutional funding, they 
are also under pressure from their donors to achieve their projects, regardless of the field dynamics 
and security situation. As a result, the political aspect of their approach remains unquestioned and 
security is reduced to the provision of technical fixes aiming at achieving the ‗right‘ goal.  
Nonetheless, there is a major flaw in Utilitarian approaches to security: their moral rectitude is 
inherently subjective. What is considered to be the ‗right‘ thing in their view is not necessarily seen as 
right by others. For instance, aid workers working for a Utilitarian organization in the conservative 
areas of Afghanistan might consider that implementing projects that empower women is a good thing, 
but may find themselves in conflict with local traditions – and facing violent resistance.283  
In addition, Utilitarian approaches to security tend to rely too much on external providers of 
security, be it armed forces or PMSCs. One may wonder what happens to these organizations if these 
security providers have other interests. In fact, this is a question which urgently needs an answer in 
Afghanistan: following the recent government‘s decision to close down PMSCs, aid agencies like IRD 
which were heavily relying on their protection will have to find alternatives rapidly.  
Utilitarian aid organizations need to understand that, though their overall aim is charitable, they 
must nevertheless question both the actual rectitude of this aim and the approaches they use to 
achieve it. The image they project is a possible cause of acts of violence perpetrated against them. 
Ryfman explains that NGOs‘ ―legitimacy is now being much more widely questioned‖ (Ryfman, p.34, 
2007) and argues that their legitimacy must be promoted. Aid agencies do not benefit from a natural 
legitimacy, but from history and customary practices that give them the ‗benefit of the doubt‘. 
Legitimacy in other words is not granted, but is obtained through operational capacity, relevance and 
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expertise. As Sørensen reaffirms (p.13, 2006): ―[i]t is clear that the humanitarian project is no longer 
self–justifying or safely located in a moral domain beyond the debatable‖. In other words, ‗what is 
done‘ is no longer enough to legitimise aid agencies; ‗how it is done‘ is just as important. Here, a 
comprehensive approach to security may play a role in ensuring that agencies adopt practices that are 
both safer for and more respectful of the local populations. Duffield has for instance argued that:  
  
In considering [fortified aid compounds], it is legitimate to ask what sort of impression they make on the 
public and, not least, those aid beneficiaries that agencies claim to empower and better? In their 
appearance and intent, these buildings are the very opposite of empowering; they are intimidating 
structures designed to keep the public out (Duffield, p.12, 2010). 
 
Similarly, authors have argued that donors and aid agencies‘ ‗partnership strategies‘ which aim 
at involving local actors often ignore existing social institutions and favour instead new organizations 
that fit better with their liberal political culture (Sørensen, 2006). A technical approach to risk 
management would most likely not identify these kinds of dynamics. Indeed, security managers often 
define their response to situations in terms of what they individually can do best. This means that the 
response frequently reflects not what the situation itself may require, but rather the way a security 
manager has interpreted it. A management of risks based on sociological or anthropological analyses, 
including the awareness of one‘s own premises and assumptions would certainly be helpful.  
7.4.2. Implications of aid agencies’ approaches to security for their own security 
In theory, aid workers‘ risk assessments take into consideration the impacts of their 
organization on the local dynamics and include the questioning of their organization‘s legitimacy in a 
given context. In reality aid agencies admit that their understanding of the contexts is often insufficient 
and their analytical capacities limited. As confessed by a Country Director, ―Haiti is so complex that 
even as CD I'm not sure that I'm competent to manage security; we often put programmes on standby 
because it's the most sensible thing to do.‖284 While providing an honest assessment, such an 
anecdote highlights the need for more investment in developing analytical capacity as well as overall 
security management. As discussed in Chapter Three, IAAs generally lack knowledge regarding the 
actual factors underpinning the origins of the insecurity and of perpetrators‘ intentions. 
This in turn, has grave implications for IAAs‘ approaches to security. Indeed, premises and 
assumptions about the causes of insecurity often hide this lack of knowledge, and influence the way 
each agency deals with insecurity. Yet, as underscored in the thesis, agency approaches to security 
are related to their respective identity and view of the world. As Fast rightly states:  
 
The obvious danger is that we develop policies and agendas that wrongly identify the problems and 
causes, and thus the appropriate and corresponding responses. In literature emphasizing factors 
outside the influence of agencies, humanitarians become reactive to external threats and passive actors 
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subject to ‗forces outside their control.‘ Translating this perspective into security management strategies 
would result in approaches that primarily or exclusively work to harden the target or deter attacks — a 
more militarized approach — as opposed to working proactively to gain community support for programs 
and activities. Ensuring community support places security management within the wider context of 
other programs and policies. In acknowledging the contributions of personal conduct and organizational 
policies, procedures, and programs to security issues, humanitarian actors regain a measure of control 
over their fates and serve as active participants and agents in their own safety and security. Security 
management strategies, therefore, become more contextualized and responsive to the particular threats 
and risks of the situation at hand (Fast, 2010, in press). 
 
 In addition, aid agencies‘ awareness of the impacts of their security approach is very limited. 
Although project evaluation and monitoring are done regularly, evaluations of security management 
practices are often done only after an incident has happened. As seen earlier however, each 
approach to security has its own premises and each has its own weaknesses. While nobody is 
perfect, aid agencies need be more aware of these, and take into consideration how their respective 
approaches to security affect the global and local dynamics. The hard approach to security is an 
obvious point in case, in particular the contracting of Weaponised companies. Similarly, risk avoidance 
may well discourage international donors from funding an agency unwilling to operate in dangerous 
areas and convince local populations that these organizations are not interested in their fate. The 
danger for aid agencies is that they lose their legitimacy in the eyes of both the international and local 
actors. This in turn potentially threatens their access to both sources of funding and areas controlled 
by armed opposing groups. Any loss of legitimacy in turn, may jeopardise agencies‘ security and, 
ultimately, survival.  
While many authors claim that aid agencies should seriously question their respective and 
collective approaches to humanitarian action, aid workers employed by Deontological organizations 
go a step further and call for multi-mandate organizations – most of them being Solidarists and 
Utilitarians – to reconsider their portfolio of activities in war zones: ―For the sake of preserving the 
space for impartial humanitarian assistance in war zones, multi-mandate organizations should make a 
choice between relief and development assistance, a choice between saving lives today or saving 
societies tomorrow‖ (Hofman and Delaunay, p.6, 2010). As Donini et al argue,  
 
… our case studies highlight the fact that coherence/integration agendas increase the risk that 
humanitarians will be seen as ―guilty by association‖ with political and securitization agendas and, more 
broadly, with the failings of internationally supported peace and reconstruction processes. The security 
of humanitarian personnel may be compromised by donor–driven pressure for coherence, by their 
linkage to agendas that are not strictly humanitarian, and by the use of humanitarian action as a tool to 
achieve political objectives (Donini et al, p.24, 2008,).  
 
This is particularly concerning when one considers that an organization‘s security stance inevitably 
affects others around it.  
                  220 of 257 
The tensions between a strict, limited approach to humanitarian action and a more expansive, 
inclusive one (both of which have been underscored in Chapter Four) remains unresolved. Several 
authors and practitioners argue that the aid sector as a whole is at a critical juncture and, depending 
on a number of variables (such as the amount of future funding available, the increasing numbers of 
disasters, the appearance of a multiplicity of new aid actors, etc), it may not be able to adapt itself 
quickly enough to survive as it is (Bishop, 2008; Donini et al, 2008). A good starting point would 
therefore be for aid agencies to study the premises and assumptions underlying their respective 
approaches to security and to understand the implications that these have for security. Self–reflexion 
is considered a necessary first step in the process of improving aid agencies‘ security conception and 
practices.  
Similarly, aid agencies should question the premises that lead them to outsource their security 
to PMSCs. Most security companies used by aid agencies are Guarding companies. Unfortunately, 
many aid workers, used to interacting with ‗innocuous‘ shopping-mall guards in their respective 
country of origin, do not realise that the stakes are higher when such companies are used in contexts 
where the rule of law is non-existent. These difficulties are compounded when warlords register their 
militias as a local guarding company to make sure their troops will avoid entering the DDR process, 
and where obtaining weapons means necessarily making use of the black market arms trade as is the 
case in both Afghanistan and Haiti.  
In addition, and as was argued in Chapter Two, PMSCs‘ clients are more prone to being 
influenced by contractors‘ approaches to security since the clients‘ expertise and capabilities are 
reduced when outsourcing security functions. Security providers have an epistemic power that 
impacts on how their clients see the world in general and the risks around them. They provide 
information and, even if they are sincerely convinced that this information is true, their information, as 
well as the way they provide it, is shaped by their own assumptions, yet influences others people‘s 
perceptions. As an NGO Country Director in Afghanistan explained, ―who you chose to manage your 
security impacts how you perceive the environment and how the environment perceives you.‖285  
7.4.3. Implications of aid agencies’ approaches to security for the local populations 
There is little doubt that the acceptance approach remains the preferred one among aid 
agencies. However, as discussed in Chapter Five, it is expected that under the current leadership, 
UNDSS will push for further protection and deterrence postures within the UN system. It is likely that 
major NGOs, in particular Utilitarians and a few Solidarists will follow. As Duffield argues, ―[a]necdotal 
evidence … suggests that donor governments and UN agencies, again concerned over litigation, are 
tending to favour subcontracting NGOs that follow formal security guidelines‖ (Duffield, p.15, 2010). 
This may eventually play against aid agencies‘ traditional acceptance strategy. 
Being ‗accepted‘ implies having political and social consent from all stakeholders, ranging from 
foreign and host governments to armed groups, local administrations, civil society and the 
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communities themselves. Getting the communities‘ acceptance is not easy. Indeed, despite a clear 
preference for acceptance, most aid workers interviewed in the course of this research placed 
conditions on it. For instance, it was said that acceptance could only work on an individual and 
contextual basis, and was dependent on the organization‘s programmes and disposition towards their 
environment.  
While the concept of ‗community‘ itself rests on the assumption that a group of people is 
(peacefully) organized and has legitimate representation, assumptions regarding aid agencies‘ 
relations with ‗communities‘ are also present among aid workers. First, ‗communities‘ are sometimes 
foreign conceptual constructs that have little to do with real social structures. According to an NGO 
security adviser in Haiti, for instance, ―there are so many social differences between populations that it 
is difficult to say what a actually community is and to build any cohesion.‖286 In addition, communities 
may not be organized according to the same value systems as those of the external interveners. 
Although not everyone would agree with the following viewpoint, an aid worker explained in Haiti that 
―we implement our projects with a horizontal value system (with participation, equality, etc) but the 
society is organized vertically (there is a leader and that‘s it).‖287 In addition, while a leader may be 
seen as legitimate by the community members, they may not be representative of the ‗truly‘ vulnerable 
(widows, handicapped, underprivileged, etc). Lastly, some have argued (De Berry, 2001) that the way 
the concept of community is used in aid discourse often ignores the realities of community dynamics 
or bypasses legitimate leaders in favour of those who think along the same lines as the aid agencies. 
Engaging with communities then necessarily involves a deep local understanding of their dynamics 
and a direct engagement with the ‗truly‘ vulnerable. Rather than preventing such interactions, security 
measures could encourage them. 
Similarly, it should be noted that the concept of ‗civil society‘ is contested, and depending on its 
definition, may contribute to excluding some actors or activities. Several authors (ACSF, Undated; 
Harpviken et al, 2002; Borchgrevink, 2007; Howell and Lind, 2008; Coburn, 2009) have shown that 
local civil societies are often seen through a western prism where local groups are essentially seen as 
service–delivery agents while ‗traditional institutions‘ such as elders, jirgas, mosques and shuras, are 
poorly incorporated into the development processes. Similarly, Howell and Lind have aptly revealed 
that in Afghanistan, civil societies are in constant evolution and are frequently shaped by external 
actors, including aid agencies (Howell and Lind, 2008). 
 
Acceptance cannot be assumed but must rather be continuously and proactively pursued. This 
implies that resources must be allocated and programmes designed accordingly. As argued in 
Chapter Five, in addition to necessitating financial and human resources, building relationships and 
networks also needs another precious resource in emergency–laden environments: time. Ensuring 
proper community participation and ownership might, for instance, imply extending tightly scheduled 
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programmes. ‗Proactive acceptance‘ also means that engagement should not focus only on those who 
benefit from the aid projects, but also and perhaps more importantly, it should focus on those who are 
ignored. At field level this consists of ‗communities‘ who do not share the same identities as those who 
are the beneficiaries of assistance; people who only see aid convoys transiting without stopping in 
their own areas. At the international level, ‗proactive acceptance‘ must take into consideration regional 
and global actors, including governments, symbolic leaders, armed groups, networks or diasporas, 
etc. Aid agencies‘ presence in certain regions (central Africa, Middle-East, Latin America, etc), is likely 
to endure for several more decades, so acceptance is of vital importance to them. Yet, few of these 
organizations have developed systematic exchanges with entities as diverse as the influential TV 
channel Al Jazeera, renowned intellectuals and religious leaders, regional organizations, Arab donors 
and Chinese foreign assistance organizations; or developed civil–military exchanges with armed 
forces from Asia, first providers of Blue Helmets. Existing efforts could be substantiated with further 
collective comprehensive initiatives such as the Islamic Relief‘s drive in creating the Humanitarian 
Forum.288  
Lastly, implementing protection and/or deterrence postures does not mean putting aside the 
acceptance approach. On the contrary, increased outreach could serve as a positive counter-balance 
to the negative perceptions that may arise when emphasising attitudes perceived as distant or 
aggressive. As Baldwin puts it: ―[t]he most rational policies for security in the long run may differ 
greatly from those for security in the short run. In the short run, a high fence, a fierce dog, and a big 
gun may be useful ways to protect oneself from the neighbours. But in the long run, it may be 
preferable to befriend them‖ (Baldwin, p.17, 1997).  
 
As seen in this thesis, when it comes to humanitarian security management, there is room for 
improvement. However, before rushing to provide fixes for identified issues, aid agencies would 
benefit from taking a step back and questioning their practices, including the premises and 
assumptions upon which these are built. Without it, one may well witness an increasing distancing 
among aid agencies as well as a permanent disconnect with the local populations. 
 
7.3. Conclusion 
Presented as both a reflection on the research and a conclusion of the thesis, this chapter has 
first provided a summary of the thesis‘ findings as these relate to the key research questions and 
hypotheses laid out in the introduction. In the end, it underscored that the empirical data significantly 
supports the main argument of the research, which is that when it comes to security, IAA identity does 
frame their approach to security, which includes the way they engage with PMSCs. Equally 
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importantly, the relevance of using a critical constructivist framework to study humanitarian security 
practices was also demonstrated by the thesis. 
Secondly, the chapter has provided a discussion of the main theoretical and empirical 
contributions of the thesis. Indeed, theoretically, the research confirms the relevance of a critical 
constructivist analysis in the field of International Relations, and by doing so, adds a new perspective 
to the existing literature about humanitarian security. A second contribution of this thesis to the field of 
IR is that it sheds new light on the concept of security. In particular, the research has argued that any 
definition of ‗humanitarian security‘ must take into account the contingent, subjective nature of 
security; the fact that security is a continuous process; and must be reflexive. Empirically, this thesis‘ 
contribution to the study and practice of humanitarian aid is twofold: it offers a unique typology of 
international aid agencies and provides a new angle of analysis of private military and security 
companies. Both contributions prove essential for a relevant understanding of humanitarian security. 
Thirdly, this chapter has delved into the implications of this thesis for the study and practice of 
humanitarian security and for future research. It has offered a reflexive definition of humanitarian 
security that takes account of its contingent, subjective nature and by doing so, confirms that a critical 
approach can be constructionist. One may use critical argumentations and empirical cases to 
deconstruct a given claim but this does not mean that the theoretical effort has to cease there. As the 
research has shown, one can offer a definition of security – in the present case of humanitarian 
security – which is sufficiently stable to work with, yet simultaneously reflexive, i.e. highlighting a 
contingent approach to the assertions that are made. 
Lastly, the chapter has discussed the implications of this thesis for international aid agencies‘ 
approaches to security. By doing so, this chapter has underscored the premises and assumptions of 
aid agencies‘ approaches to security and has outlined that humanitarian security management is not 
limited to technical discussions, but comprises wider political considerations including questions of 
legitimacy, organizations‘ coherence, as well as ethical and sociological preoccupations. Considering 
the findings of the research, the current chapter has made several suggestions for aid agencies; it has 
focused in particular on the fact that ‗what is done‘ is not enough to bestow aid agencies with security 
and legitimacy – ‗how it is done‘ is equally as important. This then reaffirms the need for aid agencies 
to question critically their respective approaches to security and look in particular at whether these are 
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Appendixes 
 
Appendix 1.1. Accountability and regulation of PMSCs  
Providing security services in complex environments is a challenge, regardless of the service 
provider. However, the stakes are raised when these services are provided by the private sector, in 
particular in countries were the rule of law is effectively non-existent. The potential to be involved or be 
the cause of wrongful behaviour is real and the consequences can be severe. Acknowledging the 
specificity of security as a private good, academics are involved alongside governments, international 
organizations, civil society and private security companies in a debate that is occurring at the global 
level. Starting with the acknowledgment of the lack of accountability of private military and security 
companies operating in complex environments, the aim is therefore to establish some regulation of 
activities. This regulation can be done through international agreements, national laws, extraterritorial 
judiciary procedures, as well as internationally recognised codes of conduct and lastly, with self -
regulation.  
The subject of regulation is a broad one, and cannot be treated in all its different facets here. It 
should be noted however that academics are well involved, providing both strategic and technical 
input. The following points are therefore only a brief selection of authors‘ arguments and positions.289  
Suggesting that a company that violates its contract or is involved in wrongful activities would 
not get further contracts, the industry initially claimed that market forces provide sufficient regulatory 
guarantees. However, as Carbonnier argues,  
 
the market evidently has no intrinsic ethics: the law of supply and demand applies just as much to the 
market for child prostitution or cocaine as to the stock market or the coffee market. It is up to the state to 
prohibit or regulate certain markets for reasons of law and order, security, morals, health and so on. ...  
The reality in the field tends to show that to protect victims of armed conflicts, it is imperative that states 
adopt an appropriate legal framework to prevent the rapidly expanding market for private security 
companies from being accompanied by a weakening of international humanitarian law and a growing 
number of violations of IHL by the employees of private companies who would enjoy de facto impunity 
(Carbonnier, 2006).  
 
Several authors join him in pushing for further regulation of PSCs.  
The ICRC was instrumental in recalling companies‘ rights and obligations vis-à-vis international 
humanitarian law – i.e. the laws of war. There was a spike in publications and conferences on this 
subject in 2005-2006, many of which now serve as guidance. Gillard in particular has shown the 
subtleties of the applicability of IHL to PSCs, their employees, and the states where PSCs are 
registered or operating (Gillard, 2006).  
                                               
289
 For more information, see: Holmqvist (2005); Kinsey (2005); Gillard (2006); Lehnardt (2007); Krahmann (2007).  
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As early as 1998, Shearer recalled that there was no international (nor national) applicable 
regulation of PSCs, and ever since authors such as such as Spearin, Mingst, and Carbonnier have 
maintained a constant push for greater controls. Singer suggested in 2003 that a group of 
international experts (which would include representatives from all the parties involved: private 
security contractors, academics, government and NGOs) elaborate a comprehensive database of the 
PSCs and tools of regulation and evaluation under a UN mandate.  
Although there is still much room for improvement (Cockayne, 2009), several initiatives have 
since been successful, in particular the Montreux Agreement, led jointly by the Swiss government and 
the ICRC. Also, the subsequent efforts of the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Centre 
(with Swiss funding) have successfully brought together an array of stakeholders, eventually leading 
to the publication of a Global Code of Conduct for PMSCs.  
The push toward greater regulation has unfolded. It has been surprising to see scholars, at 
times accused of isolation in their ivory towers, being so heavily involved in the regulation debate – 
and implementation of its findings. It seems that in front of a certain ineluctability of a further 
privatisation of security – and associated risks – scholars considered that warning is not enough and 
therefore needed to become actively involved in framing this shift. 
Appendix 1.2. Peace operations and related issues 
Along with the question of the private security industry‘s regulation, the question of the 
privatisation of peacekeeping operations is among the most debated. However, the debate is not 
limited to peacekeeping, but extends to the place of private security companies in peace operations. 
Given the weaknesses of the current United Nations peace operations system,290 some academics 
are advocating for an increasing role of PMSCs in peace operations. Doug Brooks, director of the 
International Stability Operations Association, a United States-based lobby group for PMSCs, is the 
most prominent supporter of such a solution. Brooks has written several articles and made the 
traditional arguments that privatised peacekeepers could be deployed under the auspices of the UN – 
for greater legitimacy and thus public acceptance – with better quality troops, faster deployment, more 
efficiency and lower costs. Acknowledging however that ―the world is not ready to privatise peace‖ 
(Koffi Annan in Singer (2003)). Brooks argues that the private sector could provide all sorts of support 
to UN peacekeepers, from training to transport and /or providing medical services. This actually, is 
already happening. According to Avant, ―[e]very multi-lateral peace operation conducted by the UN 
since 1990 included the presence of PSCs‖ (Avant, p.7, 2005). 
In light of the current conflict in Darfur, privatising the peacekeepers, or more realistically, using 
PSCs to support the existing peacekeepers is an option which is supported by many. Singer has 
summarized nicely the possible options when it comes to peace operations:  
 
                                               
290
 The reasons are diverse: lack of political will, ill-trained and poorly-equipped troops contributed by countries from the 
Global South, poor control and command structure, etc.  
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There are three primary scenarios for privatizing peacekeeping. … In the first, firms would provide active 
protection to humanitarian workers and their operational assets, such as convoys or warehouses. … 
Indeed, since humanitarian organizations operating in places such as Somalia have been forced to 
contract with local warlords, the more formal business alternative might be preferable. … The second 
scenario for international organizations bolstering themselves by the PMF market is where a firm would 
act as a ―Rapid Reaction Force‖ within an overall peacekeeping mission. … The third and most 
controversial scenario involves privatizing the entirety of an operation. The proposal is that, when states 
choose not to undertake humanitarian interventions and UN forces are neither ready nor willing, the 
operations would be turned over private firms. On their hire, the PMFs would deploy to a new area, 
defeat any local opposition, set up infrastructures, and then, only once the situation was stabilized, 
potentially hand over to regular UN peacekeepers. … This very scenario was a live option during the 
Rwandan refugee crisis in 1996 (Singer, p. 185, 2003). 
 
The literature on PMSCs has engaged with this – at times hot – debate. Looking into this topic 
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Appendix 2. Overview of International Aid Agencies  
 

















of the RC 
& NGOs 
CoC 
Reference to other 










Notre objectif est de combattre 
la faim sur tous les fronts : 
Par des opérations d'urgence, 
pour subvenir aux besoins 
vitaux des populations les plus 
vulnérables, 
Par des programmes de post-
crise pour favoriser 
l'autonomie des populations. 
19 countries  € 50.3 M 


















2 ActionAid 1972 Multi 
To work with poor and 
excluded people to eradicate 
poverty and injustice. 
40+ 
countries 













Eradication of poverty 
/ injustice / solidarity, 
equity / transparency 
/ humility / respect / 











ADRA works with people in 
poverty and distress to create 
positive change and justness 
through empowering 




$ 116.2 M 
55% donated 
material & other 
revenue; 29% US 
Gov 
? Yes 













To defend fundamental human 
rights according to the 1948 
universal declaration of human 
rights. As it has always been 
throughout its history, A.M.I.‘s 
priority is the protection of the 
universal and inalienable right 
to health care, i.e., the fight 
against physical disease and 
psychological injury; education 
in health and hygiene; medical 
training to local populations 
where required; and all these 
in geographic areas where 
health care systems are 
inadequate, inefficient or non-
existent. A.M.I. strives to 
accompany populations in 
their quest for self-sufficiency 
and thus in the implementation 
of their own system of health 
care, and encourages local 
populations to participate in its 
work. 
9 countries € 14 M 
For every 100 € of 
resources:  91.4 € 
came from public 





authorities); 1.1 € 
came from 
donations; 3.5 € 
came from deficit; 












fundamental needs / 
Respect for human 
dignity / Human rights 
/ Adaptability / Access 
to health care / 
Training / Evaluation / 
Independent 










We are a volunteer-led 
humanitarian organization that 
helps people in crisis, whoever 
and wherever they are. 
23 countries £ 182.1 M  
Voluntary income 
£91.6M; Trading 














Humanity / voluntary 
service / unity / 
universality / Courage 







6 CARE US 1945 Multi 
Our mission is to serve individuals 
and families in the poorest 
communities in the world. Drawing 
strength from our global diversity, 
resources and experience, we 
promote innovative solutions and 
are advocates for global 
responsibility. We facilitate lasting 
change by:  •Strengthening 
capacity for self-help •Providing 
economic opportunity •Delivering 
relief in emergencies •Influencing 
policy decisions at all levels  
•Addressing discrimination in all 
its forms.  Guided by the 
aspirations of local communities, 
we pursue our mission with both 
excellence and compassion 
because the people whom we 






07 to June 
08) 
Total support & 
revenue: $267 
177 000 US Gov; 
$149 228 000 US 











poverty / Emphasis 
on Women / Respect 
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7 Cesvi 1985 Multi 
In Italy and Europe, Cesvi 
carries out educational 
programs to develop global 
solidarity awareness, to 
increase the pool of donors 
and volunteers, and to 
influence private companies 
and public institutions to 
support cooperation projects 
for development. 
Cesvi mission to people in 
need around the world can be 
divided into three main 
categories: - Immediate help 
to ensure survival and to 
overcome emergencies; - The 
rehabilitation and 
reconstruction of systems 
destroyed by war or natural 
calamities.- Cooperation 
programs and projects for the 
development of 
underprivileged social groups 
and poor communities. 




Bodies: 19% Org 
IntL; 14% UE; 
14% UN  
870 (744 
NatL; 83 Intl;  
43 HQ) 
Yes 






8 Christian Aid 1945 Multi 
We are an agency of our 
churches in Britain and Ireland 
and are mandated to work on 
relief, development and 
advocacy for poverty 
eradication.  Christian Aid‘s 
work is founded on Christian 
faith, inspired by hope and acts 
to change an unjust world 
through charity – a  practical 
























9 CHF 1952 Multi 
 To be a catalyst for long-lasting 
positive change in low- and 
moderate-income communities 
around the world, helping them 
to improve their social, 
economic and environmental 
conditions. 













Community based / 
Demand-led / Locally 











Concern Worldwide works 
with the poorest people in the 
poorest countries of the world 
to enable them to transform 
their lives. Sustained by the 
concern of our many 
supporters, we seek out those 
who most urgently need our 
support, and work with them 
through thick and thin to tackle 









11.2 M Donated 
Commodities 


















Catholic Relief Services carries 
out the commitment of the 
Bishops of the United States to 
assist the poor and vulnerable 
overseas. We are motivated by 
the Gospel of Jesus Christ to 
cherish, preserve and uphold 
the sacredness and dignity of 
all human life, foster charity and 
justice, and embody Catholic 
social and moral teaching as 
we act to 
103 
countries 
$ 611.2 M 









Dignity / Rights & 
responsibilities / 
Social nature of 
humanity / Common 











Church World Service works 
with partners to eradicate 
hunger and poverty and to 
promote peace and justice 
around the world. 
? $ 70.9 M 





Love / respect all 
faiths / dignity / social 











La Croix-Rouge française, ce 
sont 52 000 bénévoles et 17 
000 salariés présents sur 
l‘ensemble du territoire. 
Auxiliaire des pouvoirs publics 
dans ses missions 
humanitaires, la Croix-Rouge 
française mène un combat de 
tous les instants pour soulager 
la souffrance des hommes. 
7 countries € 56.4 M 




17 000 (incl. 
in France) 
Yes 
Humanity / voluntary 






14 Goal 1977 Multi 
GOAL works towards ensuring 
that the poorest and most 
vulnerable in our world and 
those affected by humanitarian 
crises, have access to the 
fundamental needs and rights 
of life, including, but not limited 
to, food, water, shelter, medical 
attention and education. It is 
non-denominational, non-
governmental and non-political. 


















The association aims to 
contribute to development co-
operation, more specifically the 
integration and autonomy of 
people with disabilities and 
assistance in the rehabilitation 
of people whose physical, 
mental and/or social integrity 
has been harmed or who are in 
destitute situations in regions 
across the world where people 
are in need. It endeavours to 
involve the person in taking 
charge of their own life, notably 
by recognising their rights. 
60 countries $114.3 M 
$ 52 M Donations; 






















Its mission is to improve the 
quality of life through health 
interventions and related 
activities that build local 
capacity in underserved 
communities worldwide. By 
offering training and health care 
to local populations and 
medical assistance to people at 
highest risk, and with the 
flexibility to respond rapidly to 
emergency situations, 
International Medical Corps 
rehabilitates devastated health 
care systems and helps bring 
them back to self-reliance. 
22 countries $ 94.8 M 
$53.2M Contract 
& grant support; 
$37.9M Donate 
medical supplies 
















The IRC is a global leader in 
emergency relief, 
rehabilitation, protection of 
human rights, post-conflict 
development, resettlement 
services and advocacy for 
those uprooted or affected by 
violent conflict and 
oppression. 
42 countries $ 260.7 M 
79% Grants and 
contracts; 17% 
contributions 










IRD‘s mission is to reduce the 
suffering of the world‘s most 
vulnerable groups and provide 
tools and resources needed to 
increase their self-sufficiency. 
29 countries $ 539.1 M 
Refers specifically 
to its work with US 









2008  / 
Website 
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19 InterSOS 1992 Multi 
To give immediate response 
to humanitarian crises, by 
bringing relief to victims of 
armed conflicts and their long-
term consequences (poverty, 
disability, mines and explosive 
devices, etc.), and of any 
other natural or man-made 
calamity. To begin, along with 
the relief intervention, laying 
the groundwork for return to 
stability, reconstruction and 
development. To activate, 
stimulate and involve Italian 
society, in order to develop 
and spread the culture of 




Most of budget 
come from official 
funding such as 
EC or Italian Gov 
? Yes 
Solidarity / justice / 






20 Islamic Relief 1984 Multi 
Inspired by Islamic 
humanitarian values, Islamic 
Relief 
Worldwide aims to help meet 
the needs of vulnerable 
people and empower them to 
become self-reliant so 
that they can live with dignity 
and confidence. We help 
individuals, groups and 
institutions to develop safe 
and 
caring communities and make 
it possible for those who 
wish to suppor t others to 
reach people in need of their 
help. 










Alleviating suffering / 






21 Medair 1989 Multi 
Medair brings life-saving 
emergency relief and 
rehabilitation in disasters, 
conflict areas, and other crises 
by working alongside the most 
vulnerable. 
7 countries 







Faith / Hope / 
Compassion / 
Accountability / 


















La première mission de MDM 
est de soigner. Les volontaires 
de l‘association s‘engagent à 
venir en aide à toutes les 
populations vulnérables : les 
victimes de catastrophes 
naturelles, de famines, de 
maladies (endémies ou 
épidémies, notamment le 
sida), victimes de conflits 
armés, de violences 
politiques, réfugiés, déplacés, 
peuples minoritaires, enfants 
des rues, usagers de drogues 
et tous les exclus des soins. 
Nous savons qu‘il n‘y a pas de 
guérison sans justice, pas de 
secours durables sans lois 
sociales. Pour être efficace, la 
mission de Médecins du 
Monde va au-delà du soin : à 
partir de sa pratique médicale, 
et en toute indépendance, 
Médecins du Monde témoigne 
TBC 
55 countries € 57.8 M 
56% Private; 35% 
















Mercy Corps exists to alleviate 
suffering, poverty and 
oppression by helping people 
build secure, productive and 
just communities. 




$ 65.6M Private 





24 Merlin 1993 
Single 
(health) 
Merlin specialises in health, 
saving lives in times of crisis 
and helping to rebuild 
shattered health services. 










25 Mission East 1991 Multi 
Mission East is a Danish 
international non-
governmental relief and 
development organization 
which works to help the 
vulnerable through 
humanitarian relief aid, 
development assistance, the 
linking of relief, rehabilitation 
and development and through 
supporting communities‘ 





DKK 6,8 M Private 
donations; DKK 








Honesty / integrity / 
compassion / valuing 
the individual / 





26 Musllim Aid 1985 Multi 
Muslim Aid provides not just 
emergency relief, but 
sustainable development 
programmes which tackle the 
root causes of poverty 
70+ 
countries 
£ 25 M 
Reference to 
DfID, World Bank 
and 'generous 





Alleviating poverty / 
flexibility / partnership 











To be at the forefront in 
delivering relief from poverty, 
sickness and the delivery of 
education worldwide. To 
provide an ethical service for 
the collection and distribution 
of funds in an effective, 
efficient, transparent and 
wholly accountable manner.  
40+ 
countries 
£ 8.9 M ? ? Yes 
Right to a life of 
dignity, free of 
poverty and 
oppression / 










Les Médecins Sans Frontières 
apportent leur secours aux 
populations en détresse, aux 
victimes de catastrophes 
d'origine naturelle ou 
humaine, de situation de 
belligérance, sans aucune 
discrimination de race, 
religion, philosophique ou 
politique. TBC 
























MSF is a private, international 
organization made up mainly 
of doctors, nurses, 
paramedics and other 
professionals who can support 
us in our mission. 
They subscribe to the 
following principles: 
MSF provides aid and 
assistance to population 
groups in need, victims of 
natural and man-made 
disasters and (civil) war. We 
pursue our mission without 
differentiating on the basis of 
race, religion, ideology or 
political convictions. 
MSF is entirely neutral and 
impartial. TBC 












Les Médecins Sans Frontières 
apportent leur secours aux 
populations en détresse, aux 
victimes de catastrophes 
d'origine naturelle ou 
humaine, de situation de 
belligérance, sans aucune 
discrimination de race, 
religion, philosophique ou 
politique. TBC 




























NRC shall promote and 
protect the rights of all people 
who have been forced to flee 
their countries, or their homes 
within their countries, 
regardless of their race, 
religion, nationality or political 
convictions. This will be 
achieved by acting as an 
independent and courageous 
spokesman for refugee rights 
nationally and internationally, 
by providing humanitarian 
assistance in emergency 
situations, and by 
strengthening the capacity of 
the UN organizations to offer 
and coordinate international 
aid and protection. NRC shall 
in all ways seek to provide 
viable, durable solutions with 
regard to both its spokesman 






NOK 736.8 M 
Institutional 
donors 









NCA is a diakonal 
organization working for global 
justice. This mission has been 
given to us by churches and 
Christian organizations in 






NOK 140 M 
private donors; 









Compassion / justice, 








33 Oxfam GB 1942 Multi 
Oxfam works with others to 




£ 299.7 M 
£103.6 Donations 
& Legacies; £70 
from Gov & other 
publc authorities; 
£65.7¨trading 






payroll at HQ 


























Plan aims to achieve lasting 
improvements in the quality of 
life of deprived children in 
developing countries, through 
a process that unites people 
across cultures and adds 
meaning and value to their 
lives 
48 countries 
€ 468 M 
(2008-
2009) 
More than 70% of 
Plan‘s income 
comes from child 
sponsorship  
? Yes 
Best interests of the 
child / child rights and 
human right / ethic / 
honesty / 
transparency / 
integrity / personal 
empowerment / 










Dans le cadre de la défense 
des principes du droit à la vie 
et à la dignité, du droit 
humanitaire international, 
dans l'impartialité et la non-
discrimination, nous 
engageons des actions 
concrètes et directes d'aide en 
faveur de victimes civiles 
mises en péril, marginalisées 
ou exclues par les effets de 
catastrophes naturelles ou 
causées par l'homme de 
guerres, guerres civiles, 
conflits d'effondrement 
économique consécutif à un 
bouleversement politique 
international ou national 
15 countries  € 21.6 M 
82% Public; 12% 
payments in kind 
1125 (1000 
NatL, 100 
IntL, 25 HQ) 
Yes N/A Website 
36 
Save the 







Save the Children fights for 
children‘s rights; we deliver 
immediate and lasting 
improvement to children‘s 
lives worldwide. 




Donations & gifts 
(26%); £29.3M 




Rights based / Justice 















Our mission is to create 
lasting, positive change in the 
lives of children in need. With 
your support, Save the 
Children will ensure that 
children in need grow up safe, 
educated and healthy, and 




$ 446.8 M 
48% Private gifts, 
grants & 
contracts; 24% 















SOLIDARITES est une 
association d'aide humanitaire 
internationale qui, depuis 29 
ans, porte secours aux 
populations victimes de 
conflits armés et de 
catastrophes naturelles en 
répondant à leurs besoins 
vitaux – boire, manger, 
s‘abriter. 
14 countries € 45.2 M 





IntL; 40 HQ) 





39 Tearfund 1968 Multi 
We have a vision to see 50 
million people released from 
material and spiritual poverty 
through a worldwide network 
of 100,000 local churches. 
50+ 
countries 
£ 64.8 M 
(2009-
2010) 
£ 41 M Donations; 











40 Trocaire 1973 Multi 
When the Bishops of Ireland 
established Trócaire in 1973, 
they issued a pastoral letter on 
development. It is striking that 
the issues raised by the 
Bishops in 1973 are still 
relevant today. Trocaire 
website presents the full text 
of the letter. 
34 countries 
€ 47.7 M 
(2009-
20010) 
€ 25 M 
Unrestricted; € 
22.6 M Restricted 














All the people of this world 
leading their lives 
autonomously in dignity and 
justice - free from hunger and 
poverty 
46 countries € 147.4 M 
















World Vision is an 
international partnership of 
Christians whose mission is to 
follow our Lord and Savior 
Jesus Christ in working with 
the poor and oppressed to 
promote human 
transformation, seek justice, 
and bear witness to the good 
news of the Kingdom of God. 
Nearly' 100 
countries 
$ 1.109 M 
42% Private cash 
contributions; 33% 
gifts in-kind; 25% 
Gov grants 
? Yes 
Christianity / solidarity 













The International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) is an 
impartial, neutral and 
independent organization 
whose exclusively 
humanitarian mission is to 
protect the lives and dignity of 
victims of armed conflict and 
other situations of violence 
and to provide them with 
assistance. The ICRC also 
endeavours to prevent 
suffering by promoting and 
strengthening humanitarian 



























Our mission is to improve the 
lives of vulnerable people by 













Humanity / voluntary 















UNICEF is mandated by the 
United Nations General 
Assembly to advocate for the 
protection of children's rights, 
to help meet their basic needs 
and to expand their 




$ 3.3 BN 
60% Gov; 29% 







Core Commitments / 
Convention on the 













UNDP is the UN's global 
development network, an 
organization advocating for 
change and connecting 
countries to knowledge, 
experience and resources to 
help people build a better life. 
We are on the ground in 166 
countries, working with them 
on their own solutions to 




$ 5 BN 
(averages) $1.1 
BN Multilateral 
donors; $1.2 BN 
Bilateral; $0.9 BN 
Local resources; 
$0.3 BN Other; £1 
BN Core 
















UNHCR shall assume the 
function of providing 
international protection, under 
the auspices of the United 
Nations, to 
refugees who fall within the 
scope of the present Statute 
and of seeking permanent 
solutions for the problem of 
refugees by assisting 
Governments and, 
subject to the approval of the 
Governments concerned, 
private organizations 
to facilitate the voluntary 
repatriation of such refugees, 
or their assimilation 




$ 2 BN 
(2009) 
93% coming from 
Gov - 2009 
Budget: US$1.3 
billion: annual 










1951 UN Convention 
Status of Refugees 
and its 1967 Protocol. 
IntL refugee law 
provides framework 











WFP‘s key mission is to 
deliver food into the hands of 
the hungry poor. The agency 
steps in during emergencies 
and uses food to aid recovery 
after emergencies. Our longer 
term approaches to hunger 
help the transition from 
recovery to development. 
74 countries 
(2009) 
$ 5.115 BN 
The bulk of 
funding 
came from a 
limited number of 
donors.  
10 largest donors 
during the year 
accounted for 
82% of the 
resources 

















WHO is the directing 
and coordinating authority on 
international health 
within the United Nations‘ 
system. WHO experts 
produce health guidelines and 
standards, and help 
countries to address public 
health issues. WHO also 
supports and promotes health 
research. Through 
WHO, governments can jointly 
tackle global health 




$ 4.227 BN 
(2007: budget 3.3 
BN; 67% member 
states; 17% UN & 
IOG) 
















OCHA's mission is to mobilise 
and coordinate effective and 
principled humanitarian action 
in partnership with national 
and international actors in 
order to: • alleviate human 
suffering in disasters and 
emergencies •  advocate for 
the rights of people in need •  
promote preparedness and 









N/A Resolution 46/182 
Annual 
Report 
2008 / 
Website / 
What is 
OCHA 
Brochure 
 
